In‐hospital strokes account for a significant proportion of the almost 800,000 cerebrovascular accidents that occur each year in the United States.1 Although inpatient strokes are thought to be under‐recognized and under‐reported, between 4% and 17% of all stroke patients in the hospital experienced stroke onset during hospitalization.2, 3 Estimates place the number of in‐hospital strokes at 35,000‐75,000 each year in the United States.4

As a result of the exquisite sensitivity of brain tissue to ischemic events, stroke is a medical emergency and time‐to‐treatment is of the essence. With each minute of ischemia, 1.9 million neurons are destroyed.5 Evidence suggests benefit of treatment with intravenous thrombolysis up to 4.5 hours after symptom onset, with lower disability associated with more rapid initiation of therapy.6, 7 To facilitate timely thrombolytic therapy, the American Stroke Association (ASA) recommends that imaging of the brain be initiated within 25 minutes of presentation for patients with suspected stroke.8

Studies demonstrate greater delays in the evaluation of hospitalized patients suffering from stroke compared to stroke patients presenting to the Emergency Department (ED).9, 10 Performance of timely evaluation of in‐hospital stroke rarely meets ASA goals. Analysis of a Michigan stroke registry found that only 3.1% of patients with in‐hospital strokes received computed tomography (CT) scan within 25 minutes of symptom recognition, and a Colorado stroke registry found time‐to‐evaluation to be more than twice the recommended benchmark.11, 12 Data from a multicenter stroke registry in Spain showed that half of all thrombolysis‐eligible, in‐hospital stroke patients could not be treated due to delays in evaluation.13

Our prior work demonstrated that the use of an in‐hospital stroke response team significantly reduced time to evaluation for true ischemic strokes.10 Even with this rapid response mechanism, the evaluation time for in‐hospital stroke was still more than twice that observed in the ED despite using the same team to respond to both settings. Hospital rapid response systems, specifically for patients with suspected stroke, have been described in the literature and outline in‐hospital response systems capable of meeting evaluation time goals.1415 How to optimize a stroke response system has not been previously described. The aim of this quality improvement (QI) initiative was to reduce time‐to‐evaluation for strokes occurring in patients already hospitalized using systems analysis and modification. We describe key elements and tools for implementing institutional QI for in‐hospital stroke.

METHODS

The QI initiative was implemented at the University of Colorado Hospital (UCH), a tertiary care academic medical center. The Colorado Multiple Institutional Review Board determined this project to be in the exempt category. UCH uses a protocol in which all stroke alerts undergo non‐contrast CT of the brain. If no intracranial bleeding is found, and the patient is a thrombolytic candidate, advanced CT imaging including CT perfusion and CT angiogram will also be performed during the alert. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) with diffusion weighted imaging is done non‐emergently for subsequent stroke evaluation, but is not part of the stroke alert protocol. The primary endpoint of time from alert to initiation of CT was chosen because it represents an unambiguous interval which is present for all stroke alerts. Pre‐intervention data was gathered for 6 months, from September 2008 to February 2009. During this period, the process through which in‐hospital strokes were identified, referred for evaluation, and treated was mapped to identify inefficient or unreliable steps, and the process was redesigned to enhance efficiency. The intervention was rolled out over a 3‐month period from March 2009 to May 2009. During the intervention roll‐out period, the refined stroke alert process and a checklist containing the optimal in‐hospital stroke alert response system was implemented. An education campaign was initiated, for acute stroke team members and nursing staff, on signs of stroke and each individual's role in response to symptoms of in‐hospital stroke based on the new process. During the roll‐out period, each unit in the hospital was provided in‐hospital stroke alert posters and a packet containing specific stroke education on the in‐hospital stroke alert process. Unit educators were empowered to determine how to best deliver the education to their staff, and many chose to invite the stroke program coordinator to give an hour‐long presentation on stroke prior to shift or during lunch. Each unit educator kept record of the stroke instruction provided and submitted staff signatures to the stroke program. Nursing staff was also provided with in‐hospital stroke protocol badge cards that outlined optimal approach to stroke identification and treatment using the revised protocol. Interventions were being implemented in a progressive fashion throughout the roll‐out period. Starting during the roll‐out and continuing into the post‐intervention period, feedback on all in‐hospital stroke alerts was provided to the stroke team and front‐line providers. The impact of the intervention was followed for 6 months post‐intervention from June 2009 to November 2009. The QI tools used in this project are well described by the Institute of Healthcare Improvement, and each step in the QI process is outlined in detail below:16

RESULTS

During the study intervals, there were 82 inpatient stroke alerts. Of these alerts, 75 were included in the analysis. Seven were excluded for the following reasons: alert canceled by the stroke team (3), time of alert was not recorded (1), patient identifiers not recorded (1), or stroke alert was preceded by CT imaging (2).

During the 6 months prior to intervention, the median inpatient stroke alert‐to‐CT time (n = 31) was 69.0 minutes (Table 1). Nineteen percent of these alerts met the goal of 25 minutes from alert‐to‐CT time. During the 6‐month post‐intervention period, the median inpatient alert‐to‐CT time (n = 44) was 29.5 minutes. Thirty‐two percent of these alerts met the 25‐minute alert‐to‐CT time benchmark. In the unadjusted model, patients during the post‐intervention period were significantly more likely to have alert‐to‐CT scan time 25 minutes compared to patients prior to the intervention (post‐intervention compared to pre‐intervention, Relative Hazard (RH): 3.03; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.76‐5.20; log‐rank P < 0.0001). This remained significant after adjustment for hyperlipidemia, active cancer, final diagnosis of ischemic brain injury, and final diagnosis of stroke mimic (RH: 4.96; 95% CI: 2.65‐9.32; P < 0.0001); data not shown. Admit unit was not included in the adjusted model since there was no indication of differences in the 3‐level variable according to intervention group (P = 0.27). In addition to reduction in median response times, the variability of response times was markedly reduced, and no patient in the 6‐month post‐intervention period had delay to CT sufficient to preclude use of IV thrombolysis (Figure 1).

Figure 1

CONCLUSIONS

In‐hospital strokes represent an emergency for which response time is critical. Neurologic injury progresses with every minute of ischemia, and current recommendations offer a limited time window for intravenous thrombolysis. For stroke with symptom onset in the monitored setting of the hospital, there is a compelling imperative to reduce all delays from system inefficiencies. The findings of the current QI initiative suggest that dramatic improvements are possible through systematic evaluation and redesign of hospital response processes, a checklist for in‐hospital stroke carried by front‐line responders, and ongoing real‐time feedback.

Limitations of this study include a prepost design. The necessity of implementing system change hospital‐wide precluded use of a concurrent control group. The time goals for evaluation are derived from American Stroke Association targets for patients arriving in the Emergency Department. There are differences in process between the hospital ward and the Emergency Department, but the fundamental concept of minimizing time to evaluation once patient symptoms are recognized by hospital staff remains valid.

The possibility of system improvements not due to this QI initiative cannot be excluded. In 2006, this hospital expanded the responsibility of the stroke response team to include acute neurologic deficits outside of the ED without other changes to the in‐hospital stroke alert process. This reduced time to evaluation for in‐hospital ischemic strokes compared to usual care, but even with the same acute stroke response team responding to stroke alerts in both settings, in‐hospital stroke response times remained significantly longer than response times for stroke in the ED.10 The presence of an in‐hospital stroke alert response team alone was not capable of reducing evaluation times to goal. Minimal improvement in median in‐hospital stroke alert evaluation time was seen in the intervening year, following the completion of our previously published analysis, suggesting explicit system QI was necessary.

The Hawthorne effect, in which individuals who know they are being observed modify behavior while such monitoring is in effect, is a major limitation of interpreting QI initiatives. By committing to continuous and ongoing feedback to front‐line providers, this phenomenon can be harnessed to sustain improvement.17 In effect, the study of efficient response to the in‐hospital stroke never ceases. UCH has continued to employ the post‐intervention stroke alert protocol and engage in ongoing feedback after each stroke alert. In the 12 months following the conclusion of this study, the median response time to in‐hospital strokes continues to be 30 minutes, and 7 additional in‐hospital stroke patients have been treated with thrombolysis.

This inpatient stroke alert initiative decreased median inpatient alert‐to‐CT time by 57%, and demonstrates that quality of in‐hospital stroke care can be improved. Decrease in stroke alert‐to‐CT time facilitates earlier thrombolytic therapy. Analysis of treatment and patient outcomes was outside of the scope of the current study, but earlier treatment has potential to significantly improve clinical outcomes.

The Society of Hospital Medicine defines one of the goals of QI to be the change in processes with reduction in variation, thus improving the care for all patients rather than focusing exclusively on outlier events.18 This initiative markedly reduced evaluation variability, allowing a greater percentage of patients to be eligible for treatment within the critical time window. Prior to the intervention, almost a quarter of patients had delays in evaluation sufficient to preclude IV thrombolysis, whereas in the 6 months after the intervention was initiated, not a single patient had evaluation delayed to the point that IV thrombolysis would not have been an option (Figure 1). The goal of in‐hospital stroke QI must be to improve the speed of the process for all patients, and assure that no patient is denied the potential for therapy as a result of inefficiencies in hospital systems.

In‐hospital strokes account for a significant proportion of the almost 800,000 cerebrovascular accidents that occur each year in the United States.1 Although inpatient strokes are thought to be under‐recognized and under‐reported, between 4% and 17% of all stroke patients in the hospital experienced stroke onset during hospitalization.2, 3 Estimates place the number of in‐hospital strokes at 35,000‐75,000 each year in the United States.4

As a result of the exquisite sensitivity of brain tissue to ischemic events, stroke is a medical emergency and time‐to‐treatment is of the essence. With each minute of ischemia, 1.9 million neurons are destroyed.5 Evidence suggests benefit of treatment with intravenous thrombolysis up to 4.5 hours after symptom onset, with lower disability associated with more rapid initiation of therapy.6, 7 To facilitate timely thrombolytic therapy, the American Stroke Association (ASA) recommends that imaging of the brain be initiated within 25 minutes of presentation for patients with suspected stroke.8

Studies demonstrate greater delays in the evaluation of hospitalized patients suffering from stroke compared to stroke patients presenting to the Emergency Department (ED).9, 10 Performance of timely evaluation of in‐hospital stroke rarely meets ASA goals. Analysis of a Michigan stroke registry found that only 3.1% of patients with in‐hospital strokes received computed tomography (CT) scan within 25 minutes of symptom recognition, and a Colorado stroke registry found time‐to‐evaluation to be more than twice the recommended benchmark.11, 12 Data from a multicenter stroke registry in Spain showed that half of all thrombolysis‐eligible, in‐hospital stroke patients could not be treated due to delays in evaluation.13

Our prior work demonstrated that the use of an in‐hospital stroke response team significantly reduced time to evaluation for true ischemic strokes.10 Even with this rapid response mechanism, the evaluation time for in‐hospital stroke was still more than twice that observed in the ED despite using the same team to respond to both settings. Hospital rapid response systems, specifically for patients with suspected stroke, have been described in the literature and outline in‐hospital response systems capable of meeting evaluation time goals.1415 How to optimize a stroke response system has not been previously described. The aim of this quality improvement (QI) initiative was to reduce time‐to‐evaluation for strokes occurring in patients already hospitalized using systems analysis and modification. We describe key elements and tools for implementing institutional QI for in‐hospital stroke.

METHODS

The QI initiative was implemented at the University of Colorado Hospital (UCH), a tertiary care academic medical center. The Colorado Multiple Institutional Review Board determined this project to be in the exempt category. UCH uses a protocol in which all stroke alerts undergo non‐contrast CT of the brain. If no intracranial bleeding is found, and the patient is a thrombolytic candidate, advanced CT imaging including CT perfusion and CT angiogram will also be performed during the alert. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) with diffusion weighted imaging is done non‐emergently for subsequent stroke evaluation, but is not part of the stroke alert protocol. The primary endpoint of time from alert to initiation of CT was chosen because it represents an unambiguous interval which is present for all stroke alerts. Pre‐intervention data was gathered for 6 months, from September 2008 to February 2009. During this period, the process through which in‐hospital strokes were identified, referred for evaluation, and treated was mapped to identify inefficient or unreliable steps, and the process was redesigned to enhance efficiency. The intervention was rolled out over a 3‐month period from March 2009 to May 2009. During the intervention roll‐out period, the refined stroke alert process and a checklist containing the optimal in‐hospital stroke alert response system was implemented. An education campaign was initiated, for acute stroke team members and nursing staff, on signs of stroke and each individual's role in response to symptoms of in‐hospital stroke based on the new process. During the roll‐out period, each unit in the hospital was provided in‐hospital stroke alert posters and a packet containing specific stroke education on the in‐hospital stroke alert process. Unit educators were empowered to determine how to best deliver the education to their staff, and many chose to invite the stroke program coordinator to give an hour‐long presentation on stroke prior to shift or during lunch. Each unit educator kept record of the stroke instruction provided and submitted staff signatures to the stroke program. Nursing staff was also provided with in‐hospital stroke protocol badge cards that outlined optimal approach to stroke identification and treatment using the revised protocol. Interventions were being implemented in a progressive fashion throughout the roll‐out period. Starting during the roll‐out and continuing into the post‐intervention period, feedback on all in‐hospital stroke alerts was provided to the stroke team and front‐line providers. The impact of the intervention was followed for 6 months post‐intervention from June 2009 to November 2009. The QI tools used in this project are well described by the Institute of Healthcare Improvement, and each step in the QI process is outlined in detail below:16

RESULTS

During the study intervals, there were 82 inpatient stroke alerts. Of these alerts, 75 were included in the analysis. Seven were excluded for the following reasons: alert canceled by the stroke team (3), time of alert was not recorded (1), patient identifiers not recorded (1), or stroke alert was preceded by CT imaging (2).

During the 6 months prior to intervention, the median inpatient stroke alert‐to‐CT time (n = 31) was 69.0 minutes (Table 1). Nineteen percent of these alerts met the goal of 25 minutes from alert‐to‐CT time. During the 6‐month post‐intervention period, the median inpatient alert‐to‐CT time (n = 44) was 29.5 minutes. Thirty‐two percent of these alerts met the 25‐minute alert‐to‐CT time benchmark. In the unadjusted model, patients during the post‐intervention period were significantly more likely to have alert‐to‐CT scan time 25 minutes compared to patients prior to the intervention (post‐intervention compared to pre‐intervention, Relative Hazard (RH): 3.03; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.76‐5.20; log‐rank P < 0.0001). This remained significant after adjustment for hyperlipidemia, active cancer, final diagnosis of ischemic brain injury, and final diagnosis of stroke mimic (RH: 4.96; 95% CI: 2.65‐9.32; P < 0.0001); data not shown. Admit unit was not included in the adjusted model since there was no indication of differences in the 3‐level variable according to intervention group (P = 0.27). In addition to reduction in median response times, the variability of response times was markedly reduced, and no patient in the 6‐month post‐intervention period had delay to CT sufficient to preclude use of IV thrombolysis (Figure 1).

Figure 1

CONCLUSIONS

In‐hospital strokes represent an emergency for which response time is critical. Neurologic injury progresses with every minute of ischemia, and current recommendations offer a limited time window for intravenous thrombolysis. For stroke with symptom onset in the monitored setting of the hospital, there is a compelling imperative to reduce all delays from system inefficiencies. The findings of the current QI initiative suggest that dramatic improvements are possible through systematic evaluation and redesign of hospital response processes, a checklist for in‐hospital stroke carried by front‐line responders, and ongoing real‐time feedback.

Limitations of this study include a prepost design. The necessity of implementing system change hospital‐wide precluded use of a concurrent control group. The time goals for evaluation are derived from American Stroke Association targets for patients arriving in the Emergency Department. There are differences in process between the hospital ward and the Emergency Department, but the fundamental concept of minimizing time to evaluation once patient symptoms are recognized by hospital staff remains valid.

The possibility of system improvements not due to this QI initiative cannot be excluded. In 2006, this hospital expanded the responsibility of the stroke response team to include acute neurologic deficits outside of the ED without other changes to the in‐hospital stroke alert process. This reduced time to evaluation for in‐hospital ischemic strokes compared to usual care, but even with the same acute stroke response team responding to stroke alerts in both settings, in‐hospital stroke response times remained significantly longer than response times for stroke in the ED.10 The presence of an in‐hospital stroke alert response team alone was not capable of reducing evaluation times to goal. Minimal improvement in median in‐hospital stroke alert evaluation time was seen in the intervening year, following the completion of our previously published analysis, suggesting explicit system QI was necessary.

The Hawthorne effect, in which individuals who know they are being observed modify behavior while such monitoring is in effect, is a major limitation of interpreting QI initiatives. By committing to continuous and ongoing feedback to front‐line providers, this phenomenon can be harnessed to sustain improvement.17 In effect, the study of efficient response to the in‐hospital stroke never ceases. UCH has continued to employ the post‐intervention stroke alert protocol and engage in ongoing feedback after each stroke alert. In the 12 months following the conclusion of this study, the median response time to in‐hospital strokes continues to be 30 minutes, and 7 additional in‐hospital stroke patients have been treated with thrombolysis.

This inpatient stroke alert initiative decreased median inpatient alert‐to‐CT time by 57%, and demonstrates that quality of in‐hospital stroke care can be improved. Decrease in stroke alert‐to‐CT time facilitates earlier thrombolytic therapy. Analysis of treatment and patient outcomes was outside of the scope of the current study, but earlier treatment has potential to significantly improve clinical outcomes.

The Society of Hospital Medicine defines one of the goals of QI to be the change in processes with reduction in variation, thus improving the care for all patients rather than focusing exclusively on outlier events.18 This initiative markedly reduced evaluation variability, allowing a greater percentage of patients to be eligible for treatment within the critical time window. Prior to the intervention, almost a quarter of patients had delays in evaluation sufficient to preclude IV thrombolysis, whereas in the 6 months after the intervention was initiated, not a single patient had evaluation delayed to the point that IV thrombolysis would not have been an option (Figure 1). The goal of in‐hospital stroke QI must be to improve the speed of the process for all patients, and assure that no patient is denied the potential for therapy as a result of inefficiencies in hospital systems.

In‐hospital strokes account for a significant proportion of the almost 800,000 cerebrovascular accidents that occur each year in the United States.1 Although inpatient strokes are thought to be under‐recognized and under‐reported, between 4% and 17% of all stroke patients in the hospital experienced stroke onset during hospitalization.2, 3 Estimates place the number of in‐hospital strokes at 35,000‐75,000 each year in the United States.4

As a result of the exquisite sensitivity of brain tissue to ischemic events, stroke is a medical emergency and time‐to‐treatment is of the essence. With each minute of ischemia, 1.9 million neurons are destroyed.5 Evidence suggests benefit of treatment with intravenous thrombolysis up to 4.5 hours after symptom onset, with lower disability associated with more rapid initiation of therapy.6, 7 To facilitate timely thrombolytic therapy, the American Stroke Association (ASA) recommends that imaging of the brain be initiated within 25 minutes of presentation for patients with suspected stroke.8

Studies demonstrate greater delays in the evaluation of hospitalized patients suffering from stroke compared to stroke patients presenting to the Emergency Department (ED).9, 10 Performance of timely evaluation of in‐hospital stroke rarely meets ASA goals. Analysis of a Michigan stroke registry found that only 3.1% of patients with in‐hospital strokes received computed tomography (CT) scan within 25 minutes of symptom recognition, and a Colorado stroke registry found time‐to‐evaluation to be more than twice the recommended benchmark.11, 12 Data from a multicenter stroke registry in Spain showed that half of all thrombolysis‐eligible, in‐hospital stroke patients could not be treated due to delays in evaluation.13

Our prior work demonstrated that the use of an in‐hospital stroke response team significantly reduced time to evaluation for true ischemic strokes.10 Even with this rapid response mechanism, the evaluation time for in‐hospital stroke was still more than twice that observed in the ED despite using the same team to respond to both settings. Hospital rapid response systems, specifically for patients with suspected stroke, have been described in the literature and outline in‐hospital response systems capable of meeting evaluation time goals.1415 How to optimize a stroke response system has not been previously described. The aim of this quality improvement (QI) initiative was to reduce time‐to‐evaluation for strokes occurring in patients already hospitalized using systems analysis and modification. We describe key elements and tools for implementing institutional QI for in‐hospital stroke.

METHODS

The QI initiative was implemented at the University of Colorado Hospital (UCH), a tertiary care academic medical center. The Colorado Multiple Institutional Review Board determined this project to be in the exempt category. UCH uses a protocol in which all stroke alerts undergo non‐contrast CT of the brain. If no intracranial bleeding is found, and the patient is a thrombolytic candidate, advanced CT imaging including CT perfusion and CT angiogram will also be performed during the alert. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) with diffusion weighted imaging is done non‐emergently for subsequent stroke evaluation, but is not part of the stroke alert protocol. The primary endpoint of time from alert to initiation of CT was chosen because it represents an unambiguous interval which is present for all stroke alerts. Pre‐intervention data was gathered for 6 months, from September 2008 to February 2009. During this period, the process through which in‐hospital strokes were identified, referred for evaluation, and treated was mapped to identify inefficient or unreliable steps, and the process was redesigned to enhance efficiency. The intervention was rolled out over a 3‐month period from March 2009 to May 2009. During the intervention roll‐out period, the refined stroke alert process and a checklist containing the optimal in‐hospital stroke alert response system was implemented. An education campaign was initiated, for acute stroke team members and nursing staff, on signs of stroke and each individual's role in response to symptoms of in‐hospital stroke based on the new process. During the roll‐out period, each unit in the hospital was provided in‐hospital stroke alert posters and a packet containing specific stroke education on the in‐hospital stroke alert process. Unit educators were empowered to determine how to best deliver the education to their staff, and many chose to invite the stroke program coordinator to give an hour‐long presentation on stroke prior to shift or during lunch. Each unit educator kept record of the stroke instruction provided and submitted staff signatures to the stroke program. Nursing staff was also provided with in‐hospital stroke protocol badge cards that outlined optimal approach to stroke identification and treatment using the revised protocol. Interventions were being implemented in a progressive fashion throughout the roll‐out period. Starting during the roll‐out and continuing into the post‐intervention period, feedback on all in‐hospital stroke alerts was provided to the stroke team and front‐line providers. The impact of the intervention was followed for 6 months post‐intervention from June 2009 to November 2009. The QI tools used in this project are well described by the Institute of Healthcare Improvement, and each step in the QI process is outlined in detail below:16

RESULTS

During the study intervals, there were 82 inpatient stroke alerts. Of these alerts, 75 were included in the analysis. Seven were excluded for the following reasons: alert canceled by the stroke team (3), time of alert was not recorded (1), patient identifiers not recorded (1), or stroke alert was preceded by CT imaging (2).

During the 6 months prior to intervention, the median inpatient stroke alert‐to‐CT time (n = 31) was 69.0 minutes (Table 1). Nineteen percent of these alerts met the goal of 25 minutes from alert‐to‐CT time. During the 6‐month post‐intervention period, the median inpatient alert‐to‐CT time (n = 44) was 29.5 minutes. Thirty‐two percent of these alerts met the 25‐minute alert‐to‐CT time benchmark. In the unadjusted model, patients during the post‐intervention period were significantly more likely to have alert‐to‐CT scan time 25 minutes compared to patients prior to the intervention (post‐intervention compared to pre‐intervention, Relative Hazard (RH): 3.03; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.76‐5.20; log‐rank P < 0.0001). This remained significant after adjustment for hyperlipidemia, active cancer, final diagnosis of ischemic brain injury, and final diagnosis of stroke mimic (RH: 4.96; 95% CI: 2.65‐9.32; P < 0.0001); data not shown. Admit unit was not included in the adjusted model since there was no indication of differences in the 3‐level variable according to intervention group (P = 0.27). In addition to reduction in median response times, the variability of response times was markedly reduced, and no patient in the 6‐month post‐intervention period had delay to CT sufficient to preclude use of IV thrombolysis (Figure 1).

Figure 1

CONCLUSIONS

In‐hospital strokes represent an emergency for which response time is critical. Neurologic injury progresses with every minute of ischemia, and current recommendations offer a limited time window for intravenous thrombolysis. For stroke with symptom onset in the monitored setting of the hospital, there is a compelling imperative to reduce all delays from system inefficiencies. The findings of the current QI initiative suggest that dramatic improvements are possible through systematic evaluation and redesign of hospital response processes, a checklist for in‐hospital stroke carried by front‐line responders, and ongoing real‐time feedback.

Limitations of this study include a prepost design. The necessity of implementing system change hospital‐wide precluded use of a concurrent control group. The time goals for evaluation are derived from American Stroke Association targets for patients arriving in the Emergency Department. There are differences in process between the hospital ward and the Emergency Department, but the fundamental concept of minimizing time to evaluation once patient symptoms are recognized by hospital staff remains valid.

The possibility of system improvements not due to this QI initiative cannot be excluded. In 2006, this hospital expanded the responsibility of the stroke response team to include acute neurologic deficits outside of the ED without other changes to the in‐hospital stroke alert process. This reduced time to evaluation for in‐hospital ischemic strokes compared to usual care, but even with the same acute stroke response team responding to stroke alerts in both settings, in‐hospital stroke response times remained significantly longer than response times for stroke in the ED.10 The presence of an in‐hospital stroke alert response team alone was not capable of reducing evaluation times to goal. Minimal improvement in median in‐hospital stroke alert evaluation time was seen in the intervening year, following the completion of our previously published analysis, suggesting explicit system QI was necessary.

The Hawthorne effect, in which individuals who know they are being observed modify behavior while such monitoring is in effect, is a major limitation of interpreting QI initiatives. By committing to continuous and ongoing feedback to front‐line providers, this phenomenon can be harnessed to sustain improvement.17 In effect, the study of efficient response to the in‐hospital stroke never ceases. UCH has continued to employ the post‐intervention stroke alert protocol and engage in ongoing feedback after each stroke alert. In the 12 months following the conclusion of this study, the median response time to in‐hospital strokes continues to be 30 minutes, and 7 additional in‐hospital stroke patients have been treated with thrombolysis.

This inpatient stroke alert initiative decreased median inpatient alert‐to‐CT time by 57%, and demonstrates that quality of in‐hospital stroke care can be improved. Decrease in stroke alert‐to‐CT time facilitates earlier thrombolytic therapy. Analysis of treatment and patient outcomes was outside of the scope of the current study, but earlier treatment has potential to significantly improve clinical outcomes.

The Society of Hospital Medicine defines one of the goals of QI to be the change in processes with reduction in variation, thus improving the care for all patients rather than focusing exclusively on outlier events.18 This initiative markedly reduced evaluation variability, allowing a greater percentage of patients to be eligible for treatment within the critical time window. Prior to the intervention, almost a quarter of patients had delays in evaluation sufficient to preclude IV thrombolysis, whereas in the 6 months after the intervention was initiated, not a single patient had evaluation delayed to the point that IV thrombolysis would not have been an option (Figure 1). The goal of in‐hospital stroke QI must be to improve the speed of the process for all patients, and assure that no patient is denied the potential for therapy as a result of inefficiencies in hospital systems.

With an increased incidence of 13.1 per 1000 inpatients1, 2 and an attributable mortality of 6.1%,3 in 2006 the Canadian government added Clostridium difficileassociated disease (CDAD) to its list of reportable diseases.4 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Infectious Disease Society of America subsequently created definitions of the disease and recommended surveillance of rates of health care facilityassociated CDAD, which has been found to double a patient's length of stay and cost of hospitalization.57 While not included in the current list of hospital‐acquired conditions for which payment is declined,8 the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has noted CDAD as under consideration for addition to the list,9 which would require hospital reporting of CDAD rates. This reporting is typically a labor‐intensive, medical record review process that increases the cost of delivering health care. Health care institutions have reported spending as much as $21 million per year or $400 per discharged patient on quality improvement.10 These costs are passed on to payers such as those governed by the CMS that are projected to pay for more than half of all national health spending in 2018.11 Therefore, it is prudent to examine alternatives for determining rates of disease for public reporting and quality improvement initiatives such as infection control and antibiotic stewardship programs.

There are 3 methods that can be used for this reporting. First, medical record review has been used for determining the case rate of CDAD by published reports.1, 2 This procedure allows the CMS to define the desired data to be collected, but it is labor‐intensive. Second, the use of International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 9th Edition (ICD‐9) codes from hospital databases offers the speed of database query. However, due to diagnostic and coding errors, it may report inaccurate rates of disease. Previous reports include a university‐based hospital that found a sensitivity of 78% and specificity of 99.7%,12 whereas a Veterans Administration medical center found nearly two‐thirds of patients with CDAD did not have the ICD‐9 code for C. difficile infection noted in their database.13 Therefore, the accuracy of ICD‐9 code at a community hospital that better represents the majority of United States hospitals is needed. The third method of identifying CDAD is the presence of toxin identified in the microbiology laboratory. Although this method offers ease of obtainment, it suffers from potential inaccuracy arising from duplicate patient samples, positive samples in patients who are symptom‐free carriers, and patients with CDAD despite having a negative toxin.

The same organizations that recommend surveillance for CDAD have identified that there are inadequate data on which to base a decision regarding how to proceed with routine community and hospital surveillance.6 In the setting of public reporting and nonpayment, the method of identifying CDAD cases must be accurate to ensure fairness, while being inexpensive. To identify the potential value of these less labor‐intensive methods of reporting the incidence of CDAD, we evaluated the use of ICD‐9 codes and C. difficile toxin to accurately report the incidence of CDAD at a community hospital, as well as the labor hours required for each reporting method.

METHODS

Patients >18 years of age and potentially having CDAD were identified via database queries for ICD‐9 codes and positive C. difficile toxin assays at our institution from November 1, 2006, through August 31, 2007. Our institution is a 379‐bed university‐affiliated community teaching hospital in a socio‐economically diverse area of Baltimorewith approximately 110,000 emergency department visits, 30,000 discharges, and 110,000 inpatient days each yearthat uses a handwritten paper chart for all provider orders and patient documentation. The C. difficile toxin assay method used during the study period was an enzyme immunoassay that detects both toxins A and B (Meridan Bioscience, Cincinnati, OH). ICD‐9 codes were queried in the CareScience database(Premier, Inc; Charlotte, NC), while C. difficile toxin was queried via the hospital laboratory database. All identified patients underwent a medical record review to confirm the diagnosis of CDAD and the patient's location at the time of disease acquisition. To eliminate duplicate reporting of a single episode of disease, all duplicate patient visits with a diagnosis of CDAD within 30 days were removed.

Our diagnostic criteria (Table 1) used the recommended criteria of a combination of symptoms and positive toxin assay, visualization of pseudomembranes on colonoscopy or pathology‐proven CDAD.6 Based on the presence of CDAD in 25% of patients with a white blood cell count >30,000 and the recommendation that CDAD be considered in all patients with a white blood cell count >15,000, we included the criterion of clinical findings with severe leukocytosis to identify patients with toxin‐negative CDAD.14

Patients were identified by querying the CareScience database for patients having an ICD‐9 code of 008.45. Duplicate cases for the same patient within 30 days were removed. These cases were compared with the cases of CDAD determined by the medical record review for analysis. Patients were identified via positive C. difficile toxin by querying the microbiology laboratory database. A query of all patients with a positive C. difficile toxin was performed. Duplicate samples for the same patient within 30 days were removed. Patients are considered to be outside the hospital when CDAD was acquired if their toxin was positive within the first 3 days of arrival to the hospital, and they were not hospitalized at our institution within 1 week before arrival. All other cases were considered to be acquired while in our hospital. The number of patients with a toxin‐positive stool sample was compared with the medical record review.

Recognizing that it is unrealistic to review the medical records of the 23,495 discharges during the 10‐month study period, a random sample review of 500 charts not included in our CDAD‐identified patient list was performed to identify the rate at which CDAD patients failed to be identified by our methods. From a list of discharges during the study period, as long as they were not in our study population, every thirtieth patient was selected for review up to a total of 500 patient charts. Then, the identified case rate was used to predict the prevalence of disease at our institution during the study period.

Sample selection was based on the absence of previous studies evaluating the performance of C. difficile toxin assay, and the desire to have the same assay used during the entire study. The lack of data from which to perform sample size determination would result in an inaccurate estimate. Therefore, we chose a period that offered the maximum sample size, during which a single assay was used at our institution. Compared with medical record review, the accuracy and positive predictive values of the ICD‐9 code and positive stool toxin methods to identify the cases of CDAD were compared. A true positive was when the ICD‐9 or laboratory query method identified a patient who had CDAD based on chart review; a false positive was when the ICD‐9 or laboratory query method identified a patient who did not have CDAD based on chart review. Rates of over‐ or underdiagnosis, case rates, and acquisition location were determined. Statistical analysis of the case rates and acquisition location were performed via chi‐square test. The time to perform these queries was collected with accuracy to the minute.

RESULTS

Of the 23,495 discharges during the study period, the combination of ICD‐9 and C. difficile toxin assay identified a total cohort of 496 patients, 319 of whom were identified by both the ICD‐9 method and the toxin assay, 50 of whom were identified only by the toxin assay, and 127 of whom were identified only by the ICD‐9 method. Chart review confirmed the presence of CDAD in 384 of these 496 cases, for a case rate of 16.3 per 1000 discharged patients (Table 2). The diagnostic criteria for each of these confirmed cases are listed in Table 3. Of the 384 confirmed CDAD cases, 319 were identified by both the ICD‐9 and toxin assay, 50 were identified only by the toxin assay, and 15 were identified only by the ICD‐9 query. Of the 50 cases identified by the toxin assay that were not identified via the ICD‐9 method, all 50 (100%) were confirmed to have CDAD by chart review. In contrast, of the 127 cases identified via the ICD‐9 method that were not found via the toxin assay, only 15 (11.8%) were confirmed to have CDAD by chart review (Figure 1).

Figure 1

Of these 384 cases, 369 were identified via the toxin assay for a case rate of 15.7 per 1000 patient discharges, which was not found to be different from the rate of 16.3 determined by chart review (P = 0.440; 95% confidence interval [CI], 14.117.4). Compared with chart review, the toxin assay reported 96.1% (369/384) of cases. Chart review demonstrated that every patient who had a positive toxin assay met the diagnostic criteria for CDAD for a positive predictive value (PPV) of 100%.

The ICD‐9 method identified 446 patients thought to have CDAD, 334 of whom were confirmed by chart review for a PPV of 74.9% (334/446). Compared with chart review, the ICD‐9 method reported 116.1% (446/384) of cases for a case rate of 19.0 per 1000 discharges and was significantly different than the rate of 16.3 reported by chart review (P = 0.001; 95% CI, 17.320.8).

Chart review identified 156 of 384 (40.6%) patients who acquired CDAD while at our hospital and 228 of 384 (59.4%) who acquired it elsewhere. In comparison, the toxin assay criteria identified 369 cases of CDAD, of which 48.2% (178/369) were acquired while at our hospital and 51.8% (191/369) were acquired elsewhere (P = 0.003).

The time for data extraction via these 3 methods differed greatly. The ICD‐9 method only consumed 312 minutes and the toxin assay method 842 minutes, whereas the chart review method consumed 21,899 minutes. These times reported include the database query and data analysis for the ICD‐9 and toxin assay methods, while it includes the database query and list generation along with the manual chart review and data analysis for the chart review method. The review of the random sample of patients believed not to have CDAD was not included in any of the reported times. Chart review on a random sample of 500 patients not previously identified for review found no additional cases of CDAD.

DISCUSSION

Our study demonstrates that use of positive C. difficile toxin assay data from the microbiology laboratory alone is an efficient method of identifying patients with CDAD. This method only consumed 842 minutes versus 21,899 minutes consumed by the chart review method. The C. difficile toxin method reduces the workforce required to collect and analyze this data, but more importantly, it was found to be reliable by reporting an institutional case rate that is similar to that of chart review.

In contrast, the ICD‐9 method was efficient but less reliable. It only consumed 312 minutes, but it overreported the institutional rate of CDAD by 16.1%, had a PPV of only 74.9%, and of those patients who were identified by ICD‐9 but not toxin assay, only 11.8% actually had CDAD. This finding is in conflict with the previously noted underreporting of this method.13, 15 We believe this difference to be associated with institutional differences, because previous reports originated from a veterans hospital and an academic medical center, and previous authors have failed to use predefined diagnostic criteria and a complete chart review to confirm cases of CDAD. Similar to our study, an academic medical center identified that listing of CDAD in a patient's medical history in their chart was associated with a false‐positive ICD‐9 code for CDAD.15 This observation appears to bring clarity to one of the causes of the variance of ICD‐9 code accuracy between institutions. Institutions seem to vary on the method of attaching diagnoses to the patient's final hospital record. Some institutions include only what is listed as an active problem, whereas others list diagnoses listed in the chart as previous problems and those listed as a potential diagnosis without confirmation. Another potential cause of the ICD‐9 inaccuracy is the potential of clinicians to diagnose and treat a patient for CDAD in the absence of the diagnostic criteria used for chart review. Physician practices such as these are known to vary between institutions leading to a variance in the ICD‐9 code accuracy.

In total, 15 cases of CDAD were identified in the absence of a positive toxin assay, and of these, 12 cases were identified using leukocytosis‐based criteria (Table 4). This resulted in 3.1% of our cases being toxin‐negative, based on leukocytosis criteria, and is lower than the previously identified 35% of cases.14 Because it was the only assay available at the time, this previous research used a toxin Aonly assay, which is more likely to have false‐negative results than the toxin A/B assay used at our institution during the study period. The investigators also required all toxin‐negative patients to have been recently treated with antibiotics. Based on the increasing rates of community‐acquired CDAD, including those that are antibiotic‐nave patients, we felt a history of antibiotic exposure was no longer a prerequisite for CDAD and thus excluded it from our diagnostic criteria.16, 17 Based on these differences, we feel our results are likely an accurate reflection of the number of cases identified by ICD‐9 query in the absence of toxin positivity. However, concerns should be further alleviated through the realization that nonuse of this strategy improves the accuracy of the toxin assay method, while reducing the accuracy of the ICD‐9 method and thereby strengthening the validity of our conclusions. Mathematically, this would result in 369 of 369 patients identified by toxin assay and 369 patients identified by the ICD‐9 method. This would reduce the case rate of the chart review method to the same 15.7 of the toxin assay, while the ICD‐9 method would remain at 19.0.

We considered whether the toxin assay method may overestimate the number of cases due to a C. difficileasymptomatic carrier rate as high as 50% of hospitalized patients.6 However, we found no difference in the case rate when compared with that of chart review, and there were no false‐positive cases. We believe this is attributable to the 30‐day window that was used to identify a single episode of CDAD and the absence of toxin assays being performed on asymptomatic individuals. To avoid overrepresentation of the actual number of CDAD cases, we chose to label all repeat positive toxins and repeat hospitalizations within 30 days as a single episode of CDAD. This was based on the identification that 56% of patients remained toxin‐positive 26 weeks after adequate treatment for CDAD.18 The enzyme‐linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) method used by our laboratory is the method used to report 94% of CDAD cases in a national point prevalence study that collected data from United States acute care hospitals with representation from 47 states1, 6, 19 (Table 5). This use of ELISA in the majority of United States hospitals suggests that our data can be extrapolated for use throughout the United States. While laboratories are increasing their use of 2‐step algorithms involving glutamate dehydrogenase antigen assay followed by cytotoxin neutralization, and more recently beginning the use of polymerase chain reaction assays, both of these methods have been found to increase the accuracy of detecting C. difficile compared with ELISA.20 Therefore, as laboratories evolve to use more accurate assays to detect CDAD, the methods described herein will be expected to increase in reliability.

The toxin assay methodology used to determine the rate of CDAD cases acquired while the patient was at our hospital overreported these cases. Based on this result, identification of individual cases of CDAD that are obtained at a specific hospital would continue to require manual chart review. This expensive method may be avoided by instead choosing to use institutional case rates for reporting, monitoring, and incentivizing hospitals. However, a discussion of the methods of this approach and its confluence with our societal goal to move toward Accountable Care Organizations is beyond the scope of this discussion section.

Although it appears that we identified all cases of CDAD occurring at our institution, a limitation of this study is its inability to review all charts during the 10‐month study period. We used a combination of ICD‐9 and positive C. difficile toxin assay data to identify all possible cases of C. difficile. The current approach to case identification for reported hospital conditions is limited to an ICD‐9 database query. This query is followed by chart review to collect data for hospital performance that is published in locations such as www. hospitalcompare.hhs.gov. Although our approach expands upon this current method of patient identification, it may still fail to identify some cases. To investigate the reliability of our strategy, we performed a chart review on a random sample of patients not previously identified for review. In this portion of the study, 500 charts were reviewed, and no cases of CDAD were found. Considering the identified case rates of 16 to 19 per 1000 discharges, one would expect as many as 10 cases of CDAD to be identified if our methods were unreliable. The identification of zero cases supports our methods as identifying all cases of CDAD during this period. Considering the hurdle of 23,495 charts for a complete review and the inability to identify an adequate number of CDAD cases if 100% chart review over a shorter period was the selected strategy, our study design is the only realistic method of studying this subject.

Increased automation is expected in the future of reporting. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found increased rates of disease reporting and increased accuracy when reporting is electronically automated via their software system, Electronic Support for Public Health, which is designed to communicate with and perform automated data queries on providers' electronic medical records.21 While use of this model is creeping into the health system for reporting to public health authorities,22 universal hospital electronic medical record implementation and full connectivity with such reporting systems is many years from fruition. In addition to its practical use for reporting CDAD in our current health system, our work easily transitions into automated reporting within an electronically integrated health system once achieved.

In conclusion, ICD‐9 data were found to be unreliable, and consideration must be given to cessation of their use for CDAD case rate research and reporting. Use of a positive C. difficile toxin assay accurately reports the institutional incidence of disease, can be used by individual institutions to self‐monitor case rates or by the government to determine regionally acceptable intuitional rates of CDAD on which incentives and penalties can be based, and will increase in efficiency as reporting continues to be automated. This process can be instituted at a fraction of the cost of the standard chart review that is currently used for most reporting.

With an increased incidence of 13.1 per 1000 inpatients1, 2 and an attributable mortality of 6.1%,3 in 2006 the Canadian government added Clostridium difficileassociated disease (CDAD) to its list of reportable diseases.4 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Infectious Disease Society of America subsequently created definitions of the disease and recommended surveillance of rates of health care facilityassociated CDAD, which has been found to double a patient's length of stay and cost of hospitalization.57 While not included in the current list of hospital‐acquired conditions for which payment is declined,8 the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has noted CDAD as under consideration for addition to the list,9 which would require hospital reporting of CDAD rates. This reporting is typically a labor‐intensive, medical record review process that increases the cost of delivering health care. Health care institutions have reported spending as much as $21 million per year or $400 per discharged patient on quality improvement.10 These costs are passed on to payers such as those governed by the CMS that are projected to pay for more than half of all national health spending in 2018.11 Therefore, it is prudent to examine alternatives for determining rates of disease for public reporting and quality improvement initiatives such as infection control and antibiotic stewardship programs.

There are 3 methods that can be used for this reporting. First, medical record review has been used for determining the case rate of CDAD by published reports.1, 2 This procedure allows the CMS to define the desired data to be collected, but it is labor‐intensive. Second, the use of International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 9th Edition (ICD‐9) codes from hospital databases offers the speed of database query. However, due to diagnostic and coding errors, it may report inaccurate rates of disease. Previous reports include a university‐based hospital that found a sensitivity of 78% and specificity of 99.7%,12 whereas a Veterans Administration medical center found nearly two‐thirds of patients with CDAD did not have the ICD‐9 code for C. difficile infection noted in their database.13 Therefore, the accuracy of ICD‐9 code at a community hospital that better represents the majority of United States hospitals is needed. The third method of identifying CDAD is the presence of toxin identified in the microbiology laboratory. Although this method offers ease of obtainment, it suffers from potential inaccuracy arising from duplicate patient samples, positive samples in patients who are symptom‐free carriers, and patients with CDAD despite having a negative toxin.

The same organizations that recommend surveillance for CDAD have identified that there are inadequate data on which to base a decision regarding how to proceed with routine community and hospital surveillance.6 In the setting of public reporting and nonpayment, the method of identifying CDAD cases must be accurate to ensure fairness, while being inexpensive. To identify the potential value of these less labor‐intensive methods of reporting the incidence of CDAD, we evaluated the use of ICD‐9 codes and C. difficile toxin to accurately report the incidence of CDAD at a community hospital, as well as the labor hours required for each reporting method.

METHODS

Patients >18 years of age and potentially having CDAD were identified via database queries for ICD‐9 codes and positive C. difficile toxin assays at our institution from November 1, 2006, through August 31, 2007. Our institution is a 379‐bed university‐affiliated community teaching hospital in a socio‐economically diverse area of Baltimorewith approximately 110,000 emergency department visits, 30,000 discharges, and 110,000 inpatient days each yearthat uses a handwritten paper chart for all provider orders and patient documentation. The C. difficile toxin assay method used during the study period was an enzyme immunoassay that detects both toxins A and B (Meridan Bioscience, Cincinnati, OH). ICD‐9 codes were queried in the CareScience database(Premier, Inc; Charlotte, NC), while C. difficile toxin was queried via the hospital laboratory database. All identified patients underwent a medical record review to confirm the diagnosis of CDAD and the patient's location at the time of disease acquisition. To eliminate duplicate reporting of a single episode of disease, all duplicate patient visits with a diagnosis of CDAD within 30 days were removed.

Our diagnostic criteria (Table 1) used the recommended criteria of a combination of symptoms and positive toxin assay, visualization of pseudomembranes on colonoscopy or pathology‐proven CDAD.6 Based on the presence of CDAD in 25% of patients with a white blood cell count >30,000 and the recommendation that CDAD be considered in all patients with a white blood cell count >15,000, we included the criterion of clinical findings with severe leukocytosis to identify patients with toxin‐negative CDAD.14

Patients were identified by querying the CareScience database for patients having an ICD‐9 code of 008.45. Duplicate cases for the same patient within 30 days were removed. These cases were compared with the cases of CDAD determined by the medical record review for analysis. Patients were identified via positive C. difficile toxin by querying the microbiology laboratory database. A query of all patients with a positive C. difficile toxin was performed. Duplicate samples for the same patient within 30 days were removed. Patients are considered to be outside the hospital when CDAD was acquired if their toxin was positive within the first 3 days of arrival to the hospital, and they were not hospitalized at our institution within 1 week before arrival. All other cases were considered to be acquired while in our hospital. The number of patients with a toxin‐positive stool sample was compared with the medical record review.

Recognizing that it is unrealistic to review the medical records of the 23,495 discharges during the 10‐month study period, a random sample review of 500 charts not included in our CDAD‐identified patient list was performed to identify the rate at which CDAD patients failed to be identified by our methods. From a list of discharges during the study period, as long as they were not in our study population, every thirtieth patient was selected for review up to a total of 500 patient charts. Then, the identified case rate was used to predict the prevalence of disease at our institution during the study period.

Sample selection was based on the absence of previous studies evaluating the performance of C. difficile toxin assay, and the desire to have the same assay used during the entire study. The lack of data from which to perform sample size determination would result in an inaccurate estimate. Therefore, we chose a period that offered the maximum sample size, during which a single assay was used at our institution. Compared with medical record review, the accuracy and positive predictive values of the ICD‐9 code and positive stool toxin methods to identify the cases of CDAD were compared. A true positive was when the ICD‐9 or laboratory query method identified a patient who had CDAD based on chart review; a false positive was when the ICD‐9 or laboratory query method identified a patient who did not have CDAD based on chart review. Rates of over‐ or underdiagnosis, case rates, and acquisition location were determined. Statistical analysis of the case rates and acquisition location were performed via chi‐square test. The time to perform these queries was collected with accuracy to the minute.

RESULTS

Of the 23,495 discharges during the study period, the combination of ICD‐9 and C. difficile toxin assay identified a total cohort of 496 patients, 319 of whom were identified by both the ICD‐9 method and the toxin assay, 50 of whom were identified only by the toxin assay, and 127 of whom were identified only by the ICD‐9 method. Chart review confirmed the presence of CDAD in 384 of these 496 cases, for a case rate of 16.3 per 1000 discharged patients (Table 2). The diagnostic criteria for each of these confirmed cases are listed in Table 3. Of the 384 confirmed CDAD cases, 319 were identified by both the ICD‐9 and toxin assay, 50 were identified only by the toxin assay, and 15 were identified only by the ICD‐9 query. Of the 50 cases identified by the toxin assay that were not identified via the ICD‐9 method, all 50 (100%) were confirmed to have CDAD by chart review. In contrast, of the 127 cases identified via the ICD‐9 method that were not found via the toxin assay, only 15 (11.8%) were confirmed to have CDAD by chart review (Figure 1).

Figure 1

Of these 384 cases, 369 were identified via the toxin assay for a case rate of 15.7 per 1000 patient discharges, which was not found to be different from the rate of 16.3 determined by chart review (P = 0.440; 95% confidence interval [CI], 14.117.4). Compared with chart review, the toxin assay reported 96.1% (369/384) of cases. Chart review demonstrated that every patient who had a positive toxin assay met the diagnostic criteria for CDAD for a positive predictive value (PPV) of 100%.

The ICD‐9 method identified 446 patients thought to have CDAD, 334 of whom were confirmed by chart review for a PPV of 74.9% (334/446). Compared with chart review, the ICD‐9 method reported 116.1% (446/384) of cases for a case rate of 19.0 per 1000 discharges and was significantly different than the rate of 16.3 reported by chart review (P = 0.001; 95% CI, 17.320.8).

Chart review identified 156 of 384 (40.6%) patients who acquired CDAD while at our hospital and 228 of 384 (59.4%) who acquired it elsewhere. In comparison, the toxin assay criteria identified 369 cases of CDAD, of which 48.2% (178/369) were acquired while at our hospital and 51.8% (191/369) were acquired elsewhere (P = 0.003).

The time for data extraction via these 3 methods differed greatly. The ICD‐9 method only consumed 312 minutes and the toxin assay method 842 minutes, whereas the chart review method consumed 21,899 minutes. These times reported include the database query and data analysis for the ICD‐9 and toxin assay methods, while it includes the database query and list generation along with the manual chart review and data analysis for the chart review method. The review of the random sample of patients believed not to have CDAD was not included in any of the reported times. Chart review on a random sample of 500 patients not previously identified for review found no additional cases of CDAD.

DISCUSSION

Our study demonstrates that use of positive C. difficile toxin assay data from the microbiology laboratory alone is an efficient method of identifying patients with CDAD. This method only consumed 842 minutes versus 21,899 minutes consumed by the chart review method. The C. difficile toxin method reduces the workforce required to collect and analyze this data, but more importantly, it was found to be reliable by reporting an institutional case rate that is similar to that of chart review.

In contrast, the ICD‐9 method was efficient but less reliable. It only consumed 312 minutes, but it overreported the institutional rate of CDAD by 16.1%, had a PPV of only 74.9%, and of those patients who were identified by ICD‐9 but not toxin assay, only 11.8% actually had CDAD. This finding is in conflict with the previously noted underreporting of this method.13, 15 We believe this difference to be associated with institutional differences, because previous reports originated from a veterans hospital and an academic medical center, and previous authors have failed to use predefined diagnostic criteria and a complete chart review to confirm cases of CDAD. Similar to our study, an academic medical center identified that listing of CDAD in a patient's medical history in their chart was associated with a false‐positive ICD‐9 code for CDAD.15 This observation appears to bring clarity to one of the causes of the variance of ICD‐9 code accuracy between institutions. Institutions seem to vary on the method of attaching diagnoses to the patient's final hospital record. Some institutions include only what is listed as an active problem, whereas others list diagnoses listed in the chart as previous problems and those listed as a potential diagnosis without confirmation. Another potential cause of the ICD‐9 inaccuracy is the potential of clinicians to diagnose and treat a patient for CDAD in the absence of the diagnostic criteria used for chart review. Physician practices such as these are known to vary between institutions leading to a variance in the ICD‐9 code accuracy.

In total, 15 cases of CDAD were identified in the absence of a positive toxin assay, and of these, 12 cases were identified using leukocytosis‐based criteria (Table 4). This resulted in 3.1% of our cases being toxin‐negative, based on leukocytosis criteria, and is lower than the previously identified 35% of cases.14 Because it was the only assay available at the time, this previous research used a toxin Aonly assay, which is more likely to have false‐negative results than the toxin A/B assay used at our institution during the study period. The investigators also required all toxin‐negative patients to have been recently treated with antibiotics. Based on the increasing rates of community‐acquired CDAD, including those that are antibiotic‐nave patients, we felt a history of antibiotic exposure was no longer a prerequisite for CDAD and thus excluded it from our diagnostic criteria.16, 17 Based on these differences, we feel our results are likely an accurate reflection of the number of cases identified by ICD‐9 query in the absence of toxin positivity. However, concerns should be further alleviated through the realization that nonuse of this strategy improves the accuracy of the toxin assay method, while reducing the accuracy of the ICD‐9 method and thereby strengthening the validity of our conclusions. Mathematically, this would result in 369 of 369 patients identified by toxin assay and 369 patients identified by the ICD‐9 method. This would reduce the case rate of the chart review method to the same 15.7 of the toxin assay, while the ICD‐9 method would remain at 19.0.

We considered whether the toxin assay method may overestimate the number of cases due to a C. difficileasymptomatic carrier rate as high as 50% of hospitalized patients.6 However, we found no difference in the case rate when compared with that of chart review, and there were no false‐positive cases. We believe this is attributable to the 30‐day window that was used to identify a single episode of CDAD and the absence of toxin assays being performed on asymptomatic individuals. To avoid overrepresentation of the actual number of CDAD cases, we chose to label all repeat positive toxins and repeat hospitalizations within 30 days as a single episode of CDAD. This was based on the identification that 56% of patients remained toxin‐positive 26 weeks after adequate treatment for CDAD.18 The enzyme‐linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) method used by our laboratory is the method used to report 94% of CDAD cases in a national point prevalence study that collected data from United States acute care hospitals with representation from 47 states1, 6, 19 (Table 5). This use of ELISA in the majority of United States hospitals suggests that our data can be extrapolated for use throughout the United States. While laboratories are increasing their use of 2‐step algorithms involving glutamate dehydrogenase antigen assay followed by cytotoxin neutralization, and more recently beginning the use of polymerase chain reaction assays, both of these methods have been found to increase the accuracy of detecting C. difficile compared with ELISA.20 Therefore, as laboratories evolve to use more accurate assays to detect CDAD, the methods described herein will be expected to increase in reliability.

The toxin assay methodology used to determine the rate of CDAD cases acquired while the patient was at our hospital overreported these cases. Based on this result, identification of individual cases of CDAD that are obtained at a specific hospital would continue to require manual chart review. This expensive method may be avoided by instead choosing to use institutional case rates for reporting, monitoring, and incentivizing hospitals. However, a discussion of the methods of this approach and its confluence with our societal goal to move toward Accountable Care Organizations is beyond the scope of this discussion section.

Although it appears that we identified all cases of CDAD occurring at our institution, a limitation of this study is its inability to review all charts during the 10‐month study period. We used a combination of ICD‐9 and positive C. difficile toxin assay data to identify all possible cases of C. difficile. The current approach to case identification for reported hospital conditions is limited to an ICD‐9 database query. This query is followed by chart review to collect data for hospital performance that is published in locations such as www. hospitalcompare.hhs.gov. Although our approach expands upon this current method of patient identification, it may still fail to identify some cases. To investigate the reliability of our strategy, we performed a chart review on a random sample of patients not previously identified for review. In this portion of the study, 500 charts were reviewed, and no cases of CDAD were found. Considering the identified case rates of 16 to 19 per 1000 discharges, one would expect as many as 10 cases of CDAD to be identified if our methods were unreliable. The identification of zero cases supports our methods as identifying all cases of CDAD during this period. Considering the hurdle of 23,495 charts for a complete review and the inability to identify an adequate number of CDAD cases if 100% chart review over a shorter period was the selected strategy, our study design is the only realistic method of studying this subject.

Increased automation is expected in the future of reporting. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found increased rates of disease reporting and increased accuracy when reporting is electronically automated via their software system, Electronic Support for Public Health, which is designed to communicate with and perform automated data queries on providers' electronic medical records.21 While use of this model is creeping into the health system for reporting to public health authorities,22 universal hospital electronic medical record implementation and full connectivity with such reporting systems is many years from fruition. In addition to its practical use for reporting CDAD in our current health system, our work easily transitions into automated reporting within an electronically integrated health system once achieved.

In conclusion, ICD‐9 data were found to be unreliable, and consideration must be given to cessation of their use for CDAD case rate research and reporting. Use of a positive C. difficile toxin assay accurately reports the institutional incidence of disease, can be used by individual institutions to self‐monitor case rates or by the government to determine regionally acceptable intuitional rates of CDAD on which incentives and penalties can be based, and will increase in efficiency as reporting continues to be automated. This process can be instituted at a fraction of the cost of the standard chart review that is currently used for most reporting.

With an increased incidence of 13.1 per 1000 inpatients1, 2 and an attributable mortality of 6.1%,3 in 2006 the Canadian government added Clostridium difficileassociated disease (CDAD) to its list of reportable diseases.4 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Infectious Disease Society of America subsequently created definitions of the disease and recommended surveillance of rates of health care facilityassociated CDAD, which has been found to double a patient's length of stay and cost of hospitalization.57 While not included in the current list of hospital‐acquired conditions for which payment is declined,8 the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has noted CDAD as under consideration for addition to the list,9 which would require hospital reporting of CDAD rates. This reporting is typically a labor‐intensive, medical record review process that increases the cost of delivering health care. Health care institutions have reported spending as much as $21 million per year or $400 per discharged patient on quality improvement.10 These costs are passed on to payers such as those governed by the CMS that are projected to pay for more than half of all national health spending in 2018.11 Therefore, it is prudent to examine alternatives for determining rates of disease for public reporting and quality improvement initiatives such as infection control and antibiotic stewardship programs.

There are 3 methods that can be used for this reporting. First, medical record review has been used for determining the case rate of CDAD by published reports.1, 2 This procedure allows the CMS to define the desired data to be collected, but it is labor‐intensive. Second, the use of International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 9th Edition (ICD‐9) codes from hospital databases offers the speed of database query. However, due to diagnostic and coding errors, it may report inaccurate rates of disease. Previous reports include a university‐based hospital that found a sensitivity of 78% and specificity of 99.7%,12 whereas a Veterans Administration medical center found nearly two‐thirds of patients with CDAD did not have the ICD‐9 code for C. difficile infection noted in their database.13 Therefore, the accuracy of ICD‐9 code at a community hospital that better represents the majority of United States hospitals is needed. The third method of identifying CDAD is the presence of toxin identified in the microbiology laboratory. Although this method offers ease of obtainment, it suffers from potential inaccuracy arising from duplicate patient samples, positive samples in patients who are symptom‐free carriers, and patients with CDAD despite having a negative toxin.

The same organizations that recommend surveillance for CDAD have identified that there are inadequate data on which to base a decision regarding how to proceed with routine community and hospital surveillance.6 In the setting of public reporting and nonpayment, the method of identifying CDAD cases must be accurate to ensure fairness, while being inexpensive. To identify the potential value of these less labor‐intensive methods of reporting the incidence of CDAD, we evaluated the use of ICD‐9 codes and C. difficile toxin to accurately report the incidence of CDAD at a community hospital, as well as the labor hours required for each reporting method.

METHODS

Patients >18 years of age and potentially having CDAD were identified via database queries for ICD‐9 codes and positive C. difficile toxin assays at our institution from November 1, 2006, through August 31, 2007. Our institution is a 379‐bed university‐affiliated community teaching hospital in a socio‐economically diverse area of Baltimorewith approximately 110,000 emergency department visits, 30,000 discharges, and 110,000 inpatient days each yearthat uses a handwritten paper chart for all provider orders and patient documentation. The C. difficile toxin assay method used during the study period was an enzyme immunoassay that detects both toxins A and B (Meridan Bioscience, Cincinnati, OH). ICD‐9 codes were queried in the CareScience database(Premier, Inc; Charlotte, NC), while C. difficile toxin was queried via the hospital laboratory database. All identified patients underwent a medical record review to confirm the diagnosis of CDAD and the patient's location at the time of disease acquisition. To eliminate duplicate reporting of a single episode of disease, all duplicate patient visits with a diagnosis of CDAD within 30 days were removed.

Our diagnostic criteria (Table 1) used the recommended criteria of a combination of symptoms and positive toxin assay, visualization of pseudomembranes on colonoscopy or pathology‐proven CDAD.6 Based on the presence of CDAD in 25% of patients with a white blood cell count >30,000 and the recommendation that CDAD be considered in all patients with a white blood cell count >15,000, we included the criterion of clinical findings with severe leukocytosis to identify patients with toxin‐negative CDAD.14

Patients were identified by querying the CareScience database for patients having an ICD‐9 code of 008.45. Duplicate cases for the same patient within 30 days were removed. These cases were compared with the cases of CDAD determined by the medical record review for analysis. Patients were identified via positive C. difficile toxin by querying the microbiology laboratory database. A query of all patients with a positive C. difficile toxin was performed. Duplicate samples for the same patient within 30 days were removed. Patients are considered to be outside the hospital when CDAD was acquired if their toxin was positive within the first 3 days of arrival to the hospital, and they were not hospitalized at our institution within 1 week before arrival. All other cases were considered to be acquired while in our hospital. The number of patients with a toxin‐positive stool sample was compared with the medical record review.

Recognizing that it is unrealistic to review the medical records of the 23,495 discharges during the 10‐month study period, a random sample review of 500 charts not included in our CDAD‐identified patient list was performed to identify the rate at which CDAD patients failed to be identified by our methods. From a list of discharges during the study period, as long as they were not in our study population, every thirtieth patient was selected for review up to a total of 500 patient charts. Then, the identified case rate was used to predict the prevalence of disease at our institution during the study period.

Sample selection was based on the absence of previous studies evaluating the performance of C. difficile toxin assay, and the desire to have the same assay used during the entire study. The lack of data from which to perform sample size determination would result in an inaccurate estimate. Therefore, we chose a period that offered the maximum sample size, during which a single assay was used at our institution. Compared with medical record review, the accuracy and positive predictive values of the ICD‐9 code and positive stool toxin methods to identify the cases of CDAD were compared. A true positive was when the ICD‐9 or laboratory query method identified a patient who had CDAD based on chart review; a false positive was when the ICD‐9 or laboratory query method identified a patient who did not have CDAD based on chart review. Rates of over‐ or underdiagnosis, case rates, and acquisition location were determined. Statistical analysis of the case rates and acquisition location were performed via chi‐square test. The time to perform these queries was collected with accuracy to the minute.

RESULTS

Of the 23,495 discharges during the study period, the combination of ICD‐9 and C. difficile toxin assay identified a total cohort of 496 patients, 319 of whom were identified by both the ICD‐9 method and the toxin assay, 50 of whom were identified only by the toxin assay, and 127 of whom were identified only by the ICD‐9 method. Chart review confirmed the presence of CDAD in 384 of these 496 cases, for a case rate of 16.3 per 1000 discharged patients (Table 2). The diagnostic criteria for each of these confirmed cases are listed in Table 3. Of the 384 confirmed CDAD cases, 319 were identified by both the ICD‐9 and toxin assay, 50 were identified only by the toxin assay, and 15 were identified only by the ICD‐9 query. Of the 50 cases identified by the toxin assay that were not identified via the ICD‐9 method, all 50 (100%) were confirmed to have CDAD by chart review. In contrast, of the 127 cases identified via the ICD‐9 method that were not found via the toxin assay, only 15 (11.8%) were confirmed to have CDAD by chart review (Figure 1).

Figure 1

Of these 384 cases, 369 were identified via the toxin assay for a case rate of 15.7 per 1000 patient discharges, which was not found to be different from the rate of 16.3 determined by chart review (P = 0.440; 95% confidence interval [CI], 14.117.4). Compared with chart review, the toxin assay reported 96.1% (369/384) of cases. Chart review demonstrated that every patient who had a positive toxin assay met the diagnostic criteria for CDAD for a positive predictive value (PPV) of 100%.

The ICD‐9 method identified 446 patients thought to have CDAD, 334 of whom were confirmed by chart review for a PPV of 74.9% (334/446). Compared with chart review, the ICD‐9 method reported 116.1% (446/384) of cases for a case rate of 19.0 per 1000 discharges and was significantly different than the rate of 16.3 reported by chart review (P = 0.001; 95% CI, 17.320.8).

Chart review identified 156 of 384 (40.6%) patients who acquired CDAD while at our hospital and 228 of 384 (59.4%) who acquired it elsewhere. In comparison, the toxin assay criteria identified 369 cases of CDAD, of which 48.2% (178/369) were acquired while at our hospital and 51.8% (191/369) were acquired elsewhere (P = 0.003).

The time for data extraction via these 3 methods differed greatly. The ICD‐9 method only consumed 312 minutes and the toxin assay method 842 minutes, whereas the chart review method consumed 21,899 minutes. These times reported include the database query and data analysis for the ICD‐9 and toxin assay methods, while it includes the database query and list generation along with the manual chart review and data analysis for the chart review method. The review of the random sample of patients believed not to have CDAD was not included in any of the reported times. Chart review on a random sample of 500 patients not previously identified for review found no additional cases of CDAD.

DISCUSSION

Our study demonstrates that use of positive C. difficile toxin assay data from the microbiology laboratory alone is an efficient method of identifying patients with CDAD. This method only consumed 842 minutes versus 21,899 minutes consumed by the chart review method. The C. difficile toxin method reduces the workforce required to collect and analyze this data, but more importantly, it was found to be reliable by reporting an institutional case rate that is similar to that of chart review.

In contrast, the ICD‐9 method was efficient but less reliable. It only consumed 312 minutes, but it overreported the institutional rate of CDAD by 16.1%, had a PPV of only 74.9%, and of those patients who were identified by ICD‐9 but not toxin assay, only 11.8% actually had CDAD. This finding is in conflict with the previously noted underreporting of this method.13, 15 We believe this difference to be associated with institutional differences, because previous reports originated from a veterans hospital and an academic medical center, and previous authors have failed to use predefined diagnostic criteria and a complete chart review to confirm cases of CDAD. Similar to our study, an academic medical center identified that listing of CDAD in a patient's medical history in their chart was associated with a false‐positive ICD‐9 code for CDAD.15 This observation appears to bring clarity to one of the causes of the variance of ICD‐9 code accuracy between institutions. Institutions seem to vary on the method of attaching diagnoses to the patient's final hospital record. Some institutions include only what is listed as an active problem, whereas others list diagnoses listed in the chart as previous problems and those listed as a potential diagnosis without confirmation. Another potential cause of the ICD‐9 inaccuracy is the potential of clinicians to diagnose and treat a patient for CDAD in the absence of the diagnostic criteria used for chart review. Physician practices such as these are known to vary between institutions leading to a variance in the ICD‐9 code accuracy.

In total, 15 cases of CDAD were identified in the absence of a positive toxin assay, and of these, 12 cases were identified using leukocytosis‐based criteria (Table 4). This resulted in 3.1% of our cases being toxin‐negative, based on leukocytosis criteria, and is lower than the previously identified 35% of cases.14 Because it was the only assay available at the time, this previous research used a toxin Aonly assay, which is more likely to have false‐negative results than the toxin A/B assay used at our institution during the study period. The investigators also required all toxin‐negative patients to have been recently treated with antibiotics. Based on the increasing rates of community‐acquired CDAD, including those that are antibiotic‐nave patients, we felt a history of antibiotic exposure was no longer a prerequisite for CDAD and thus excluded it from our diagnostic criteria.16, 17 Based on these differences, we feel our results are likely an accurate reflection of the number of cases identified by ICD‐9 query in the absence of toxin positivity. However, concerns should be further alleviated through the realization that nonuse of this strategy improves the accuracy of the toxin assay method, while reducing the accuracy of the ICD‐9 method and thereby strengthening the validity of our conclusions. Mathematically, this would result in 369 of 369 patients identified by toxin assay and 369 patients identified by the ICD‐9 method. This would reduce the case rate of the chart review method to the same 15.7 of the toxin assay, while the ICD‐9 method would remain at 19.0.

We considered whether the toxin assay method may overestimate the number of cases due to a C. difficileasymptomatic carrier rate as high as 50% of hospitalized patients.6 However, we found no difference in the case rate when compared with that of chart review, and there were no false‐positive cases. We believe this is attributable to the 30‐day window that was used to identify a single episode of CDAD and the absence of toxin assays being performed on asymptomatic individuals. To avoid overrepresentation of the actual number of CDAD cases, we chose to label all repeat positive toxins and repeat hospitalizations within 30 days as a single episode of CDAD. This was based on the identification that 56% of patients remained toxin‐positive 26 weeks after adequate treatment for CDAD.18 The enzyme‐linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) method used by our laboratory is the method used to report 94% of CDAD cases in a national point prevalence study that collected data from United States acute care hospitals with representation from 47 states1, 6, 19 (Table 5). This use of ELISA in the majority of United States hospitals suggests that our data can be extrapolated for use throughout the United States. While laboratories are increasing their use of 2‐step algorithms involving glutamate dehydrogenase antigen assay followed by cytotoxin neutralization, and more recently beginning the use of polymerase chain reaction assays, both of these methods have been found to increase the accuracy of detecting C. difficile compared with ELISA.20 Therefore, as laboratories evolve to use more accurate assays to detect CDAD, the methods described herein will be expected to increase in reliability.

The toxin assay methodology used to determine the rate of CDAD cases acquired while the patient was at our hospital overreported these cases. Based on this result, identification of individual cases of CDAD that are obtained at a specific hospital would continue to require manual chart review. This expensive method may be avoided by instead choosing to use institutional case rates for reporting, monitoring, and incentivizing hospitals. However, a discussion of the methods of this approach and its confluence with our societal goal to move toward Accountable Care Organizations is beyond the scope of this discussion section.

Although it appears that we identified all cases of CDAD occurring at our institution, a limitation of this study is its inability to review all charts during the 10‐month study period. We used a combination of ICD‐9 and positive C. difficile toxin assay data to identify all possible cases of C. difficile. The current approach to case identification for reported hospital conditions is limited to an ICD‐9 database query. This query is followed by chart review to collect data for hospital performance that is published in locations such as www. hospitalcompare.hhs.gov. Although our approach expands upon this current method of patient identification, it may still fail to identify some cases. To investigate the reliability of our strategy, we performed a chart review on a random sample of patients not previously identified for review. In this portion of the study, 500 charts were reviewed, and no cases of CDAD were found. Considering the identified case rates of 16 to 19 per 1000 discharges, one would expect as many as 10 cases of CDAD to be identified if our methods were unreliable. The identification of zero cases supports our methods as identifying all cases of CDAD during this period. Considering the hurdle of 23,495 charts for a complete review and the inability to identify an adequate number of CDAD cases if 100% chart review over a shorter period was the selected strategy, our study design is the only realistic method of studying this subject.

Increased automation is expected in the future of reporting. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found increased rates of disease reporting and increased accuracy when reporting is electronically automated via their software system, Electronic Support for Public Health, which is designed to communicate with and perform automated data queries on providers' electronic medical records.21 While use of this model is creeping into the health system for reporting to public health authorities,22 universal hospital electronic medical record implementation and full connectivity with such reporting systems is many years from fruition. In addition to its practical use for reporting CDAD in our current health system, our work easily transitions into automated reporting within an electronically integrated health system once achieved.

In conclusion, ICD‐9 data were found to be unreliable, and consideration must be given to cessation of their use for CDAD case rate research and reporting. Use of a positive C. difficile toxin assay accurately reports the institutional incidence of disease, can be used by individual institutions to self‐monitor case rates or by the government to determine regionally acceptable intuitional rates of CDAD on which incentives and penalties can be based, and will increase in efficiency as reporting continues to be automated. This process can be instituted at a fraction of the cost of the standard chart review that is currently used for most reporting.

Patient flow refers to the management and movement of patients in health care settings and is linked to quality, safety, and cost.16 The intensive care unit (ICU) is crucial in patient flow.7, 8 The limited number of beds and the resource‐intensive services and staffing associated with them require that hospitals optimize their utilization, as is increasingly true of all hospital resources. To maximize delivery of services to patients who need them and minimize real and opportunity losses (eg, postponed surgery, diverted transports, or inability to accept patients), patients in ICU beds should receive critical care medicine/nursing services while there and be transferred or discharged when appropriate.

The time between arrival and departure from any area of the hospital, including the ICU, is considered the time when a patient is receiving needed clinical carethe value‐added portion of health care operationsand time waiting to move on to the next step.911 This period includes both necessary logistics (eg, signing out a patient or waiting a reasonable amount of time for room cleaning) and nonvalue‐added time (eg, an excessively long amount of time for room cleaning). Operations management labels nonvalue‐added time as waste, and its reduction is vital for high‐quality health care.9, 12, 13 As in other industries, one important way to understand value versus waste is through direct observation.11, 14 Although operating rooms have been the subject of several published process improvement projects to improve efficiency,1518 inpatient beds have not been the subject of such scrutiny. The objectives of this study were to generate a direct observation method and use it to describe pediatric ICU (PICU) bed utilization from a value‐added perspective.

METHODS

An interdisciplinary work group of physicians, nurses, quality improvement specialists, and 1 operations management expert developed an Excel spreadsheet to categorize hour‐by‐hour status of PICU beds. The clinicians generated a list of 27 activities. A critical care nurse trained in quality improvement piloted the list for 3 separate 4‐hour blocks over 2 weeks adding 18 activities; 2 additional activities were added during the 5 weeks of observation (Table 1). (The recording tool is provided in the Supporting Information Appendix.) Three observers with knowledge of medical terminology (2 third‐year medical students and 1 premedical student with years of experience as an emergency medical technician) were trained over 12 hours to conduct the observations. Prior to the observations, the 3 observers also spent time in the PICU, and terminology used for recordings was reviewed. Interobserver reliability was checked during 3 sets of observation circuits by all 3 observers and the principal investigator, as well as by spot checks during the study.

The targeted area included 24 single‐patient rooms. The activity of each bed was recorded hourly. Real‐time recording in to the Excel spreadsheet on a dedicated laptop occurred from 8:00 _AM until 11:00 _PM. The most visible or critical event was recorded. Although some activities were not mutually exclusive (eg, a patient could be ventilated and on a continuous infusion simultaneously), the objective was to identify when a room was being used for any critical care service, not enumerate all of them. The observers noted overnight events that occurred from 11:00 _PM to 8:00 _AM in the morning by reviewing the bedside record and talking to the staff to complete each day's 24‐hour recording. The observers also recorded the hospital‐wide census and the census for the other half of the PICU every 4 hours. The observations occurred over 5 noncontiguous weeks between January 2009 and April 2009.

After all observations were complete, activities were classified as critical care services (CCS) or noncritical‐care services (NCCS). NCCSs were further divided into necessary logistics (defined for analysis purposes as the first hour of any NCCS activity) or nonvalue‐added (the second or greater hour of NCCS). A time limit of 1 hour was chosen to define necessary logistics based on a consensus that nonclinical activities optimally would not take more than 1 hour each. We also analyzed results with 2 hours as the cutoff for necessary logistics. Admission, discharge, and transfer records were reviewed to check for returns to the PICU or hospital within 48 hours of transfer or discharge from the PICU.

Analyses were conducted using Microsoft Excel (Microsoft, Redmond, WA) and Stata 10.0 (StataCorp, College Station, TX). The study was approved by the Children's Hospital of Philadelphia Institutional Review Board with waiver of consent.

RESULTS

A total of 824 hours of recordings included 19,887 bed‐hours with 219 unique patients; among them, 2 remained from the first day of recording in January to the last day in April (sample recording in Figure 1). A total of 50 patients (range, 812 per week) stayed for the entirety of each 1‐week observation period. Of the 47 possible activities, 45 of them were recorded for at least 1 hour in the 5 weeks. Overall, 14 activities accounted for 95% of the observed bed‐hours and 31 activities accounted for the remaining 5%. CCS accounted for 82% of observed bed‐hours, NCCS accounted for 10.4%, and empty unassigned accounted for 8% (Figure 2). Using the 1‐hour cutoff for necessary services, 77% of NCCS time was nonvalue‐added, whereas 23% of it was necessary logistics; using the 2‐hour cutoff, 54% was nonvalue‐added, and 46% was necessary logistics.

Figure 1

Figure 2

During the observation period, <1% of bed‐hours were used for CCS for overflow patients from the neonatal ICU (NICU), cardiac care unit (CCU), cardiac ICU (CICU), or progressive care unit (PCU; tracheostomy/ventilator unit). Although only 4 patients required transport to a rehabilitation facility, their wait time comprised 99 hours (<1%) of total recordings. Eight patients waited a mean of 2.6 hours for transportation home (maximum, 10 hours).

To demonstrate the cycle of room use, activities were divided into 4 categories: room preparation, critical care services, disposition pending, and postcritical care services (Figure 3). As an example of detailed data revealed by direct observation, we identified 102 instances totaling 919 hours when a patient was waiting for a bed assignment on another floor (5% of all bed‐hours). The mean wait time was 9 hours (range, 188 hours) and the median time was 5.5 hours. There were only 15 instances when floor bed assignment took 1 hour or less, and only 9 instances when it took 12 hours. Similarly, considerable time was spent on cleaning rooms between patients: only 66 of 146 instances of cleaning took 1 hour or less. The mean time for cleaning was 2.2 hours (range, 115), and the median was 2 hours. (There were 136 recorded instances of room cleaning and 10 additional episodes that were not recorded but had to be completed for the room to turnover from one patient to the next, yielding a total of 146 instances of cleaning.)

Figure 3

From the 824 hours of recording, we identified 200 hours (25% of time) when there were zero empty unassigned beds available in the section of the PICU being observed. Episodes of full occupancy occurred mostly on weekdays, with 23% of hours of full capacity on Thursdays, 21% on Mondays, and 21% on Wednesdays; only 8% were on Saturdays and <1% on Sundays. These 200 hours fell into 36 separate episodes of complete occupancy, each lasting 122 hours. Each patient, on average, received 3.1 hours of NCCS during each episode of full occupancy (range, 111 hours). Within these 200 hours at capacity, we identified only 15 hours (8%) when all 24 beds were used for CCS. For 72% of the time, there was at least 1 bed with NCCS, and for 37% at least 2 beds. A small portion of the time (7%), the lack of beds was affected by occupancy by patients who should have been in the NICU, CICU, CCU, or PCU.

Data collected through direct observation can be used to understand aggregated and averaged experiences, but also more specific time periods. For example, we identified 1 week with the highest consistent level of occupancy and turnover: March 915 had empty unassigned beds for only 4% of the week. Of the 168 hours in the week, 68 (40%) had full capacity. However, for 90% of the time, at least 1 bed was used for a NCCS. Other analytic options included varying the assumptions around time needed for logistics. Overall, NCCS time on necessary logistics changes from 23% to 46% using 1 hour versus 2 hours as the cutoff. For floor bed assignments, assuming that the first hour of this activity is necessary logistics and any hour thereafter is not, 817 hours were wasted. Even after assuming 2 hours of necessary logistical time (which may also include steps such as nursing and physician sign‐out to the receiving team, often not recorded in the observations), this left 715 hours of NCCS time in which patients waited to be placed elsewhere in the hospital. For room cleaning, because recordings were hourly, but room cleaning could take less time, we performed a sensitivity analysis, converting all 1‐hour recordings to half‐hour recordings to half‐hour recordings (an exaggerated shortening since industry‐standard cleaning may take longer).

Of the 219 patients directly observed, 15 were noted to be waiting for a transfer out of the PICU but experienced a change in disposition before the transfer. On average, these patients waited 8 hours for a floor bed assignment (range, 221) before reverting to a CCS, which then lasted an average of 16.5 hours (range, 149). (Included in this group are 2 patients who experienced this change in disposition twice.) In post hoc review across the 5 weeks, no patients were transferred back to the PICU within 48 hours after being transferred out. During the study period, 19 patients were discharged directly from the PICU (8 to home, 7 by transport to another facility, and 4 to rehabilitation). One patient returned to the hospital (but not the PICU) within 48 hours of being discharged home from the PICU.

During the study period, using the highest census value for recorded for each 24‐hour period and the number of beds available that day, median hospital‐wide occupancy was 93% (interquartile range, 90%96%). During the 35 days of observation, 71% of the days had occupancy >90%, 29% of days had occupancy >95%, and 3% of days had occupancy >100%.

DISCUSSION

In this direct observation of a PICU, we found high usage of beds for delivery of CCS. We identified many episodes in which the half of the PICU we observed was fully occupied (200 of 824 hours), but not necessarily delivering PICU‐level care to all patients. In fact, 75% of the full‐capacity hours had at least 1 patient receiving NCCS and 37% had at least 2. Patients waiting for a floor bed assignment represented nearly 5% of bed‐hours observed (mean 9 hours per patient). That full occupancy was not random, but rather clustered on weekdays, is consistent with other work showing that hospitals are at greater risk for midweek crowding due to the way in which scheduled admissions enter and leave.1925

Our methods provide the basis for operational analysis and improvement to patient flow, such as value stream mapping.9, 26 Process improvement work could be directed to areas of delay uncovered through this analysis and inform clinical and nonclinical management. For example, one of the key problems faced by the PICU was finding floor bed assignments for patients leaving the unit. Simply building more beds in the PICU will not solve this problemand at an estimated cost of $2 million to add a bed, it is likely not an efficient means of responding to poor flow. In these cases, the problem seems to lie downstream, and could suggest shortage of regular floor beds or inefficient bed assignment procedures within the hospital. The output also suggests that variation in nonclinical processes should be a target for improvement, such as time to clean rooms, because variation is known to be a source of nonvalue‐added time in many operations.9, 26 High occupancy on weekdays but low occupancy on weekends also emphasizes the potential for smoothing occupancy to reduce the risk of midweek crowding and to better manage bed utilization and staffing.24, 25

When seeking to reduce nonvalue‐added time, one must weigh the risks of increased efficiency against clinical outcomes. For example, if patients could be transferred out of the PICU faster, would the risk of returns to the PICU be higher? In this study, 15 patients (7%) had a change in disposition from awaiting transfer back to a CCS. The fact that transfers did not happen instantaneously may serve as a safety check to reduce rapid returns, but it is not possible for us to evaluate the reasons why patients did not actually complete the pending transfers. Specifically, we cannot determine whether the patient's clinical status objectively deteriorated, the ICU team made a judgment call to hold the patient, or the floor team refused to accept the transfer. Given this fact, although it appears in this study (and in the health care system more broadly) that there are opportunities to increase efficiency and reduce nonvalue‐added time, it is not realistic (nor advisable) that such time be reduced to zero. Along this line, one must consider separately purely nonclinical functions such as room cleaning and those that include some clinical element, such as time waiting for a patient to be transferred.

Beyond the direct findings of this study, the method should be replicable in other settings and can reveal important information about health care efficiency, capacity, and flexibility. The bottlenecks identified would have been difficult to identify through administrative record review. The exact amount of time to spend on observation may vary from place to place and would depend on the expected variation over time and the level of detail sought. In general, the more common the event and the less variation, the less time needed to observe it.

This study has several limitations that should be considered in terms of interpreting the results and in seeking to reproduce the approach. First, hourly recordings may not be discrete enough for events that took less than 1 hour. To assess the degree to which this would affect our results, we reanalyzed all NCCS by subtracting 30 minutes (0.5 hour) from all recordings, which increased total CCS from 82% to 87% and decreased NCCS by the same 5 percentage points. In a related fashion, our recordings were truncated at the start and end of each 1‐week period, so we could only observe a maximum of 168 hours for any given activity and did not record how long an activity was happening before or after the recordings started or stopped, respectively. Second, each recording could only be for 1 activity per hour. Separate from the level of granularity already noted, this also limits interpretation of critical care activities that may have been simultaneous. However, because the goal of the study was not to describe the provision of critical care services, but rather the times when they were not being delivered, this does not influence our conclusions. For movement of patients, however, we missed instances of physician and nursing calling sign‐out on patients to receiving units, as these events last less than 1 hour (and in the case of surgical patients, generally do not occur as the team provides continuous coverage). The time for such events is then included in other activities. To the extent that this may influence the results, it would increase the perceived time for nonvalue‐added services, but to a limited degree, and never by more than 59 minutes. Third, the overnight hours (11:00 _PM to 8:00 _AM) were not directly observed, but retrospectively recorded each morning by reviewing the records and discussing the overnight events with the clinical staff. For example, if a patient was intubated at 11:00 _PM and at 8:00 _AM, the observer would confirm this and record that status for the intervening hours. This is unlikely to result in a substantial impact on the findings, because the overnight hours have a relative degree of stability even for unstable patients in terms of their status of needing or not needing a CCS. Fourth, we did not evaluate the appropriateness of CCS delivered (eg, how long a patient was ventilated). Our definitions for CCS and NCSS were based on Children's Hospital of Philadelphia practices, which may not be the same as those of other facilities. The categorization of CCS was objective for activities such as ventilation or continuous infusion, but was less clear for the not otherwise specified recordings, which represented patients with a complex illness or projected organ, respiratory, cardiac, or neurological failure. These patients were not receiving a specific critical care intervention, but were deemed to need to be in the PICU as opposed to a regular floor (eg, for frequent monitoring of potential respiratory failure). It would also include patients receiving combinations of therapies more efficiently delivered in the PICU. For that, the observers relied on the judgment of clinicians (primarily nurses) to determine whether the patient needed to be in the PICU or not; if no specific reason could be provided, not otherwise specified was applied. These 192 instances accounted for 2982 aggregate bed‐hours (15% of total). It is difficult to judge the direction of bias, because overestimation of need to be in the PICU may be as likely to occur as underestimation. Fifth, the very presence of the observers may have changed behavior. Knowing that they were being observed staff may have acted with greater efficiency than otherwise. We expect that such a finding would lead to less time appearing as necessary logistics or NCCS. Finally, results may not be generalizable to other hospitals or hospital settings. There are clearly important contextual factors, not only for the location but also for the duration. For example, staffing was never an issue during the 5 weeks of observation, but there are locations where an empty bed is not necessarily usable due to lack of staffing. Nonetheless, we believe the results provide a generalizable approach and methodology for other settings (and staffing could be a reason for an empty bed).

In terms of the setting, as noted, we observed one discrete 24‐bed unit, which comprises half of the total PICU. Thus, statements that the PICU was at full capacity must be interpreted in the context that additional rooms may have been available on the other side. Patients are generally admitted alternately to each unit, so the occupancies should parallel each other. We recorded the census every 4 hours for both sides from the electronic system (Sunrise Clinical Manager [SCM]). However, this only accounts for patients physically in beds, not beds held for patients in other locations. Thus, we would expect a discrepancy between direct observation and the SCM value. Through analysis of the entire pediatric intensive care unit,* that part which observed directly, and that which we did not observe directly using census data, we think it reasonable to assert that both units of the total PICU had constrained capacity during the times we directly observed and recorded such constraint on one side.

This study demonstrates the use of direct observation for inpatient settings to learn about resource utilization and identification of value‐added services. PubMed searches for the terms efficiency, flow, process redesign, and time management bring up many more references for operating rooms than for ICUs or inpatient beds. Some examples of ICU‐directed work include videography of an ICU in Australia27 and human factor analysis in ICU nursing.5 Time‐motion studies have also been conducted on clinical staff, such as physicians.28, 29

In conclusion, we found that direct observation provided important insights into the utilization of patient rooms in an important inpatient setting. Data such as these are valuable for clinical and process improvement work, as well as understanding how best to match capacity to patient need. Finally, the methodology is reproducible for other settings and would be an additional tool to measuring and improving the efficiency and value of the health system. When appropriate, this approach can also evaluate the effectiveness of process improvement, help identify and reduce waste,13 and contribute to the growing field that merges operations management with hospital administration and clinical care: in other words, evidence‐based management.30

Patient flow refers to the management and movement of patients in health care settings and is linked to quality, safety, and cost.16 The intensive care unit (ICU) is crucial in patient flow.7, 8 The limited number of beds and the resource‐intensive services and staffing associated with them require that hospitals optimize their utilization, as is increasingly true of all hospital resources. To maximize delivery of services to patients who need them and minimize real and opportunity losses (eg, postponed surgery, diverted transports, or inability to accept patients), patients in ICU beds should receive critical care medicine/nursing services while there and be transferred or discharged when appropriate.

The time between arrival and departure from any area of the hospital, including the ICU, is considered the time when a patient is receiving needed clinical carethe value‐added portion of health care operationsand time waiting to move on to the next step.911 This period includes both necessary logistics (eg, signing out a patient or waiting a reasonable amount of time for room cleaning) and nonvalue‐added time (eg, an excessively long amount of time for room cleaning). Operations management labels nonvalue‐added time as waste, and its reduction is vital for high‐quality health care.9, 12, 13 As in other industries, one important way to understand value versus waste is through direct observation.11, 14 Although operating rooms have been the subject of several published process improvement projects to improve efficiency,1518 inpatient beds have not been the subject of such scrutiny. The objectives of this study were to generate a direct observation method and use it to describe pediatric ICU (PICU) bed utilization from a value‐added perspective.

METHODS

An interdisciplinary work group of physicians, nurses, quality improvement specialists, and 1 operations management expert developed an Excel spreadsheet to categorize hour‐by‐hour status of PICU beds. The clinicians generated a list of 27 activities. A critical care nurse trained in quality improvement piloted the list for 3 separate 4‐hour blocks over 2 weeks adding 18 activities; 2 additional activities were added during the 5 weeks of observation (Table 1). (The recording tool is provided in the Supporting Information Appendix.) Three observers with knowledge of medical terminology (2 third‐year medical students and 1 premedical student with years of experience as an emergency medical technician) were trained over 12 hours to conduct the observations. Prior to the observations, the 3 observers also spent time in the PICU, and terminology used for recordings was reviewed. Interobserver reliability was checked during 3 sets of observation circuits by all 3 observers and the principal investigator, as well as by spot checks during the study.

The targeted area included 24 single‐patient rooms. The activity of each bed was recorded hourly. Real‐time recording in to the Excel spreadsheet on a dedicated laptop occurred from 8:00 _AM until 11:00 _PM. The most visible or critical event was recorded. Although some activities were not mutually exclusive (eg, a patient could be ventilated and on a continuous infusion simultaneously), the objective was to identify when a room was being used for any critical care service, not enumerate all of them. The observers noted overnight events that occurred from 11:00 _PM to 8:00 _AM in the morning by reviewing the bedside record and talking to the staff to complete each day's 24‐hour recording. The observers also recorded the hospital‐wide census and the census for the other half of the PICU every 4 hours. The observations occurred over 5 noncontiguous weeks between January 2009 and April 2009.

After all observations were complete, activities were classified as critical care services (CCS) or noncritical‐care services (NCCS). NCCSs were further divided into necessary logistics (defined for analysis purposes as the first hour of any NCCS activity) or nonvalue‐added (the second or greater hour of NCCS). A time limit of 1 hour was chosen to define necessary logistics based on a consensus that nonclinical activities optimally would not take more than 1 hour each. We also analyzed results with 2 hours as the cutoff for necessary logistics. Admission, discharge, and transfer records were reviewed to check for returns to the PICU or hospital within 48 hours of transfer or discharge from the PICU.

Analyses were conducted using Microsoft Excel (Microsoft, Redmond, WA) and Stata 10.0 (StataCorp, College Station, TX). The study was approved by the Children's Hospital of Philadelphia Institutional Review Board with waiver of consent.

RESULTS

A total of 824 hours of recordings included 19,887 bed‐hours with 219 unique patients; among them, 2 remained from the first day of recording in January to the last day in April (sample recording in Figure 1). A total of 50 patients (range, 812 per week) stayed for the entirety of each 1‐week observation period. Of the 47 possible activities, 45 of them were recorded for at least 1 hour in the 5 weeks. Overall, 14 activities accounted for 95% of the observed bed‐hours and 31 activities accounted for the remaining 5%. CCS accounted for 82% of observed bed‐hours, NCCS accounted for 10.4%, and empty unassigned accounted for 8% (Figure 2). Using the 1‐hour cutoff for necessary services, 77% of NCCS time was nonvalue‐added, whereas 23% of it was necessary logistics; using the 2‐hour cutoff, 54% was nonvalue‐added, and 46% was necessary logistics.

Figure 1

Figure 2

During the observation period, <1% of bed‐hours were used for CCS for overflow patients from the neonatal ICU (NICU), cardiac care unit (CCU), cardiac ICU (CICU), or progressive care unit (PCU; tracheostomy/ventilator unit). Although only 4 patients required transport to a rehabilitation facility, their wait time comprised 99 hours (<1%) of total recordings. Eight patients waited a mean of 2.6 hours for transportation home (maximum, 10 hours).

To demonstrate the cycle of room use, activities were divided into 4 categories: room preparation, critical care services, disposition pending, and postcritical care services (Figure 3). As an example of detailed data revealed by direct observation, we identified 102 instances totaling 919 hours when a patient was waiting for a bed assignment on another floor (5% of all bed‐hours). The mean wait time was 9 hours (range, 188 hours) and the median time was 5.5 hours. There were only 15 instances when floor bed assignment took 1 hour or less, and only 9 instances when it took 12 hours. Similarly, considerable time was spent on cleaning rooms between patients: only 66 of 146 instances of cleaning took 1 hour or less. The mean time for cleaning was 2.2 hours (range, 115), and the median was 2 hours. (There were 136 recorded instances of room cleaning and 10 additional episodes that were not recorded but had to be completed for the room to turnover from one patient to the next, yielding a total of 146 instances of cleaning.)

Figure 3

From the 824 hours of recording, we identified 200 hours (25% of time) when there were zero empty unassigned beds available in the section of the PICU being observed. Episodes of full occupancy occurred mostly on weekdays, with 23% of hours of full capacity on Thursdays, 21% on Mondays, and 21% on Wednesdays; only 8% were on Saturdays and <1% on Sundays. These 200 hours fell into 36 separate episodes of complete occupancy, each lasting 122 hours. Each patient, on average, received 3.1 hours of NCCS during each episode of full occupancy (range, 111 hours). Within these 200 hours at capacity, we identified only 15 hours (8%) when all 24 beds were used for CCS. For 72% of the time, there was at least 1 bed with NCCS, and for 37% at least 2 beds. A small portion of the time (7%), the lack of beds was affected by occupancy by patients who should have been in the NICU, CICU, CCU, or PCU.

Data collected through direct observation can be used to understand aggregated and averaged experiences, but also more specific time periods. For example, we identified 1 week with the highest consistent level of occupancy and turnover: March 915 had empty unassigned beds for only 4% of the week. Of the 168 hours in the week, 68 (40%) had full capacity. However, for 90% of the time, at least 1 bed was used for a NCCS. Other analytic options included varying the assumptions around time needed for logistics. Overall, NCCS time on necessary logistics changes from 23% to 46% using 1 hour versus 2 hours as the cutoff. For floor bed assignments, assuming that the first hour of this activity is necessary logistics and any hour thereafter is not, 817 hours were wasted. Even after assuming 2 hours of necessary logistical time (which may also include steps such as nursing and physician sign‐out to the receiving team, often not recorded in the observations), this left 715 hours of NCCS time in which patients waited to be placed elsewhere in the hospital. For room cleaning, because recordings were hourly, but room cleaning could take less time, we performed a sensitivity analysis, converting all 1‐hour recordings to half‐hour recordings to half‐hour recordings (an exaggerated shortening since industry‐standard cleaning may take longer).

Of the 219 patients directly observed, 15 were noted to be waiting for a transfer out of the PICU but experienced a change in disposition before the transfer. On average, these patients waited 8 hours for a floor bed assignment (range, 221) before reverting to a CCS, which then lasted an average of 16.5 hours (range, 149). (Included in this group are 2 patients who experienced this change in disposition twice.) In post hoc review across the 5 weeks, no patients were transferred back to the PICU within 48 hours after being transferred out. During the study period, 19 patients were discharged directly from the PICU (8 to home, 7 by transport to another facility, and 4 to rehabilitation). One patient returned to the hospital (but not the PICU) within 48 hours of being discharged home from the PICU.

During the study period, using the highest census value for recorded for each 24‐hour period and the number of beds available that day, median hospital‐wide occupancy was 93% (interquartile range, 90%96%). During the 35 days of observation, 71% of the days had occupancy >90%, 29% of days had occupancy >95%, and 3% of days had occupancy >100%.

DISCUSSION

In this direct observation of a PICU, we found high usage of beds for delivery of CCS. We identified many episodes in which the half of the PICU we observed was fully occupied (200 of 824 hours), but not necessarily delivering PICU‐level care to all patients. In fact, 75% of the full‐capacity hours had at least 1 patient receiving NCCS and 37% had at least 2. Patients waiting for a floor bed assignment represented nearly 5% of bed‐hours observed (mean 9 hours per patient). That full occupancy was not random, but rather clustered on weekdays, is consistent with other work showing that hospitals are at greater risk for midweek crowding due to the way in which scheduled admissions enter and leave.1925

Our methods provide the basis for operational analysis and improvement to patient flow, such as value stream mapping.9, 26 Process improvement work could be directed to areas of delay uncovered through this analysis and inform clinical and nonclinical management. For example, one of the key problems faced by the PICU was finding floor bed assignments for patients leaving the unit. Simply building more beds in the PICU will not solve this problemand at an estimated cost of $2 million to add a bed, it is likely not an efficient means of responding to poor flow. In these cases, the problem seems to lie downstream, and could suggest shortage of regular floor beds or inefficient bed assignment procedures within the hospital. The output also suggests that variation in nonclinical processes should be a target for improvement, such as time to clean rooms, because variation is known to be a source of nonvalue‐added time in many operations.9, 26 High occupancy on weekdays but low occupancy on weekends also emphasizes the potential for smoothing occupancy to reduce the risk of midweek crowding and to better manage bed utilization and staffing.24, 25

When seeking to reduce nonvalue‐added time, one must weigh the risks of increased efficiency against clinical outcomes. For example, if patients could be transferred out of the PICU faster, would the risk of returns to the PICU be higher? In this study, 15 patients (7%) had a change in disposition from awaiting transfer back to a CCS. The fact that transfers did not happen instantaneously may serve as a safety check to reduce rapid returns, but it is not possible for us to evaluate the reasons why patients did not actually complete the pending transfers. Specifically, we cannot determine whether the patient's clinical status objectively deteriorated, the ICU team made a judgment call to hold the patient, or the floor team refused to accept the transfer. Given this fact, although it appears in this study (and in the health care system more broadly) that there are opportunities to increase efficiency and reduce nonvalue‐added time, it is not realistic (nor advisable) that such time be reduced to zero. Along this line, one must consider separately purely nonclinical functions such as room cleaning and those that include some clinical element, such as time waiting for a patient to be transferred.

Beyond the direct findings of this study, the method should be replicable in other settings and can reveal important information about health care efficiency, capacity, and flexibility. The bottlenecks identified would have been difficult to identify through administrative record review. The exact amount of time to spend on observation may vary from place to place and would depend on the expected variation over time and the level of detail sought. In general, the more common the event and the less variation, the less time needed to observe it.

This study has several limitations that should be considered in terms of interpreting the results and in seeking to reproduce the approach. First, hourly recordings may not be discrete enough for events that took less than 1 hour. To assess the degree to which this would affect our results, we reanalyzed all NCCS by subtracting 30 minutes (0.5 hour) from all recordings, which increased total CCS from 82% to 87% and decreased NCCS by the same 5 percentage points. In a related fashion, our recordings were truncated at the start and end of each 1‐week period, so we could only observe a maximum of 168 hours for any given activity and did not record how long an activity was happening before or after the recordings started or stopped, respectively. Second, each recording could only be for 1 activity per hour. Separate from the level of granularity already noted, this also limits interpretation of critical care activities that may have been simultaneous. However, because the goal of the study was not to describe the provision of critical care services, but rather the times when they were not being delivered, this does not influence our conclusions. For movement of patients, however, we missed instances of physician and nursing calling sign‐out on patients to receiving units, as these events last less than 1 hour (and in the case of surgical patients, generally do not occur as the team provides continuous coverage). The time for such events is then included in other activities. To the extent that this may influence the results, it would increase the perceived time for nonvalue‐added services, but to a limited degree, and never by more than 59 minutes. Third, the overnight hours (11:00 _PM to 8:00 _AM) were not directly observed, but retrospectively recorded each morning by reviewing the records and discussing the overnight events with the clinical staff. For example, if a patient was intubated at 11:00 _PM and at 8:00 _AM, the observer would confirm this and record that status for the intervening hours. This is unlikely to result in a substantial impact on the findings, because the overnight hours have a relative degree of stability even for unstable patients in terms of their status of needing or not needing a CCS. Fourth, we did not evaluate the appropriateness of CCS delivered (eg, how long a patient was ventilated). Our definitions for CCS and NCSS were based on Children's Hospital of Philadelphia practices, which may not be the same as those of other facilities. The categorization of CCS was objective for activities such as ventilation or continuous infusion, but was less clear for the not otherwise specified recordings, which represented patients with a complex illness or projected organ, respiratory, cardiac, or neurological failure. These patients were not receiving a specific critical care intervention, but were deemed to need to be in the PICU as opposed to a regular floor (eg, for frequent monitoring of potential respiratory failure). It would also include patients receiving combinations of therapies more efficiently delivered in the PICU. For that, the observers relied on the judgment of clinicians (primarily nurses) to determine whether the patient needed to be in the PICU or not; if no specific reason could be provided, not otherwise specified was applied. These 192 instances accounted for 2982 aggregate bed‐hours (15% of total). It is difficult to judge the direction of bias, because overestimation of need to be in the PICU may be as likely to occur as underestimation. Fifth, the very presence of the observers may have changed behavior. Knowing that they were being observed staff may have acted with greater efficiency than otherwise. We expect that such a finding would lead to less time appearing as necessary logistics or NCCS. Finally, results may not be generalizable to other hospitals or hospital settings. There are clearly important contextual factors, not only for the location but also for the duration. For example, staffing was never an issue during the 5 weeks of observation, but there are locations where an empty bed is not necessarily usable due to lack of staffing. Nonetheless, we believe the results provide a generalizable approach and methodology for other settings (and staffing could be a reason for an empty bed).

In terms of the setting, as noted, we observed one discrete 24‐bed unit, which comprises half of the total PICU. Thus, statements that the PICU was at full capacity must be interpreted in the context that additional rooms may have been available on the other side. Patients are generally admitted alternately to each unit, so the occupancies should parallel each other. We recorded the census every 4 hours for both sides from the electronic system (Sunrise Clinical Manager [SCM]). However, this only accounts for patients physically in beds, not beds held for patients in other locations. Thus, we would expect a discrepancy between direct observation and the SCM value. Through analysis of the entire pediatric intensive care unit,* that part which observed directly, and that which we did not observe directly using census data, we think it reasonable to assert that both units of the total PICU had constrained capacity during the times we directly observed and recorded such constraint on one side.

This study demonstrates the use of direct observation for inpatient settings to learn about resource utilization and identification of value‐added services. PubMed searches for the terms efficiency, flow, process redesign, and time management bring up many more references for operating rooms than for ICUs or inpatient beds. Some examples of ICU‐directed work include videography of an ICU in Australia27 and human factor analysis in ICU nursing.5 Time‐motion studies have also been conducted on clinical staff, such as physicians.28, 29

In conclusion, we found that direct observation provided important insights into the utilization of patient rooms in an important inpatient setting. Data such as these are valuable for clinical and process improvement work, as well as understanding how best to match capacity to patient need. Finally, the methodology is reproducible for other settings and would be an additional tool to measuring and improving the efficiency and value of the health system. When appropriate, this approach can also evaluate the effectiveness of process improvement, help identify and reduce waste,13 and contribute to the growing field that merges operations management with hospital administration and clinical care: in other words, evidence‐based management.30

Patient flow refers to the management and movement of patients in health care settings and is linked to quality, safety, and cost.16 The intensive care unit (ICU) is crucial in patient flow.7, 8 The limited number of beds and the resource‐intensive services and staffing associated with them require that hospitals optimize their utilization, as is increasingly true of all hospital resources. To maximize delivery of services to patients who need them and minimize real and opportunity losses (eg, postponed surgery, diverted transports, or inability to accept patients), patients in ICU beds should receive critical care medicine/nursing services while there and be transferred or discharged when appropriate.

The time between arrival and departure from any area of the hospital, including the ICU, is considered the time when a patient is receiving needed clinical carethe value‐added portion of health care operationsand time waiting to move on to the next step.911 This period includes both necessary logistics (eg, signing out a patient or waiting a reasonable amount of time for room cleaning) and nonvalue‐added time (eg, an excessively long amount of time for room cleaning). Operations management labels nonvalue‐added time as waste, and its reduction is vital for high‐quality health care.9, 12, 13 As in other industries, one important way to understand value versus waste is through direct observation.11, 14 Although operating rooms have been the subject of several published process improvement projects to improve efficiency,1518 inpatient beds have not been the subject of such scrutiny. The objectives of this study were to generate a direct observation method and use it to describe pediatric ICU (PICU) bed utilization from a value‐added perspective.

METHODS

An interdisciplinary work group of physicians, nurses, quality improvement specialists, and 1 operations management expert developed an Excel spreadsheet to categorize hour‐by‐hour status of PICU beds. The clinicians generated a list of 27 activities. A critical care nurse trained in quality improvement piloted the list for 3 separate 4‐hour blocks over 2 weeks adding 18 activities; 2 additional activities were added during the 5 weeks of observation (Table 1). (The recording tool is provided in the Supporting Information Appendix.) Three observers with knowledge of medical terminology (2 third‐year medical students and 1 premedical student with years of experience as an emergency medical technician) were trained over 12 hours to conduct the observations. Prior to the observations, the 3 observers also spent time in the PICU, and terminology used for recordings was reviewed. Interobserver reliability was checked during 3 sets of observation circuits by all 3 observers and the principal investigator, as well as by spot checks during the study.

The targeted area included 24 single‐patient rooms. The activity of each bed was recorded hourly. Real‐time recording in to the Excel spreadsheet on a dedicated laptop occurred from 8:00 _AM until 11:00 _PM. The most visible or critical event was recorded. Although some activities were not mutually exclusive (eg, a patient could be ventilated and on a continuous infusion simultaneously), the objective was to identify when a room was being used for any critical care service, not enumerate all of them. The observers noted overnight events that occurred from 11:00 _PM to 8:00 _AM in the morning by reviewing the bedside record and talking to the staff to complete each day's 24‐hour recording. The observers also recorded the hospital‐wide census and the census for the other half of the PICU every 4 hours. The observations occurred over 5 noncontiguous weeks between January 2009 and April 2009.

After all observations were complete, activities were classified as critical care services (CCS) or noncritical‐care services (NCCS). NCCSs were further divided into necessary logistics (defined for analysis purposes as the first hour of any NCCS activity) or nonvalue‐added (the second or greater hour of NCCS). A time limit of 1 hour was chosen to define necessary logistics based on a consensus that nonclinical activities optimally would not take more than 1 hour each. We also analyzed results with 2 hours as the cutoff for necessary logistics. Admission, discharge, and transfer records were reviewed to check for returns to the PICU or hospital within 48 hours of transfer or discharge from the PICU.

Analyses were conducted using Microsoft Excel (Microsoft, Redmond, WA) and Stata 10.0 (StataCorp, College Station, TX). The study was approved by the Children's Hospital of Philadelphia Institutional Review Board with waiver of consent.

RESULTS

A total of 824 hours of recordings included 19,887 bed‐hours with 219 unique patients; among them, 2 remained from the first day of recording in January to the last day in April (sample recording in Figure 1). A total of 50 patients (range, 812 per week) stayed for the entirety of each 1‐week observation period. Of the 47 possible activities, 45 of them were recorded for at least 1 hour in the 5 weeks. Overall, 14 activities accounted for 95% of the observed bed‐hours and 31 activities accounted for the remaining 5%. CCS accounted for 82% of observed bed‐hours, NCCS accounted for 10.4%, and empty unassigned accounted for 8% (Figure 2). Using the 1‐hour cutoff for necessary services, 77% of NCCS time was nonvalue‐added, whereas 23% of it was necessary logistics; using the 2‐hour cutoff, 54% was nonvalue‐added, and 46% was necessary logistics.

Figure 1

Figure 2

During the observation period, <1% of bed‐hours were used for CCS for overflow patients from the neonatal ICU (NICU), cardiac care unit (CCU), cardiac ICU (CICU), or progressive care unit (PCU; tracheostomy/ventilator unit). Although only 4 patients required transport to a rehabilitation facility, their wait time comprised 99 hours (<1%) of total recordings. Eight patients waited a mean of 2.6 hours for transportation home (maximum, 10 hours).

To demonstrate the cycle of room use, activities were divided into 4 categories: room preparation, critical care services, disposition pending, and postcritical care services (Figure 3). As an example of detailed data revealed by direct observation, we identified 102 instances totaling 919 hours when a patient was waiting for a bed assignment on another floor (5% of all bed‐hours). The mean wait time was 9 hours (range, 188 hours) and the median time was 5.5 hours. There were only 15 instances when floor bed assignment took 1 hour or less, and only 9 instances when it took 12 hours. Similarly, considerable time was spent on cleaning rooms between patients: only 66 of 146 instances of cleaning took 1 hour or less. The mean time for cleaning was 2.2 hours (range, 115), and the median was 2 hours. (There were 136 recorded instances of room cleaning and 10 additional episodes that were not recorded but had to be completed for the room to turnover from one patient to the next, yielding a total of 146 instances of cleaning.)

Figure 3

From the 824 hours of recording, we identified 200 hours (25% of time) when there were zero empty unassigned beds available in the section of the PICU being observed. Episodes of full occupancy occurred mostly on weekdays, with 23% of hours of full capacity on Thursdays, 21% on Mondays, and 21% on Wednesdays; only 8% were on Saturdays and <1% on Sundays. These 200 hours fell into 36 separate episodes of complete occupancy, each lasting 122 hours. Each patient, on average, received 3.1 hours of NCCS during each episode of full occupancy (range, 111 hours). Within these 200 hours at capacity, we identified only 15 hours (8%) when all 24 beds were used for CCS. For 72% of the time, there was at least 1 bed with NCCS, and for 37% at least 2 beds. A small portion of the time (7%), the lack of beds was affected by occupancy by patients who should have been in the NICU, CICU, CCU, or PCU.

Data collected through direct observation can be used to understand aggregated and averaged experiences, but also more specific time periods. For example, we identified 1 week with the highest consistent level of occupancy and turnover: March 915 had empty unassigned beds for only 4% of the week. Of the 168 hours in the week, 68 (40%) had full capacity. However, for 90% of the time, at least 1 bed was used for a NCCS. Other analytic options included varying the assumptions around time needed for logistics. Overall, NCCS time on necessary logistics changes from 23% to 46% using 1 hour versus 2 hours as the cutoff. For floor bed assignments, assuming that the first hour of this activity is necessary logistics and any hour thereafter is not, 817 hours were wasted. Even after assuming 2 hours of necessary logistical time (which may also include steps such as nursing and physician sign‐out to the receiving team, often not recorded in the observations), this left 715 hours of NCCS time in which patients waited to be placed elsewhere in the hospital. For room cleaning, because recordings were hourly, but room cleaning could take less time, we performed a sensitivity analysis, converting all 1‐hour recordings to half‐hour recordings to half‐hour recordings (an exaggerated shortening since industry‐standard cleaning may take longer).

Of the 219 patients directly observed, 15 were noted to be waiting for a transfer out of the PICU but experienced a change in disposition before the transfer. On average, these patients waited 8 hours for a floor bed assignment (range, 221) before reverting to a CCS, which then lasted an average of 16.5 hours (range, 149). (Included in this group are 2 patients who experienced this change in disposition twice.) In post hoc review across the 5 weeks, no patients were transferred back to the PICU within 48 hours after being transferred out. During the study period, 19 patients were discharged directly from the PICU (8 to home, 7 by transport to another facility, and 4 to rehabilitation). One patient returned to the hospital (but not the PICU) within 48 hours of being discharged home from the PICU.

During the study period, using the highest census value for recorded for each 24‐hour period and the number of beds available that day, median hospital‐wide occupancy was 93% (interquartile range, 90%96%). During the 35 days of observation, 71% of the days had occupancy >90%, 29% of days had occupancy >95%, and 3% of days had occupancy >100%.

DISCUSSION

In this direct observation of a PICU, we found high usage of beds for delivery of CCS. We identified many episodes in which the half of the PICU we observed was fully occupied (200 of 824 hours), but not necessarily delivering PICU‐level care to all patients. In fact, 75% of the full‐capacity hours had at least 1 patient receiving NCCS and 37% had at least 2. Patients waiting for a floor bed assignment represented nearly 5% of bed‐hours observed (mean 9 hours per patient). That full occupancy was not random, but rather clustered on weekdays, is consistent with other work showing that hospitals are at greater risk for midweek crowding due to the way in which scheduled admissions enter and leave.1925

Our methods provide the basis for operational analysis and improvement to patient flow, such as value stream mapping.9, 26 Process improvement work could be directed to areas of delay uncovered through this analysis and inform clinical and nonclinical management. For example, one of the key problems faced by the PICU was finding floor bed assignments for patients leaving the unit. Simply building more beds in the PICU will not solve this problemand at an estimated cost of $2 million to add a bed, it is likely not an efficient means of responding to poor flow. In these cases, the problem seems to lie downstream, and could suggest shortage of regular floor beds or inefficient bed assignment procedures within the hospital. The output also suggests that variation in nonclinical processes should be a target for improvement, such as time to clean rooms, because variation is known to be a source of nonvalue‐added time in many operations.9, 26 High occupancy on weekdays but low occupancy on weekends also emphasizes the potential for smoothing occupancy to reduce the risk of midweek crowding and to better manage bed utilization and staffing.24, 25

When seeking to reduce nonvalue‐added time, one must weigh the risks of increased efficiency against clinical outcomes. For example, if patients could be transferred out of the PICU faster, would the risk of returns to the PICU be higher? In this study, 15 patients (7%) had a change in disposition from awaiting transfer back to a CCS. The fact that transfers did not happen instantaneously may serve as a safety check to reduce rapid returns, but it is not possible for us to evaluate the reasons why patients did not actually complete the pending transfers. Specifically, we cannot determine whether the patient's clinical status objectively deteriorated, the ICU team made a judgment call to hold the patient, or the floor team refused to accept the transfer. Given this fact, although it appears in this study (and in the health care system more broadly) that there are opportunities to increase efficiency and reduce nonvalue‐added time, it is not realistic (nor advisable) that such time be reduced to zero. Along this line, one must consider separately purely nonclinical functions such as room cleaning and those that include some clinical element, such as time waiting for a patient to be transferred.

Beyond the direct findings of this study, the method should be replicable in other settings and can reveal important information about health care efficiency, capacity, and flexibility. The bottlenecks identified would have been difficult to identify through administrative record review. The exact amount of time to spend on observation may vary from place to place and would depend on the expected variation over time and the level of detail sought. In general, the more common the event and the less variation, the less time needed to observe it.

This study has several limitations that should be considered in terms of interpreting the results and in seeking to reproduce the approach. First, hourly recordings may not be discrete enough for events that took less than 1 hour. To assess the degree to which this would affect our results, we reanalyzed all NCCS by subtracting 30 minutes (0.5 hour) from all recordings, which increased total CCS from 82% to 87% and decreased NCCS by the same 5 percentage points. In a related fashion, our recordings were truncated at the start and end of each 1‐week period, so we could only observe a maximum of 168 hours for any given activity and did not record how long an activity was happening before or after the recordings started or stopped, respectively. Second, each recording could only be for 1 activity per hour. Separate from the level of granularity already noted, this also limits interpretation of critical care activities that may have been simultaneous. However, because the goal of the study was not to describe the provision of critical care services, but rather the times when they were not being delivered, this does not influence our conclusions. For movement of patients, however, we missed instances of physician and nursing calling sign‐out on patients to receiving units, as these events last less than 1 hour (and in the case of surgical patients, generally do not occur as the team provides continuous coverage). The time for such events is then included in other activities. To the extent that this may influence the results, it would increase the perceived time for nonvalue‐added services, but to a limited degree, and never by more than 59 minutes. Third, the overnight hours (11:00 _PM to 8:00 _AM) were not directly observed, but retrospectively recorded each morning by reviewing the records and discussing the overnight events with the clinical staff. For example, if a patient was intubated at 11:00 _PM and at 8:00 _AM, the observer would confirm this and record that status for the intervening hours. This is unlikely to result in a substantial impact on the findings, because the overnight hours have a relative degree of stability even for unstable patients in terms of their status of needing or not needing a CCS. Fourth, we did not evaluate the appropriateness of CCS delivered (eg, how long a patient was ventilated). Our definitions for CCS and NCSS were based on Children's Hospital of Philadelphia practices, which may not be the same as those of other facilities. The categorization of CCS was objective for activities such as ventilation or continuous infusion, but was less clear for the not otherwise specified recordings, which represented patients with a complex illness or projected organ, respiratory, cardiac, or neurological failure. These patients were not receiving a specific critical care intervention, but were deemed to need to be in the PICU as opposed to a regular floor (eg, for frequent monitoring of potential respiratory failure). It would also include patients receiving combinations of therapies more efficiently delivered in the PICU. For that, the observers relied on the judgment of clinicians (primarily nurses) to determine whether the patient needed to be in the PICU or not; if no specific reason could be provided, not otherwise specified was applied. These 192 instances accounted for 2982 aggregate bed‐hours (15% of total). It is difficult to judge the direction of bias, because overestimation of need to be in the PICU may be as likely to occur as underestimation. Fifth, the very presence of the observers may have changed behavior. Knowing that they were being observed staff may have acted with greater efficiency than otherwise. We expect that such a finding would lead to less time appearing as necessary logistics or NCCS. Finally, results may not be generalizable to other hospitals or hospital settings. There are clearly important contextual factors, not only for the location but also for the duration. For example, staffing was never an issue during the 5 weeks of observation, but there are locations where an empty bed is not necessarily usable due to lack of staffing. Nonetheless, we believe the results provide a generalizable approach and methodology for other settings (and staffing could be a reason for an empty bed).

In terms of the setting, as noted, we observed one discrete 24‐bed unit, which comprises half of the total PICU. Thus, statements that the PICU was at full capacity must be interpreted in the context that additional rooms may have been available on the other side. Patients are generally admitted alternately to each unit, so the occupancies should parallel each other. We recorded the census every 4 hours for both sides from the electronic system (Sunrise Clinical Manager [SCM]). However, this only accounts for patients physically in beds, not beds held for patients in other locations. Thus, we would expect a discrepancy between direct observation and the SCM value. Through analysis of the entire pediatric intensive care unit,* that part which observed directly, and that which we did not observe directly using census data, we think it reasonable to assert that both units of the total PICU had constrained capacity during the times we directly observed and recorded such constraint on one side.

This study demonstrates the use of direct observation for inpatient settings to learn about resource utilization and identification of value‐added services. PubMed searches for the terms efficiency, flow, process redesign, and time management bring up many more references for operating rooms than for ICUs or inpatient beds. Some examples of ICU‐directed work include videography of an ICU in Australia27 and human factor analysis in ICU nursing.5 Time‐motion studies have also been conducted on clinical staff, such as physicians.28, 29

In conclusion, we found that direct observation provided important insights into the utilization of patient rooms in an important inpatient setting. Data such as these are valuable for clinical and process improvement work, as well as understanding how best to match capacity to patient need. Finally, the methodology is reproducible for other settings and would be an additional tool to measuring and improving the efficiency and value of the health system. When appropriate, this approach can also evaluate the effectiveness of process improvement, help identify and reduce waste,13 and contribute to the growing field that merges operations management with hospital administration and clinical care: in other words, evidence‐based management.30

Ten years ago, leaders in Hospital Medicine saw the need for a peer‐reviewed Hospital Medicine journal, a key step in the growth of the field. However, there was no small amount of uncertainty as to whether there was room for another medical publication, or whether Hospital Medicine was ready for its own journal.

It's clear now that we should not have been worried. Our specialty has grown in size and influence, and the Journal of Hospital Medicine's growth has progressed along a similar track, linked to the success of the many leaders in our field, including the founders of the Society of Hospital Medicine: John Nelson, MD, MHM, Win Whitcomb, MD, MHM, and Bob Wachter, MD, MHM. Support from them in selecting the Founding Editor, Mark V. Williams, ensured his success in assembling an outstanding editorial team, developing JHM's editorial process, and setting this journal as the bestand not just the onlyjournal for hospitalists to publish their work. JHM serves as both a beacon and a mirror for the field of Hospital Medicine, and I am honored for the opportunity to lead this dynamic journal. I also owe special thanks to the Society of Hospital Medicine and the outstanding team at Wiley‐Blackwell, who have made my transition to this role a smooth one.

After the transition, JHM will continue to be a mirror for Hospital Medicine in that it will reflect the scholarship and innovation of hospitalists' scholarly work in research, quality improvement, education, and clinical excellence. From a practical standpoint, this means JHM will continue to do what it has done so successfully to date: provide fair, insightful, and rapid evaluation and publication of articles that are scientifically rigorous and have an impact on hospitalists and their patients. Being an effective mirror also means the journal will need to be in tune with technological advances in publication and learning. Few of us read paper journals any longer, and the move from print to digital and mobile media provides an important opportunity for this journal. Expanding the means by which we disseminate JHM's findings, highlight evidence, and promote knowledge that impacts our field is a clear direction for the journal.

At the transition from JHM 1.0 to JHM 2.0, the journal is positioned to be a beacon for the field by publishing papers that address new and rapidly evolving issues that will affect hospitalists and their patients. JHM and my editorial team eagerly seek submission of manuscripts on these issues delineated below.

Even if health care reform legislation evolves or changes after the 2012 elections, the need to improve health care value across multiple phases of care is unlikely to disappear. The medical home and accountable care organizations will prompt hospitalists to work with outpatient partners to achieve improvements; focus on readmissions and high‐utilization patients may catalyze integration even without larger changes. This evolution plays to hospitalists' traditional strengths as innovators and leaders of health system innovations while erasing the boundaries between inpatient and outpatient phases of care. How the field adapts toor even better, anticipateschanges in care delivery is a momentous opportunity.

Hospitalists will continue to be leaders in quality and safety improvement, but the need to develop innovations that are effective, scalable, and widely adoptable is growing even more acute. Stated alternately, we need to develop innovations quickly and rigorously, so that neither time nor resources are wasted. Fortunately, there is likely to be financial support for projects that link improvement and evaluation from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovations (CMMI). It is a fair bet that a large number of the CMMI's target issues will be ones that hospitalists also find important, and which are ripe for inquiry.

Shifting from quality to outcomes will prompt a revisiting of how we measure our success as hospitalists. Achieving success in process benchmarks will no longer be sufficient, as our practices will increasingly be measured by our patients' experience, functional status, quality of life, and clinical events (of which measures of safety are a part)both within the walls of the hospital and afterwardrather than solely relying on whether patients appropriately received a drug or procedure during their stay. The need to improve outcomes will immediately bump up against the disappointingly small proportion of measures or evidence that apply to the typical Hospital Medicine patient. Developing these new measures, and the evidence for how to improve them, will be a key challenge for the field of Hospital Medicine. Outcome development and comparisons are a clear focus of the Patient‐Centered Outcomes Research Institute. Again, studies documenting such research will find a welcome home at JHM.

The role of information technology in how hospitalists provide care to patients, decide on best practices, communicate with physicians and patients, and manage their practices is becoming central. A huge, nationwide natural experiment is underway as health systems work to meet meaningful use criteria, and oftentimes hospitalists are central to these efforts. Disseminating best practices, implementing innovative systems, and creating workflows that meet the needs of hospitalists' patients is a key short‐term need, and one our field is uniquely positioned to address.

Finally, the practice of Hospital Medicine continues to evolve. In teaching centers, hospitalists are leading educators of medical students and residents; developing training models that reflect newer thinking about how to teach a 21^st‐century physician is a key need for the field. The importance of adaptations to work‐hour reductions for residents cannot be overstated, but attention must be paid to how hospitalists' work hours impact patient care as well. Comanagement systemswhether for medical subspecialties (ie, cancer or heart failure) or surgical specialtieshave yet to fulfill their promise, yet demand for comanagement grows. How might comanagement systems be adapted and targeted so that they become more effective?

Not being a futurist or even slightly omniscient, I am sure this list is neither exhaustive nor final. In my 15 or so years in Hospital Medicine, I know firsthand that the field is vigorous, innovative, and full of surprises. Fortunately, JHM is attuned to changes happening now as well as issues on the horizon, and will always strive to be an even better messenger for Hospital Medicine as a professional and academic specialty.1 In that way, JHM 2.0 will be the same as JHM 1.0. I'm excited to shepherd JHM's ongoing growth and look forward to my years at the helm.

Ten years ago, leaders in Hospital Medicine saw the need for a peer‐reviewed Hospital Medicine journal, a key step in the growth of the field. However, there was no small amount of uncertainty as to whether there was room for another medical publication, or whether Hospital Medicine was ready for its own journal.

It's clear now that we should not have been worried. Our specialty has grown in size and influence, and the Journal of Hospital Medicine's growth has progressed along a similar track, linked to the success of the many leaders in our field, including the founders of the Society of Hospital Medicine: John Nelson, MD, MHM, Win Whitcomb, MD, MHM, and Bob Wachter, MD, MHM. Support from them in selecting the Founding Editor, Mark V. Williams, ensured his success in assembling an outstanding editorial team, developing JHM's editorial process, and setting this journal as the bestand not just the onlyjournal for hospitalists to publish their work. JHM serves as both a beacon and a mirror for the field of Hospital Medicine, and I am honored for the opportunity to lead this dynamic journal. I also owe special thanks to the Society of Hospital Medicine and the outstanding team at Wiley‐Blackwell, who have made my transition to this role a smooth one.

After the transition, JHM will continue to be a mirror for Hospital Medicine in that it will reflect the scholarship and innovation of hospitalists' scholarly work in research, quality improvement, education, and clinical excellence. From a practical standpoint, this means JHM will continue to do what it has done so successfully to date: provide fair, insightful, and rapid evaluation and publication of articles that are scientifically rigorous and have an impact on hospitalists and their patients. Being an effective mirror also means the journal will need to be in tune with technological advances in publication and learning. Few of us read paper journals any longer, and the move from print to digital and mobile media provides an important opportunity for this journal. Expanding the means by which we disseminate JHM's findings, highlight evidence, and promote knowledge that impacts our field is a clear direction for the journal.

At the transition from JHM 1.0 to JHM 2.0, the journal is positioned to be a beacon for the field by publishing papers that address new and rapidly evolving issues that will affect hospitalists and their patients. JHM and my editorial team eagerly seek submission of manuscripts on these issues delineated below.

Even if health care reform legislation evolves or changes after the 2012 elections, the need to improve health care value across multiple phases of care is unlikely to disappear. The medical home and accountable care organizations will prompt hospitalists to work with outpatient partners to achieve improvements; focus on readmissions and high‐utilization patients may catalyze integration even without larger changes. This evolution plays to hospitalists' traditional strengths as innovators and leaders of health system innovations while erasing the boundaries between inpatient and outpatient phases of care. How the field adapts toor even better, anticipateschanges in care delivery is a momentous opportunity.

Hospitalists will continue to be leaders in quality and safety improvement, but the need to develop innovations that are effective, scalable, and widely adoptable is growing even more acute. Stated alternately, we need to develop innovations quickly and rigorously, so that neither time nor resources are wasted. Fortunately, there is likely to be financial support for projects that link improvement and evaluation from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovations (CMMI). It is a fair bet that a large number of the CMMI's target issues will be ones that hospitalists also find important, and which are ripe for inquiry.

Shifting from quality to outcomes will prompt a revisiting of how we measure our success as hospitalists. Achieving success in process benchmarks will no longer be sufficient, as our practices will increasingly be measured by our patients' experience, functional status, quality of life, and clinical events (of which measures of safety are a part)both within the walls of the hospital and afterwardrather than solely relying on whether patients appropriately received a drug or procedure during their stay. The need to improve outcomes will immediately bump up against the disappointingly small proportion of measures or evidence that apply to the typical Hospital Medicine patient. Developing these new measures, and the evidence for how to improve them, will be a key challenge for the field of Hospital Medicine. Outcome development and comparisons are a clear focus of the Patient‐Centered Outcomes Research Institute. Again, studies documenting such research will find a welcome home at JHM.

The role of information technology in how hospitalists provide care to patients, decide on best practices, communicate with physicians and patients, and manage their practices is becoming central. A huge, nationwide natural experiment is underway as health systems work to meet meaningful use criteria, and oftentimes hospitalists are central to these efforts. Disseminating best practices, implementing innovative systems, and creating workflows that meet the needs of hospitalists' patients is a key short‐term need, and one our field is uniquely positioned to address.

Finally, the practice of Hospital Medicine continues to evolve. In teaching centers, hospitalists are leading educators of medical students and residents; developing training models that reflect newer thinking about how to teach a 21^st‐century physician is a key need for the field. The importance of adaptations to work‐hour reductions for residents cannot be overstated, but attention must be paid to how hospitalists' work hours impact patient care as well. Comanagement systemswhether for medical subspecialties (ie, cancer or heart failure) or surgical specialtieshave yet to fulfill their promise, yet demand for comanagement grows. How might comanagement systems be adapted and targeted so that they become more effective?

Not being a futurist or even slightly omniscient, I am sure this list is neither exhaustive nor final. In my 15 or so years in Hospital Medicine, I know firsthand that the field is vigorous, innovative, and full of surprises. Fortunately, JHM is attuned to changes happening now as well as issues on the horizon, and will always strive to be an even better messenger for Hospital Medicine as a professional and academic specialty.1 In that way, JHM 2.0 will be the same as JHM 1.0. I'm excited to shepherd JHM's ongoing growth and look forward to my years at the helm.

Ten years ago, leaders in Hospital Medicine saw the need for a peer‐reviewed Hospital Medicine journal, a key step in the growth of the field. However, there was no small amount of uncertainty as to whether there was room for another medical publication, or whether Hospital Medicine was ready for its own journal.

It's clear now that we should not have been worried. Our specialty has grown in size and influence, and the Journal of Hospital Medicine's growth has progressed along a similar track, linked to the success of the many leaders in our field, including the founders of the Society of Hospital Medicine: John Nelson, MD, MHM, Win Whitcomb, MD, MHM, and Bob Wachter, MD, MHM. Support from them in selecting the Founding Editor, Mark V. Williams, ensured his success in assembling an outstanding editorial team, developing JHM's editorial process, and setting this journal as the bestand not just the onlyjournal for hospitalists to publish their work. JHM serves as both a beacon and a mirror for the field of Hospital Medicine, and I am honored for the opportunity to lead this dynamic journal. I also owe special thanks to the Society of Hospital Medicine and the outstanding team at Wiley‐Blackwell, who have made my transition to this role a smooth one.

After the transition, JHM will continue to be a mirror for Hospital Medicine in that it will reflect the scholarship and innovation of hospitalists' scholarly work in research, quality improvement, education, and clinical excellence. From a practical standpoint, this means JHM will continue to do what it has done so successfully to date: provide fair, insightful, and rapid evaluation and publication of articles that are scientifically rigorous and have an impact on hospitalists and their patients. Being an effective mirror also means the journal will need to be in tune with technological advances in publication and learning. Few of us read paper journals any longer, and the move from print to digital and mobile media provides an important opportunity for this journal. Expanding the means by which we disseminate JHM's findings, highlight evidence, and promote knowledge that impacts our field is a clear direction for the journal.

At the transition from JHM 1.0 to JHM 2.0, the journal is positioned to be a beacon for the field by publishing papers that address new and rapidly evolving issues that will affect hospitalists and their patients. JHM and my editorial team eagerly seek submission of manuscripts on these issues delineated below.

Even if health care reform legislation evolves or changes after the 2012 elections, the need to improve health care value across multiple phases of care is unlikely to disappear. The medical home and accountable care organizations will prompt hospitalists to work with outpatient partners to achieve improvements; focus on readmissions and high‐utilization patients may catalyze integration even without larger changes. This evolution plays to hospitalists' traditional strengths as innovators and leaders of health system innovations while erasing the boundaries between inpatient and outpatient phases of care. How the field adapts toor even better, anticipateschanges in care delivery is a momentous opportunity.

Hospitalists will continue to be leaders in quality and safety improvement, but the need to develop innovations that are effective, scalable, and widely adoptable is growing even more acute. Stated alternately, we need to develop innovations quickly and rigorously, so that neither time nor resources are wasted. Fortunately, there is likely to be financial support for projects that link improvement and evaluation from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovations (CMMI). It is a fair bet that a large number of the CMMI's target issues will be ones that hospitalists also find important, and which are ripe for inquiry.

Shifting from quality to outcomes will prompt a revisiting of how we measure our success as hospitalists. Achieving success in process benchmarks will no longer be sufficient, as our practices will increasingly be measured by our patients' experience, functional status, quality of life, and clinical events (of which measures of safety are a part)both within the walls of the hospital and afterwardrather than solely relying on whether patients appropriately received a drug or procedure during their stay. The need to improve outcomes will immediately bump up against the disappointingly small proportion of measures or evidence that apply to the typical Hospital Medicine patient. Developing these new measures, and the evidence for how to improve them, will be a key challenge for the field of Hospital Medicine. Outcome development and comparisons are a clear focus of the Patient‐Centered Outcomes Research Institute. Again, studies documenting such research will find a welcome home at JHM.

The role of information technology in how hospitalists provide care to patients, decide on best practices, communicate with physicians and patients, and manage their practices is becoming central. A huge, nationwide natural experiment is underway as health systems work to meet meaningful use criteria, and oftentimes hospitalists are central to these efforts. Disseminating best practices, implementing innovative systems, and creating workflows that meet the needs of hospitalists' patients is a key short‐term need, and one our field is uniquely positioned to address.

Finally, the practice of Hospital Medicine continues to evolve. In teaching centers, hospitalists are leading educators of medical students and residents; developing training models that reflect newer thinking about how to teach a 21^st‐century physician is a key need for the field. The importance of adaptations to work‐hour reductions for residents cannot be overstated, but attention must be paid to how hospitalists' work hours impact patient care as well. Comanagement systemswhether for medical subspecialties (ie, cancer or heart failure) or surgical specialtieshave yet to fulfill their promise, yet demand for comanagement grows. How might comanagement systems be adapted and targeted so that they become more effective?

Not being a futurist or even slightly omniscient, I am sure this list is neither exhaustive nor final. In my 15 or so years in Hospital Medicine, I know firsthand that the field is vigorous, innovative, and full of surprises. Fortunately, JHM is attuned to changes happening now as well as issues on the horizon, and will always strive to be an even better messenger for Hospital Medicine as a professional and academic specialty.1 In that way, JHM 2.0 will be the same as JHM 1.0. I'm excited to shepherd JHM's ongoing growth and look forward to my years at the helm.