User login
Guidelines for today and tomorrow
In this edition of “How I Will Treat My Next Patient,” I review “guidelines for today” and speculate about “guidelines for tomorrow,” highlighting recommendations from the American Society of Clinical Oncology about hereditary cancer testing in epithelial ovarian cancer (OC) and data that support a reexamination of the age at which screening for colorectal cancer (CRC) should begin.
ASCO guidelines on genetic testing in epithelial ovarian cancer
After reviewing 19 studies, including 6 meta-analyses; 11 randomized, controlled trials; and 2 observational studies, an ASCO panel recommended germline genetic testing for BRCA1, BRCA2, and other ovarian cancer susceptibility genes for all women with newly diagnosed epithelial OC, regardless of family history (J Clin Oncol. 2020 Jan 27. doi: 10.1200/JCO.19.02960).
For OC patients with a germline mutation, cascade testing of first- and second-degree relatives was strongly urged. For patients without a germline mutation, the guidelines recommended offering somatic tumor testing for BRCA1/2 pathogenic or likely pathogenic variants at disease recurrence or after initial therapy and for mismatch repair deficiency (MMRD) in patients with clear cell, endometrioid, or mucinous and potentially other histologic types of OC. The authors cautioned that the discussion of testing results should involve professionals with expertise in the surveillance and management of hereditary cancer syndromes.
The panel said the discovery of germline or somatic pathogenic or likely pathogenic BRCA1/2 variants should lead to considering treatment with Food and Drug Administration–approved poly (ADP-ribose) polymerase inhibitors, including niraparib, olaparib, and rucaparib. Identification of MMRD in a patient with recurrent OC should trigger consideration of treatment with pembrolizumab, consistent with its labeled indications, and surveillance for other malignancies.
The guidelines cautioned that, when patients have variants of uncertain significance on germline testing, “clinical features and family history should inform clinical decision making.” Similarly, the panel made no recommendation regarding testing for or making treatment decisions based on tests for homologous recombination deficiency.
How these results influence practice
Every oncologist recognizes that better understanding of cancer biology can guide personalized diagnostic, predictive, prognostic, and therapeutic strategies for patients and their family members.
It is estimated that approximately 25% of all OC is caused by a heritable genetic condition. Germline mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2 are identified in 13%-15% of patients with OC, and somatic mutations are found in an additional 7%. Perhaps 6% of all ovarian/fallopian tube/peritoneal cancers are caused by mutations in genes other than BRCA1/2. For that reason, germline sequencing should be performed via multigene panels that assess BRCA1/2 and other relevant mutations.
MMDR has been found in 10%-12% of unselected epithelial OC, with increased representation in nonserous histologies. That frequency is high enough to justify testing for it routinely.
Unfortunately, only about 30% of women undergo genetic testing. Given the frequency of molecular abnormalities in OC, this is problematic in every conceivable domain of clinical care for patients and family members. ASCO’s comprehensive, educational guidelines provide a template for shared decision making and utilize resources that are available in almost all clinical settings. For those clinicians who have recommended genetic testing for all epithelial OC patients, these guidelines are practice reaffirming. For the rest of us, they are practice changing.
Colorectal cancer cases spike after start of routine screening
Instead of examining CRC incidence by the usual 5- or 10-year age ranges, a group of researchers looked at CRC incidence in 1-year intervals for adults aged 30-60 years in the SEER-18 registry from 2000 to 2015 (JAMA Network Open. 2020 Jan 31. doi: 10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2019.20407). The researchers focused their attention on the transition between age 49 and 50 years, which is when routine screening generally begins and case-finding based on symptoms and signs of CRC alone ideally ends.
The group’s hypothesis was that steep increases in CRC incidence between ages 49 and 50 would be consistent with a high, undetected preclinical case burden in patients aged younger than 50 years and that this “real-world” registry data could help estimate outcomes of screening at younger ages. The researchers found that CRC incidence increased by 46.1% in the transition period from age 49 to 50 years. A majority (93%) of these cases were invasive and, therefore, likely to be clinically relevant. The increase in cancer rates occurred across geographical regions, gender, and race, and likely reflected the impact of screening. The states with the steepest increases in CRC between ages 49 and 50 (Connecticut and Utah) were the states with the first and third highest CRC screening rates for individuals 50 years of age and older.
Stage stratification showed steep increases in incidence in the target age range for localized and regional CRC and for colon and rectal tumors. In the transition between age 49 and 50, the researchers found a significant increase in 5-year relative survival (6.9% absolute increase, 10% relative increase), suggesting that earlier screening had a survival impact, apart from the effects of treatment in cases diagnosed after symptoms occurred.
The authors concluded that their analysis of the transition from age 49 to 50 years provides registry-based data regarding CRC risk among individuals younger than 50, which can add to existing modeling studies to help inform guidelines about the age at which to initiate screening.
How these results influence practice
Early-onset CRC (EOCRC) incidence is increasing, with controversy regarding whether average-risk screening should begin before age 50 years. The justification for starting screening at age 50 is that there is a near doubling of incidence from patients aged 45-49 years (34 per 100,000) to those aged 50-54 years (60.2 per 100,000).
However, the increase in CRC incidence beyond age 50 may not be because rates are truly lower among younger individuals but rather because of uneven screening between the two populations. Doubling times for CRCs have been estimated to be perhaps as long as 1,000 days. Because many CRCs are asymptomatic, observed incidence rates of EOCRC in SEER registries do not reflect preclinical CRC case burdens in younger patients.
The current interrogation of SEER-18 data to identify preexisting CRC that was clinically silent in the 1-year interval between age 49 and 50 is highly supportive of a large undiagnosed number of EOCRC cases. In SEER-18, CRC rates increased 46.1% in this 1-year age transition, more than in earlier 1-year age transitions. With almost 93% of cases being invasive, these data suggest a high case burden of preclinical, undetected, clinically relevant EOCRC in younger patients that is not reflected in observed SEER incidence rates examining wider age group intervals.
The dual goals of screening for CRC are to prevent malignant neoplasms by the removal of precancerous polyps and improve cancer-specific survival. The data presented suggest that, by starting average-risk screening at age 50 years, we may be “missing the window.” The 6.9% absolute and 10.1% relative survival increase in the target transition period suggest the authors’ hypothesis is correct.
As in any real-world database survey, the analysis is limited by a lack of specific outcomes data, the inability to determine when the cancers developed, and how long they germinated. Because of those limitations and others, more detailed studies are needed to determine the ideal age at which to begin CRC screening.
Modeling studies incorporating the steep incidence inflection point at 49-50 years can be conducted to estimate the incidence rate increase at, for example, 45 years; the cost-benefit ratio; quality-adjusted life-years gained; and other important endpoints. However, this review of over 170,000 cases of CRC, with a data-completeness rate of over 98%, over the 15-year time frame when CRC screening became common, supports a fresh look at whether it is within our power to improve outcomes for EOCRC patients by using existing technology but applying it earlier.
Dr. Lyss has been a community-based medical oncologist and clinical researcher for more than 35 years, practicing in St. Louis. His clinical and research interests are in the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of breast and lung cancers and in expanding access to clinical trials to medically underserved populations.
In this edition of “How I Will Treat My Next Patient,” I review “guidelines for today” and speculate about “guidelines for tomorrow,” highlighting recommendations from the American Society of Clinical Oncology about hereditary cancer testing in epithelial ovarian cancer (OC) and data that support a reexamination of the age at which screening for colorectal cancer (CRC) should begin.
ASCO guidelines on genetic testing in epithelial ovarian cancer
After reviewing 19 studies, including 6 meta-analyses; 11 randomized, controlled trials; and 2 observational studies, an ASCO panel recommended germline genetic testing for BRCA1, BRCA2, and other ovarian cancer susceptibility genes for all women with newly diagnosed epithelial OC, regardless of family history (J Clin Oncol. 2020 Jan 27. doi: 10.1200/JCO.19.02960).
For OC patients with a germline mutation, cascade testing of first- and second-degree relatives was strongly urged. For patients without a germline mutation, the guidelines recommended offering somatic tumor testing for BRCA1/2 pathogenic or likely pathogenic variants at disease recurrence or after initial therapy and for mismatch repair deficiency (MMRD) in patients with clear cell, endometrioid, or mucinous and potentially other histologic types of OC. The authors cautioned that the discussion of testing results should involve professionals with expertise in the surveillance and management of hereditary cancer syndromes.
The panel said the discovery of germline or somatic pathogenic or likely pathogenic BRCA1/2 variants should lead to considering treatment with Food and Drug Administration–approved poly (ADP-ribose) polymerase inhibitors, including niraparib, olaparib, and rucaparib. Identification of MMRD in a patient with recurrent OC should trigger consideration of treatment with pembrolizumab, consistent with its labeled indications, and surveillance for other malignancies.
The guidelines cautioned that, when patients have variants of uncertain significance on germline testing, “clinical features and family history should inform clinical decision making.” Similarly, the panel made no recommendation regarding testing for or making treatment decisions based on tests for homologous recombination deficiency.
How these results influence practice
Every oncologist recognizes that better understanding of cancer biology can guide personalized diagnostic, predictive, prognostic, and therapeutic strategies for patients and their family members.
It is estimated that approximately 25% of all OC is caused by a heritable genetic condition. Germline mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2 are identified in 13%-15% of patients with OC, and somatic mutations are found in an additional 7%. Perhaps 6% of all ovarian/fallopian tube/peritoneal cancers are caused by mutations in genes other than BRCA1/2. For that reason, germline sequencing should be performed via multigene panels that assess BRCA1/2 and other relevant mutations.
MMDR has been found in 10%-12% of unselected epithelial OC, with increased representation in nonserous histologies. That frequency is high enough to justify testing for it routinely.
Unfortunately, only about 30% of women undergo genetic testing. Given the frequency of molecular abnormalities in OC, this is problematic in every conceivable domain of clinical care for patients and family members. ASCO’s comprehensive, educational guidelines provide a template for shared decision making and utilize resources that are available in almost all clinical settings. For those clinicians who have recommended genetic testing for all epithelial OC patients, these guidelines are practice reaffirming. For the rest of us, they are practice changing.
Colorectal cancer cases spike after start of routine screening
Instead of examining CRC incidence by the usual 5- or 10-year age ranges, a group of researchers looked at CRC incidence in 1-year intervals for adults aged 30-60 years in the SEER-18 registry from 2000 to 2015 (JAMA Network Open. 2020 Jan 31. doi: 10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2019.20407). The researchers focused their attention on the transition between age 49 and 50 years, which is when routine screening generally begins and case-finding based on symptoms and signs of CRC alone ideally ends.
The group’s hypothesis was that steep increases in CRC incidence between ages 49 and 50 would be consistent with a high, undetected preclinical case burden in patients aged younger than 50 years and that this “real-world” registry data could help estimate outcomes of screening at younger ages. The researchers found that CRC incidence increased by 46.1% in the transition period from age 49 to 50 years. A majority (93%) of these cases were invasive and, therefore, likely to be clinically relevant. The increase in cancer rates occurred across geographical regions, gender, and race, and likely reflected the impact of screening. The states with the steepest increases in CRC between ages 49 and 50 (Connecticut and Utah) were the states with the first and third highest CRC screening rates for individuals 50 years of age and older.
Stage stratification showed steep increases in incidence in the target age range for localized and regional CRC and for colon and rectal tumors. In the transition between age 49 and 50, the researchers found a significant increase in 5-year relative survival (6.9% absolute increase, 10% relative increase), suggesting that earlier screening had a survival impact, apart from the effects of treatment in cases diagnosed after symptoms occurred.
The authors concluded that their analysis of the transition from age 49 to 50 years provides registry-based data regarding CRC risk among individuals younger than 50, which can add to existing modeling studies to help inform guidelines about the age at which to initiate screening.
How these results influence practice
Early-onset CRC (EOCRC) incidence is increasing, with controversy regarding whether average-risk screening should begin before age 50 years. The justification for starting screening at age 50 is that there is a near doubling of incidence from patients aged 45-49 years (34 per 100,000) to those aged 50-54 years (60.2 per 100,000).
However, the increase in CRC incidence beyond age 50 may not be because rates are truly lower among younger individuals but rather because of uneven screening between the two populations. Doubling times for CRCs have been estimated to be perhaps as long as 1,000 days. Because many CRCs are asymptomatic, observed incidence rates of EOCRC in SEER registries do not reflect preclinical CRC case burdens in younger patients.
The current interrogation of SEER-18 data to identify preexisting CRC that was clinically silent in the 1-year interval between age 49 and 50 is highly supportive of a large undiagnosed number of EOCRC cases. In SEER-18, CRC rates increased 46.1% in this 1-year age transition, more than in earlier 1-year age transitions. With almost 93% of cases being invasive, these data suggest a high case burden of preclinical, undetected, clinically relevant EOCRC in younger patients that is not reflected in observed SEER incidence rates examining wider age group intervals.
The dual goals of screening for CRC are to prevent malignant neoplasms by the removal of precancerous polyps and improve cancer-specific survival. The data presented suggest that, by starting average-risk screening at age 50 years, we may be “missing the window.” The 6.9% absolute and 10.1% relative survival increase in the target transition period suggest the authors’ hypothesis is correct.
As in any real-world database survey, the analysis is limited by a lack of specific outcomes data, the inability to determine when the cancers developed, and how long they germinated. Because of those limitations and others, more detailed studies are needed to determine the ideal age at which to begin CRC screening.
Modeling studies incorporating the steep incidence inflection point at 49-50 years can be conducted to estimate the incidence rate increase at, for example, 45 years; the cost-benefit ratio; quality-adjusted life-years gained; and other important endpoints. However, this review of over 170,000 cases of CRC, with a data-completeness rate of over 98%, over the 15-year time frame when CRC screening became common, supports a fresh look at whether it is within our power to improve outcomes for EOCRC patients by using existing technology but applying it earlier.
Dr. Lyss has been a community-based medical oncologist and clinical researcher for more than 35 years, practicing in St. Louis. His clinical and research interests are in the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of breast and lung cancers and in expanding access to clinical trials to medically underserved populations.
In this edition of “How I Will Treat My Next Patient,” I review “guidelines for today” and speculate about “guidelines for tomorrow,” highlighting recommendations from the American Society of Clinical Oncology about hereditary cancer testing in epithelial ovarian cancer (OC) and data that support a reexamination of the age at which screening for colorectal cancer (CRC) should begin.
ASCO guidelines on genetic testing in epithelial ovarian cancer
After reviewing 19 studies, including 6 meta-analyses; 11 randomized, controlled trials; and 2 observational studies, an ASCO panel recommended germline genetic testing for BRCA1, BRCA2, and other ovarian cancer susceptibility genes for all women with newly diagnosed epithelial OC, regardless of family history (J Clin Oncol. 2020 Jan 27. doi: 10.1200/JCO.19.02960).
For OC patients with a germline mutation, cascade testing of first- and second-degree relatives was strongly urged. For patients without a germline mutation, the guidelines recommended offering somatic tumor testing for BRCA1/2 pathogenic or likely pathogenic variants at disease recurrence or after initial therapy and for mismatch repair deficiency (MMRD) in patients with clear cell, endometrioid, or mucinous and potentially other histologic types of OC. The authors cautioned that the discussion of testing results should involve professionals with expertise in the surveillance and management of hereditary cancer syndromes.
The panel said the discovery of germline or somatic pathogenic or likely pathogenic BRCA1/2 variants should lead to considering treatment with Food and Drug Administration–approved poly (ADP-ribose) polymerase inhibitors, including niraparib, olaparib, and rucaparib. Identification of MMRD in a patient with recurrent OC should trigger consideration of treatment with pembrolizumab, consistent with its labeled indications, and surveillance for other malignancies.
The guidelines cautioned that, when patients have variants of uncertain significance on germline testing, “clinical features and family history should inform clinical decision making.” Similarly, the panel made no recommendation regarding testing for or making treatment decisions based on tests for homologous recombination deficiency.
How these results influence practice
Every oncologist recognizes that better understanding of cancer biology can guide personalized diagnostic, predictive, prognostic, and therapeutic strategies for patients and their family members.
It is estimated that approximately 25% of all OC is caused by a heritable genetic condition. Germline mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2 are identified in 13%-15% of patients with OC, and somatic mutations are found in an additional 7%. Perhaps 6% of all ovarian/fallopian tube/peritoneal cancers are caused by mutations in genes other than BRCA1/2. For that reason, germline sequencing should be performed via multigene panels that assess BRCA1/2 and other relevant mutations.
MMDR has been found in 10%-12% of unselected epithelial OC, with increased representation in nonserous histologies. That frequency is high enough to justify testing for it routinely.
Unfortunately, only about 30% of women undergo genetic testing. Given the frequency of molecular abnormalities in OC, this is problematic in every conceivable domain of clinical care for patients and family members. ASCO’s comprehensive, educational guidelines provide a template for shared decision making and utilize resources that are available in almost all clinical settings. For those clinicians who have recommended genetic testing for all epithelial OC patients, these guidelines are practice reaffirming. For the rest of us, they are practice changing.
Colorectal cancer cases spike after start of routine screening
Instead of examining CRC incidence by the usual 5- or 10-year age ranges, a group of researchers looked at CRC incidence in 1-year intervals for adults aged 30-60 years in the SEER-18 registry from 2000 to 2015 (JAMA Network Open. 2020 Jan 31. doi: 10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2019.20407). The researchers focused their attention on the transition between age 49 and 50 years, which is when routine screening generally begins and case-finding based on symptoms and signs of CRC alone ideally ends.
The group’s hypothesis was that steep increases in CRC incidence between ages 49 and 50 would be consistent with a high, undetected preclinical case burden in patients aged younger than 50 years and that this “real-world” registry data could help estimate outcomes of screening at younger ages. The researchers found that CRC incidence increased by 46.1% in the transition period from age 49 to 50 years. A majority (93%) of these cases were invasive and, therefore, likely to be clinically relevant. The increase in cancer rates occurred across geographical regions, gender, and race, and likely reflected the impact of screening. The states with the steepest increases in CRC between ages 49 and 50 (Connecticut and Utah) were the states with the first and third highest CRC screening rates for individuals 50 years of age and older.
Stage stratification showed steep increases in incidence in the target age range for localized and regional CRC and for colon and rectal tumors. In the transition between age 49 and 50, the researchers found a significant increase in 5-year relative survival (6.9% absolute increase, 10% relative increase), suggesting that earlier screening had a survival impact, apart from the effects of treatment in cases diagnosed after symptoms occurred.
The authors concluded that their analysis of the transition from age 49 to 50 years provides registry-based data regarding CRC risk among individuals younger than 50, which can add to existing modeling studies to help inform guidelines about the age at which to initiate screening.
How these results influence practice
Early-onset CRC (EOCRC) incidence is increasing, with controversy regarding whether average-risk screening should begin before age 50 years. The justification for starting screening at age 50 is that there is a near doubling of incidence from patients aged 45-49 years (34 per 100,000) to those aged 50-54 years (60.2 per 100,000).
However, the increase in CRC incidence beyond age 50 may not be because rates are truly lower among younger individuals but rather because of uneven screening between the two populations. Doubling times for CRCs have been estimated to be perhaps as long as 1,000 days. Because many CRCs are asymptomatic, observed incidence rates of EOCRC in SEER registries do not reflect preclinical CRC case burdens in younger patients.
The current interrogation of SEER-18 data to identify preexisting CRC that was clinically silent in the 1-year interval between age 49 and 50 is highly supportive of a large undiagnosed number of EOCRC cases. In SEER-18, CRC rates increased 46.1% in this 1-year age transition, more than in earlier 1-year age transitions. With almost 93% of cases being invasive, these data suggest a high case burden of preclinical, undetected, clinically relevant EOCRC in younger patients that is not reflected in observed SEER incidence rates examining wider age group intervals.
The dual goals of screening for CRC are to prevent malignant neoplasms by the removal of precancerous polyps and improve cancer-specific survival. The data presented suggest that, by starting average-risk screening at age 50 years, we may be “missing the window.” The 6.9% absolute and 10.1% relative survival increase in the target transition period suggest the authors’ hypothesis is correct.
As in any real-world database survey, the analysis is limited by a lack of specific outcomes data, the inability to determine when the cancers developed, and how long they germinated. Because of those limitations and others, more detailed studies are needed to determine the ideal age at which to begin CRC screening.
Modeling studies incorporating the steep incidence inflection point at 49-50 years can be conducted to estimate the incidence rate increase at, for example, 45 years; the cost-benefit ratio; quality-adjusted life-years gained; and other important endpoints. However, this review of over 170,000 cases of CRC, with a data-completeness rate of over 98%, over the 15-year time frame when CRC screening became common, supports a fresh look at whether it is within our power to improve outcomes for EOCRC patients by using existing technology but applying it earlier.
Dr. Lyss has been a community-based medical oncologist and clinical researcher for more than 35 years, practicing in St. Louis. His clinical and research interests are in the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of breast and lung cancers and in expanding access to clinical trials to medically underserved populations.
‘Momentous’ USMLE change: New pass/fail format stuns medicine
News that the United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE) program will change its Step 1 scoring from a 3-digit number to pass/fail starting Jan. 1, 2022, has set off a flurry of shocked responses from students and physicians.
J. Bryan Carmody, MD, MPH, an assistant professor at Eastern Virginia Medical School in Norfolk, said in an interview that he was “stunned” when he heard the news on Wednesday and said the switch presents “the single biggest opportunity for medical school education reform since the Flexner Report,” which in 1910 established standards for modern medical education.
Numbers will continue for some tests
The USMLE cosponsors – the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) and the National Board of Medical Examiners (NBME) – said that the Step 2 Clinical Knowledge (CK) exam and Step 3 will continue to be scored numerically. Step 2 Clinical Skills (CS) will continue its pass/fail system.
The change was made after Step 1 had been roundly criticized as playing too big a role in the process of becoming a physician and for causing students to study for the test instead of engaging fully in their medical education.
Ramie Fathy, a third-year medical student at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, currently studying for Step 1, said in an interview that it would have been nice personally to have the pass/fail choice, but he predicts both good and unintended consequences in the change.
The positive news, Mr. Fathy said, is that less emphasis will be put on the Step 1 test, which includes memorizing basic science details that may or not be relevant depending on later specialty choice.
“It’s not necessarily measuring what the test makers intended, which was whether or not a student can understand and apply basic science concepts to the practice of medicine,” he said.
“The current system encourages students to get as high a score as possible, which – after a certain point – translates to memorizing many little details that become increasingly less practically relevant,” Mr. Fathy said.
Pressure may move elsewhere?
However, Mr. Fathy worries that, without a scoring system to help decide who stands out in Step 1, residency program directors will depend more on the reputation of candidates’ medical school and the clout of the person writing a letter of recommendation – factors that are often influenced by family resources and social standing. That could wedge a further economic divide into the path to becoming a physician.
Mr. Fathy said he and fellow students are watching for information on what the passing bar will be and what happens with Step 2 Clinical Knowledge exam. USMLE has promised more information as soon as it is available.
“The question is whether that test will replace Step 1 as the standardized metric of student competency,” Mr. Fathy said, which would put more pressure on students further down the medical path.
Will Step 2 anxiety increase?
Dr. Carmody agreed that there is the danger that students now will spend their time studying for Step 2 CK at the expense of other parts of their education.
Meaningful reform will depend on the pass/fail move being coupled with other reforms, most importantly application caps, said Dr. Carmody, who teaches preclinical medical students and works with the residency program.
He has been blogging about Step 1 pass/fail for the past year.
Currently students can apply for as many residencies as they can pay for and Carmody said the number of applications per student has been rising over the past decade.
“That puts program directors under an impossible burden,” he said. “With our Step 1-based system, there’s significant inequality in the number of interviews people get. Programs end up overinviting the same group of people who look good on paper.”
People outside that group respond by sending more applications than they need to just to get a few interviews, Dr. Carmody added.
With caps, students would have an incentive to apply to only those programs in which they had a sincere interest, he said. Program directors also would then be better able to evaluate each application.
Switching Step 1 to pass/fail may have some effect on medical school burnout, Dr. Carmody said.
“It’s one thing to work hard when you’re on call and your patients depend on it,” he said. “But I would have a hard time staying up late every night studying something that I know in my heart is not going to help my patients, but I have to do it because I have to do better than the person who’s studying in the apartment next to me.”
Test has strayed from original purpose
Joseph Safdieh, MD, an assistant dean for clinical curriculum and director of the medical student neurology clerkship for the Weill Cornell Medicine, New York, sees the move as positive overall.
“We should not be using any single metric to define or describe our students’ overall profile,” he said in an interview.
“This has been a very significant anxiety point for our medical students for quite a number of years,” Dr. Safdieh said. “They were frustrated that their entire 4 years of medical school seemingly came down to one number.”
The test was created originally as one of three parts of licensure, he pointed out.
“Over the past 10 or 15 years, the exam has morphed to become a litmus test for very specific residency programs,” he said.
However, Dr. Safdieh has concerns that Step 2 will cultivate the same anxiety and may get too big a spotlight without the Step 1 metric, “although one could argue that test does more accurately reflect clinical material,” he said.
He also worries that students who have selected a specialty by the time they take Step 2 may find late in the game that they are less competitive in their field than they thought they were and may have to make a last-minute switch.
Dr. Safdieh said he thinks Step 2 will be next to go the pass/fail route. In reading between the lines of the announcement, he believes the test cosponsors didn’t make both pass/fail at once because it would have been “a nuclear bomb to the system.”
He credited the cosponsors with making what he called a “bold and momentous decision to initiate radical change in the overall transition between undergraduate and graduate medical education.”
Dr. Safdieh added that few in medicine were expecting Wednesday’s announcement.
“I think many of us were expecting them to go to quartile grading, not to go this far,” he said.
Dr. Safdieh suggested that, among those who may see downstream effects from the pass/fail move are offshore schools, such as those in the Caribbean. “Those schools rely on Step 1 to demonstrate that their students are meeting the rigor,” he said. But he hopes that this will lead to more holistic review.
“We’re hoping that this will force change in the system so that residency directors will look at more than just test-taking ability. They’ll look at publications and scholarship, community service and advocacy and performance in medical school,” Dr. Safdieh said.
Alison J. Whelan, MD, chief medical education officer of the Association of American Medical Colleges said in a statement, “The transition from medical school to residency training is a matter of great concern throughout academic medicine.
“The decision by the NBME and FSMB to change USMLE Step 1 score reporting to pass/fail was very carefully considered to balance student learning and student well-being,” she said. “The medical education community must now work together to identify and implement additional changes to improve the overall UME-GME [undergraduate and graduate medical education] transition system for all stakeholders and the AAMC is committed to helping lead this work.”
Dr. Fathy, Dr. Carmody, and Dr. Safdieh have disclosed no relevant financial relationships.
This article first appeared on Medscape.com.
News that the United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE) program will change its Step 1 scoring from a 3-digit number to pass/fail starting Jan. 1, 2022, has set off a flurry of shocked responses from students and physicians.
J. Bryan Carmody, MD, MPH, an assistant professor at Eastern Virginia Medical School in Norfolk, said in an interview that he was “stunned” when he heard the news on Wednesday and said the switch presents “the single biggest opportunity for medical school education reform since the Flexner Report,” which in 1910 established standards for modern medical education.
Numbers will continue for some tests
The USMLE cosponsors – the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) and the National Board of Medical Examiners (NBME) – said that the Step 2 Clinical Knowledge (CK) exam and Step 3 will continue to be scored numerically. Step 2 Clinical Skills (CS) will continue its pass/fail system.
The change was made after Step 1 had been roundly criticized as playing too big a role in the process of becoming a physician and for causing students to study for the test instead of engaging fully in their medical education.
Ramie Fathy, a third-year medical student at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, currently studying for Step 1, said in an interview that it would have been nice personally to have the pass/fail choice, but he predicts both good and unintended consequences in the change.
The positive news, Mr. Fathy said, is that less emphasis will be put on the Step 1 test, which includes memorizing basic science details that may or not be relevant depending on later specialty choice.
“It’s not necessarily measuring what the test makers intended, which was whether or not a student can understand and apply basic science concepts to the practice of medicine,” he said.
“The current system encourages students to get as high a score as possible, which – after a certain point – translates to memorizing many little details that become increasingly less practically relevant,” Mr. Fathy said.
Pressure may move elsewhere?
However, Mr. Fathy worries that, without a scoring system to help decide who stands out in Step 1, residency program directors will depend more on the reputation of candidates’ medical school and the clout of the person writing a letter of recommendation – factors that are often influenced by family resources and social standing. That could wedge a further economic divide into the path to becoming a physician.
Mr. Fathy said he and fellow students are watching for information on what the passing bar will be and what happens with Step 2 Clinical Knowledge exam. USMLE has promised more information as soon as it is available.
“The question is whether that test will replace Step 1 as the standardized metric of student competency,” Mr. Fathy said, which would put more pressure on students further down the medical path.
Will Step 2 anxiety increase?
Dr. Carmody agreed that there is the danger that students now will spend their time studying for Step 2 CK at the expense of other parts of their education.
Meaningful reform will depend on the pass/fail move being coupled with other reforms, most importantly application caps, said Dr. Carmody, who teaches preclinical medical students and works with the residency program.
He has been blogging about Step 1 pass/fail for the past year.
Currently students can apply for as many residencies as they can pay for and Carmody said the number of applications per student has been rising over the past decade.
“That puts program directors under an impossible burden,” he said. “With our Step 1-based system, there’s significant inequality in the number of interviews people get. Programs end up overinviting the same group of people who look good on paper.”
People outside that group respond by sending more applications than they need to just to get a few interviews, Dr. Carmody added.
With caps, students would have an incentive to apply to only those programs in which they had a sincere interest, he said. Program directors also would then be better able to evaluate each application.
Switching Step 1 to pass/fail may have some effect on medical school burnout, Dr. Carmody said.
“It’s one thing to work hard when you’re on call and your patients depend on it,” he said. “But I would have a hard time staying up late every night studying something that I know in my heart is not going to help my patients, but I have to do it because I have to do better than the person who’s studying in the apartment next to me.”
Test has strayed from original purpose
Joseph Safdieh, MD, an assistant dean for clinical curriculum and director of the medical student neurology clerkship for the Weill Cornell Medicine, New York, sees the move as positive overall.
“We should not be using any single metric to define or describe our students’ overall profile,” he said in an interview.
“This has been a very significant anxiety point for our medical students for quite a number of years,” Dr. Safdieh said. “They were frustrated that their entire 4 years of medical school seemingly came down to one number.”
The test was created originally as one of three parts of licensure, he pointed out.
“Over the past 10 or 15 years, the exam has morphed to become a litmus test for very specific residency programs,” he said.
However, Dr. Safdieh has concerns that Step 2 will cultivate the same anxiety and may get too big a spotlight without the Step 1 metric, “although one could argue that test does more accurately reflect clinical material,” he said.
He also worries that students who have selected a specialty by the time they take Step 2 may find late in the game that they are less competitive in their field than they thought they were and may have to make a last-minute switch.
Dr. Safdieh said he thinks Step 2 will be next to go the pass/fail route. In reading between the lines of the announcement, he believes the test cosponsors didn’t make both pass/fail at once because it would have been “a nuclear bomb to the system.”
He credited the cosponsors with making what he called a “bold and momentous decision to initiate radical change in the overall transition between undergraduate and graduate medical education.”
Dr. Safdieh added that few in medicine were expecting Wednesday’s announcement.
“I think many of us were expecting them to go to quartile grading, not to go this far,” he said.
Dr. Safdieh suggested that, among those who may see downstream effects from the pass/fail move are offshore schools, such as those in the Caribbean. “Those schools rely on Step 1 to demonstrate that their students are meeting the rigor,” he said. But he hopes that this will lead to more holistic review.
“We’re hoping that this will force change in the system so that residency directors will look at more than just test-taking ability. They’ll look at publications and scholarship, community service and advocacy and performance in medical school,” Dr. Safdieh said.
Alison J. Whelan, MD, chief medical education officer of the Association of American Medical Colleges said in a statement, “The transition from medical school to residency training is a matter of great concern throughout academic medicine.
“The decision by the NBME and FSMB to change USMLE Step 1 score reporting to pass/fail was very carefully considered to balance student learning and student well-being,” she said. “The medical education community must now work together to identify and implement additional changes to improve the overall UME-GME [undergraduate and graduate medical education] transition system for all stakeholders and the AAMC is committed to helping lead this work.”
Dr. Fathy, Dr. Carmody, and Dr. Safdieh have disclosed no relevant financial relationships.
This article first appeared on Medscape.com.
News that the United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE) program will change its Step 1 scoring from a 3-digit number to pass/fail starting Jan. 1, 2022, has set off a flurry of shocked responses from students and physicians.
J. Bryan Carmody, MD, MPH, an assistant professor at Eastern Virginia Medical School in Norfolk, said in an interview that he was “stunned” when he heard the news on Wednesday and said the switch presents “the single biggest opportunity for medical school education reform since the Flexner Report,” which in 1910 established standards for modern medical education.
Numbers will continue for some tests
The USMLE cosponsors – the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) and the National Board of Medical Examiners (NBME) – said that the Step 2 Clinical Knowledge (CK) exam and Step 3 will continue to be scored numerically. Step 2 Clinical Skills (CS) will continue its pass/fail system.
The change was made after Step 1 had been roundly criticized as playing too big a role in the process of becoming a physician and for causing students to study for the test instead of engaging fully in their medical education.
Ramie Fathy, a third-year medical student at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, currently studying for Step 1, said in an interview that it would have been nice personally to have the pass/fail choice, but he predicts both good and unintended consequences in the change.
The positive news, Mr. Fathy said, is that less emphasis will be put on the Step 1 test, which includes memorizing basic science details that may or not be relevant depending on later specialty choice.
“It’s not necessarily measuring what the test makers intended, which was whether or not a student can understand and apply basic science concepts to the practice of medicine,” he said.
“The current system encourages students to get as high a score as possible, which – after a certain point – translates to memorizing many little details that become increasingly less practically relevant,” Mr. Fathy said.
Pressure may move elsewhere?
However, Mr. Fathy worries that, without a scoring system to help decide who stands out in Step 1, residency program directors will depend more on the reputation of candidates’ medical school and the clout of the person writing a letter of recommendation – factors that are often influenced by family resources and social standing. That could wedge a further economic divide into the path to becoming a physician.
Mr. Fathy said he and fellow students are watching for information on what the passing bar will be and what happens with Step 2 Clinical Knowledge exam. USMLE has promised more information as soon as it is available.
“The question is whether that test will replace Step 1 as the standardized metric of student competency,” Mr. Fathy said, which would put more pressure on students further down the medical path.
Will Step 2 anxiety increase?
Dr. Carmody agreed that there is the danger that students now will spend their time studying for Step 2 CK at the expense of other parts of their education.
Meaningful reform will depend on the pass/fail move being coupled with other reforms, most importantly application caps, said Dr. Carmody, who teaches preclinical medical students and works with the residency program.
He has been blogging about Step 1 pass/fail for the past year.
Currently students can apply for as many residencies as they can pay for and Carmody said the number of applications per student has been rising over the past decade.
“That puts program directors under an impossible burden,” he said. “With our Step 1-based system, there’s significant inequality in the number of interviews people get. Programs end up overinviting the same group of people who look good on paper.”
People outside that group respond by sending more applications than they need to just to get a few interviews, Dr. Carmody added.
With caps, students would have an incentive to apply to only those programs in which they had a sincere interest, he said. Program directors also would then be better able to evaluate each application.
Switching Step 1 to pass/fail may have some effect on medical school burnout, Dr. Carmody said.
“It’s one thing to work hard when you’re on call and your patients depend on it,” he said. “But I would have a hard time staying up late every night studying something that I know in my heart is not going to help my patients, but I have to do it because I have to do better than the person who’s studying in the apartment next to me.”
Test has strayed from original purpose
Joseph Safdieh, MD, an assistant dean for clinical curriculum and director of the medical student neurology clerkship for the Weill Cornell Medicine, New York, sees the move as positive overall.
“We should not be using any single metric to define or describe our students’ overall profile,” he said in an interview.
“This has been a very significant anxiety point for our medical students for quite a number of years,” Dr. Safdieh said. “They were frustrated that their entire 4 years of medical school seemingly came down to one number.”
The test was created originally as one of three parts of licensure, he pointed out.
“Over the past 10 or 15 years, the exam has morphed to become a litmus test for very specific residency programs,” he said.
However, Dr. Safdieh has concerns that Step 2 will cultivate the same anxiety and may get too big a spotlight without the Step 1 metric, “although one could argue that test does more accurately reflect clinical material,” he said.
He also worries that students who have selected a specialty by the time they take Step 2 may find late in the game that they are less competitive in their field than they thought they were and may have to make a last-minute switch.
Dr. Safdieh said he thinks Step 2 will be next to go the pass/fail route. In reading between the lines of the announcement, he believes the test cosponsors didn’t make both pass/fail at once because it would have been “a nuclear bomb to the system.”
He credited the cosponsors with making what he called a “bold and momentous decision to initiate radical change in the overall transition between undergraduate and graduate medical education.”
Dr. Safdieh added that few in medicine were expecting Wednesday’s announcement.
“I think many of us were expecting them to go to quartile grading, not to go this far,” he said.
Dr. Safdieh suggested that, among those who may see downstream effects from the pass/fail move are offshore schools, such as those in the Caribbean. “Those schools rely on Step 1 to demonstrate that their students are meeting the rigor,” he said. But he hopes that this will lead to more holistic review.
“We’re hoping that this will force change in the system so that residency directors will look at more than just test-taking ability. They’ll look at publications and scholarship, community service and advocacy and performance in medical school,” Dr. Safdieh said.
Alison J. Whelan, MD, chief medical education officer of the Association of American Medical Colleges said in a statement, “The transition from medical school to residency training is a matter of great concern throughout academic medicine.
“The decision by the NBME and FSMB to change USMLE Step 1 score reporting to pass/fail was very carefully considered to balance student learning and student well-being,” she said. “The medical education community must now work together to identify and implement additional changes to improve the overall UME-GME [undergraduate and graduate medical education] transition system for all stakeholders and the AAMC is committed to helping lead this work.”
Dr. Fathy, Dr. Carmody, and Dr. Safdieh have disclosed no relevant financial relationships.
This article first appeared on Medscape.com.
My inspiration
Kobe Bryant knew me. Not personally, of course. I never received an autograph or shook his hand. But once in a while if I was up early enough, I’d run into Kobe at the gym in Newport Beach where he and I both worked out. As he did for all his fans at the gym, he’d make eye contact with me and nod hello. He was always focused on his workout – working with a trainer, never with headphones on. In person, he appeared enormous. Unlike most retired professional athletes, he still was in great shape. No doubt he could have suited up in purple and gold, and played against the Clippers that night if needed.
Being from New England, I never was a Laker fan. But I thought, if Kobe can head to the gym after midnight and take a 1,000 shots to prepare for a game, then I could set my alarm for 4 a.m. and take a few dozen more questions from my First Aid books. Head down, “Kryptonite” cranked on my iPod, I wasn’t going to let anyone in that test room outwork me. Neither did he. I put in the time and, like Kobe in the 2002 conference finals against Sacramento, I crushed it.*
When we moved to California, I followed Kobe and the Lakers until he retired. To be clear, I didn’t aspire to be like him, firstly because I’m slightly shorter than Michael Bloomberg, but also because although accomplished, Kobe made some poor choices at times. Indeed, it seems he might have been kinder and more considerate when he was at the top. But in his retirement he looked to be toiling to make reparations, refocusing his prodigious energy and talent for the benefit of others rather than for just for scoring 81 points. His Rolls Royce was there before mine at the gym, and I was there early. He was still getting up early and now preparing to be a great venture capitalist, podcaster, author, and father to his girls.
Watching him carry kettle bells across the floor one morning, I wondered, do people like Kobe Bryant look to others for inspiration? Or are they are born with an endless supply of it? For me, I seemed to push harder and faster when watching idols pass by. Whether it was Kobe or Clayton Christensen (author of “The Innovator’s Dilemma”), Joe Jorizzo, or Barack Obama, I found I could do just a bit more if I had them in mind.
On game days, Kobe spoke of arriving at the arena early, long before anyone. He would use the silent, solo time to reflect on what he needed to do perform that night. I tried this last week, arriving at our clinic early, before any patients or staff. I turned the lights on and took a few minutes to think about what we needed to accomplish that day. I previewed patients on my schedule, searched Up to Date for the latest recommendations on a difficult case. I didn’t know Kobe, but I felt like I did.
When I received the text that Kobe Bryant had died, I was actually working on this column. So I decided to change the topic to write about people who inspire me, ironically inspired by him again. May he rest in peace.
Dr. Benabio is director of Healthcare Transformation and chief of dermatology at Kaiser Permanente San Diego. The opinions expressed in this column are his own and do not represent those of Kaiser Permanente. Dr. Benabio is @Dermdoc on Twitter. Write to him at [email protected].
*This article was updated 2/19/2020.
Kobe Bryant knew me. Not personally, of course. I never received an autograph or shook his hand. But once in a while if I was up early enough, I’d run into Kobe at the gym in Newport Beach where he and I both worked out. As he did for all his fans at the gym, he’d make eye contact with me and nod hello. He was always focused on his workout – working with a trainer, never with headphones on. In person, he appeared enormous. Unlike most retired professional athletes, he still was in great shape. No doubt he could have suited up in purple and gold, and played against the Clippers that night if needed.
Being from New England, I never was a Laker fan. But I thought, if Kobe can head to the gym after midnight and take a 1,000 shots to prepare for a game, then I could set my alarm for 4 a.m. and take a few dozen more questions from my First Aid books. Head down, “Kryptonite” cranked on my iPod, I wasn’t going to let anyone in that test room outwork me. Neither did he. I put in the time and, like Kobe in the 2002 conference finals against Sacramento, I crushed it.*
When we moved to California, I followed Kobe and the Lakers until he retired. To be clear, I didn’t aspire to be like him, firstly because I’m slightly shorter than Michael Bloomberg, but also because although accomplished, Kobe made some poor choices at times. Indeed, it seems he might have been kinder and more considerate when he was at the top. But in his retirement he looked to be toiling to make reparations, refocusing his prodigious energy and talent for the benefit of others rather than for just for scoring 81 points. His Rolls Royce was there before mine at the gym, and I was there early. He was still getting up early and now preparing to be a great venture capitalist, podcaster, author, and father to his girls.
Watching him carry kettle bells across the floor one morning, I wondered, do people like Kobe Bryant look to others for inspiration? Or are they are born with an endless supply of it? For me, I seemed to push harder and faster when watching idols pass by. Whether it was Kobe or Clayton Christensen (author of “The Innovator’s Dilemma”), Joe Jorizzo, or Barack Obama, I found I could do just a bit more if I had them in mind.
On game days, Kobe spoke of arriving at the arena early, long before anyone. He would use the silent, solo time to reflect on what he needed to do perform that night. I tried this last week, arriving at our clinic early, before any patients or staff. I turned the lights on and took a few minutes to think about what we needed to accomplish that day. I previewed patients on my schedule, searched Up to Date for the latest recommendations on a difficult case. I didn’t know Kobe, but I felt like I did.
When I received the text that Kobe Bryant had died, I was actually working on this column. So I decided to change the topic to write about people who inspire me, ironically inspired by him again. May he rest in peace.
Dr. Benabio is director of Healthcare Transformation and chief of dermatology at Kaiser Permanente San Diego. The opinions expressed in this column are his own and do not represent those of Kaiser Permanente. Dr. Benabio is @Dermdoc on Twitter. Write to him at [email protected].
*This article was updated 2/19/2020.
Kobe Bryant knew me. Not personally, of course. I never received an autograph or shook his hand. But once in a while if I was up early enough, I’d run into Kobe at the gym in Newport Beach where he and I both worked out. As he did for all his fans at the gym, he’d make eye contact with me and nod hello. He was always focused on his workout – working with a trainer, never with headphones on. In person, he appeared enormous. Unlike most retired professional athletes, he still was in great shape. No doubt he could have suited up in purple and gold, and played against the Clippers that night if needed.
Being from New England, I never was a Laker fan. But I thought, if Kobe can head to the gym after midnight and take a 1,000 shots to prepare for a game, then I could set my alarm for 4 a.m. and take a few dozen more questions from my First Aid books. Head down, “Kryptonite” cranked on my iPod, I wasn’t going to let anyone in that test room outwork me. Neither did he. I put in the time and, like Kobe in the 2002 conference finals against Sacramento, I crushed it.*
When we moved to California, I followed Kobe and the Lakers until he retired. To be clear, I didn’t aspire to be like him, firstly because I’m slightly shorter than Michael Bloomberg, but also because although accomplished, Kobe made some poor choices at times. Indeed, it seems he might have been kinder and more considerate when he was at the top. But in his retirement he looked to be toiling to make reparations, refocusing his prodigious energy and talent for the benefit of others rather than for just for scoring 81 points. His Rolls Royce was there before mine at the gym, and I was there early. He was still getting up early and now preparing to be a great venture capitalist, podcaster, author, and father to his girls.
Watching him carry kettle bells across the floor one morning, I wondered, do people like Kobe Bryant look to others for inspiration? Or are they are born with an endless supply of it? For me, I seemed to push harder and faster when watching idols pass by. Whether it was Kobe or Clayton Christensen (author of “The Innovator’s Dilemma”), Joe Jorizzo, or Barack Obama, I found I could do just a bit more if I had them in mind.
On game days, Kobe spoke of arriving at the arena early, long before anyone. He would use the silent, solo time to reflect on what he needed to do perform that night. I tried this last week, arriving at our clinic early, before any patients or staff. I turned the lights on and took a few minutes to think about what we needed to accomplish that day. I previewed patients on my schedule, searched Up to Date for the latest recommendations on a difficult case. I didn’t know Kobe, but I felt like I did.
When I received the text that Kobe Bryant had died, I was actually working on this column. So I decided to change the topic to write about people who inspire me, ironically inspired by him again. May he rest in peace.
Dr. Benabio is director of Healthcare Transformation and chief of dermatology at Kaiser Permanente San Diego. The opinions expressed in this column are his own and do not represent those of Kaiser Permanente. Dr. Benabio is @Dermdoc on Twitter. Write to him at [email protected].
*This article was updated 2/19/2020.
Survey queries pulmonologists' happiness at work
Only 26% of pulmonologists report that they are happy at work, with about twice as many happy outside of work, according to Medscape’s Pulmonologist Lifestyle, Happiness & Burnout Report 2020. Dermatologists are the happiest at work, at 41%, and neurologists are the least happy, at 18%. 
According to the report, which surveyed more than 15,000 physicians from various specialties, 29% of pulmonologists report feeling burned out, with 5% reporting feeling depressed and 12% both depressed and burned out. An overabundance of bureaucratic tasks is the lead contributor to burnout (52%), according to pulmonologists, followed by lack of respect from administrators, employers, colleagues, and staff (38%) and spending too many hours at work (35%).
Pulmonologists report that exercise is the biggest way they cope with burnout (47%), compared with neurologists, for example, who ranked it third at 40%. Other ways they deal with burnout include isolating themselves from others (43%) and playing or listening to music (38%).
Among depressed or burned-out pulmonologists, 70% reported not planning to seek professional help or seeking it in the past, while 12% reported currently seeking professional help. Furthermore, almost half of pulmonologists (48%) say they’re unlikely to participate in workplace programs.
When asked for reasons they wouldn’t seek professional help, 60% said they deal with it without professional help and 49% didn’t think their symptoms were severe enough, while 31% were simply too busy.
The slideshow of the full report is available on Medscape.com.
Only 26% of pulmonologists report that they are happy at work, with about twice as many happy outside of work, according to Medscape’s Pulmonologist Lifestyle, Happiness & Burnout Report 2020. Dermatologists are the happiest at work, at 41%, and neurologists are the least happy, at 18%. 
According to the report, which surveyed more than 15,000 physicians from various specialties, 29% of pulmonologists report feeling burned out, with 5% reporting feeling depressed and 12% both depressed and burned out. An overabundance of bureaucratic tasks is the lead contributor to burnout (52%), according to pulmonologists, followed by lack of respect from administrators, employers, colleagues, and staff (38%) and spending too many hours at work (35%).
Pulmonologists report that exercise is the biggest way they cope with burnout (47%), compared with neurologists, for example, who ranked it third at 40%. Other ways they deal with burnout include isolating themselves from others (43%) and playing or listening to music (38%).
Among depressed or burned-out pulmonologists, 70% reported not planning to seek professional help or seeking it in the past, while 12% reported currently seeking professional help. Furthermore, almost half of pulmonologists (48%) say they’re unlikely to participate in workplace programs.
When asked for reasons they wouldn’t seek professional help, 60% said they deal with it without professional help and 49% didn’t think their symptoms were severe enough, while 31% were simply too busy.
The slideshow of the full report is available on Medscape.com.
Only 26% of pulmonologists report that they are happy at work, with about twice as many happy outside of work, according to Medscape’s Pulmonologist Lifestyle, Happiness & Burnout Report 2020. Dermatologists are the happiest at work, at 41%, and neurologists are the least happy, at 18%. 
According to the report, which surveyed more than 15,000 physicians from various specialties, 29% of pulmonologists report feeling burned out, with 5% reporting feeling depressed and 12% both depressed and burned out. An overabundance of bureaucratic tasks is the lead contributor to burnout (52%), according to pulmonologists, followed by lack of respect from administrators, employers, colleagues, and staff (38%) and spending too many hours at work (35%).
Pulmonologists report that exercise is the biggest way they cope with burnout (47%), compared with neurologists, for example, who ranked it third at 40%. Other ways they deal with burnout include isolating themselves from others (43%) and playing or listening to music (38%).
Among depressed or burned-out pulmonologists, 70% reported not planning to seek professional help or seeking it in the past, while 12% reported currently seeking professional help. Furthermore, almost half of pulmonologists (48%) say they’re unlikely to participate in workplace programs.
When asked for reasons they wouldn’t seek professional help, 60% said they deal with it without professional help and 49% didn’t think their symptoms were severe enough, while 31% were simply too busy.
The slideshow of the full report is available on Medscape.com.
Oncologists are average in terms of happiness, survey suggests
When it comes to physician happiness both in and outside the workplace, oncologists are about average, according to Medscape’s 2020 Lifestyle, Happiness, and Burnout Report.

Oncologists landed in the middle of the pack among all physicians surveyed for happiness. Rheumatologists were most likely to report being very or extremely happy outside of work (60%) and neurologists were least likely to do so (44%), but about half of oncologists (51%) reported being very/extremely happy outside of work. For happiness at work, dermatologists topped the list (41%), neurologists came in last (18%), and oncologists remained in the middle (29%).
Oncologists were average when it came to burnout as well, matching the rate of overall physicians. Specifically, 32% of oncologists were burned out, 4% were depressed, and 9% were both burned out and depressed.
The most commonly reported factors contributing to burnout among oncologists were an overabundance of bureaucratic tasks (74%), spending too many hours at work (42%), and a lack of respect from colleagues in the workplace (36%).
Exercise was the most commonly reported way oncologists dealt with burnout (51%), followed by talking with family and friends (49%), and isolating themselves from others (38%). In addition, 57% of oncologists took 3-4 weeks’ vacation, compared with 44% of physicians overall; 29% of oncologists took less than 3 weeks’ vacation.
About 18% of oncologists said they had contemplated suicide, and 1% said they’d attempted it; 72% said they’d never had thoughts of suicide. Just under one-quarter of oncologists said they were currently seeking professional help or were planning to seek help for symptoms of depression and/or burnout.
“The survey results are concerning on several levels,” Maurie Markman, MD, of Cancer Treatment Centers of America, Philadelphia, said in an interview.
“First, the data suggest a considerable number of oncologists are simply burned out from the day-to-day bureaucracy (paperwork, etc.) of medical practice, which has absolutely nothing to do with the actual care delivered. This likely impacts the willingness to continue in this role. Second, one must be concerned for the future recruitment of physicians to become clinical oncologists. And finally, one must wonder about the impact of these concerning figures on the quality of care being provided to cancer patients.”
This survey was conducted from June 25 to Sept. 19, 2019, and involved 15,181 physicians. Oncologists made up 1% of the survey pool.
When it comes to physician happiness both in and outside the workplace, oncologists are about average, according to Medscape’s 2020 Lifestyle, Happiness, and Burnout Report.

Oncologists landed in the middle of the pack among all physicians surveyed for happiness. Rheumatologists were most likely to report being very or extremely happy outside of work (60%) and neurologists were least likely to do so (44%), but about half of oncologists (51%) reported being very/extremely happy outside of work. For happiness at work, dermatologists topped the list (41%), neurologists came in last (18%), and oncologists remained in the middle (29%).
Oncologists were average when it came to burnout as well, matching the rate of overall physicians. Specifically, 32% of oncologists were burned out, 4% were depressed, and 9% were both burned out and depressed.
The most commonly reported factors contributing to burnout among oncologists were an overabundance of bureaucratic tasks (74%), spending too many hours at work (42%), and a lack of respect from colleagues in the workplace (36%).
Exercise was the most commonly reported way oncologists dealt with burnout (51%), followed by talking with family and friends (49%), and isolating themselves from others (38%). In addition, 57% of oncologists took 3-4 weeks’ vacation, compared with 44% of physicians overall; 29% of oncologists took less than 3 weeks’ vacation.
About 18% of oncologists said they had contemplated suicide, and 1% said they’d attempted it; 72% said they’d never had thoughts of suicide. Just under one-quarter of oncologists said they were currently seeking professional help or were planning to seek help for symptoms of depression and/or burnout.
“The survey results are concerning on several levels,” Maurie Markman, MD, of Cancer Treatment Centers of America, Philadelphia, said in an interview.
“First, the data suggest a considerable number of oncologists are simply burned out from the day-to-day bureaucracy (paperwork, etc.) of medical practice, which has absolutely nothing to do with the actual care delivered. This likely impacts the willingness to continue in this role. Second, one must be concerned for the future recruitment of physicians to become clinical oncologists. And finally, one must wonder about the impact of these concerning figures on the quality of care being provided to cancer patients.”
This survey was conducted from June 25 to Sept. 19, 2019, and involved 15,181 physicians. Oncologists made up 1% of the survey pool.
When it comes to physician happiness both in and outside the workplace, oncologists are about average, according to Medscape’s 2020 Lifestyle, Happiness, and Burnout Report.

Oncologists landed in the middle of the pack among all physicians surveyed for happiness. Rheumatologists were most likely to report being very or extremely happy outside of work (60%) and neurologists were least likely to do so (44%), but about half of oncologists (51%) reported being very/extremely happy outside of work. For happiness at work, dermatologists topped the list (41%), neurologists came in last (18%), and oncologists remained in the middle (29%).
Oncologists were average when it came to burnout as well, matching the rate of overall physicians. Specifically, 32% of oncologists were burned out, 4% were depressed, and 9% were both burned out and depressed.
The most commonly reported factors contributing to burnout among oncologists were an overabundance of bureaucratic tasks (74%), spending too many hours at work (42%), and a lack of respect from colleagues in the workplace (36%).
Exercise was the most commonly reported way oncologists dealt with burnout (51%), followed by talking with family and friends (49%), and isolating themselves from others (38%). In addition, 57% of oncologists took 3-4 weeks’ vacation, compared with 44% of physicians overall; 29% of oncologists took less than 3 weeks’ vacation.
About 18% of oncologists said they had contemplated suicide, and 1% said they’d attempted it; 72% said they’d never had thoughts of suicide. Just under one-quarter of oncologists said they were currently seeking professional help or were planning to seek help for symptoms of depression and/or burnout.
“The survey results are concerning on several levels,” Maurie Markman, MD, of Cancer Treatment Centers of America, Philadelphia, said in an interview.
“First, the data suggest a considerable number of oncologists are simply burned out from the day-to-day bureaucracy (paperwork, etc.) of medical practice, which has absolutely nothing to do with the actual care delivered. This likely impacts the willingness to continue in this role. Second, one must be concerned for the future recruitment of physicians to become clinical oncologists. And finally, one must wonder about the impact of these concerning figures on the quality of care being provided to cancer patients.”
This survey was conducted from June 25 to Sept. 19, 2019, and involved 15,181 physicians. Oncologists made up 1% of the survey pool.
Trump seeks to cut NIH, CDC budgets, some Medicare spending
The Trump administration on Feb. 10 argued for cutting spending for a federal agency at the forefront of the efforts to combat the coronavirus, while also seeking to slow spending in certain parts of the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
President Donald Trump presented his fiscal 2021 request to Congress for refilling the coffers of federal agencies. In any administration, an annual budget serves only as a political blueprint, as the White House document itself makes no changes in federal spending.
In Mr. Trump’s case, several of his requests for agencies within the Department of Health & Human Services run counter to recent budget trends. Republicans and Democrats in Congress have worked together in recent years to increase budgets for major federal health agencies.
But Mr. Trump asked Congress to cut annual budget authority for the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases by $430 million to $5.446 billion for fiscal 2021. In contrast, Congress has raised the annual budget for NIAID, a key agency in combating the coronavirus, from $5.545 billion in fiscal 2019 to $5.876 billion in fiscal 2020, which began in October, according to an HHS summary of Mr. Trump’s request.
For the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which is central to the battle against the coronavirus, Mr. Trump proposed a drop in discretionary funding to $5.627 billion. In contrast, Congress raised the CDC budget from $6.544 billion in fiscal 2019 to $6.917 in fiscal 2020.
Mr. Trump also wants to cut $559 million from the budget of the National Cancer Institute, dropping it to $5.881 billion in fiscal 2021. In contrast, Congress raised NCI’s budget from $6.121 billion in fiscal 2019 to $6.440 billion in fiscal 2020.
Mr. Trump requested a $2.6 billion reduction in the National Institutes of Health’s total discretionary budget, seeking to drop it to $37.70 billion. In contrast, Congress raised NIH’s budget from $37.887 in fiscal 2019 to $40.304 billion in fiscal 2020.
Mr. Trump’s budget proposal also includes an estimate of $152 billion in savings over a decade for Medicaid through the implementation of what the administration calls “community engagement” requirements.
The Trump administration has been at odds with Democrats for years about whether work requirements should be attached to Medicaid. “Well-designed community engagement incentives have great potential to improve health and well-being while empowering beneficiaries to rise out of poverty,” HHS said in a budget document.
Yet researchers last year reported that Arkansas’ attempt to attach work requirements to Medicaid caused almost 17,000 adults to lose this health care coverage within the first 6 months, and there was no significant difference in employment.
The researchers say this loss of coverage was partly a result of bureaucratic obstacles and confusion about the new rules. In June 2018, Arkansas became the first state to implement work requirements for Medicaid, Benjamin D. Sommers, MD, PhD, of the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, and colleagues wrote in the New England Journal of Medicine (2019 Sep 12;381[11]:1073-82).
Budget ‘would thwart’ progress
A few medical groups on Monday quickly criticized Mr. Trump’s proposals.
“In a time where our nation continues to face significant public health challenges — including 2019 novel coronavirus, climate change, gun violence, and costly chronic diseases such as heart disease and cancer – the administration should be investing more resources in better health, not cutting federal health budgets,” said Georges C. Benjamin, MD, executive director of the American Public Health Association, in a statement.
David J. Skorton, MD, chief executive and president of the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) also urged increased investment in fighting disease.
“We must continue the bipartisan budget trajectory set forth by Congress over the last several years, not reverse course,” Dr. Skorton said in a statement.
Mr. Trump’s proposed cuts in medical research “would thwart scientific progress on strategies to prevent, diagnose, treat, and cure medical conditions that affect countless patients nationwide,” he said.
In total, the new 2021 appropriations for HHS would fall by $9.46 billion to $85.667 billion under Mr. Trump’s proposal. Appropriations, also called discretionary budget authority, represents the operating budgets for federal agencies. These are decided through annual spending bills.
Congress has separate sets of laws for handling payments the federal government makes through Medicare and Medicaid. These are known as mandatory spending.
‘Untenable cuts’
AAMC’s Dr. Skorton also objected to what he termed Mr. Trump’s bid “to reduce and consolidate Medicare, Medicaid, and children’s hospital graduate medical education into a single grant program.”
This would force teaching hospitals to absorb $52 billion in “untenable cuts,” he said.
“The proposal ignores the intent of the Medicare GME program, which is to ensure an adequate physician workforce to care for Medicare beneficiaries and support the critical patient care missions of America’s teaching hospitals,” Dr. Skorton said.
The budget also seeks cuts to Medicaid, which come in addition to the administration’s “recent proposals to scale back Medicaid coverage,” Dr. Skorton said.
“More than 26% of all Medicaid hospitalizations occur at AAMC-member teaching hospitals, even though these institutions represent only 5% of all hospitals,” Dr. Skorton said. “Each of the administration’s proposals on their own would be devastating for patients – and combined, they would be disastrous.”
Rick Pollack, the chief executive and president of the American Hospital Association, described Mr. Trump’s fiscal 2021 proposal as another bid to undermine medical care in the United States.
“Every year, we adapt to a constantly changing environment, but every year, the administration aims to gut our nation’s health care infrastructure,” Mr. Pollack said in a statement.
In it, he noted that about one in five people in America depend on Medicaid, with children accounting for a large proportion of those covered by the state-federal program.
“The budget’s proposal on Medicaid financing and service delivery would cut hundreds of billions of dollars from the Medicaid program annually,” Mr. Pollack said.
He also objected to “hundreds of billions of proposed reductions to Medicare” endorsed by Mr. Trump.
Medical malpractice overhaul
The Trump administration also offered many suggestions for changing federal laws to reduce health care spending. Among these was a proposed overhaul of the approach to medical malpractice cases.
The president’s budget proposal estimates $40 billion in savings over a decade from steps to limit medical liability, according to a report from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
“The current medical liability system does not work for patients or providers, nor does it promote high-quality, evidence-based care,” OMB said. “Providers practice with a threat of potentially frivolous lawsuits, and injured patients often do not receive just compensation for their injuries.”
Mr. Trump’s fiscal 2021 budget calls for a cap on noneconomic damage awards of $250,000, which would increase with inflation over time, and a 3-year statute of limitations. Under this plan, courts could also modify attorney’s fee arrangements. HHS could provide guidance to states on how to create expert panels and administrative health care tribunals to review medical liability.
These steps would lead to lower health care spending, with clinicians dropping “defensive medicine practices,” OMB said. That would benefit the Medicare and Medicaid programs as well as lowering costs of health insurance in general.
Mr. Trump’s fiscal 2021 budget also includes a series of proposals for Medicare that it estimates would, in aggregate, save $755.5 billion over a decade.
Site-neutral policy
A large chunk of the estimated Medicare savings in Mr. Trump’s fiscal 2021 health budget would come from lowering payments to hospitals for services provided in their outpatient and physician offices.
In the fiscal 2021 proposal, HHS noted that “Medicare generally pays on-campus hospital outpatient departments substantially more than physician offices for the same services.”
Mr. Trump’s budget proposal seeks a more expansive shift to what’s called a “site-neutral” payment for services delivered in hospital outpatient programs or physician offices. This would bring these payments more in line with those made to independent physician practices.
“This proposal would eliminate the often significant disparity between what Medicare pays in these different settings for the same services,” HHS said in the budget summary.
HHS estimated this change in policy would generate $117.2 billion in savings over a decade. Combined with saving from medical malpractice reforms, the Trump administration estimates these two moves combined could save about $164 billion over a decade.
The site-neutral policy has been a legal battleground, with hospital and physician groups winning a round last year.
Another Medicare proposal included in Mr. Trump’s fiscal 2021 budget homes in on this issue for cases where a hospital owns a physician office. Medicare now pays most off-campus hospital outpatient departments higher rates than the program’s physician fee schedule dictates for the same services.
Switching to a site-neutral policy for these hospital-owned physician offices would result in $47.2 billion in savings over a decade, HHS said in the budget document.
This article first appeared on Medscape.com.
The Trump administration on Feb. 10 argued for cutting spending for a federal agency at the forefront of the efforts to combat the coronavirus, while also seeking to slow spending in certain parts of the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
President Donald Trump presented his fiscal 2021 request to Congress for refilling the coffers of federal agencies. In any administration, an annual budget serves only as a political blueprint, as the White House document itself makes no changes in federal spending.
In Mr. Trump’s case, several of his requests for agencies within the Department of Health & Human Services run counter to recent budget trends. Republicans and Democrats in Congress have worked together in recent years to increase budgets for major federal health agencies.
But Mr. Trump asked Congress to cut annual budget authority for the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases by $430 million to $5.446 billion for fiscal 2021. In contrast, Congress has raised the annual budget for NIAID, a key agency in combating the coronavirus, from $5.545 billion in fiscal 2019 to $5.876 billion in fiscal 2020, which began in October, according to an HHS summary of Mr. Trump’s request.
For the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which is central to the battle against the coronavirus, Mr. Trump proposed a drop in discretionary funding to $5.627 billion. In contrast, Congress raised the CDC budget from $6.544 billion in fiscal 2019 to $6.917 in fiscal 2020.
Mr. Trump also wants to cut $559 million from the budget of the National Cancer Institute, dropping it to $5.881 billion in fiscal 2021. In contrast, Congress raised NCI’s budget from $6.121 billion in fiscal 2019 to $6.440 billion in fiscal 2020.
Mr. Trump requested a $2.6 billion reduction in the National Institutes of Health’s total discretionary budget, seeking to drop it to $37.70 billion. In contrast, Congress raised NIH’s budget from $37.887 in fiscal 2019 to $40.304 billion in fiscal 2020.
Mr. Trump’s budget proposal also includes an estimate of $152 billion in savings over a decade for Medicaid through the implementation of what the administration calls “community engagement” requirements.
The Trump administration has been at odds with Democrats for years about whether work requirements should be attached to Medicaid. “Well-designed community engagement incentives have great potential to improve health and well-being while empowering beneficiaries to rise out of poverty,” HHS said in a budget document.
Yet researchers last year reported that Arkansas’ attempt to attach work requirements to Medicaid caused almost 17,000 adults to lose this health care coverage within the first 6 months, and there was no significant difference in employment.
The researchers say this loss of coverage was partly a result of bureaucratic obstacles and confusion about the new rules. In June 2018, Arkansas became the first state to implement work requirements for Medicaid, Benjamin D. Sommers, MD, PhD, of the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, and colleagues wrote in the New England Journal of Medicine (2019 Sep 12;381[11]:1073-82).
Budget ‘would thwart’ progress
A few medical groups on Monday quickly criticized Mr. Trump’s proposals.
“In a time where our nation continues to face significant public health challenges — including 2019 novel coronavirus, climate change, gun violence, and costly chronic diseases such as heart disease and cancer – the administration should be investing more resources in better health, not cutting federal health budgets,” said Georges C. Benjamin, MD, executive director of the American Public Health Association, in a statement.
David J. Skorton, MD, chief executive and president of the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) also urged increased investment in fighting disease.
“We must continue the bipartisan budget trajectory set forth by Congress over the last several years, not reverse course,” Dr. Skorton said in a statement.
Mr. Trump’s proposed cuts in medical research “would thwart scientific progress on strategies to prevent, diagnose, treat, and cure medical conditions that affect countless patients nationwide,” he said.
In total, the new 2021 appropriations for HHS would fall by $9.46 billion to $85.667 billion under Mr. Trump’s proposal. Appropriations, also called discretionary budget authority, represents the operating budgets for federal agencies. These are decided through annual spending bills.
Congress has separate sets of laws for handling payments the federal government makes through Medicare and Medicaid. These are known as mandatory spending.
‘Untenable cuts’
AAMC’s Dr. Skorton also objected to what he termed Mr. Trump’s bid “to reduce and consolidate Medicare, Medicaid, and children’s hospital graduate medical education into a single grant program.”
This would force teaching hospitals to absorb $52 billion in “untenable cuts,” he said.
“The proposal ignores the intent of the Medicare GME program, which is to ensure an adequate physician workforce to care for Medicare beneficiaries and support the critical patient care missions of America’s teaching hospitals,” Dr. Skorton said.
The budget also seeks cuts to Medicaid, which come in addition to the administration’s “recent proposals to scale back Medicaid coverage,” Dr. Skorton said.
“More than 26% of all Medicaid hospitalizations occur at AAMC-member teaching hospitals, even though these institutions represent only 5% of all hospitals,” Dr. Skorton said. “Each of the administration’s proposals on their own would be devastating for patients – and combined, they would be disastrous.”
Rick Pollack, the chief executive and president of the American Hospital Association, described Mr. Trump’s fiscal 2021 proposal as another bid to undermine medical care in the United States.
“Every year, we adapt to a constantly changing environment, but every year, the administration aims to gut our nation’s health care infrastructure,” Mr. Pollack said in a statement.
In it, he noted that about one in five people in America depend on Medicaid, with children accounting for a large proportion of those covered by the state-federal program.
“The budget’s proposal on Medicaid financing and service delivery would cut hundreds of billions of dollars from the Medicaid program annually,” Mr. Pollack said.
He also objected to “hundreds of billions of proposed reductions to Medicare” endorsed by Mr. Trump.
Medical malpractice overhaul
The Trump administration also offered many suggestions for changing federal laws to reduce health care spending. Among these was a proposed overhaul of the approach to medical malpractice cases.
The president’s budget proposal estimates $40 billion in savings over a decade from steps to limit medical liability, according to a report from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
“The current medical liability system does not work for patients or providers, nor does it promote high-quality, evidence-based care,” OMB said. “Providers practice with a threat of potentially frivolous lawsuits, and injured patients often do not receive just compensation for their injuries.”
Mr. Trump’s fiscal 2021 budget calls for a cap on noneconomic damage awards of $250,000, which would increase with inflation over time, and a 3-year statute of limitations. Under this plan, courts could also modify attorney’s fee arrangements. HHS could provide guidance to states on how to create expert panels and administrative health care tribunals to review medical liability.
These steps would lead to lower health care spending, with clinicians dropping “defensive medicine practices,” OMB said. That would benefit the Medicare and Medicaid programs as well as lowering costs of health insurance in general.
Mr. Trump’s fiscal 2021 budget also includes a series of proposals for Medicare that it estimates would, in aggregate, save $755.5 billion over a decade.
Site-neutral policy
A large chunk of the estimated Medicare savings in Mr. Trump’s fiscal 2021 health budget would come from lowering payments to hospitals for services provided in their outpatient and physician offices.
In the fiscal 2021 proposal, HHS noted that “Medicare generally pays on-campus hospital outpatient departments substantially more than physician offices for the same services.”
Mr. Trump’s budget proposal seeks a more expansive shift to what’s called a “site-neutral” payment for services delivered in hospital outpatient programs or physician offices. This would bring these payments more in line with those made to independent physician practices.
“This proposal would eliminate the often significant disparity between what Medicare pays in these different settings for the same services,” HHS said in the budget summary.
HHS estimated this change in policy would generate $117.2 billion in savings over a decade. Combined with saving from medical malpractice reforms, the Trump administration estimates these two moves combined could save about $164 billion over a decade.
The site-neutral policy has been a legal battleground, with hospital and physician groups winning a round last year.
Another Medicare proposal included in Mr. Trump’s fiscal 2021 budget homes in on this issue for cases where a hospital owns a physician office. Medicare now pays most off-campus hospital outpatient departments higher rates than the program’s physician fee schedule dictates for the same services.
Switching to a site-neutral policy for these hospital-owned physician offices would result in $47.2 billion in savings over a decade, HHS said in the budget document.
This article first appeared on Medscape.com.
The Trump administration on Feb. 10 argued for cutting spending for a federal agency at the forefront of the efforts to combat the coronavirus, while also seeking to slow spending in certain parts of the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
President Donald Trump presented his fiscal 2021 request to Congress for refilling the coffers of federal agencies. In any administration, an annual budget serves only as a political blueprint, as the White House document itself makes no changes in federal spending.
In Mr. Trump’s case, several of his requests for agencies within the Department of Health & Human Services run counter to recent budget trends. Republicans and Democrats in Congress have worked together in recent years to increase budgets for major federal health agencies.
But Mr. Trump asked Congress to cut annual budget authority for the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases by $430 million to $5.446 billion for fiscal 2021. In contrast, Congress has raised the annual budget for NIAID, a key agency in combating the coronavirus, from $5.545 billion in fiscal 2019 to $5.876 billion in fiscal 2020, which began in October, according to an HHS summary of Mr. Trump’s request.
For the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which is central to the battle against the coronavirus, Mr. Trump proposed a drop in discretionary funding to $5.627 billion. In contrast, Congress raised the CDC budget from $6.544 billion in fiscal 2019 to $6.917 in fiscal 2020.
Mr. Trump also wants to cut $559 million from the budget of the National Cancer Institute, dropping it to $5.881 billion in fiscal 2021. In contrast, Congress raised NCI’s budget from $6.121 billion in fiscal 2019 to $6.440 billion in fiscal 2020.
Mr. Trump requested a $2.6 billion reduction in the National Institutes of Health’s total discretionary budget, seeking to drop it to $37.70 billion. In contrast, Congress raised NIH’s budget from $37.887 in fiscal 2019 to $40.304 billion in fiscal 2020.
Mr. Trump’s budget proposal also includes an estimate of $152 billion in savings over a decade for Medicaid through the implementation of what the administration calls “community engagement” requirements.
The Trump administration has been at odds with Democrats for years about whether work requirements should be attached to Medicaid. “Well-designed community engagement incentives have great potential to improve health and well-being while empowering beneficiaries to rise out of poverty,” HHS said in a budget document.
Yet researchers last year reported that Arkansas’ attempt to attach work requirements to Medicaid caused almost 17,000 adults to lose this health care coverage within the first 6 months, and there was no significant difference in employment.
The researchers say this loss of coverage was partly a result of bureaucratic obstacles and confusion about the new rules. In June 2018, Arkansas became the first state to implement work requirements for Medicaid, Benjamin D. Sommers, MD, PhD, of the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, and colleagues wrote in the New England Journal of Medicine (2019 Sep 12;381[11]:1073-82).
Budget ‘would thwart’ progress
A few medical groups on Monday quickly criticized Mr. Trump’s proposals.
“In a time where our nation continues to face significant public health challenges — including 2019 novel coronavirus, climate change, gun violence, and costly chronic diseases such as heart disease and cancer – the administration should be investing more resources in better health, not cutting federal health budgets,” said Georges C. Benjamin, MD, executive director of the American Public Health Association, in a statement.
David J. Skorton, MD, chief executive and president of the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) also urged increased investment in fighting disease.
“We must continue the bipartisan budget trajectory set forth by Congress over the last several years, not reverse course,” Dr. Skorton said in a statement.
Mr. Trump’s proposed cuts in medical research “would thwart scientific progress on strategies to prevent, diagnose, treat, and cure medical conditions that affect countless patients nationwide,” he said.
In total, the new 2021 appropriations for HHS would fall by $9.46 billion to $85.667 billion under Mr. Trump’s proposal. Appropriations, also called discretionary budget authority, represents the operating budgets for federal agencies. These are decided through annual spending bills.
Congress has separate sets of laws for handling payments the federal government makes through Medicare and Medicaid. These are known as mandatory spending.
‘Untenable cuts’
AAMC’s Dr. Skorton also objected to what he termed Mr. Trump’s bid “to reduce and consolidate Medicare, Medicaid, and children’s hospital graduate medical education into a single grant program.”
This would force teaching hospitals to absorb $52 billion in “untenable cuts,” he said.
“The proposal ignores the intent of the Medicare GME program, which is to ensure an adequate physician workforce to care for Medicare beneficiaries and support the critical patient care missions of America’s teaching hospitals,” Dr. Skorton said.
The budget also seeks cuts to Medicaid, which come in addition to the administration’s “recent proposals to scale back Medicaid coverage,” Dr. Skorton said.
“More than 26% of all Medicaid hospitalizations occur at AAMC-member teaching hospitals, even though these institutions represent only 5% of all hospitals,” Dr. Skorton said. “Each of the administration’s proposals on their own would be devastating for patients – and combined, they would be disastrous.”
Rick Pollack, the chief executive and president of the American Hospital Association, described Mr. Trump’s fiscal 2021 proposal as another bid to undermine medical care in the United States.
“Every year, we adapt to a constantly changing environment, but every year, the administration aims to gut our nation’s health care infrastructure,” Mr. Pollack said in a statement.
In it, he noted that about one in five people in America depend on Medicaid, with children accounting for a large proportion of those covered by the state-federal program.
“The budget’s proposal on Medicaid financing and service delivery would cut hundreds of billions of dollars from the Medicaid program annually,” Mr. Pollack said.
He also objected to “hundreds of billions of proposed reductions to Medicare” endorsed by Mr. Trump.
Medical malpractice overhaul
The Trump administration also offered many suggestions for changing federal laws to reduce health care spending. Among these was a proposed overhaul of the approach to medical malpractice cases.
The president’s budget proposal estimates $40 billion in savings over a decade from steps to limit medical liability, according to a report from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
“The current medical liability system does not work for patients or providers, nor does it promote high-quality, evidence-based care,” OMB said. “Providers practice with a threat of potentially frivolous lawsuits, and injured patients often do not receive just compensation for their injuries.”
Mr. Trump’s fiscal 2021 budget calls for a cap on noneconomic damage awards of $250,000, which would increase with inflation over time, and a 3-year statute of limitations. Under this plan, courts could also modify attorney’s fee arrangements. HHS could provide guidance to states on how to create expert panels and administrative health care tribunals to review medical liability.
These steps would lead to lower health care spending, with clinicians dropping “defensive medicine practices,” OMB said. That would benefit the Medicare and Medicaid programs as well as lowering costs of health insurance in general.
Mr. Trump’s fiscal 2021 budget also includes a series of proposals for Medicare that it estimates would, in aggregate, save $755.5 billion over a decade.
Site-neutral policy
A large chunk of the estimated Medicare savings in Mr. Trump’s fiscal 2021 health budget would come from lowering payments to hospitals for services provided in their outpatient and physician offices.
In the fiscal 2021 proposal, HHS noted that “Medicare generally pays on-campus hospital outpatient departments substantially more than physician offices for the same services.”
Mr. Trump’s budget proposal seeks a more expansive shift to what’s called a “site-neutral” payment for services delivered in hospital outpatient programs or physician offices. This would bring these payments more in line with those made to independent physician practices.
“This proposal would eliminate the often significant disparity between what Medicare pays in these different settings for the same services,” HHS said in the budget summary.
HHS estimated this change in policy would generate $117.2 billion in savings over a decade. Combined with saving from medical malpractice reforms, the Trump administration estimates these two moves combined could save about $164 billion over a decade.
The site-neutral policy has been a legal battleground, with hospital and physician groups winning a round last year.
Another Medicare proposal included in Mr. Trump’s fiscal 2021 budget homes in on this issue for cases where a hospital owns a physician office. Medicare now pays most off-campus hospital outpatient departments higher rates than the program’s physician fee schedule dictates for the same services.
Switching to a site-neutral policy for these hospital-owned physician offices would result in $47.2 billion in savings over a decade, HHS said in the budget document.
This article first appeared on Medscape.com.
What you absolutely need to know about tail coverage
A 28-year-old pediatrician working in a large group practice in California found a new job in Pennsylvania. The job would allow her to live with her husband, who was a nonphysician.
On her last day of work at the California job, the practice’s office manager asked her, “Do you know about the tail coverage?”
He explained that it is malpractice insurance for any cases filed against her after leaving the job. Without it, he said, she would not be covered for those claims.
The physician (who asked not to be identified) had very little savings and suddenly had to pay a five-figure bill for tail coverage. To provide the extra malpractice coverage, she and her husband had to use savings they’d set aside to buy a house.
Getting tail coverage, known formally as an extended reporting endorsement, often comes as a complete and costly surprise for new doctors, says Dennis Hursh, Esq, a health care attorney based in Middletown, Penn., who deals with physicians’ employment contracts.
“Having to pay for a tail can disrupt lives,” Hursh said. “A tail can cost about one third of a young doctor’s salary. If you don’t feel you can afford to pay that, you may be forced to stay with a job you don’t like.”
Most medical residents don’t think about tail coverage until they apply for their first job, but last year, residents at Hahnemann University Hospital in Philadelphia got a painful early lesson.
In the summer, the hospital went out of business because of financial problems. Hundreds of medical residents and fellows not only were forced to find new programs but also had to prepare to buy tail coverage for their training years at Hahnemann.
“All the guarantees have been yanked out from under us,” said Tom Sibert, MD, a former internal medicine resident at the hospital, who is now finishing his training in California. “Residents don’t have that kind of money.”
Hahnemann trainees have asked the judge in the bankruptcy proceedings to put them ahead of other creditors and to ensure their tail coverage is paid. As of early February, the issue had not been resolved.
Meanwhile, Sibert and many other former trainees were trying to get quotes for purchasing tail coverage. They have been shocked by the amounts they would have to pay.
How tail coverage works
Medical malpractice tail coverage protects from incidents that took place when doctors were at their previous jobs but that later resulted in malpractice claims after they had left that employer.
One type of malpractice insurance, an occurrence policy, does not need tail coverage. Occurrence policies cover any incident that occurred when the policy was in force, no matter when a claim was filed – even if it is filed many years after the claims-filing period of the policy ends.
However, most malpractice policies – as many as 85%, according to one estimate – are claims-made policies. Claims-made policies are more much common because they’re significantly less expensive than occurrence policies.
Under a claims-made policy, coverage for malpractice claims completely stops when the policy ends. It does not cover incidents that occurred when the policy was in force but for which the patients later filed claims, as the occurrence policy does. So a tail is needed to cover these claims.
Physicians in all stages of their career may need tail coverage when they leave a job, change malpractice carriers, or retire.
But young physicians often have greater problems with tail coverage, for several reasons. They tend to be employed, and as such, they cannot choose the coverage they want. As a result, they most likely get claims-made coverage. In addition, the job turnover tends to be higher for these doctors. When leaving a job, the tail comes into play. More than half of new physicians leave their first job within 5 years, and of those, more than half leave after only 1 or 2 years.
Young physicians have no experience with tails and may not even know what they are. “In training, malpractice coverage is not a problem because the program handles it,” Mr. Hursh said. Accreditation standards require that teaching hospitals buy coverage, including a tail when residents leave.
So when young physicians are offered their first job and are handed an employment contract to sign, they may not even look for tail coverage, says Mr. Hursh, who wrote The Final Hurdle, a Physician’s Guide to Negotiating a Fair Employment Agreement. Instead, “young physicians tend to focus on issues like salary, benefits, and signing bonuses,” he said.
Mr. Hursh says the tail is usually the most expensive potential cost in the contract.
There’s no easy way to get out of paying the tail coverage once it is enshrined in the contract. The full tail can cost five or even six figures, depending on the physicians’ specialty, the local malpractice premium, and the physician’s own claims history.
Can you negotiate your tail coverage?
Negotiating tail coverage in the employment contract involves some familiarity with medical malpractice insurance and a close reading of the contract. First, you have to determine that the employer is providing claims-made coverage, which would require a tail if you leave. Then you have to determine whether the employer will pay for the tail coverage.
Often, the contract does not even mention tail coverage. “It could merely state that the practice will be responsible for malpractice coverage while you are working there,” Mr. Hursh said. Although it never specifies the tail, this language indicates that you will be paying for it, he says.
Therefore, it’s wise to have a conversation with your prospective employer about the tail. “Some new doctors never ask the question ‘What happens if I leave? Do I get tail coverage?’ ” said Israel Teitelbaum, an attorney who is chairman of Contemporary Insurance Services, an insurance broker in Silver Spring, Md.
Talking about the tail, however, can be a touchy subject for many young doctors applying for their first job. The tail matters only if you leave the job, and you may not want to imply that you would ever want to leave. Too much money, however, is on the line for you not to ask, Mr. Teitelbaum said.
Even if the employer verbally agrees to pay for the tail coverage, experts advise that you try to get the employer’s commitment in writing and have it put it into the contract.
Getting the employer to cover the tail in the initial contract is crucial because once you have agreed to work there, “it’s much more difficult to get it changed,” Mr. Teitelbaum said. However, even if tail coverage is not in the first contract, you shouldn’t give up, he says. You should try again in the next contract a few years later.
“It’s never too late to bring it up,” Mr. Teitelbaum said. After a few years of employment, you have a track record at the job. “A doctor who is very desirable to the employer may be able to get tail coverage on contract renewal.”
Coverage: Large employers vs. small employers
Willingness to pay for an employee’s tail coverage varies depending on the size of the employer. Large employers – systems, hospitals, and large practices – are much more likely to cover the tail than small and medium-sized practices.
Large employers tend to pay for at least part of the tail because they realize that it is in their interest to do so. Since they have the deepest pockets, they’re often the first to be named in a lawsuit. They might have to pay the whole claim if the physician did not have tail coverage.
However, many large employers want to use tail coverage as a bargaining chip to make sure doctors stay for a while at least. One typical arrangement, Mr. Hursh says, is to pay only one-fifth of the tail if the physician leaves in the first year of employment and then to pay one fifth more in each succeeding year until year five, when the employer assumes the entire cost of the tail.
Smaller practices, on the other hand, are usually close-fisted about tail coverage. “They tend to view the tail as an unnecessary expense,” Mr. Hursh said. “They don’t want to pay for a doctor who is not generating revenue for them any more.”
Traditionally, when physicians become partners, practices are more generous and agree to pay their tails if they leave, Mr. Hursh says. But he thinks this is changing, too – recent partnership contracts he has reviewed did not provide for tail coverage.
Times you don’t need to pay for tail coverage
Even if you’re responsible for the tail coverage, your insurance arrangement may be such that you don’t have to pay for it, says Michelle Perron, a malpractice insurance broker in North Hampton, N.H.
For example, if the carrier at your new job is the same as the one at your old job, your coverage would continue with no break, and you would not need a tail, she says. Even if you move to another state, your old carrier might also sell policies there, and you would then likely have seamless coverage, Ms. Perron says. This would be handy if you could choose your new carrier.
Even when you change carriers, Ms. Perron says, the new one might agree to pick up the old carrier’s coverage in return for getting your business, assuming you are an independent physician buying your own coverage. The new carrier would issue prior acts coverage, also known as nose coverage.
Older doctors going into retirement also have a potential tail coverage problem, but their tail coverage premium is often waived, Ms. Perron says. The need for a tail has to do with claims arising post retirement, after your coverage has ended. Typically, if you have been with the carrier for at least 5 years and you are age 55 years or older, your carrier will waive the tail coverage premium, she says.
However, if the retired doctor starts practicing again, even part time, the carrier may want to take back the free tail, she says. Some retired doctors get around this by buying a lower-priced tail from another company, but the former carrier may still want its money back, Ms. Perron says.
Can you just go without tail coverage?
What happens if physicians with a tail commitment choose to wing it and not pay for the tail? If a claim was never made against them, they may believe that the expense is unnecessary. The situation, however, is not so simple.
Some states require having tail coverage. Malpractice coverage is required in seven states, and at least some of those states explicitly extend this requirement to tails. They are Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Eleven more states tie malpractice coverage, perhaps including tails, to some benefit for the doctor, such as tort reform. These states include Indiana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, and Pennsylvania.
Many hospitals require tail coverage for privileges, and some insurers do as well. In addition, Ms. Perron says a missing tail reduces your prospects when looking for a job. “For the employer, having to pay coverage for a new hire will cost more than starting fresh with someone else,” she said.
Still, it’s important to remember the risk of being sued. “If you don’t buy the tail coverage, you are at risk for a lawsuit for many years to come,” Mr. Teitelbaum said.
Doctors should consider their potential lifetime risk, not just their current risk. Although only 8% of doctors younger than age 40 have been sued for malpractice, that figure climbs to almost half by the time doctors reach age 55.
The risks are higher in some specialties. About 63% of general surgeons and ob.gyns. have been sued.
Many of these claims are without merit, and doctors pay only the legal expenses of defending the case. Some doctors may think they could risk frivolous suits and cover legal expenses out of pocket. An American Medical Association survey showed that 68% of closed claims against doctors were dropped, dismissed, or withdrawn. It said these claims cost an average of more than $30,000 to defend.
However, Mr. Teitelbaum puts the defense costs for so-called frivolous suits much higher than the AMA, at $250,000 or more. “Even if you’re sure you won’t have to pay a claim, you still have to defend yourself against frivolous suits,” he said. “You won’t recover those expenses.”
How to lower your tail coverage cost
Physicians typically have 60 days to buy tail coverage after their regular coverage has ended. Specialized brokers such as Mr. Teitelbaum and Ms. Perron help physicians look for the best tails to buy.
The cost of the tail depends on how long you’ve been at your job when you leave it, Ms. Perron says. If you leave in the first 1 or 2 years of the policy, she says, the tail price will be lower because the coverage period is shorter.
Usually the most expensive tail available is from the carrier that issued the original policy. Why is this? “Carriers rarely sell a tail that undercuts their retail price,” Mr. Teitelbaum said. “They don’t want to compete with themselves, and in fact doing so could pose regulatory problems for them.”
Instead of buying from their own carrier, doctors can purchase stand-alone tails from competitors, which Mr. Teitelbaum says are 10%-30% less expensive than the policy the original carrier issues. However, stand-alone tails are not always easy to find, especially for high-cost specialties such as neurosurgery and ob.gyn., he says.
Some physicians try to bring down the cost of the tail by limiting the duration of the tail. You can buy tails that only cover claims filed 1-5 years after the incident took place, rather than indefinitely. These limits mirror the typical statute of limitations – the time limit to file a claim in each state. This limit is as little as 2 years in some states, though it can be as long as 6 years in others.
However, some states make exceptions to the statute of limitations. The 2- to 6-year clock doesn’t start ticking until the mistake is discovered or, in the case of children, when they reach adulthood. “This means that with a limited tail, you always have risk,” Perron said.
And yet some doctors insist on these time-limited tails. “If a doctor opts for 3 years’ coverage, that’s better than no years,” Mr. Teitelbaum said. “But I would advise them to take at least 5 years because that gives you coverage for the basic statute of limitations in most states. Three-year tails do yield savings, but often they’re not enough to warrant the risk.”
Another way to reduce costs is to lower the coverage limits of the tail. The standard coverage limit is $1 million per case and $3 million per year, so doctors might be able to save money on the premium by buying limits of $200,000/$600,000. But Mr. Teitelbaum says most companies would refuse to sell a policy with a limit lower than that of the expiring policy.
Further ways to reduce the cost of the tail include buying tail coverage that doesn’t give the physician the right to approve a settlement or that doesn’t include legal fees in the coverage limits. But these options, too, raise the physician’s risks. Whichever option you choose, the important thing is to protect yourself against costly lawsuits.
This article first appeared on Medscape.com.
A 28-year-old pediatrician working in a large group practice in California found a new job in Pennsylvania. The job would allow her to live with her husband, who was a nonphysician.
On her last day of work at the California job, the practice’s office manager asked her, “Do you know about the tail coverage?”
He explained that it is malpractice insurance for any cases filed against her after leaving the job. Without it, he said, she would not be covered for those claims.
The physician (who asked not to be identified) had very little savings and suddenly had to pay a five-figure bill for tail coverage. To provide the extra malpractice coverage, she and her husband had to use savings they’d set aside to buy a house.
Getting tail coverage, known formally as an extended reporting endorsement, often comes as a complete and costly surprise for new doctors, says Dennis Hursh, Esq, a health care attorney based in Middletown, Penn., who deals with physicians’ employment contracts.
“Having to pay for a tail can disrupt lives,” Hursh said. “A tail can cost about one third of a young doctor’s salary. If you don’t feel you can afford to pay that, you may be forced to stay with a job you don’t like.”
Most medical residents don’t think about tail coverage until they apply for their first job, but last year, residents at Hahnemann University Hospital in Philadelphia got a painful early lesson.
In the summer, the hospital went out of business because of financial problems. Hundreds of medical residents and fellows not only were forced to find new programs but also had to prepare to buy tail coverage for their training years at Hahnemann.
“All the guarantees have been yanked out from under us,” said Tom Sibert, MD, a former internal medicine resident at the hospital, who is now finishing his training in California. “Residents don’t have that kind of money.”
Hahnemann trainees have asked the judge in the bankruptcy proceedings to put them ahead of other creditors and to ensure their tail coverage is paid. As of early February, the issue had not been resolved.
Meanwhile, Sibert and many other former trainees were trying to get quotes for purchasing tail coverage. They have been shocked by the amounts they would have to pay.
How tail coverage works
Medical malpractice tail coverage protects from incidents that took place when doctors were at their previous jobs but that later resulted in malpractice claims after they had left that employer.
One type of malpractice insurance, an occurrence policy, does not need tail coverage. Occurrence policies cover any incident that occurred when the policy was in force, no matter when a claim was filed – even if it is filed many years after the claims-filing period of the policy ends.
However, most malpractice policies – as many as 85%, according to one estimate – are claims-made policies. Claims-made policies are more much common because they’re significantly less expensive than occurrence policies.
Under a claims-made policy, coverage for malpractice claims completely stops when the policy ends. It does not cover incidents that occurred when the policy was in force but for which the patients later filed claims, as the occurrence policy does. So a tail is needed to cover these claims.
Physicians in all stages of their career may need tail coverage when they leave a job, change malpractice carriers, or retire.
But young physicians often have greater problems with tail coverage, for several reasons. They tend to be employed, and as such, they cannot choose the coverage they want. As a result, they most likely get claims-made coverage. In addition, the job turnover tends to be higher for these doctors. When leaving a job, the tail comes into play. More than half of new physicians leave their first job within 5 years, and of those, more than half leave after only 1 or 2 years.
Young physicians have no experience with tails and may not even know what they are. “In training, malpractice coverage is not a problem because the program handles it,” Mr. Hursh said. Accreditation standards require that teaching hospitals buy coverage, including a tail when residents leave.
So when young physicians are offered their first job and are handed an employment contract to sign, they may not even look for tail coverage, says Mr. Hursh, who wrote The Final Hurdle, a Physician’s Guide to Negotiating a Fair Employment Agreement. Instead, “young physicians tend to focus on issues like salary, benefits, and signing bonuses,” he said.
Mr. Hursh says the tail is usually the most expensive potential cost in the contract.
There’s no easy way to get out of paying the tail coverage once it is enshrined in the contract. The full tail can cost five or even six figures, depending on the physicians’ specialty, the local malpractice premium, and the physician’s own claims history.
Can you negotiate your tail coverage?
Negotiating tail coverage in the employment contract involves some familiarity with medical malpractice insurance and a close reading of the contract. First, you have to determine that the employer is providing claims-made coverage, which would require a tail if you leave. Then you have to determine whether the employer will pay for the tail coverage.
Often, the contract does not even mention tail coverage. “It could merely state that the practice will be responsible for malpractice coverage while you are working there,” Mr. Hursh said. Although it never specifies the tail, this language indicates that you will be paying for it, he says.
Therefore, it’s wise to have a conversation with your prospective employer about the tail. “Some new doctors never ask the question ‘What happens if I leave? Do I get tail coverage?’ ” said Israel Teitelbaum, an attorney who is chairman of Contemporary Insurance Services, an insurance broker in Silver Spring, Md.
Talking about the tail, however, can be a touchy subject for many young doctors applying for their first job. The tail matters only if you leave the job, and you may not want to imply that you would ever want to leave. Too much money, however, is on the line for you not to ask, Mr. Teitelbaum said.
Even if the employer verbally agrees to pay for the tail coverage, experts advise that you try to get the employer’s commitment in writing and have it put it into the contract.
Getting the employer to cover the tail in the initial contract is crucial because once you have agreed to work there, “it’s much more difficult to get it changed,” Mr. Teitelbaum said. However, even if tail coverage is not in the first contract, you shouldn’t give up, he says. You should try again in the next contract a few years later.
“It’s never too late to bring it up,” Mr. Teitelbaum said. After a few years of employment, you have a track record at the job. “A doctor who is very desirable to the employer may be able to get tail coverage on contract renewal.”
Coverage: Large employers vs. small employers
Willingness to pay for an employee’s tail coverage varies depending on the size of the employer. Large employers – systems, hospitals, and large practices – are much more likely to cover the tail than small and medium-sized practices.
Large employers tend to pay for at least part of the tail because they realize that it is in their interest to do so. Since they have the deepest pockets, they’re often the first to be named in a lawsuit. They might have to pay the whole claim if the physician did not have tail coverage.
However, many large employers want to use tail coverage as a bargaining chip to make sure doctors stay for a while at least. One typical arrangement, Mr. Hursh says, is to pay only one-fifth of the tail if the physician leaves in the first year of employment and then to pay one fifth more in each succeeding year until year five, when the employer assumes the entire cost of the tail.
Smaller practices, on the other hand, are usually close-fisted about tail coverage. “They tend to view the tail as an unnecessary expense,” Mr. Hursh said. “They don’t want to pay for a doctor who is not generating revenue for them any more.”
Traditionally, when physicians become partners, practices are more generous and agree to pay their tails if they leave, Mr. Hursh says. But he thinks this is changing, too – recent partnership contracts he has reviewed did not provide for tail coverage.
Times you don’t need to pay for tail coverage
Even if you’re responsible for the tail coverage, your insurance arrangement may be such that you don’t have to pay for it, says Michelle Perron, a malpractice insurance broker in North Hampton, N.H.
For example, if the carrier at your new job is the same as the one at your old job, your coverage would continue with no break, and you would not need a tail, she says. Even if you move to another state, your old carrier might also sell policies there, and you would then likely have seamless coverage, Ms. Perron says. This would be handy if you could choose your new carrier.
Even when you change carriers, Ms. Perron says, the new one might agree to pick up the old carrier’s coverage in return for getting your business, assuming you are an independent physician buying your own coverage. The new carrier would issue prior acts coverage, also known as nose coverage.
Older doctors going into retirement also have a potential tail coverage problem, but their tail coverage premium is often waived, Ms. Perron says. The need for a tail has to do with claims arising post retirement, after your coverage has ended. Typically, if you have been with the carrier for at least 5 years and you are age 55 years or older, your carrier will waive the tail coverage premium, she says.
However, if the retired doctor starts practicing again, even part time, the carrier may want to take back the free tail, she says. Some retired doctors get around this by buying a lower-priced tail from another company, but the former carrier may still want its money back, Ms. Perron says.
Can you just go without tail coverage?
What happens if physicians with a tail commitment choose to wing it and not pay for the tail? If a claim was never made against them, they may believe that the expense is unnecessary. The situation, however, is not so simple.
Some states require having tail coverage. Malpractice coverage is required in seven states, and at least some of those states explicitly extend this requirement to tails. They are Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Eleven more states tie malpractice coverage, perhaps including tails, to some benefit for the doctor, such as tort reform. These states include Indiana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, and Pennsylvania.
Many hospitals require tail coverage for privileges, and some insurers do as well. In addition, Ms. Perron says a missing tail reduces your prospects when looking for a job. “For the employer, having to pay coverage for a new hire will cost more than starting fresh with someone else,” she said.
Still, it’s important to remember the risk of being sued. “If you don’t buy the tail coverage, you are at risk for a lawsuit for many years to come,” Mr. Teitelbaum said.
Doctors should consider their potential lifetime risk, not just their current risk. Although only 8% of doctors younger than age 40 have been sued for malpractice, that figure climbs to almost half by the time doctors reach age 55.
The risks are higher in some specialties. About 63% of general surgeons and ob.gyns. have been sued.
Many of these claims are without merit, and doctors pay only the legal expenses of defending the case. Some doctors may think they could risk frivolous suits and cover legal expenses out of pocket. An American Medical Association survey showed that 68% of closed claims against doctors were dropped, dismissed, or withdrawn. It said these claims cost an average of more than $30,000 to defend.
However, Mr. Teitelbaum puts the defense costs for so-called frivolous suits much higher than the AMA, at $250,000 or more. “Even if you’re sure you won’t have to pay a claim, you still have to defend yourself against frivolous suits,” he said. “You won’t recover those expenses.”
How to lower your tail coverage cost
Physicians typically have 60 days to buy tail coverage after their regular coverage has ended. Specialized brokers such as Mr. Teitelbaum and Ms. Perron help physicians look for the best tails to buy.
The cost of the tail depends on how long you’ve been at your job when you leave it, Ms. Perron says. If you leave in the first 1 or 2 years of the policy, she says, the tail price will be lower because the coverage period is shorter.
Usually the most expensive tail available is from the carrier that issued the original policy. Why is this? “Carriers rarely sell a tail that undercuts their retail price,” Mr. Teitelbaum said. “They don’t want to compete with themselves, and in fact doing so could pose regulatory problems for them.”
Instead of buying from their own carrier, doctors can purchase stand-alone tails from competitors, which Mr. Teitelbaum says are 10%-30% less expensive than the policy the original carrier issues. However, stand-alone tails are not always easy to find, especially for high-cost specialties such as neurosurgery and ob.gyn., he says.
Some physicians try to bring down the cost of the tail by limiting the duration of the tail. You can buy tails that only cover claims filed 1-5 years after the incident took place, rather than indefinitely. These limits mirror the typical statute of limitations – the time limit to file a claim in each state. This limit is as little as 2 years in some states, though it can be as long as 6 years in others.
However, some states make exceptions to the statute of limitations. The 2- to 6-year clock doesn’t start ticking until the mistake is discovered or, in the case of children, when they reach adulthood. “This means that with a limited tail, you always have risk,” Perron said.
And yet some doctors insist on these time-limited tails. “If a doctor opts for 3 years’ coverage, that’s better than no years,” Mr. Teitelbaum said. “But I would advise them to take at least 5 years because that gives you coverage for the basic statute of limitations in most states. Three-year tails do yield savings, but often they’re not enough to warrant the risk.”
Another way to reduce costs is to lower the coverage limits of the tail. The standard coverage limit is $1 million per case and $3 million per year, so doctors might be able to save money on the premium by buying limits of $200,000/$600,000. But Mr. Teitelbaum says most companies would refuse to sell a policy with a limit lower than that of the expiring policy.
Further ways to reduce the cost of the tail include buying tail coverage that doesn’t give the physician the right to approve a settlement or that doesn’t include legal fees in the coverage limits. But these options, too, raise the physician’s risks. Whichever option you choose, the important thing is to protect yourself against costly lawsuits.
This article first appeared on Medscape.com.
A 28-year-old pediatrician working in a large group practice in California found a new job in Pennsylvania. The job would allow her to live with her husband, who was a nonphysician.
On her last day of work at the California job, the practice’s office manager asked her, “Do you know about the tail coverage?”
He explained that it is malpractice insurance for any cases filed against her after leaving the job. Without it, he said, she would not be covered for those claims.
The physician (who asked not to be identified) had very little savings and suddenly had to pay a five-figure bill for tail coverage. To provide the extra malpractice coverage, she and her husband had to use savings they’d set aside to buy a house.
Getting tail coverage, known formally as an extended reporting endorsement, often comes as a complete and costly surprise for new doctors, says Dennis Hursh, Esq, a health care attorney based in Middletown, Penn., who deals with physicians’ employment contracts.
“Having to pay for a tail can disrupt lives,” Hursh said. “A tail can cost about one third of a young doctor’s salary. If you don’t feel you can afford to pay that, you may be forced to stay with a job you don’t like.”
Most medical residents don’t think about tail coverage until they apply for their first job, but last year, residents at Hahnemann University Hospital in Philadelphia got a painful early lesson.
In the summer, the hospital went out of business because of financial problems. Hundreds of medical residents and fellows not only were forced to find new programs but also had to prepare to buy tail coverage for their training years at Hahnemann.
“All the guarantees have been yanked out from under us,” said Tom Sibert, MD, a former internal medicine resident at the hospital, who is now finishing his training in California. “Residents don’t have that kind of money.”
Hahnemann trainees have asked the judge in the bankruptcy proceedings to put them ahead of other creditors and to ensure their tail coverage is paid. As of early February, the issue had not been resolved.
Meanwhile, Sibert and many other former trainees were trying to get quotes for purchasing tail coverage. They have been shocked by the amounts they would have to pay.
How tail coverage works
Medical malpractice tail coverage protects from incidents that took place when doctors were at their previous jobs but that later resulted in malpractice claims after they had left that employer.
One type of malpractice insurance, an occurrence policy, does not need tail coverage. Occurrence policies cover any incident that occurred when the policy was in force, no matter when a claim was filed – even if it is filed many years after the claims-filing period of the policy ends.
However, most malpractice policies – as many as 85%, according to one estimate – are claims-made policies. Claims-made policies are more much common because they’re significantly less expensive than occurrence policies.
Under a claims-made policy, coverage for malpractice claims completely stops when the policy ends. It does not cover incidents that occurred when the policy was in force but for which the patients later filed claims, as the occurrence policy does. So a tail is needed to cover these claims.
Physicians in all stages of their career may need tail coverage when they leave a job, change malpractice carriers, or retire.
But young physicians often have greater problems with tail coverage, for several reasons. They tend to be employed, and as such, they cannot choose the coverage they want. As a result, they most likely get claims-made coverage. In addition, the job turnover tends to be higher for these doctors. When leaving a job, the tail comes into play. More than half of new physicians leave their first job within 5 years, and of those, more than half leave after only 1 or 2 years.
Young physicians have no experience with tails and may not even know what they are. “In training, malpractice coverage is not a problem because the program handles it,” Mr. Hursh said. Accreditation standards require that teaching hospitals buy coverage, including a tail when residents leave.
So when young physicians are offered their first job and are handed an employment contract to sign, they may not even look for tail coverage, says Mr. Hursh, who wrote The Final Hurdle, a Physician’s Guide to Negotiating a Fair Employment Agreement. Instead, “young physicians tend to focus on issues like salary, benefits, and signing bonuses,” he said.
Mr. Hursh says the tail is usually the most expensive potential cost in the contract.
There’s no easy way to get out of paying the tail coverage once it is enshrined in the contract. The full tail can cost five or even six figures, depending on the physicians’ specialty, the local malpractice premium, and the physician’s own claims history.
Can you negotiate your tail coverage?
Negotiating tail coverage in the employment contract involves some familiarity with medical malpractice insurance and a close reading of the contract. First, you have to determine that the employer is providing claims-made coverage, which would require a tail if you leave. Then you have to determine whether the employer will pay for the tail coverage.
Often, the contract does not even mention tail coverage. “It could merely state that the practice will be responsible for malpractice coverage while you are working there,” Mr. Hursh said. Although it never specifies the tail, this language indicates that you will be paying for it, he says.
Therefore, it’s wise to have a conversation with your prospective employer about the tail. “Some new doctors never ask the question ‘What happens if I leave? Do I get tail coverage?’ ” said Israel Teitelbaum, an attorney who is chairman of Contemporary Insurance Services, an insurance broker in Silver Spring, Md.
Talking about the tail, however, can be a touchy subject for many young doctors applying for their first job. The tail matters only if you leave the job, and you may not want to imply that you would ever want to leave. Too much money, however, is on the line for you not to ask, Mr. Teitelbaum said.
Even if the employer verbally agrees to pay for the tail coverage, experts advise that you try to get the employer’s commitment in writing and have it put it into the contract.
Getting the employer to cover the tail in the initial contract is crucial because once you have agreed to work there, “it’s much more difficult to get it changed,” Mr. Teitelbaum said. However, even if tail coverage is not in the first contract, you shouldn’t give up, he says. You should try again in the next contract a few years later.
“It’s never too late to bring it up,” Mr. Teitelbaum said. After a few years of employment, you have a track record at the job. “A doctor who is very desirable to the employer may be able to get tail coverage on contract renewal.”
Coverage: Large employers vs. small employers
Willingness to pay for an employee’s tail coverage varies depending on the size of the employer. Large employers – systems, hospitals, and large practices – are much more likely to cover the tail than small and medium-sized practices.
Large employers tend to pay for at least part of the tail because they realize that it is in their interest to do so. Since they have the deepest pockets, they’re often the first to be named in a lawsuit. They might have to pay the whole claim if the physician did not have tail coverage.
However, many large employers want to use tail coverage as a bargaining chip to make sure doctors stay for a while at least. One typical arrangement, Mr. Hursh says, is to pay only one-fifth of the tail if the physician leaves in the first year of employment and then to pay one fifth more in each succeeding year until year five, when the employer assumes the entire cost of the tail.
Smaller practices, on the other hand, are usually close-fisted about tail coverage. “They tend to view the tail as an unnecessary expense,” Mr. Hursh said. “They don’t want to pay for a doctor who is not generating revenue for them any more.”
Traditionally, when physicians become partners, practices are more generous and agree to pay their tails if they leave, Mr. Hursh says. But he thinks this is changing, too – recent partnership contracts he has reviewed did not provide for tail coverage.
Times you don’t need to pay for tail coverage
Even if you’re responsible for the tail coverage, your insurance arrangement may be such that you don’t have to pay for it, says Michelle Perron, a malpractice insurance broker in North Hampton, N.H.
For example, if the carrier at your new job is the same as the one at your old job, your coverage would continue with no break, and you would not need a tail, she says. Even if you move to another state, your old carrier might also sell policies there, and you would then likely have seamless coverage, Ms. Perron says. This would be handy if you could choose your new carrier.
Even when you change carriers, Ms. Perron says, the new one might agree to pick up the old carrier’s coverage in return for getting your business, assuming you are an independent physician buying your own coverage. The new carrier would issue prior acts coverage, also known as nose coverage.
Older doctors going into retirement also have a potential tail coverage problem, but their tail coverage premium is often waived, Ms. Perron says. The need for a tail has to do with claims arising post retirement, after your coverage has ended. Typically, if you have been with the carrier for at least 5 years and you are age 55 years or older, your carrier will waive the tail coverage premium, she says.
However, if the retired doctor starts practicing again, even part time, the carrier may want to take back the free tail, she says. Some retired doctors get around this by buying a lower-priced tail from another company, but the former carrier may still want its money back, Ms. Perron says.
Can you just go without tail coverage?
What happens if physicians with a tail commitment choose to wing it and not pay for the tail? If a claim was never made against them, they may believe that the expense is unnecessary. The situation, however, is not so simple.
Some states require having tail coverage. Malpractice coverage is required in seven states, and at least some of those states explicitly extend this requirement to tails. They are Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Eleven more states tie malpractice coverage, perhaps including tails, to some benefit for the doctor, such as tort reform. These states include Indiana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, and Pennsylvania.
Many hospitals require tail coverage for privileges, and some insurers do as well. In addition, Ms. Perron says a missing tail reduces your prospects when looking for a job. “For the employer, having to pay coverage for a new hire will cost more than starting fresh with someone else,” she said.
Still, it’s important to remember the risk of being sued. “If you don’t buy the tail coverage, you are at risk for a lawsuit for many years to come,” Mr. Teitelbaum said.
Doctors should consider their potential lifetime risk, not just their current risk. Although only 8% of doctors younger than age 40 have been sued for malpractice, that figure climbs to almost half by the time doctors reach age 55.
The risks are higher in some specialties. About 63% of general surgeons and ob.gyns. have been sued.
Many of these claims are without merit, and doctors pay only the legal expenses of defending the case. Some doctors may think they could risk frivolous suits and cover legal expenses out of pocket. An American Medical Association survey showed that 68% of closed claims against doctors were dropped, dismissed, or withdrawn. It said these claims cost an average of more than $30,000 to defend.
However, Mr. Teitelbaum puts the defense costs for so-called frivolous suits much higher than the AMA, at $250,000 or more. “Even if you’re sure you won’t have to pay a claim, you still have to defend yourself against frivolous suits,” he said. “You won’t recover those expenses.”
How to lower your tail coverage cost
Physicians typically have 60 days to buy tail coverage after their regular coverage has ended. Specialized brokers such as Mr. Teitelbaum and Ms. Perron help physicians look for the best tails to buy.
The cost of the tail depends on how long you’ve been at your job when you leave it, Ms. Perron says. If you leave in the first 1 or 2 years of the policy, she says, the tail price will be lower because the coverage period is shorter.
Usually the most expensive tail available is from the carrier that issued the original policy. Why is this? “Carriers rarely sell a tail that undercuts their retail price,” Mr. Teitelbaum said. “They don’t want to compete with themselves, and in fact doing so could pose regulatory problems for them.”
Instead of buying from their own carrier, doctors can purchase stand-alone tails from competitors, which Mr. Teitelbaum says are 10%-30% less expensive than the policy the original carrier issues. However, stand-alone tails are not always easy to find, especially for high-cost specialties such as neurosurgery and ob.gyn., he says.
Some physicians try to bring down the cost of the tail by limiting the duration of the tail. You can buy tails that only cover claims filed 1-5 years after the incident took place, rather than indefinitely. These limits mirror the typical statute of limitations – the time limit to file a claim in each state. This limit is as little as 2 years in some states, though it can be as long as 6 years in others.
However, some states make exceptions to the statute of limitations. The 2- to 6-year clock doesn’t start ticking until the mistake is discovered or, in the case of children, when they reach adulthood. “This means that with a limited tail, you always have risk,” Perron said.
And yet some doctors insist on these time-limited tails. “If a doctor opts for 3 years’ coverage, that’s better than no years,” Mr. Teitelbaum said. “But I would advise them to take at least 5 years because that gives you coverage for the basic statute of limitations in most states. Three-year tails do yield savings, but often they’re not enough to warrant the risk.”
Another way to reduce costs is to lower the coverage limits of the tail. The standard coverage limit is $1 million per case and $3 million per year, so doctors might be able to save money on the premium by buying limits of $200,000/$600,000. But Mr. Teitelbaum says most companies would refuse to sell a policy with a limit lower than that of the expiring policy.
Further ways to reduce the cost of the tail include buying tail coverage that doesn’t give the physician the right to approve a settlement or that doesn’t include legal fees in the coverage limits. But these options, too, raise the physician’s risks. Whichever option you choose, the important thing is to protect yourself against costly lawsuits.
This article first appeared on Medscape.com.
ObGyn malpractice liability risk: 2020 developments and probabilities
In this second in a series of 3 articles discussing medical malpractice and the ObGyn we look at the reasons for malpractice claims and liability, what happens to malpractice claims, and the direction and future of medical malpractice. The first article dealt with 2 sources of major malpractice damages: the “big verdict” and physicians with multiple malpractice paid claims. Next month we look at the place of apology in medicine, in cases in which error, including negligence, may have caused a patient injury.
CASE 1 Long-term brachial plexus injury
Right upper extremity injury occurs in the neonate at delivery with sequela of long-term brachial plexus injury (which is diagnosed around 6 months of age). Physical therapy and orthopedic assessment are rendered. Despite continued treatment, discrepancy in arm lengths (ie, affected side arm is noticeably shorter than opposite side) remains. The child cannot play basketball with his older brother and is the victim of ridicule, the plaintiff’s attorney emphasizes. He is unable to properly pronate or supinate the affected arm.
The defendant ObGyn maintains that there was “no shoulder dystocia [at delivery] and the shoulder did not get obstructed in the pelvis; shoulder was delivered 15 seconds after delivery of the head.” The nursing staff testifies that if shoulder dystocia had been the problem they would have launched upon a series of procedures to address such, in accord with the delivering obstetrician. The defense expert witness testifies that a brachial plexus injury can happen without shoulder dystocia.
A defense verdict is rendered by the Florida jury.1
CASE 2 Shoulder dystocia
During delivery, the obstetrician notes a shoulder dystocia (“turtle sign”). After initial attempts to release the shoulder were unsuccessful, the physician applies traction several times to the head of the child, and the baby is delivered. There is permanent injury to the right brachial plexus. The defendant ObGyn says that traction was necessary to dislodge the shoulder, and that the injury was the result of the forces of labor (not the traction). The expert witness for the plaintiff testifies that the medical standard of care did not permit traction under these circumstances, and that the traction was the likely cause of the injury.
The Virginia jury awards $2.32 million in damages.2
Note: The above vignettes are drawn from actual cases but are only outlines of those cases and are not complete descriptions of the claims in the cases. Because the information comes from informal sources, not formal court records, the facts may be inaccurate and incomplete. They should be viewed as illustrations only.

The trend in malpractice
It has been clear for many years that medical malpractice claims are not randomly or evenly distributed among physicians. Notably, the variation among specialties has, and continues to be, substantial (FIGURE 1).3 Recent data suggest that, although paid claims per “1,000 physician-years” averages 14 paid claims per 1,000 physician years, it ranges from 4 or 5 in 1,000 (psychiatry and pediatrics) to 53 and 49 claims per 1,000 (neurology and plastic surgery, respectively). Obstetrics and gynecology has the fourth highest rate at 42.5 paid claims per 1,000 physician years.4 (These data are for the years 1992–2014.)

Continue to: The number of ObGyn paid malpractice claims has decreased over time...
The number of ObGyn paid malpractice claims has decreased over time. Although large verdicts and physicians with multiple paid malpractice claims receive a good deal of attention (as we noted in part 1 of our series), in fact, paid medical malpractice claims have trended downward in recent decades.5 When the data above are disaggregated by 5-year periods, for example, in obstetrics and gynecology, there has been a consistent reduction in paid malpractice claims from 1992 to 2014. Paid claims went from 58 per 1,000 physician-years in 1992–1996 to 25 per 1,000 in 2009–2014 (FIGURE 2).4,6 In short, the rate dropped by half over approximately 20 years.4

It is reasonable to expect that such a decline in the cost of malpractice insurance premiums would follow. Robert L. Barbieri, MD, who practices in Boston, Massachusetts, in his excellent recent editorial in OBG M

Why have malpractice payouts declined overall?
Have medical errors declined?
It would be wonderful if the reduction in malpractice claims represented a significant decrease in medical errors. Attention to medical errors was driven by the first widely noticed study of medical error deaths. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) study in 2000, put the number of deaths annually at 44,000 to 98,000.8 There have been many efforts to reduce such errors, and it is possible that those efforts have indeed reduced errors somewhat.4 Barbieri provided a helpful digest of many of the error-reduction suggestions for ObGyn practice (TABLE 1).6 But the number of medical errors remains high. More recent studies have suggested that the IOM’s reported number of injuries may have been low.9 In 2013, one study suggested that 210,000 deaths annually were “associated with preventable harm” in hospitals. Because of how the data were gathered the authors estimated that the actual number of preventable deaths was closer to 400,000 annually. Serious harm to patients was estimated at 10 to 20 times the IOM rate.9
Therefore, a dramatic reduction in preventable medical errors does not appear to explain the reduction in malpractice claims. Some portion of it may be explained by malpractice reforms—see "The medical reform factor" section below.

The collective accountability factor
The way malpractice claims are paid (FIGURE 4),10 reported, and handled may explain some of the apparent reduction in overall paid claims. Perhaps the advent of “collective accountability,” in which patient care is rendered by teams and responsibility accepted at a team level, can alleviate a significant amount of individual physician medical malpractice claims.11 This “enterprise liability” may shift the burden of medical error from physicians to health care organizations.12 Collective accountability may, therefore, focus on institutional responsibility rather than individual physician negligence.11,13 Institutions frequently hire multiple specialists and cover their medical malpractice costs as well as stand to be named in suits.

Continue to: The institutional involvement in malpractice cases also may affect...
The institutional involvement in malpractice cases also may affect apparent malpractice rates in another way. The National Practitioner Data Bank, which is the source of information for many malpractice studies, only requires reporting about individual physicians, not institutions.14 If, therefore, claims are settled on behalf of an institution, without implicating the physician, the number of physician malpractice cases may appear to decline without any real change in malpractice rates.14 In addition, institutions have taken the lead in informal resolution of injuries that occur in the institution, and these programs may reduce the direct malpractice claims against physicians. (These “disclosure, apology, and offer,” and similar programs, are discussed in the upcoming third part of this series.)
The medical reform factor
As noted, annual rates paid for medical malpractice in our specialty are trending downward. Many commentators look to malpractice reforms as the reason for the drop in malpractice rates.15-17 Because medical malpractice is essentially a matter of state law, the medical malpractice reform has occurred primarily at the state level.18 There have been many different reforms tried—limits on expert witnesses, review panels, and a variety of procedural limitations.19 Perhaps the most effective reform has been caps being placed on noneconomic damages (generally pain and suffering).20 These caps vary by state (FIGURE 5)21,22 and, of course, affect the “big verdict” cases. (As we saw in the second case scenario above, Virginia is an example of a state with a cap on malpractice awards.) They also have the secondary effect of reducing the number of malpractice cases. They make malpractice cases less attractive to some attorneys because they reduce the opportunity of large contingency fees from large verdicts. (Virtually all medical malpractice cases in the United States are tried on a contingency-fee basis, meaning that the plaintiff does not pay the attorney handling the case but rather the attorney takes a percentage of any recovery—typically in the neighborhood of 35%.) The reform process continues, although, presently, there is less pressure to act on the malpractice crisis.

Medical malpractice cases are emotional and costly
Another reason for the relatively low rate of paid claims is that medical malpractice cases are difficult, emotionally challenging, time consuming, and expensive to pursue.23 They typically drag on for years, require extensive and expensive expert consultants as well as witnesses, and face stiff defense (compared with many other torts). The settlement of medical malpractice cases, for example, is less likely than other kinds of personal injury cases.
The contingency-fee basis does mean that injured patients do not have to pay attorney fees up front; however, plaintiffs may have to pay substantial costs along the way. The other side of this coin is that lawyers can be reluctant to take malpractice cases in which the damages are likely to be small, or where the legal uncertainty reduces the odds of achieving any damages. Thus, many potential malpractice cases are never filed.
A word of caution
The news of a reduction in malpractice paid claims may not be permanent. The numbers can conceivably be cyclical, and political reforms achieved can be changed. In addition, new technology will likely bring new kinds of malpractice claims. That appears to be the case, for example, with electronic health records (EHRs). One insurer reports that EHR malpractice claims have increased over the last 8 years.24 The most common injury in these claims was death (25%), as well as a magnitude of less serious injuries. EHR-related claims result from system failures, copy-paste inaccuracies, faulty drop-down menu use, and uncorrected “auto-populated” fields. Obstetrics is tied for fifth on the list of 14 specialties with claims related to EHRs, and gynecology is tied for eighth place.24
Continue to: A federal court ruled that a hospital that changed from...
A federal court ruled that a hospital that changed from paper records to EHRs for test results had a duty to “‘implement a reasonable procedure during the transition phase’ to ensure the timely delivery of test results” to health care providers.25 We will address this in a future “What’s the Verdict?”.
Rates of harm, malpractice cases, and the disposition of cases
There are many surprises when looking at medical malpractice claims data generally. The first surprise is how few claims are filed relative to the number of error-related injuries. Given the estimate of 210,000 to 400,000 deaths “associated with preventable harm” in hospitals, plus 10 to 20 times that number of serious injuries, it would be reasonable to expect claims of many hundreds of thousands per year. Compare the probability of a malpractice claim from an error-related injury, for example, with the probability of other personal injuries—eg, of traffic deaths associated with preventable harm.
The second key observation is how many of the claims filed are not successful—even when there was evidence in the record of errors associated with the injury. Studies slice the data in different ways but collectively suggest that only a small proportion of malpractice claims filed (a claim is generally regarded as some written demand for compensation for injuries) result in payments, either through settlement or by trial. A 2006 study by Studdert and colleagues determined that 63% of formal malpractice claims filed did involve injuries resulting from errors.26 The study found that in 16% of the claims (not injuries) there was no payment even though there was error. In 10% of the claims there was payment, even in the absence of error.
Overall, in this study, 56% of the claims received some compensation.26 That is higher than a more recent study by Jena and others, which found only 22% of claims resulted in compensation.3
How malpractice claims are decided is also interesting. Jena and colleagues found that only 55% of claims resulted in litigation.27 Presumably, the other 45% may have resulted in the plaintiff dropping the case, or in some form of settlement. Of the claims that were litigated, 54% were dismissed by the court, and another 35% were settled before a trial verdict. The cases that went to trial (about 10%), overwhelmingly (80%) resulted in verdicts for the defense.3,27 A different study found that only 9% of cases went to trial, and 87% were a defense verdict.28 The high level of defense verdicts may suggest that malpractice defense lawyers, and their client physicians, do a good job of assessing cases they are likely to lose, and settling them before trial.
ObGyns generally have larger numbers of claims and among the largest payment amounts when there is payment. Fewer of their cases are dismissed by the courts, so more go to trial. At trial, however, ObGyns prevail at a remarkably high rate.27 As for the probability of payment of a malpractice claim for ObGyns, one study suggested that there is approximately a 16% annual probability of a claim being filed, but only a 3% annual probability of a payment being made (suggesting about a 20% probability of payment per claim).3
Continue to: The purposes and effects of the medical malpractice system...
The purposes and effects of the medical malpractice system
The essential goals of tort law (including medical malpractice) include compensation for those who are injured and deterrence of future injuries (TABLE 2). What are the overall effects to the medical malpractice system? Unfortunately, the answer is that the law delivers disappointing results at best. It has a fairly high error rate. Many people who deserve some compensation for their injuries never seek compensation, and many deserving injured patients fail in efforts to receive compensation. At the same time, a few of the injured receive huge recoveries (even windfalls), and at least a small fraction receive compensation when there was no medical error. In addition to the high error rate, the system is inefficient and very expensive. Both defendants (through their insurance carriers) and plaintiffs spend a lot of money, years of time, and untold emotional pain dealing with these cases. The system also exacts high emotional and personal costs on plaintiffs and defendants.

Malpractice reform has not really addressed these issues—it has generally been focused on ways to reduce the cost of malpractice insurance. The most effective reform in reducing rates—caps—has had the effect of compensating the most seriously injured as though they were more modestly injured, and dissuading attorneys from taking the cases of those less seriously injured.
The medical and legal professions exist to help patients (the public). It does not seem that we have arrived at a system that does that very fairly or efficiently when a patient is injured because of preventable medical error.
The two vignettes described at the beginning, with similar injuries (shoulder dystocia), had disparate outcomes. In one there was a defense verdict and in the other a verdict for the plaintiffs of more than $2 million. The differences explain a number of important elements related to malpractice claims. (We have only very abbreviated and incomplete descriptions of the cases, so this discussion necessarily assumes facts and jumps to conclusions that may not be entirely consistent with the actual cases.)
These vignettes are unusual in that they went to trial. As we have noted, only a small percentage of malpractice cases are tried. And the verdict for the plaintiff-patient (in the second case) is unusual among those cases that go to trial, where plaintiffs seldom prevail.
From the facts we have, one significant difference in the 2 cases is that the plaintiff’s expert witness specifically testified in the second case that the “medical standard of care did not permit traction under these circumstances.” That is an essential element of a successful plaintiff’s malpractice case. In this case, the expert could also draw a connection between that breach of standard of care and harm to the child. In the case without liability, the nursing staff was able to testify that there was no shoulder dystocia because if there had been such an injury, they would have immediately launched into special action, which did not happen. By contrast, in the liability case, there seemed to be critical gaps in the medical record.
It is also important to remember that these cases were tried in different states, with different laws. The juries and judges in the 2 cases were different. Finally, the quality of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs and defendants were different. We mention these factors to point out that medical malpractice is not an exact science. It depends on many human elements that make the outcome of cases somewhat unpredictable. This unpredictability is one reason why parties and attorneys like to settle cases.
Watch for the third and final article in this series next month, as we are going to look at “apology in medicine and a proactive response” to communication regarding a complication.
- Shoulder dystocia—Florida defense verdict. Medical Malpractice: Verdicts, Settlements & Experts. 2019;35(1):18.
- Shoulder dystocia improperly managed--$2.320 million Virginia verdict. Medical Malpractice: Verdicts, Settlements & Experts. 2019;35(2):13.
- Jena AB, Seabury S, Lakdawalla D, et al. Malpractice risk according to physician specialty. N Engl J Med. 2011;365:629-636.
- Schaffer AC, Jena AB, Seabury SA, et al. Rates and characteristics of paid malpractice claims among US physicians by specialty, 1992-2014. JAMA Intern Med. 2017;177:710-718.
- Lowes R. Malpractice premiums trail inflation for some physicians. Medscape. December 16, 2016. https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/873422. Accessed January 10, 2020.
- Barbieri RL. Good news for ObGyns: medical liability claims resulting in payment are decreasing! OBG Manag. 2019;31:10-13.
- Guardado JR. Medical professional liability insurance premiums: an overview of the market from 2008 to 2017. AMA Policy Research Perspectives, 2018. https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/government/advocacy/policy-research-perspective-liability-insurance-premiums.pdf. Accessed January 10, 2020.
- Institute of Medicine Committee on Quality Health Care in America; Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, Donaldson MS, eds. To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System. Washington, DC: National Academies Press; 2000.
- James JT. A new, evidence-based estimate of patient harms associated with hospital care. J Patient Saf. 2013;9:122-128. https://journals.lww.com/journalpatientsafety/Fulltext/
2013/09000/A_New,_Evidence_based_Estimate_of_Patient_
Harms.2.aspx. Accessed January 10, 2020. - Public Citizen Congress Watch. The great medical malpractice hoax: NPDB data continue to show medical liability system produces rational outcomes. January 2007. https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/npdb_report_
final.pdf. Accessed January 23, 2020. - Bell SK, Delbanco T, Anderson-Shaw L, et al. Accountability for medical error: moving beyond blame to advocacy. Chest. 2011;140:519-526.
- Ramanathan T. Legal mechanisms supporting accountable care principles. Am J Public Health. 2014;104:2048-2051.
- Kachalia A, Kaufman SR, Boothman R, et al. Liability claims and costs before and after implementation of a medical error disclosure program. Ann Intern Med. 2010;153:213-221.
- National Practitioner Data Bank web site. What you must report to the NPDB. https://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/hcorg/whatYouMustReport
ToTheDataBank.jsp. Accessed January 10, 2020. - Bovbjerg RR. Malpractice crisis and reform. Clin Perinatol. 2005;32:203-233, viii-ix.
- Viscusi WK. Medical malpractice reform: what works and what doesn't. Denver Law Rev. 2019;96:775-791. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5cb79f7efd6793296c0eb738 /t/5d5f4ffabd6c5400011a12f6/1566527483118/Vol96_Issue4_Viscusi_
FINAL.pdf. Accessed January 10, 2020. - National Conference of State Legislatures. Medical malpractice reform. Health Cost Containment and Efficiencies: NCSL Briefs for State Legislators. 2011;(16). http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/medical-malpractice-reform-health-cost-brief.aspx. Accessed January 10, 2020.
- Kass JS, Rose RV. Medical malpractice reform: historical approaches, alternative models, and communication and resolution programs. AMA J Ethics. 2016;18:299-310.
- Boehm G. Debunking medical malpractice myths: unraveling the false premises behind "tort reform". Yale J Health Policy Law Ethics. 2005;5:357-369.
- Hellinger FJ, Encinosa WE. The impact of state laws limiting malpractice damage awards on health care expenditures. Am J Public Health. 2006;96:1375-1381.
- Perry G. Medical malpractice caps by state [infographic]. January 3, 2013. https://www.business2community.com/infographics/medical-malpractice-caps-by-state-infographic-0368345. Accessed January 23, 2020.
- Goguen D. State-by-state medical malpractice damages caps. An in-depth look at state laws limiting compensation for medical malpractice plaintiffs. https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/state-state-medical-malpractice-damages-caps.html. Accessed January 23, 2020.
- Berlin L. Medical errors, malpractice, and defensive medicine: an ill-fated triad. Diagnosis (Berl). 2017;4:133-139.
- Ranum D. Electronic health records continue to lead to medical malpractice suits. The Doctors Company. August 2019. https://www.thedoctors.com/articles/electronic-health-records-continue-to-lead-to-medical-malpractice-suits/. Accessed January 10, 2020.
- Mangalmurti SS, Murtagh L, Mello MM. Medical malpractice liability in the age of electronic health records. N Engl J Med. 2010;363:2060-2067.
- Studdert DM, Mello MM, Gawande AA, et al. Claims, errors, and compensation payments in medical malpractice litigation. N Engl J Med. 2006;354(19):2024-2033.
- Jena AB, Chandra A, Lakdawalla D, et al. Outcomes of medical malpractice litigation against US physicians. Arch Intern Med. 2012;172:892-894.
- Glaser LM, Alvi FA, Milad MP. Trends in malpractice claims for obstetric and gynecologic procedures, 2005 through 2014. Am J Obstet Gynecol. 2017;217:340.e1-340.e6.
In this second in a series of 3 articles discussing medical malpractice and the ObGyn we look at the reasons for malpractice claims and liability, what happens to malpractice claims, and the direction and future of medical malpractice. The first article dealt with 2 sources of major malpractice damages: the “big verdict” and physicians with multiple malpractice paid claims. Next month we look at the place of apology in medicine, in cases in which error, including negligence, may have caused a patient injury.
CASE 1 Long-term brachial plexus injury
Right upper extremity injury occurs in the neonate at delivery with sequela of long-term brachial plexus injury (which is diagnosed around 6 months of age). Physical therapy and orthopedic assessment are rendered. Despite continued treatment, discrepancy in arm lengths (ie, affected side arm is noticeably shorter than opposite side) remains. The child cannot play basketball with his older brother and is the victim of ridicule, the plaintiff’s attorney emphasizes. He is unable to properly pronate or supinate the affected arm.
The defendant ObGyn maintains that there was “no shoulder dystocia [at delivery] and the shoulder did not get obstructed in the pelvis; shoulder was delivered 15 seconds after delivery of the head.” The nursing staff testifies that if shoulder dystocia had been the problem they would have launched upon a series of procedures to address such, in accord with the delivering obstetrician. The defense expert witness testifies that a brachial plexus injury can happen without shoulder dystocia.
A defense verdict is rendered by the Florida jury.1
CASE 2 Shoulder dystocia
During delivery, the obstetrician notes a shoulder dystocia (“turtle sign”). After initial attempts to release the shoulder were unsuccessful, the physician applies traction several times to the head of the child, and the baby is delivered. There is permanent injury to the right brachial plexus. The defendant ObGyn says that traction was necessary to dislodge the shoulder, and that the injury was the result of the forces of labor (not the traction). The expert witness for the plaintiff testifies that the medical standard of care did not permit traction under these circumstances, and that the traction was the likely cause of the injury.
The Virginia jury awards $2.32 million in damages.2
Note: The above vignettes are drawn from actual cases but are only outlines of those cases and are not complete descriptions of the claims in the cases. Because the information comes from informal sources, not formal court records, the facts may be inaccurate and incomplete. They should be viewed as illustrations only.

The trend in malpractice
It has been clear for many years that medical malpractice claims are not randomly or evenly distributed among physicians. Notably, the variation among specialties has, and continues to be, substantial (FIGURE 1).3 Recent data suggest that, although paid claims per “1,000 physician-years” averages 14 paid claims per 1,000 physician years, it ranges from 4 or 5 in 1,000 (psychiatry and pediatrics) to 53 and 49 claims per 1,000 (neurology and plastic surgery, respectively). Obstetrics and gynecology has the fourth highest rate at 42.5 paid claims per 1,000 physician years.4 (These data are for the years 1992–2014.)

Continue to: The number of ObGyn paid malpractice claims has decreased over time...
The number of ObGyn paid malpractice claims has decreased over time. Although large verdicts and physicians with multiple paid malpractice claims receive a good deal of attention (as we noted in part 1 of our series), in fact, paid medical malpractice claims have trended downward in recent decades.5 When the data above are disaggregated by 5-year periods, for example, in obstetrics and gynecology, there has been a consistent reduction in paid malpractice claims from 1992 to 2014. Paid claims went from 58 per 1,000 physician-years in 1992–1996 to 25 per 1,000 in 2009–2014 (FIGURE 2).4,6 In short, the rate dropped by half over approximately 20 years.4

It is reasonable to expect that such a decline in the cost of malpractice insurance premiums would follow. Robert L. Barbieri, MD, who practices in Boston, Massachusetts, in his excellent recent editorial in OBG M

Why have malpractice payouts declined overall?
Have medical errors declined?
It would be wonderful if the reduction in malpractice claims represented a significant decrease in medical errors. Attention to medical errors was driven by the first widely noticed study of medical error deaths. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) study in 2000, put the number of deaths annually at 44,000 to 98,000.8 There have been many efforts to reduce such errors, and it is possible that those efforts have indeed reduced errors somewhat.4 Barbieri provided a helpful digest of many of the error-reduction suggestions for ObGyn practice (TABLE 1).6 But the number of medical errors remains high. More recent studies have suggested that the IOM’s reported number of injuries may have been low.9 In 2013, one study suggested that 210,000 deaths annually were “associated with preventable harm” in hospitals. Because of how the data were gathered the authors estimated that the actual number of preventable deaths was closer to 400,000 annually. Serious harm to patients was estimated at 10 to 20 times the IOM rate.9
Therefore, a dramatic reduction in preventable medical errors does not appear to explain the reduction in malpractice claims. Some portion of it may be explained by malpractice reforms—see "The medical reform factor" section below.

The collective accountability factor
The way malpractice claims are paid (FIGURE 4),10 reported, and handled may explain some of the apparent reduction in overall paid claims. Perhaps the advent of “collective accountability,” in which patient care is rendered by teams and responsibility accepted at a team level, can alleviate a significant amount of individual physician medical malpractice claims.11 This “enterprise liability” may shift the burden of medical error from physicians to health care organizations.12 Collective accountability may, therefore, focus on institutional responsibility rather than individual physician negligence.11,13 Institutions frequently hire multiple specialists and cover their medical malpractice costs as well as stand to be named in suits.

Continue to: The institutional involvement in malpractice cases also may affect...
The institutional involvement in malpractice cases also may affect apparent malpractice rates in another way. The National Practitioner Data Bank, which is the source of information for many malpractice studies, only requires reporting about individual physicians, not institutions.14 If, therefore, claims are settled on behalf of an institution, without implicating the physician, the number of physician malpractice cases may appear to decline without any real change in malpractice rates.14 In addition, institutions have taken the lead in informal resolution of injuries that occur in the institution, and these programs may reduce the direct malpractice claims against physicians. (These “disclosure, apology, and offer,” and similar programs, are discussed in the upcoming third part of this series.)
The medical reform factor
As noted, annual rates paid for medical malpractice in our specialty are trending downward. Many commentators look to malpractice reforms as the reason for the drop in malpractice rates.15-17 Because medical malpractice is essentially a matter of state law, the medical malpractice reform has occurred primarily at the state level.18 There have been many different reforms tried—limits on expert witnesses, review panels, and a variety of procedural limitations.19 Perhaps the most effective reform has been caps being placed on noneconomic damages (generally pain and suffering).20 These caps vary by state (FIGURE 5)21,22 and, of course, affect the “big verdict” cases. (As we saw in the second case scenario above, Virginia is an example of a state with a cap on malpractice awards.) They also have the secondary effect of reducing the number of malpractice cases. They make malpractice cases less attractive to some attorneys because they reduce the opportunity of large contingency fees from large verdicts. (Virtually all medical malpractice cases in the United States are tried on a contingency-fee basis, meaning that the plaintiff does not pay the attorney handling the case but rather the attorney takes a percentage of any recovery—typically in the neighborhood of 35%.) The reform process continues, although, presently, there is less pressure to act on the malpractice crisis.

Medical malpractice cases are emotional and costly
Another reason for the relatively low rate of paid claims is that medical malpractice cases are difficult, emotionally challenging, time consuming, and expensive to pursue.23 They typically drag on for years, require extensive and expensive expert consultants as well as witnesses, and face stiff defense (compared with many other torts). The settlement of medical malpractice cases, for example, is less likely than other kinds of personal injury cases.
The contingency-fee basis does mean that injured patients do not have to pay attorney fees up front; however, plaintiffs may have to pay substantial costs along the way. The other side of this coin is that lawyers can be reluctant to take malpractice cases in which the damages are likely to be small, or where the legal uncertainty reduces the odds of achieving any damages. Thus, many potential malpractice cases are never filed.
A word of caution
The news of a reduction in malpractice paid claims may not be permanent. The numbers can conceivably be cyclical, and political reforms achieved can be changed. In addition, new technology will likely bring new kinds of malpractice claims. That appears to be the case, for example, with electronic health records (EHRs). One insurer reports that EHR malpractice claims have increased over the last 8 years.24 The most common injury in these claims was death (25%), as well as a magnitude of less serious injuries. EHR-related claims result from system failures, copy-paste inaccuracies, faulty drop-down menu use, and uncorrected “auto-populated” fields. Obstetrics is tied for fifth on the list of 14 specialties with claims related to EHRs, and gynecology is tied for eighth place.24
Continue to: A federal court ruled that a hospital that changed from...
A federal court ruled that a hospital that changed from paper records to EHRs for test results had a duty to “‘implement a reasonable procedure during the transition phase’ to ensure the timely delivery of test results” to health care providers.25 We will address this in a future “What’s the Verdict?”.
Rates of harm, malpractice cases, and the disposition of cases
There are many surprises when looking at medical malpractice claims data generally. The first surprise is how few claims are filed relative to the number of error-related injuries. Given the estimate of 210,000 to 400,000 deaths “associated with preventable harm” in hospitals, plus 10 to 20 times that number of serious injuries, it would be reasonable to expect claims of many hundreds of thousands per year. Compare the probability of a malpractice claim from an error-related injury, for example, with the probability of other personal injuries—eg, of traffic deaths associated with preventable harm.
The second key observation is how many of the claims filed are not successful—even when there was evidence in the record of errors associated with the injury. Studies slice the data in different ways but collectively suggest that only a small proportion of malpractice claims filed (a claim is generally regarded as some written demand for compensation for injuries) result in payments, either through settlement or by trial. A 2006 study by Studdert and colleagues determined that 63% of formal malpractice claims filed did involve injuries resulting from errors.26 The study found that in 16% of the claims (not injuries) there was no payment even though there was error. In 10% of the claims there was payment, even in the absence of error.
Overall, in this study, 56% of the claims received some compensation.26 That is higher than a more recent study by Jena and others, which found only 22% of claims resulted in compensation.3
How malpractice claims are decided is also interesting. Jena and colleagues found that only 55% of claims resulted in litigation.27 Presumably, the other 45% may have resulted in the plaintiff dropping the case, or in some form of settlement. Of the claims that were litigated, 54% were dismissed by the court, and another 35% were settled before a trial verdict. The cases that went to trial (about 10%), overwhelmingly (80%) resulted in verdicts for the defense.3,27 A different study found that only 9% of cases went to trial, and 87% were a defense verdict.28 The high level of defense verdicts may suggest that malpractice defense lawyers, and their client physicians, do a good job of assessing cases they are likely to lose, and settling them before trial.
ObGyns generally have larger numbers of claims and among the largest payment amounts when there is payment. Fewer of their cases are dismissed by the courts, so more go to trial. At trial, however, ObGyns prevail at a remarkably high rate.27 As for the probability of payment of a malpractice claim for ObGyns, one study suggested that there is approximately a 16% annual probability of a claim being filed, but only a 3% annual probability of a payment being made (suggesting about a 20% probability of payment per claim).3
Continue to: The purposes and effects of the medical malpractice system...
The purposes and effects of the medical malpractice system
The essential goals of tort law (including medical malpractice) include compensation for those who are injured and deterrence of future injuries (TABLE 2). What are the overall effects to the medical malpractice system? Unfortunately, the answer is that the law delivers disappointing results at best. It has a fairly high error rate. Many people who deserve some compensation for their injuries never seek compensation, and many deserving injured patients fail in efforts to receive compensation. At the same time, a few of the injured receive huge recoveries (even windfalls), and at least a small fraction receive compensation when there was no medical error. In addition to the high error rate, the system is inefficient and very expensive. Both defendants (through their insurance carriers) and plaintiffs spend a lot of money, years of time, and untold emotional pain dealing with these cases. The system also exacts high emotional and personal costs on plaintiffs and defendants.

Malpractice reform has not really addressed these issues—it has generally been focused on ways to reduce the cost of malpractice insurance. The most effective reform in reducing rates—caps—has had the effect of compensating the most seriously injured as though they were more modestly injured, and dissuading attorneys from taking the cases of those less seriously injured.
The medical and legal professions exist to help patients (the public). It does not seem that we have arrived at a system that does that very fairly or efficiently when a patient is injured because of preventable medical error.
The two vignettes described at the beginning, with similar injuries (shoulder dystocia), had disparate outcomes. In one there was a defense verdict and in the other a verdict for the plaintiffs of more than $2 million. The differences explain a number of important elements related to malpractice claims. (We have only very abbreviated and incomplete descriptions of the cases, so this discussion necessarily assumes facts and jumps to conclusions that may not be entirely consistent with the actual cases.)
These vignettes are unusual in that they went to trial. As we have noted, only a small percentage of malpractice cases are tried. And the verdict for the plaintiff-patient (in the second case) is unusual among those cases that go to trial, where plaintiffs seldom prevail.
From the facts we have, one significant difference in the 2 cases is that the plaintiff’s expert witness specifically testified in the second case that the “medical standard of care did not permit traction under these circumstances.” That is an essential element of a successful plaintiff’s malpractice case. In this case, the expert could also draw a connection between that breach of standard of care and harm to the child. In the case without liability, the nursing staff was able to testify that there was no shoulder dystocia because if there had been such an injury, they would have immediately launched into special action, which did not happen. By contrast, in the liability case, there seemed to be critical gaps in the medical record.
It is also important to remember that these cases were tried in different states, with different laws. The juries and judges in the 2 cases were different. Finally, the quality of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs and defendants were different. We mention these factors to point out that medical malpractice is not an exact science. It depends on many human elements that make the outcome of cases somewhat unpredictable. This unpredictability is one reason why parties and attorneys like to settle cases.
Watch for the third and final article in this series next month, as we are going to look at “apology in medicine and a proactive response” to communication regarding a complication.
In this second in a series of 3 articles discussing medical malpractice and the ObGyn we look at the reasons for malpractice claims and liability, what happens to malpractice claims, and the direction and future of medical malpractice. The first article dealt with 2 sources of major malpractice damages: the “big verdict” and physicians with multiple malpractice paid claims. Next month we look at the place of apology in medicine, in cases in which error, including negligence, may have caused a patient injury.
CASE 1 Long-term brachial plexus injury
Right upper extremity injury occurs in the neonate at delivery with sequela of long-term brachial plexus injury (which is diagnosed around 6 months of age). Physical therapy and orthopedic assessment are rendered. Despite continued treatment, discrepancy in arm lengths (ie, affected side arm is noticeably shorter than opposite side) remains. The child cannot play basketball with his older brother and is the victim of ridicule, the plaintiff’s attorney emphasizes. He is unable to properly pronate or supinate the affected arm.
The defendant ObGyn maintains that there was “no shoulder dystocia [at delivery] and the shoulder did not get obstructed in the pelvis; shoulder was delivered 15 seconds after delivery of the head.” The nursing staff testifies that if shoulder dystocia had been the problem they would have launched upon a series of procedures to address such, in accord with the delivering obstetrician. The defense expert witness testifies that a brachial plexus injury can happen without shoulder dystocia.
A defense verdict is rendered by the Florida jury.1
CASE 2 Shoulder dystocia
During delivery, the obstetrician notes a shoulder dystocia (“turtle sign”). After initial attempts to release the shoulder were unsuccessful, the physician applies traction several times to the head of the child, and the baby is delivered. There is permanent injury to the right brachial plexus. The defendant ObGyn says that traction was necessary to dislodge the shoulder, and that the injury was the result of the forces of labor (not the traction). The expert witness for the plaintiff testifies that the medical standard of care did not permit traction under these circumstances, and that the traction was the likely cause of the injury.
The Virginia jury awards $2.32 million in damages.2
Note: The above vignettes are drawn from actual cases but are only outlines of those cases and are not complete descriptions of the claims in the cases. Because the information comes from informal sources, not formal court records, the facts may be inaccurate and incomplete. They should be viewed as illustrations only.

The trend in malpractice
It has been clear for many years that medical malpractice claims are not randomly or evenly distributed among physicians. Notably, the variation among specialties has, and continues to be, substantial (FIGURE 1).3 Recent data suggest that, although paid claims per “1,000 physician-years” averages 14 paid claims per 1,000 physician years, it ranges from 4 or 5 in 1,000 (psychiatry and pediatrics) to 53 and 49 claims per 1,000 (neurology and plastic surgery, respectively). Obstetrics and gynecology has the fourth highest rate at 42.5 paid claims per 1,000 physician years.4 (These data are for the years 1992–2014.)

Continue to: The number of ObGyn paid malpractice claims has decreased over time...
The number of ObGyn paid malpractice claims has decreased over time. Although large verdicts and physicians with multiple paid malpractice claims receive a good deal of attention (as we noted in part 1 of our series), in fact, paid medical malpractice claims have trended downward in recent decades.5 When the data above are disaggregated by 5-year periods, for example, in obstetrics and gynecology, there has been a consistent reduction in paid malpractice claims from 1992 to 2014. Paid claims went from 58 per 1,000 physician-years in 1992–1996 to 25 per 1,000 in 2009–2014 (FIGURE 2).4,6 In short, the rate dropped by half over approximately 20 years.4

It is reasonable to expect that such a decline in the cost of malpractice insurance premiums would follow. Robert L. Barbieri, MD, who practices in Boston, Massachusetts, in his excellent recent editorial in OBG M

Why have malpractice payouts declined overall?
Have medical errors declined?
It would be wonderful if the reduction in malpractice claims represented a significant decrease in medical errors. Attention to medical errors was driven by the first widely noticed study of medical error deaths. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) study in 2000, put the number of deaths annually at 44,000 to 98,000.8 There have been many efforts to reduce such errors, and it is possible that those efforts have indeed reduced errors somewhat.4 Barbieri provided a helpful digest of many of the error-reduction suggestions for ObGyn practice (TABLE 1).6 But the number of medical errors remains high. More recent studies have suggested that the IOM’s reported number of injuries may have been low.9 In 2013, one study suggested that 210,000 deaths annually were “associated with preventable harm” in hospitals. Because of how the data were gathered the authors estimated that the actual number of preventable deaths was closer to 400,000 annually. Serious harm to patients was estimated at 10 to 20 times the IOM rate.9
Therefore, a dramatic reduction in preventable medical errors does not appear to explain the reduction in malpractice claims. Some portion of it may be explained by malpractice reforms—see "The medical reform factor" section below.

The collective accountability factor
The way malpractice claims are paid (FIGURE 4),10 reported, and handled may explain some of the apparent reduction in overall paid claims. Perhaps the advent of “collective accountability,” in which patient care is rendered by teams and responsibility accepted at a team level, can alleviate a significant amount of individual physician medical malpractice claims.11 This “enterprise liability” may shift the burden of medical error from physicians to health care organizations.12 Collective accountability may, therefore, focus on institutional responsibility rather than individual physician negligence.11,13 Institutions frequently hire multiple specialists and cover their medical malpractice costs as well as stand to be named in suits.

Continue to: The institutional involvement in malpractice cases also may affect...
The institutional involvement in malpractice cases also may affect apparent malpractice rates in another way. The National Practitioner Data Bank, which is the source of information for many malpractice studies, only requires reporting about individual physicians, not institutions.14 If, therefore, claims are settled on behalf of an institution, without implicating the physician, the number of physician malpractice cases may appear to decline without any real change in malpractice rates.14 In addition, institutions have taken the lead in informal resolution of injuries that occur in the institution, and these programs may reduce the direct malpractice claims against physicians. (These “disclosure, apology, and offer,” and similar programs, are discussed in the upcoming third part of this series.)
The medical reform factor
As noted, annual rates paid for medical malpractice in our specialty are trending downward. Many commentators look to malpractice reforms as the reason for the drop in malpractice rates.15-17 Because medical malpractice is essentially a matter of state law, the medical malpractice reform has occurred primarily at the state level.18 There have been many different reforms tried—limits on expert witnesses, review panels, and a variety of procedural limitations.19 Perhaps the most effective reform has been caps being placed on noneconomic damages (generally pain and suffering).20 These caps vary by state (FIGURE 5)21,22 and, of course, affect the “big verdict” cases. (As we saw in the second case scenario above, Virginia is an example of a state with a cap on malpractice awards.) They also have the secondary effect of reducing the number of malpractice cases. They make malpractice cases less attractive to some attorneys because they reduce the opportunity of large contingency fees from large verdicts. (Virtually all medical malpractice cases in the United States are tried on a contingency-fee basis, meaning that the plaintiff does not pay the attorney handling the case but rather the attorney takes a percentage of any recovery—typically in the neighborhood of 35%.) The reform process continues, although, presently, there is less pressure to act on the malpractice crisis.

Medical malpractice cases are emotional and costly
Another reason for the relatively low rate of paid claims is that medical malpractice cases are difficult, emotionally challenging, time consuming, and expensive to pursue.23 They typically drag on for years, require extensive and expensive expert consultants as well as witnesses, and face stiff defense (compared with many other torts). The settlement of medical malpractice cases, for example, is less likely than other kinds of personal injury cases.
The contingency-fee basis does mean that injured patients do not have to pay attorney fees up front; however, plaintiffs may have to pay substantial costs along the way. The other side of this coin is that lawyers can be reluctant to take malpractice cases in which the damages are likely to be small, or where the legal uncertainty reduces the odds of achieving any damages. Thus, many potential malpractice cases are never filed.
A word of caution
The news of a reduction in malpractice paid claims may not be permanent. The numbers can conceivably be cyclical, and political reforms achieved can be changed. In addition, new technology will likely bring new kinds of malpractice claims. That appears to be the case, for example, with electronic health records (EHRs). One insurer reports that EHR malpractice claims have increased over the last 8 years.24 The most common injury in these claims was death (25%), as well as a magnitude of less serious injuries. EHR-related claims result from system failures, copy-paste inaccuracies, faulty drop-down menu use, and uncorrected “auto-populated” fields. Obstetrics is tied for fifth on the list of 14 specialties with claims related to EHRs, and gynecology is tied for eighth place.24
Continue to: A federal court ruled that a hospital that changed from...
A federal court ruled that a hospital that changed from paper records to EHRs for test results had a duty to “‘implement a reasonable procedure during the transition phase’ to ensure the timely delivery of test results” to health care providers.25 We will address this in a future “What’s the Verdict?”.
Rates of harm, malpractice cases, and the disposition of cases
There are many surprises when looking at medical malpractice claims data generally. The first surprise is how few claims are filed relative to the number of error-related injuries. Given the estimate of 210,000 to 400,000 deaths “associated with preventable harm” in hospitals, plus 10 to 20 times that number of serious injuries, it would be reasonable to expect claims of many hundreds of thousands per year. Compare the probability of a malpractice claim from an error-related injury, for example, with the probability of other personal injuries—eg, of traffic deaths associated with preventable harm.
The second key observation is how many of the claims filed are not successful—even when there was evidence in the record of errors associated with the injury. Studies slice the data in different ways but collectively suggest that only a small proportion of malpractice claims filed (a claim is generally regarded as some written demand for compensation for injuries) result in payments, either through settlement or by trial. A 2006 study by Studdert and colleagues determined that 63% of formal malpractice claims filed did involve injuries resulting from errors.26 The study found that in 16% of the claims (not injuries) there was no payment even though there was error. In 10% of the claims there was payment, even in the absence of error.
Overall, in this study, 56% of the claims received some compensation.26 That is higher than a more recent study by Jena and others, which found only 22% of claims resulted in compensation.3
How malpractice claims are decided is also interesting. Jena and colleagues found that only 55% of claims resulted in litigation.27 Presumably, the other 45% may have resulted in the plaintiff dropping the case, or in some form of settlement. Of the claims that were litigated, 54% were dismissed by the court, and another 35% were settled before a trial verdict. The cases that went to trial (about 10%), overwhelmingly (80%) resulted in verdicts for the defense.3,27 A different study found that only 9% of cases went to trial, and 87% were a defense verdict.28 The high level of defense verdicts may suggest that malpractice defense lawyers, and their client physicians, do a good job of assessing cases they are likely to lose, and settling them before trial.
ObGyns generally have larger numbers of claims and among the largest payment amounts when there is payment. Fewer of their cases are dismissed by the courts, so more go to trial. At trial, however, ObGyns prevail at a remarkably high rate.27 As for the probability of payment of a malpractice claim for ObGyns, one study suggested that there is approximately a 16% annual probability of a claim being filed, but only a 3% annual probability of a payment being made (suggesting about a 20% probability of payment per claim).3
Continue to: The purposes and effects of the medical malpractice system...
The purposes and effects of the medical malpractice system
The essential goals of tort law (including medical malpractice) include compensation for those who are injured and deterrence of future injuries (TABLE 2). What are the overall effects to the medical malpractice system? Unfortunately, the answer is that the law delivers disappointing results at best. It has a fairly high error rate. Many people who deserve some compensation for their injuries never seek compensation, and many deserving injured patients fail in efforts to receive compensation. At the same time, a few of the injured receive huge recoveries (even windfalls), and at least a small fraction receive compensation when there was no medical error. In addition to the high error rate, the system is inefficient and very expensive. Both defendants (through their insurance carriers) and plaintiffs spend a lot of money, years of time, and untold emotional pain dealing with these cases. The system also exacts high emotional and personal costs on plaintiffs and defendants.

Malpractice reform has not really addressed these issues—it has generally been focused on ways to reduce the cost of malpractice insurance. The most effective reform in reducing rates—caps—has had the effect of compensating the most seriously injured as though they were more modestly injured, and dissuading attorneys from taking the cases of those less seriously injured.
The medical and legal professions exist to help patients (the public). It does not seem that we have arrived at a system that does that very fairly or efficiently when a patient is injured because of preventable medical error.
The two vignettes described at the beginning, with similar injuries (shoulder dystocia), had disparate outcomes. In one there was a defense verdict and in the other a verdict for the plaintiffs of more than $2 million. The differences explain a number of important elements related to malpractice claims. (We have only very abbreviated and incomplete descriptions of the cases, so this discussion necessarily assumes facts and jumps to conclusions that may not be entirely consistent with the actual cases.)
These vignettes are unusual in that they went to trial. As we have noted, only a small percentage of malpractice cases are tried. And the verdict for the plaintiff-patient (in the second case) is unusual among those cases that go to trial, where plaintiffs seldom prevail.
From the facts we have, one significant difference in the 2 cases is that the plaintiff’s expert witness specifically testified in the second case that the “medical standard of care did not permit traction under these circumstances.” That is an essential element of a successful plaintiff’s malpractice case. In this case, the expert could also draw a connection between that breach of standard of care and harm to the child. In the case without liability, the nursing staff was able to testify that there was no shoulder dystocia because if there had been such an injury, they would have immediately launched into special action, which did not happen. By contrast, in the liability case, there seemed to be critical gaps in the medical record.
It is also important to remember that these cases were tried in different states, with different laws. The juries and judges in the 2 cases were different. Finally, the quality of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs and defendants were different. We mention these factors to point out that medical malpractice is not an exact science. It depends on many human elements that make the outcome of cases somewhat unpredictable. This unpredictability is one reason why parties and attorneys like to settle cases.
Watch for the third and final article in this series next month, as we are going to look at “apology in medicine and a proactive response” to communication regarding a complication.
- Shoulder dystocia—Florida defense verdict. Medical Malpractice: Verdicts, Settlements & Experts. 2019;35(1):18.
- Shoulder dystocia improperly managed--$2.320 million Virginia verdict. Medical Malpractice: Verdicts, Settlements & Experts. 2019;35(2):13.
- Jena AB, Seabury S, Lakdawalla D, et al. Malpractice risk according to physician specialty. N Engl J Med. 2011;365:629-636.
- Schaffer AC, Jena AB, Seabury SA, et al. Rates and characteristics of paid malpractice claims among US physicians by specialty, 1992-2014. JAMA Intern Med. 2017;177:710-718.
- Lowes R. Malpractice premiums trail inflation for some physicians. Medscape. December 16, 2016. https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/873422. Accessed January 10, 2020.
- Barbieri RL. Good news for ObGyns: medical liability claims resulting in payment are decreasing! OBG Manag. 2019;31:10-13.
- Guardado JR. Medical professional liability insurance premiums: an overview of the market from 2008 to 2017. AMA Policy Research Perspectives, 2018. https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/government/advocacy/policy-research-perspective-liability-insurance-premiums.pdf. Accessed January 10, 2020.
- Institute of Medicine Committee on Quality Health Care in America; Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, Donaldson MS, eds. To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System. Washington, DC: National Academies Press; 2000.
- James JT. A new, evidence-based estimate of patient harms associated with hospital care. J Patient Saf. 2013;9:122-128. https://journals.lww.com/journalpatientsafety/Fulltext/
2013/09000/A_New,_Evidence_based_Estimate_of_Patient_
Harms.2.aspx. Accessed January 10, 2020. - Public Citizen Congress Watch. The great medical malpractice hoax: NPDB data continue to show medical liability system produces rational outcomes. January 2007. https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/npdb_report_
final.pdf. Accessed January 23, 2020. - Bell SK, Delbanco T, Anderson-Shaw L, et al. Accountability for medical error: moving beyond blame to advocacy. Chest. 2011;140:519-526.
- Ramanathan T. Legal mechanisms supporting accountable care principles. Am J Public Health. 2014;104:2048-2051.
- Kachalia A, Kaufman SR, Boothman R, et al. Liability claims and costs before and after implementation of a medical error disclosure program. Ann Intern Med. 2010;153:213-221.
- National Practitioner Data Bank web site. What you must report to the NPDB. https://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/hcorg/whatYouMustReport
ToTheDataBank.jsp. Accessed January 10, 2020. - Bovbjerg RR. Malpractice crisis and reform. Clin Perinatol. 2005;32:203-233, viii-ix.
- Viscusi WK. Medical malpractice reform: what works and what doesn't. Denver Law Rev. 2019;96:775-791. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5cb79f7efd6793296c0eb738 /t/5d5f4ffabd6c5400011a12f6/1566527483118/Vol96_Issue4_Viscusi_
FINAL.pdf. Accessed January 10, 2020. - National Conference of State Legislatures. Medical malpractice reform. Health Cost Containment and Efficiencies: NCSL Briefs for State Legislators. 2011;(16). http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/medical-malpractice-reform-health-cost-brief.aspx. Accessed January 10, 2020.
- Kass JS, Rose RV. Medical malpractice reform: historical approaches, alternative models, and communication and resolution programs. AMA J Ethics. 2016;18:299-310.
- Boehm G. Debunking medical malpractice myths: unraveling the false premises behind "tort reform". Yale J Health Policy Law Ethics. 2005;5:357-369.
- Hellinger FJ, Encinosa WE. The impact of state laws limiting malpractice damage awards on health care expenditures. Am J Public Health. 2006;96:1375-1381.
- Perry G. Medical malpractice caps by state [infographic]. January 3, 2013. https://www.business2community.com/infographics/medical-malpractice-caps-by-state-infographic-0368345. Accessed January 23, 2020.
- Goguen D. State-by-state medical malpractice damages caps. An in-depth look at state laws limiting compensation for medical malpractice plaintiffs. https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/state-state-medical-malpractice-damages-caps.html. Accessed January 23, 2020.
- Berlin L. Medical errors, malpractice, and defensive medicine: an ill-fated triad. Diagnosis (Berl). 2017;4:133-139.
- Ranum D. Electronic health records continue to lead to medical malpractice suits. The Doctors Company. August 2019. https://www.thedoctors.com/articles/electronic-health-records-continue-to-lead-to-medical-malpractice-suits/. Accessed January 10, 2020.
- Mangalmurti SS, Murtagh L, Mello MM. Medical malpractice liability in the age of electronic health records. N Engl J Med. 2010;363:2060-2067.
- Studdert DM, Mello MM, Gawande AA, et al. Claims, errors, and compensation payments in medical malpractice litigation. N Engl J Med. 2006;354(19):2024-2033.
- Jena AB, Chandra A, Lakdawalla D, et al. Outcomes of medical malpractice litigation against US physicians. Arch Intern Med. 2012;172:892-894.
- Glaser LM, Alvi FA, Milad MP. Trends in malpractice claims for obstetric and gynecologic procedures, 2005 through 2014. Am J Obstet Gynecol. 2017;217:340.e1-340.e6.
- Shoulder dystocia—Florida defense verdict. Medical Malpractice: Verdicts, Settlements & Experts. 2019;35(1):18.
- Shoulder dystocia improperly managed--$2.320 million Virginia verdict. Medical Malpractice: Verdicts, Settlements & Experts. 2019;35(2):13.
- Jena AB, Seabury S, Lakdawalla D, et al. Malpractice risk according to physician specialty. N Engl J Med. 2011;365:629-636.
- Schaffer AC, Jena AB, Seabury SA, et al. Rates and characteristics of paid malpractice claims among US physicians by specialty, 1992-2014. JAMA Intern Med. 2017;177:710-718.
- Lowes R. Malpractice premiums trail inflation for some physicians. Medscape. December 16, 2016. https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/873422. Accessed January 10, 2020.
- Barbieri RL. Good news for ObGyns: medical liability claims resulting in payment are decreasing! OBG Manag. 2019;31:10-13.
- Guardado JR. Medical professional liability insurance premiums: an overview of the market from 2008 to 2017. AMA Policy Research Perspectives, 2018. https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/government/advocacy/policy-research-perspective-liability-insurance-premiums.pdf. Accessed January 10, 2020.
- Institute of Medicine Committee on Quality Health Care in America; Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, Donaldson MS, eds. To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System. Washington, DC: National Academies Press; 2000.
- James JT. A new, evidence-based estimate of patient harms associated with hospital care. J Patient Saf. 2013;9:122-128. https://journals.lww.com/journalpatientsafety/Fulltext/
2013/09000/A_New,_Evidence_based_Estimate_of_Patient_
Harms.2.aspx. Accessed January 10, 2020. - Public Citizen Congress Watch. The great medical malpractice hoax: NPDB data continue to show medical liability system produces rational outcomes. January 2007. https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/npdb_report_
final.pdf. Accessed January 23, 2020. - Bell SK, Delbanco T, Anderson-Shaw L, et al. Accountability for medical error: moving beyond blame to advocacy. Chest. 2011;140:519-526.
- Ramanathan T. Legal mechanisms supporting accountable care principles. Am J Public Health. 2014;104:2048-2051.
- Kachalia A, Kaufman SR, Boothman R, et al. Liability claims and costs before and after implementation of a medical error disclosure program. Ann Intern Med. 2010;153:213-221.
- National Practitioner Data Bank web site. What you must report to the NPDB. https://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/hcorg/whatYouMustReport
ToTheDataBank.jsp. Accessed January 10, 2020. - Bovbjerg RR. Malpractice crisis and reform. Clin Perinatol. 2005;32:203-233, viii-ix.
- Viscusi WK. Medical malpractice reform: what works and what doesn't. Denver Law Rev. 2019;96:775-791. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5cb79f7efd6793296c0eb738 /t/5d5f4ffabd6c5400011a12f6/1566527483118/Vol96_Issue4_Viscusi_
FINAL.pdf. Accessed January 10, 2020. - National Conference of State Legislatures. Medical malpractice reform. Health Cost Containment and Efficiencies: NCSL Briefs for State Legislators. 2011;(16). http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/medical-malpractice-reform-health-cost-brief.aspx. Accessed January 10, 2020.
- Kass JS, Rose RV. Medical malpractice reform: historical approaches, alternative models, and communication and resolution programs. AMA J Ethics. 2016;18:299-310.
- Boehm G. Debunking medical malpractice myths: unraveling the false premises behind "tort reform". Yale J Health Policy Law Ethics. 2005;5:357-369.
- Hellinger FJ, Encinosa WE. The impact of state laws limiting malpractice damage awards on health care expenditures. Am J Public Health. 2006;96:1375-1381.
- Perry G. Medical malpractice caps by state [infographic]. January 3, 2013. https://www.business2community.com/infographics/medical-malpractice-caps-by-state-infographic-0368345. Accessed January 23, 2020.
- Goguen D. State-by-state medical malpractice damages caps. An in-depth look at state laws limiting compensation for medical malpractice plaintiffs. https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/state-state-medical-malpractice-damages-caps.html. Accessed January 23, 2020.
- Berlin L. Medical errors, malpractice, and defensive medicine: an ill-fated triad. Diagnosis (Berl). 2017;4:133-139.
- Ranum D. Electronic health records continue to lead to medical malpractice suits. The Doctors Company. August 2019. https://www.thedoctors.com/articles/electronic-health-records-continue-to-lead-to-medical-malpractice-suits/. Accessed January 10, 2020.
- Mangalmurti SS, Murtagh L, Mello MM. Medical malpractice liability in the age of electronic health records. N Engl J Med. 2010;363:2060-2067.
- Studdert DM, Mello MM, Gawande AA, et al. Claims, errors, and compensation payments in medical malpractice litigation. N Engl J Med. 2006;354(19):2024-2033.
- Jena AB, Chandra A, Lakdawalla D, et al. Outcomes of medical malpractice litigation against US physicians. Arch Intern Med. 2012;172:892-894.
- Glaser LM, Alvi FA, Milad MP. Trends in malpractice claims for obstetric and gynecologic procedures, 2005 through 2014. Am J Obstet Gynecol. 2017;217:340.e1-340.e6.
CMS proposes second specialty tier for Medicare drugs
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ latest maneuver to combat rising drug prices is the proposed addition of a second specialty drug tier for the Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit.
The proposal is part of a broader proposed update to Medicare Parts C and D for contract years 2021 and 2022.
In a fact sheet highlighting various elements of the overall proposal, CMS noted that Part D plan sponsors and pharmacy benefit managers have been requesting the option to add a second “preferred” specialty tier that would “encourage the use of more preferred, less expensive agents, reduce enrollee cost sharing, and reduce costs to CMS.”
Currently, all pharmaceuticals with a cost greater than $670 are placed in a single specialty tier.
During a Feb. 5 press briefing, CMS Administrator Seema Verma described this change as “giving plans more negotiating power so they can lower prices for beneficiaries even further.”
Ms. Verma used a hypothetical example of two rheumatoid arthritis drugs to illustrate how the change will work. Currently, if both are over the $670 threshold, they would both be on the specialty tier with the same cost sharing. “Creating a second preferred specialty tier would allow for a different copay and fosters a more competitive environment that places Part D plans in a better position to negotiate the price of similar drugs and pass those savings onto the patient through lower cost sharing,” she said.
CMS is proposing to allow plans to implement a preferred specialty tier for the 2021 plan year.
The agency is also seeking to drive more generic drug use as a means of lowering costs.
Ms. Verma noted that, typically, even after a generic drug is launched, health plan sponsors prefer to drive patients to the brand name product, if they can secure a greater rebate from the manufacturer.
In a separate Feb. 5 blog post, Ms. Verma noted that when a brand was included on a formulary, the generic was also on the formulary 91.8% of the time. For the times in which the generic was not, it was typically because the wholesale cost of the generic was only 5%-15% lower than the brand wholesale cost.
In an effort to encourage use of generics, CMS is seeking comment on the development of measures of generic and biosimilar use in Medicare Part D that could be incorporated in health plan star ratings.
Some of the measures proposed in the blog post include the generic substitution rate, the generic therapeutic alternative opportunity rate (which measures the number of brand fills divided by the sum of the brand and generic fills when both are available), and the biosimilar utilization rate.
[email protected]
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ latest maneuver to combat rising drug prices is the proposed addition of a second specialty drug tier for the Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit.
The proposal is part of a broader proposed update to Medicare Parts C and D for contract years 2021 and 2022.
In a fact sheet highlighting various elements of the overall proposal, CMS noted that Part D plan sponsors and pharmacy benefit managers have been requesting the option to add a second “preferred” specialty tier that would “encourage the use of more preferred, less expensive agents, reduce enrollee cost sharing, and reduce costs to CMS.”
Currently, all pharmaceuticals with a cost greater than $670 are placed in a single specialty tier.
During a Feb. 5 press briefing, CMS Administrator Seema Verma described this change as “giving plans more negotiating power so they can lower prices for beneficiaries even further.”
Ms. Verma used a hypothetical example of two rheumatoid arthritis drugs to illustrate how the change will work. Currently, if both are over the $670 threshold, they would both be on the specialty tier with the same cost sharing. “Creating a second preferred specialty tier would allow for a different copay and fosters a more competitive environment that places Part D plans in a better position to negotiate the price of similar drugs and pass those savings onto the patient through lower cost sharing,” she said.
CMS is proposing to allow plans to implement a preferred specialty tier for the 2021 plan year.
The agency is also seeking to drive more generic drug use as a means of lowering costs.
Ms. Verma noted that, typically, even after a generic drug is launched, health plan sponsors prefer to drive patients to the brand name product, if they can secure a greater rebate from the manufacturer.
In a separate Feb. 5 blog post, Ms. Verma noted that when a brand was included on a formulary, the generic was also on the formulary 91.8% of the time. For the times in which the generic was not, it was typically because the wholesale cost of the generic was only 5%-15% lower than the brand wholesale cost.
In an effort to encourage use of generics, CMS is seeking comment on the development of measures of generic and biosimilar use in Medicare Part D that could be incorporated in health plan star ratings.
Some of the measures proposed in the blog post include the generic substitution rate, the generic therapeutic alternative opportunity rate (which measures the number of brand fills divided by the sum of the brand and generic fills when both are available), and the biosimilar utilization rate.
[email protected]
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ latest maneuver to combat rising drug prices is the proposed addition of a second specialty drug tier for the Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit.
The proposal is part of a broader proposed update to Medicare Parts C and D for contract years 2021 and 2022.
In a fact sheet highlighting various elements of the overall proposal, CMS noted that Part D plan sponsors and pharmacy benefit managers have been requesting the option to add a second “preferred” specialty tier that would “encourage the use of more preferred, less expensive agents, reduce enrollee cost sharing, and reduce costs to CMS.”
Currently, all pharmaceuticals with a cost greater than $670 are placed in a single specialty tier.
During a Feb. 5 press briefing, CMS Administrator Seema Verma described this change as “giving plans more negotiating power so they can lower prices for beneficiaries even further.”
Ms. Verma used a hypothetical example of two rheumatoid arthritis drugs to illustrate how the change will work. Currently, if both are over the $670 threshold, they would both be on the specialty tier with the same cost sharing. “Creating a second preferred specialty tier would allow for a different copay and fosters a more competitive environment that places Part D plans in a better position to negotiate the price of similar drugs and pass those savings onto the patient through lower cost sharing,” she said.
CMS is proposing to allow plans to implement a preferred specialty tier for the 2021 plan year.
The agency is also seeking to drive more generic drug use as a means of lowering costs.
Ms. Verma noted that, typically, even after a generic drug is launched, health plan sponsors prefer to drive patients to the brand name product, if they can secure a greater rebate from the manufacturer.
In a separate Feb. 5 blog post, Ms. Verma noted that when a brand was included on a formulary, the generic was also on the formulary 91.8% of the time. For the times in which the generic was not, it was typically because the wholesale cost of the generic was only 5%-15% lower than the brand wholesale cost.
In an effort to encourage use of generics, CMS is seeking comment on the development of measures of generic and biosimilar use in Medicare Part D that could be incorporated in health plan star ratings.
Some of the measures proposed in the blog post include the generic substitution rate, the generic therapeutic alternative opportunity rate (which measures the number of brand fills divided by the sum of the brand and generic fills when both are available), and the biosimilar utilization rate.
[email protected]
Funding failures: Tobacco prevention and cessation
When it comes to state funding for tobacco prevention and cessation, the American Lung Association grades on a curve. It did not help.

Each state’s annual funding for tobacco prevention and cessation was calculated and then compared with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s recommended spending level. That percentage became the grade, with any level of funding at 80% or more of the CDC’s recommendation getting an A and anything below 50% getting an F, the ALA explained.
The three A’s went to Alaska – which spent $10.14 million, or 99.4% of the CDC-recommended $10.2 million – California (96.0%), and Maine (83.5%). The lowest levels of spending came from Georgia, which spend just 2.8% of the CDC’s recommendation of $106 million, and Missouri, which spent 3.0%, the ALA reported.
States’ grades were generally better in the four other areas of tobacco-control policy: There were 24 A’s and 9 F’s for smoke-free air laws, 1 A and 35 F’s for tobacco excise taxes, 3 A’s and 17 F’s for access to cessation treatment, and 10 A’s and 30 F’s for laws to raise the tobacco sales age to 21 years, the ALA said in the report.
Despite an overall grade of F, the federal government managed to earn some praise in that last area: “In what could only be described as unimaginable even 2 years ago, in December 2019, Congress passed bipartisan legislation to raise the minimum age of sale for tobacco products to 21,” the ALA said.
The federal government was strongly criticized on the subject of e-cigarettes. “The Trump Administration failed to prioritize public health over the tobacco industry with its Jan. 2, 2020, announcement that will leave thousands of flavored e-cigarettes on the market,” the ALA said, while concluding that the rising use of e-cigarettes in recent years “is a real-world demonstration of the failure of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to properly oversee all tobacco products. … This failure places the lung health and lives of Americans at risk.”
When it comes to state funding for tobacco prevention and cessation, the American Lung Association grades on a curve. It did not help.

Each state’s annual funding for tobacco prevention and cessation was calculated and then compared with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s recommended spending level. That percentage became the grade, with any level of funding at 80% or more of the CDC’s recommendation getting an A and anything below 50% getting an F, the ALA explained.
The three A’s went to Alaska – which spent $10.14 million, or 99.4% of the CDC-recommended $10.2 million – California (96.0%), and Maine (83.5%). The lowest levels of spending came from Georgia, which spend just 2.8% of the CDC’s recommendation of $106 million, and Missouri, which spent 3.0%, the ALA reported.
States’ grades were generally better in the four other areas of tobacco-control policy: There were 24 A’s and 9 F’s for smoke-free air laws, 1 A and 35 F’s for tobacco excise taxes, 3 A’s and 17 F’s for access to cessation treatment, and 10 A’s and 30 F’s for laws to raise the tobacco sales age to 21 years, the ALA said in the report.
Despite an overall grade of F, the federal government managed to earn some praise in that last area: “In what could only be described as unimaginable even 2 years ago, in December 2019, Congress passed bipartisan legislation to raise the minimum age of sale for tobacco products to 21,” the ALA said.
The federal government was strongly criticized on the subject of e-cigarettes. “The Trump Administration failed to prioritize public health over the tobacco industry with its Jan. 2, 2020, announcement that will leave thousands of flavored e-cigarettes on the market,” the ALA said, while concluding that the rising use of e-cigarettes in recent years “is a real-world demonstration of the failure of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to properly oversee all tobacco products. … This failure places the lung health and lives of Americans at risk.”
When it comes to state funding for tobacco prevention and cessation, the American Lung Association grades on a curve. It did not help.

Each state’s annual funding for tobacco prevention and cessation was calculated and then compared with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s recommended spending level. That percentage became the grade, with any level of funding at 80% or more of the CDC’s recommendation getting an A and anything below 50% getting an F, the ALA explained.
The three A’s went to Alaska – which spent $10.14 million, or 99.4% of the CDC-recommended $10.2 million – California (96.0%), and Maine (83.5%). The lowest levels of spending came from Georgia, which spend just 2.8% of the CDC’s recommendation of $106 million, and Missouri, which spent 3.0%, the ALA reported.
States’ grades were generally better in the four other areas of tobacco-control policy: There were 24 A’s and 9 F’s for smoke-free air laws, 1 A and 35 F’s for tobacco excise taxes, 3 A’s and 17 F’s for access to cessation treatment, and 10 A’s and 30 F’s for laws to raise the tobacco sales age to 21 years, the ALA said in the report.
Despite an overall grade of F, the federal government managed to earn some praise in that last area: “In what could only be described as unimaginable even 2 years ago, in December 2019, Congress passed bipartisan legislation to raise the minimum age of sale for tobacco products to 21,” the ALA said.
The federal government was strongly criticized on the subject of e-cigarettes. “The Trump Administration failed to prioritize public health over the tobacco industry with its Jan. 2, 2020, announcement that will leave thousands of flavored e-cigarettes on the market,” the ALA said, while concluding that the rising use of e-cigarettes in recent years “is a real-world demonstration of the failure of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to properly oversee all tobacco products. … This failure places the lung health and lives of Americans at risk.”






