Hospital Medicine

In a few short months, the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 has spread across the world, and illness caused by coronavirus 2019, or COVID-19, now affects every corner of the United States.¹ As healthcare systems prepare to care for a wave of affected patients, those with a teaching mission face the added challenge of balancing the educational needs and safety of trainees with those of delivering patient care. In response to concerns for student welfare, medical and nursing schools have suspended classroom-based education and clinical rotations.² The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) and American Association of Colleges of Nursing (AACN) have emphasized the importance of adequate training in the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) for their trainees.³ The National League for Nursing has called on training programs to allow flexibility for graduating students who may have been removed from clinical rotations because of safety concerns.⁴

These decisions have precedent: During the SARS-CoV epidemic in 2003, medical and nursing student education was temporarily halted in affected areas.^5-6 Healthcare trainees described concerns for their safety and reported adverse emotional impact.^7-9 In the current pandemic, there is variation in how countries around the world are approaching the role of learners, with options ranging from removing learners from the clinical environment to encouraging early graduation for students in hopes of ameliorating the impending physician shortage.^10-13 The need to balance educational goals with ethical concerns raised by this pandemic affects health professions trainees broadly.

Despite the challenges, there are unique educational opportunities at hand. In this Perspective, we draw on our collective experience, multiple informal interviews with educational leaders across the country, and educational literature to create a framework for health professions education during a crisis. From this framework, we propose a set of recommendations to assist educational policymakers and those working directly with learners to navigate these issues effectively.

Patient and Hospital Welfare

There are significant concerns about nosocomial spread of SARS-CoV-2. Having learners directly see COVID-19 patients can increase the risk of nosocomial spread. In one of the original case series, 29% of those infected were health care workers and 12.3% were patients hospitalized prior to infection.¹⁴ Additionally, preserving supplies of personal protective equipment (PPE) for healthcare workers has been a commonly cited reason for suspending student presence on clinical rotations. Insufficient supply of PPE has forced hospitals to relax PPE guidelines for those seeing patients under investigation and liberalize quarantine requirements for exposed health care workers, so many hospitals have reduced provider-patient interactions to only those considered essential.

Learner Welfare

As educators, we have a duty to keep our learners safe and psychologically well. The COVID-19 pandemic poses a risk of illness, permanent injury, or death among those infected. In some instances, the risks of exposure may be greater than the educational benefits of remaining in that clinical setting; however, health professions trainees at many institutions play such a central operational role that their absence could seriously impair overall care delivery. Furthermore, trainees are usually younger and healthier than supervising clinicians, which could leave them feeling an obligation to conduct a disproportionately large share of the direct patient contact. Despite these valid concerns, those being removed from the clinical environment for their safety could misinterpret it as a sign that their contributions or educational interests are not valued.

Educational Experience

Canceled clinical rotations will have significant negative educational effects on undergraduate learners. Depending on the extent of the pandemic’s effects, for example, third-year medical students may lack core rotations prior to applying for residency training. Other health professions face similar challenges—nursing students in their final year are likely missing their last opportunity for hands-on clinical training before graduation. Advanced practice nursing students may not be able to complete the required number of contact hours or clinical experiences mandated for accreditation. Graduate training programs must accommodate and adapt to these disparities when reviewing their applicant pools.

Absence from the clinical front lines, though, risks failing to capitalize on the unique educational opportunities presented by this pandemic. Students might miss the chance to learn about a new clinical entity and its increasingly varied clinical presentations, crisis medicine, infection control measures, emergency preparedness, ethics in the setting of scarce resources, public health and community response, communication in the setting of uncertainty and fear, and professionalism in the response to this singular situation. Trainees at all levels may miss the opportunity to stand alongside their teachers and peers to give care to those who need it most.

Heterogeneity of COVID-19 Responses Across the Country

The diversity of training sites in US health professions education has led to a wide range of responses to these challenges. In addition to regional variations, sites within individual academic programs are creating different educational and clinical polices, including the role of learners in the care of COVID-19 patients and even PPE requirements. Although educational accreditation bodies have offered guidance, implementation of creative responses has been left to individual schools, programs, and hospitals, creating important differences in learner training and experience.

Given these challenges, we offer four broad principles to guide health professions education in response to this pandemic. Within this framework, we offer multiple suggestions to individual educators, health professions programs, healthcare systems, and educational policymakers.

1. Prioritize healthcare system welfare: Patients are the core of our professional responsibility, and their needs take precedence. First and foremost, plans for our learners must always promote and support the proper functioning of the health system and its individual healthcare workers. To support care delivery, healthcare systems should do the following:

• Ensure educational activities minimize the risk of nosocomial transmission and adverse effects on patient safety. For example, hospitals can modify bedside care to reduce exposure by using phone or video for patient-trainee contact, performing selective physical examination only, and, when needed, prioritizing a single skilled examiner.
• Ensure learner use of PPE does not negatively affect availability for others, both now and as the pandemic unfolds.
• Engage learners in authentic, value-added healthcare activities outside of direct patient contact: tele-medicine, meeting with families, or spending video time with inpatients not under their direct care.

2. Promote learner welfare: Educators have a duty to ensure the physical and psychological safety of learners across the health professions continuum. By virtue of power differentials in the hierarchy of the teaching environment, learners can be particularly vulnerable. To promote learner wellbeing, educators should do the following:

• Deploy technology to maximize opportunities for and quality of non–face-to-face clinical, didactic, and interprofessional learning.
• Ensure learners have access to and proper training in the use of PPE, independent of whether they may be using PPE as part of clinical responsibilities, while remaining aware of the potential supply constraints during a pandemic.
• Deliberately include stop points during teaching for dialogue around fears, stress, resilience, and coping.¹⁵ Deploy additional resources for support, including in-person or virtual psychological and psychiatric care and crisis intervention counseling.
• Maintain flexibility regarding trainee’s educational needs. For example, welcome trainees from other services joining inpatient medicine or ICU teams. Acknowledge the stress they may feel and support them as they learn and adapt. This can be a unique opportunity for lessons in professionalism, teamwork, and communication.

3. Maximize educational value: Efforts must be made to preserve educational quality and content, limit educational cost, and leverage unique opportunities that may only be available during this time. Educators and programs should do the following:

• Adapt teaching to reflect changes in the hospital environment. A student may have spent more time on the phone with a patient; the nurse may have examined the patient; a resident may have vital sign and lab data; the attending may have spoken to the family or know about local policy changes affecting care. The usual modes of rounding should adapt, focusing on sharing and synthesizing multisource data to generate rapid, intelligent plans while mitigating risk.
• Turn the potential challenge of diminished access to previously routine diagnostic testing into an opportunity for trainees to assertively develop clinical skills often underutilized in practice environments without resource limitation.
• Discuss learning opportunities for healthcare ethics. Multiple aspects of this pandemic raise ethical issues around allocation of scarce resources and principles such as contingency and crisis standards of care: the availability and application of testing, potential changes to patient triage standards in which patients sicker than ever may be sent home, and crisis allocation of life support resources.
• Highlight opportunities to support interprofessional education and collaborative practice. As traditional professional boundaries are temporarily blurred, we may find nurses asking gowned physicians to perform nursing tasks (eg, inflate blood pressure cuffs). Physicians may ask nurses for patient-related information (eg, physical examination findings), all to limit collective risk, maximize efficiency, and minimize the use of scarce PPE.
• Teach telemedicine. This is an opportunity to create a cadre of clinicians adept with this type of practice for the future—even outside pandemics. Now may be the time for virtual visits to be better integrated into clinical practice, which has been of interest to patients and providers for some time, and to address the constraints of reimbursement policies.
• Provide explicit role modeling to ensure learners recognize and learn from the key components of faculty activity—modeling communication skills, engaging in clinical reasoning, or navigating clinical and professional uncertainty.¹⁶ For example, faculty could share their clinical reasoning regarding diagnosis of respiratory complaints. While COVID-19 may be the most urgent diagnostic consideration, educators can emphasize the risk and implications of anchoring bias as an important cause of diagnostic errors.
• Identify opportunities for educational scholarship around these and other changes resulting from the pandemic. Seek to engage learners in this work.

4. Communicate transparently: Learners must be witness to decision-making processes; this will demonstrate that their safety and education are valued. Wherever possible, include learners in decision-making discussions and in the process of disseminating information.

• At the institutional level, generate, modify, and share communication regarding the ways that education is changing and the values and goals behind those changes.
• Invite trainees as active contributors to intellectual exchanges regarding changes in the learning environment.
• Limit the negative impact of the “rumor mill” by replacing it with frequent, targeted, and accurate messaging that relies on evidence to the greatest extent possible.
• Strive for consistency in communication content but diversity in distribution to reach the learners in the most effective ways. In times of uncertainty and stress, err on the side of overcommunication.

Healthcare and medical education face a challenge unprecedented in our lifetimes. The COVID-19 pandemic will touch every aspect of how we care for patients, train the next generation of health professionals, and keep ourselves safe. By highlighting key issues facing health professions educators, offering a framework for education during pandemics, and providing specific suggestions for applying this framework, we hope to provide clarity on how we may advance our teaching mission and realize the educational opportunities as we face this crisis together.

In a few short months, the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 has spread across the world, and illness caused by coronavirus 2019, or COVID-19, now affects every corner of the United States.¹ As healthcare systems prepare to care for a wave of affected patients, those with a teaching mission face the added challenge of balancing the educational needs and safety of trainees with those of delivering patient care. In response to concerns for student welfare, medical and nursing schools have suspended classroom-based education and clinical rotations.² The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) and American Association of Colleges of Nursing (AACN) have emphasized the importance of adequate training in the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) for their trainees.³ The National League for Nursing has called on training programs to allow flexibility for graduating students who may have been removed from clinical rotations because of safety concerns.⁴

These decisions have precedent: During the SARS-CoV epidemic in 2003, medical and nursing student education was temporarily halted in affected areas.^5-6 Healthcare trainees described concerns for their safety and reported adverse emotional impact.^7-9 In the current pandemic, there is variation in how countries around the world are approaching the role of learners, with options ranging from removing learners from the clinical environment to encouraging early graduation for students in hopes of ameliorating the impending physician shortage.^10-13 The need to balance educational goals with ethical concerns raised by this pandemic affects health professions trainees broadly.

Despite the challenges, there are unique educational opportunities at hand. In this Perspective, we draw on our collective experience, multiple informal interviews with educational leaders across the country, and educational literature to create a framework for health professions education during a crisis. From this framework, we propose a set of recommendations to assist educational policymakers and those working directly with learners to navigate these issues effectively.

Patient and Hospital Welfare

There are significant concerns about nosocomial spread of SARS-CoV-2. Having learners directly see COVID-19 patients can increase the risk of nosocomial spread. In one of the original case series, 29% of those infected were health care workers and 12.3% were patients hospitalized prior to infection.¹⁴ Additionally, preserving supplies of personal protective equipment (PPE) for healthcare workers has been a commonly cited reason for suspending student presence on clinical rotations. Insufficient supply of PPE has forced hospitals to relax PPE guidelines for those seeing patients under investigation and liberalize quarantine requirements for exposed health care workers, so many hospitals have reduced provider-patient interactions to only those considered essential.

Learner Welfare

As educators, we have a duty to keep our learners safe and psychologically well. The COVID-19 pandemic poses a risk of illness, permanent injury, or death among those infected. In some instances, the risks of exposure may be greater than the educational benefits of remaining in that clinical setting; however, health professions trainees at many institutions play such a central operational role that their absence could seriously impair overall care delivery. Furthermore, trainees are usually younger and healthier than supervising clinicians, which could leave them feeling an obligation to conduct a disproportionately large share of the direct patient contact. Despite these valid concerns, those being removed from the clinical environment for their safety could misinterpret it as a sign that their contributions or educational interests are not valued.

Educational Experience

Canceled clinical rotations will have significant negative educational effects on undergraduate learners. Depending on the extent of the pandemic’s effects, for example, third-year medical students may lack core rotations prior to applying for residency training. Other health professions face similar challenges—nursing students in their final year are likely missing their last opportunity for hands-on clinical training before graduation. Advanced practice nursing students may not be able to complete the required number of contact hours or clinical experiences mandated for accreditation. Graduate training programs must accommodate and adapt to these disparities when reviewing their applicant pools.

Absence from the clinical front lines, though, risks failing to capitalize on the unique educational opportunities presented by this pandemic. Students might miss the chance to learn about a new clinical entity and its increasingly varied clinical presentations, crisis medicine, infection control measures, emergency preparedness, ethics in the setting of scarce resources, public health and community response, communication in the setting of uncertainty and fear, and professionalism in the response to this singular situation. Trainees at all levels may miss the opportunity to stand alongside their teachers and peers to give care to those who need it most.

Heterogeneity of COVID-19 Responses Across the Country

The diversity of training sites in US health professions education has led to a wide range of responses to these challenges. In addition to regional variations, sites within individual academic programs are creating different educational and clinical polices, including the role of learners in the care of COVID-19 patients and even PPE requirements. Although educational accreditation bodies have offered guidance, implementation of creative responses has been left to individual schools, programs, and hospitals, creating important differences in learner training and experience.

Given these challenges, we offer four broad principles to guide health professions education in response to this pandemic. Within this framework, we offer multiple suggestions to individual educators, health professions programs, healthcare systems, and educational policymakers.

1. Prioritize healthcare system welfare: Patients are the core of our professional responsibility, and their needs take precedence. First and foremost, plans for our learners must always promote and support the proper functioning of the health system and its individual healthcare workers. To support care delivery, healthcare systems should do the following:

• Ensure educational activities minimize the risk of nosocomial transmission and adverse effects on patient safety. For example, hospitals can modify bedside care to reduce exposure by using phone or video for patient-trainee contact, performing selective physical examination only, and, when needed, prioritizing a single skilled examiner.
• Ensure learner use of PPE does not negatively affect availability for others, both now and as the pandemic unfolds.
• Engage learners in authentic, value-added healthcare activities outside of direct patient contact: tele-medicine, meeting with families, or spending video time with inpatients not under their direct care.

2. Promote learner welfare: Educators have a duty to ensure the physical and psychological safety of learners across the health professions continuum. By virtue of power differentials in the hierarchy of the teaching environment, learners can be particularly vulnerable. To promote learner wellbeing, educators should do the following:

• Deploy technology to maximize opportunities for and quality of non–face-to-face clinical, didactic, and interprofessional learning.
• Ensure learners have access to and proper training in the use of PPE, independent of whether they may be using PPE as part of clinical responsibilities, while remaining aware of the potential supply constraints during a pandemic.
• Deliberately include stop points during teaching for dialogue around fears, stress, resilience, and coping.¹⁵ Deploy additional resources for support, including in-person or virtual psychological and psychiatric care and crisis intervention counseling.
• Maintain flexibility regarding trainee’s educational needs. For example, welcome trainees from other services joining inpatient medicine or ICU teams. Acknowledge the stress they may feel and support them as they learn and adapt. This can be a unique opportunity for lessons in professionalism, teamwork, and communication.

3. Maximize educational value: Efforts must be made to preserve educational quality and content, limit educational cost, and leverage unique opportunities that may only be available during this time. Educators and programs should do the following:

• Adapt teaching to reflect changes in the hospital environment. A student may have spent more time on the phone with a patient; the nurse may have examined the patient; a resident may have vital sign and lab data; the attending may have spoken to the family or know about local policy changes affecting care. The usual modes of rounding should adapt, focusing on sharing and synthesizing multisource data to generate rapid, intelligent plans while mitigating risk.
• Turn the potential challenge of diminished access to previously routine diagnostic testing into an opportunity for trainees to assertively develop clinical skills often underutilized in practice environments without resource limitation.
• Discuss learning opportunities for healthcare ethics. Multiple aspects of this pandemic raise ethical issues around allocation of scarce resources and principles such as contingency and crisis standards of care: the availability and application of testing, potential changes to patient triage standards in which patients sicker than ever may be sent home, and crisis allocation of life support resources.
• Highlight opportunities to support interprofessional education and collaborative practice. As traditional professional boundaries are temporarily blurred, we may find nurses asking gowned physicians to perform nursing tasks (eg, inflate blood pressure cuffs). Physicians may ask nurses for patient-related information (eg, physical examination findings), all to limit collective risk, maximize efficiency, and minimize the use of scarce PPE.
• Teach telemedicine. This is an opportunity to create a cadre of clinicians adept with this type of practice for the future—even outside pandemics. Now may be the time for virtual visits to be better integrated into clinical practice, which has been of interest to patients and providers for some time, and to address the constraints of reimbursement policies.
• Provide explicit role modeling to ensure learners recognize and learn from the key components of faculty activity—modeling communication skills, engaging in clinical reasoning, or navigating clinical and professional uncertainty.¹⁶ For example, faculty could share their clinical reasoning regarding diagnosis of respiratory complaints. While COVID-19 may be the most urgent diagnostic consideration, educators can emphasize the risk and implications of anchoring bias as an important cause of diagnostic errors.
• Identify opportunities for educational scholarship around these and other changes resulting from the pandemic. Seek to engage learners in this work.

4. Communicate transparently: Learners must be witness to decision-making processes; this will demonstrate that their safety and education are valued. Wherever possible, include learners in decision-making discussions and in the process of disseminating information.

• At the institutional level, generate, modify, and share communication regarding the ways that education is changing and the values and goals behind those changes.
• Invite trainees as active contributors to intellectual exchanges regarding changes in the learning environment.
• Limit the negative impact of the “rumor mill” by replacing it with frequent, targeted, and accurate messaging that relies on evidence to the greatest extent possible.
• Strive for consistency in communication content but diversity in distribution to reach the learners in the most effective ways. In times of uncertainty and stress, err on the side of overcommunication.

Healthcare and medical education face a challenge unprecedented in our lifetimes. The COVID-19 pandemic will touch every aspect of how we care for patients, train the next generation of health professionals, and keep ourselves safe. By highlighting key issues facing health professions educators, offering a framework for education during pandemics, and providing specific suggestions for applying this framework, we hope to provide clarity on how we may advance our teaching mission and realize the educational opportunities as we face this crisis together.

In a few short months, the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 has spread across the world, and illness caused by coronavirus 2019, or COVID-19, now affects every corner of the United States.¹ As healthcare systems prepare to care for a wave of affected patients, those with a teaching mission face the added challenge of balancing the educational needs and safety of trainees with those of delivering patient care. In response to concerns for student welfare, medical and nursing schools have suspended classroom-based education and clinical rotations.² The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) and American Association of Colleges of Nursing (AACN) have emphasized the importance of adequate training in the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) for their trainees.³ The National League for Nursing has called on training programs to allow flexibility for graduating students who may have been removed from clinical rotations because of safety concerns.⁴

These decisions have precedent: During the SARS-CoV epidemic in 2003, medical and nursing student education was temporarily halted in affected areas.^5-6 Healthcare trainees described concerns for their safety and reported adverse emotional impact.^7-9 In the current pandemic, there is variation in how countries around the world are approaching the role of learners, with options ranging from removing learners from the clinical environment to encouraging early graduation for students in hopes of ameliorating the impending physician shortage.^10-13 The need to balance educational goals with ethical concerns raised by this pandemic affects health professions trainees broadly.

Despite the challenges, there are unique educational opportunities at hand. In this Perspective, we draw on our collective experience, multiple informal interviews with educational leaders across the country, and educational literature to create a framework for health professions education during a crisis. From this framework, we propose a set of recommendations to assist educational policymakers and those working directly with learners to navigate these issues effectively.

Patient and Hospital Welfare

There are significant concerns about nosocomial spread of SARS-CoV-2. Having learners directly see COVID-19 patients can increase the risk of nosocomial spread. In one of the original case series, 29% of those infected were health care workers and 12.3% were patients hospitalized prior to infection.¹⁴ Additionally, preserving supplies of personal protective equipment (PPE) for healthcare workers has been a commonly cited reason for suspending student presence on clinical rotations. Insufficient supply of PPE has forced hospitals to relax PPE guidelines for those seeing patients under investigation and liberalize quarantine requirements for exposed health care workers, so many hospitals have reduced provider-patient interactions to only those considered essential.

Learner Welfare

As educators, we have a duty to keep our learners safe and psychologically well. The COVID-19 pandemic poses a risk of illness, permanent injury, or death among those infected. In some instances, the risks of exposure may be greater than the educational benefits of remaining in that clinical setting; however, health professions trainees at many institutions play such a central operational role that their absence could seriously impair overall care delivery. Furthermore, trainees are usually younger and healthier than supervising clinicians, which could leave them feeling an obligation to conduct a disproportionately large share of the direct patient contact. Despite these valid concerns, those being removed from the clinical environment for their safety could misinterpret it as a sign that their contributions or educational interests are not valued.

Educational Experience

Canceled clinical rotations will have significant negative educational effects on undergraduate learners. Depending on the extent of the pandemic’s effects, for example, third-year medical students may lack core rotations prior to applying for residency training. Other health professions face similar challenges—nursing students in their final year are likely missing their last opportunity for hands-on clinical training before graduation. Advanced practice nursing students may not be able to complete the required number of contact hours or clinical experiences mandated for accreditation. Graduate training programs must accommodate and adapt to these disparities when reviewing their applicant pools.

Absence from the clinical front lines, though, risks failing to capitalize on the unique educational opportunities presented by this pandemic. Students might miss the chance to learn about a new clinical entity and its increasingly varied clinical presentations, crisis medicine, infection control measures, emergency preparedness, ethics in the setting of scarce resources, public health and community response, communication in the setting of uncertainty and fear, and professionalism in the response to this singular situation. Trainees at all levels may miss the opportunity to stand alongside their teachers and peers to give care to those who need it most.

Heterogeneity of COVID-19 Responses Across the Country

The diversity of training sites in US health professions education has led to a wide range of responses to these challenges. In addition to regional variations, sites within individual academic programs are creating different educational and clinical polices, including the role of learners in the care of COVID-19 patients and even PPE requirements. Although educational accreditation bodies have offered guidance, implementation of creative responses has been left to individual schools, programs, and hospitals, creating important differences in learner training and experience.

Given these challenges, we offer four broad principles to guide health professions education in response to this pandemic. Within this framework, we offer multiple suggestions to individual educators, health professions programs, healthcare systems, and educational policymakers.

1. Prioritize healthcare system welfare: Patients are the core of our professional responsibility, and their needs take precedence. First and foremost, plans for our learners must always promote and support the proper functioning of the health system and its individual healthcare workers. To support care delivery, healthcare systems should do the following:

• Ensure educational activities minimize the risk of nosocomial transmission and adverse effects on patient safety. For example, hospitals can modify bedside care to reduce exposure by using phone or video for patient-trainee contact, performing selective physical examination only, and, when needed, prioritizing a single skilled examiner.
• Ensure learner use of PPE does not negatively affect availability for others, both now and as the pandemic unfolds.
• Engage learners in authentic, value-added healthcare activities outside of direct patient contact: tele-medicine, meeting with families, or spending video time with inpatients not under their direct care.

2. Promote learner welfare: Educators have a duty to ensure the physical and psychological safety of learners across the health professions continuum. By virtue of power differentials in the hierarchy of the teaching environment, learners can be particularly vulnerable. To promote learner wellbeing, educators should do the following:

• Deploy technology to maximize opportunities for and quality of non–face-to-face clinical, didactic, and interprofessional learning.
• Ensure learners have access to and proper training in the use of PPE, independent of whether they may be using PPE as part of clinical responsibilities, while remaining aware of the potential supply constraints during a pandemic.
• Deliberately include stop points during teaching for dialogue around fears, stress, resilience, and coping.¹⁵ Deploy additional resources for support, including in-person or virtual psychological and psychiatric care and crisis intervention counseling.
• Maintain flexibility regarding trainee’s educational needs. For example, welcome trainees from other services joining inpatient medicine or ICU teams. Acknowledge the stress they may feel and support them as they learn and adapt. This can be a unique opportunity for lessons in professionalism, teamwork, and communication.

3. Maximize educational value: Efforts must be made to preserve educational quality and content, limit educational cost, and leverage unique opportunities that may only be available during this time. Educators and programs should do the following:

• Adapt teaching to reflect changes in the hospital environment. A student may have spent more time on the phone with a patient; the nurse may have examined the patient; a resident may have vital sign and lab data; the attending may have spoken to the family or know about local policy changes affecting care. The usual modes of rounding should adapt, focusing on sharing and synthesizing multisource data to generate rapid, intelligent plans while mitigating risk.
• Turn the potential challenge of diminished access to previously routine diagnostic testing into an opportunity for trainees to assertively develop clinical skills often underutilized in practice environments without resource limitation.
• Discuss learning opportunities for healthcare ethics. Multiple aspects of this pandemic raise ethical issues around allocation of scarce resources and principles such as contingency and crisis standards of care: the availability and application of testing, potential changes to patient triage standards in which patients sicker than ever may be sent home, and crisis allocation of life support resources.
• Highlight opportunities to support interprofessional education and collaborative practice. As traditional professional boundaries are temporarily blurred, we may find nurses asking gowned physicians to perform nursing tasks (eg, inflate blood pressure cuffs). Physicians may ask nurses for patient-related information (eg, physical examination findings), all to limit collective risk, maximize efficiency, and minimize the use of scarce PPE.
• Teach telemedicine. This is an opportunity to create a cadre of clinicians adept with this type of practice for the future—even outside pandemics. Now may be the time for virtual visits to be better integrated into clinical practice, which has been of interest to patients and providers for some time, and to address the constraints of reimbursement policies.
• Provide explicit role modeling to ensure learners recognize and learn from the key components of faculty activity—modeling communication skills, engaging in clinical reasoning, or navigating clinical and professional uncertainty.¹⁶ For example, faculty could share their clinical reasoning regarding diagnosis of respiratory complaints. While COVID-19 may be the most urgent diagnostic consideration, educators can emphasize the risk and implications of anchoring bias as an important cause of diagnostic errors.
• Identify opportunities for educational scholarship around these and other changes resulting from the pandemic. Seek to engage learners in this work.

4. Communicate transparently: Learners must be witness to decision-making processes; this will demonstrate that their safety and education are valued. Wherever possible, include learners in decision-making discussions and in the process of disseminating information.

• At the institutional level, generate, modify, and share communication regarding the ways that education is changing and the values and goals behind those changes.
• Invite trainees as active contributors to intellectual exchanges regarding changes in the learning environment.
• Limit the negative impact of the “rumor mill” by replacing it with frequent, targeted, and accurate messaging that relies on evidence to the greatest extent possible.
• Strive for consistency in communication content but diversity in distribution to reach the learners in the most effective ways. In times of uncertainty and stress, err on the side of overcommunication.

Healthcare and medical education face a challenge unprecedented in our lifetimes. The COVID-19 pandemic will touch every aspect of how we care for patients, train the next generation of health professionals, and keep ourselves safe. By highlighting key issues facing health professions educators, offering a framework for education during pandemics, and providing specific suggestions for applying this framework, we hope to provide clarity on how we may advance our teaching mission and realize the educational opportunities as we face this crisis together.

Cervical pannus is a disease that could easily develop in an active-duty soldier or veteran. The disease has been associated with trauma and rheumatoid arthritis, or can be idiopathic. For years, cervical pannus has been closely tied to rheumatoid arthritis; however, a study published in 2019 showed that only 28% of patients with cervical pannus had an associated diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis.¹ In the same study, 18% of patients had undergone some type of prior cervical spine surgery as the next most common cause. The condition also can occur years after an injury.

Background

In the US, 42,000 veterans are living with spinal cord disease, and thousands of these veterans have surgery every year.² Service men and women and veterans are at risk for cervical pannus as they age especially if they have a history of rheumatoid arthritis, cervical spine surgery, trauma, and numerous other causes. It is critical for health care providers who treat this population to understand cervical pannus, how to recognize it, and how to identify patients at risk. A cervical pannus can be life threatening if not detected and treated properly.

There is no clear definition for cervical pannus. Some researchers think of it as the chronically inflamed synovial membrane in patients with rheumatoid arthritis (RA); others consider it as a specialized synovial membrane derived from vascular soft tissue structures at or near the bone synovial membrane.³ The pathogenesis for developing a pannus is not well understood, and little is known when a pannus begins or its initial location. A pannus formation can occur in any synovial joint in the body, such as wrists, metacarpophalangeal joint, proximal interphalangeal joint, and cervical joints.

A cervical pannus can cause serious complications. It can lead to a cervical subluxation in up to 4% of patients with RA, or it also can occur spontaneously in some patients without RA especially those with trauma or cancer.⁴

There are 2 suggested mechanisms by which the synovial membrane proliferates. It was originally believed that T cells from the chronic inflamed joint lead to the pannus formation by initiating an autoimmune reaction through the production of different cytokines against arthritogenic agents.^3-5 These cytokines increase inflammation by recruiting neutrophils and activating various kinds of macrophages that might lead to increased osteoclast activity.⁶ Osteoclastic activity can damage bone and allow the synovium to penetrate the bone, forming the pannus.

Another proposed mechanism is that the synovial cells hyperpolarize and hypertrophy automatically without T-cell help by expressing oncogenes and their proteins.³ In either case, angiogenesis follows this proliferation and increases the influx of inflammatory cells into the joints, which can lead to more destruction.⁷ This increase in blood supply to the synovial membrane is important in the growth of the pannus and can have a damaging effect to cartilage, bone, and joints.^4,7

Cervical pannus can progress in patients with prolonged use of corticosteroids.⁸ Because a pannus can put pressure on any segment of the cervical spine and the cranio-cervical junction leading to cervical instability, patients with this condition may present with a variety of clinical symptoms.⁹ The most frequently reported clinical features include neck pain, easy fatigability, difficulty walking, abnormal gait, increased clumsiness, and numbness and tingling in the arms. Patients also may complain of neck stiffness and decreased neck motion.¹⁰Cervical pannus is most frequently seen in patients with RA. However, patients without a RA diagnosis and incidental atlantoaxial pannus on cervical spine magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) are unlikely to have previously undiagnosed RA.¹¹

Case Presentation

A 70-year-old white woman presented to the neurology clinic at Gretna Medical Center in Virginia in December 2016 with constant headache and imbalance that started in September 2016. She characterized the pain as predominately pressure (6 on a 10-point pain scale) with occasional shooting pains. The pain started at the left occipital lobe and radiated toward the left temporal lobe and left eye. The patient also stated that it was very difficult to lay her head down on a pillow to sleep and that she had to use a recliner in order to sleep over the past 3 months. She reported that the headache felt slightly worse if she had a lot of repetitive head and neck movements during the day. There was no photophobia, phonophobia, nausea, vomiting, facial paresthesias, lacrimation, nasal congestion, confusion, or impaired speech.

The patient’s lack of balance, which resulted in an unsteady gait, had started 1 month before and had increased significantly in the past 2 to 3 weeks. She stated that the unsteady gait was associated with numbness in her right upper and lower extremities, although more intense in the right lower extremity. Aside from the headaches, paresthesia, and unsteady gait, the patient reported no other major symptoms. She did not smoke tobacco or drink alcohol. Her family history revealed that her brothers had heart disease.

The patient’s vital signs at physical examination included heart rate, 83 beats per minute; blood pressure, 159/75 mm hg; temporal temperature, 97.9 °F; and respiratory rate, 20 breaths per minute. The patient’s gait was unsteady, needing stabilization by holding on to her husband’s arm, slightly favoring right lower extremity. Finger-to-nose test, rapid alternating movements, heel-knee-shin testing were all normal. The Romberg sign was positive. The patient could rise on toes and heels with slight balance disturbance. Deep tendon reflexes and reflexes in the upper and lower extremities was symmetric 2+ bilaterally. Musculoskeletal examination revealed strength and tone in all major muscle groups and demonstrated symmetrical movements with no fasciculation noted. A rheumatologic evaluation showed no abnormalities, including inspection of hands, feet, major joints, and other range of motion, besides her neck. The rest of the physical, cognitive, and neurologic examination findings were otherwise unremarkable. A routine rheumatologic laboratory evaluation was negative.

A head computed tomography ordered before coming to the clinic showed normal results. An MRI of the head was obtained to evaluate for ischemic cause or structural abnormality (Figures 1 and 2). Given the patient’s presentation and the pattern seen on the MRI results, it was determined that large pannus posterior to the dens, severely narrowing the spinal canal, was most likely the diagnosis. A second opinion confirmed the diagnosis, and a second MRI revealed stabilization with no signs of enhancement.

The patient was advised to meet with a neurosurgeon to remove the pannus. The patient agreed on occiput to C2 posterior instrument arthrodesis as well as decompression. A plain film radiograph showed C2-occipital repair after surgery (Figure 3). The patient recovered in the neurosurgical intensive care unit, and the rest of the recovery was uncomplicated. She showed some improvement in her headaches and unsteady gait. A postoperative pathologic evaluation of tissue was not available. She was referred to a rheumatologist to rule out an autoimmune disease as the cause for this pannus, but no autoimmune disease was found.

Discussion

Cervical pannus is relatively uncommon in those without RA. However, there are multiple reasons that a patient could develop a cervical pannus. Cervical pannus in RA and cervical pannus without RA may mimic each other clinically, but medical management is distinctly different. Consequently, a rheumatology consult is necessary to ensure that there is no undiagnosed autoimmune disorder. Our patient did not have RA, and a neurosurgery intervention was needed to manage her headaches and unsteady gait. Although we could not isolate a cause of this patient’s cervical pannus development, we believed that nonintervention would adversely affect this patient.

The course of pannus progression can be fatal especially if left untreated.¹² MRI can detect a pannus and may be helpful for planning surgery.¹³ Surgical resection has been the treatment of choice for patients with neurologic symptoms.¹⁴ However, some cases have reported resolution of pannus associated with RA and other forms of chronic atlantoaxial instability only after posterior stabilization.¹⁴In order to manage pannus, cervical spine examination for the diagnosis of cervical involvement is encouraged to prevent morbidity and mortality.¹³ There are new data that demonstrated the potential of using retinoid X receptor agonists, such as bexarotene, as a treatment against the development and progression of pannus.¹⁴

Conclusions

We present a patient with cervical pannus disease without RA whose diagnosis was based on the pathognomonic pattern seen on MRI. She showed a clinically significant recovery with an occiput to C2 posterior instrument arthrodesis as well as decompression. She showed marked improvements in her headaches and unsteady gait. This case report highlights the importance of realizing cervical pannus as a disease found in patients without RA. It serves as an alert to clinicians for timely detection, diagnosis, and initiation of treatment to prevent mortality and long-term neurologic sequelae of cervical pannus.

Although further studies of early diagnosis and treatment for cervical pannus are warranted, we propose that including pannus in a differential diagnosis for patients with no RA could be lifesaving.

Cervical pannus is a disease that could easily develop in an active-duty soldier or veteran. The disease has been associated with trauma and rheumatoid arthritis, or can be idiopathic. For years, cervical pannus has been closely tied to rheumatoid arthritis; however, a study published in 2019 showed that only 28% of patients with cervical pannus had an associated diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis.¹ In the same study, 18% of patients had undergone some type of prior cervical spine surgery as the next most common cause. The condition also can occur years after an injury.

Background

In the US, 42,000 veterans are living with spinal cord disease, and thousands of these veterans have surgery every year.² Service men and women and veterans are at risk for cervical pannus as they age especially if they have a history of rheumatoid arthritis, cervical spine surgery, trauma, and numerous other causes. It is critical for health care providers who treat this population to understand cervical pannus, how to recognize it, and how to identify patients at risk. A cervical pannus can be life threatening if not detected and treated properly.

There is no clear definition for cervical pannus. Some researchers think of it as the chronically inflamed synovial membrane in patients with rheumatoid arthritis (RA); others consider it as a specialized synovial membrane derived from vascular soft tissue structures at or near the bone synovial membrane.³ The pathogenesis for developing a pannus is not well understood, and little is known when a pannus begins or its initial location. A pannus formation can occur in any synovial joint in the body, such as wrists, metacarpophalangeal joint, proximal interphalangeal joint, and cervical joints.

A cervical pannus can cause serious complications. It can lead to a cervical subluxation in up to 4% of patients with RA, or it also can occur spontaneously in some patients without RA especially those with trauma or cancer.⁴

There are 2 suggested mechanisms by which the synovial membrane proliferates. It was originally believed that T cells from the chronic inflamed joint lead to the pannus formation by initiating an autoimmune reaction through the production of different cytokines against arthritogenic agents.^3-5 These cytokines increase inflammation by recruiting neutrophils and activating various kinds of macrophages that might lead to increased osteoclast activity.⁶ Osteoclastic activity can damage bone and allow the synovium to penetrate the bone, forming the pannus.

Another proposed mechanism is that the synovial cells hyperpolarize and hypertrophy automatically without T-cell help by expressing oncogenes and their proteins.³ In either case, angiogenesis follows this proliferation and increases the influx of inflammatory cells into the joints, which can lead to more destruction.⁷ This increase in blood supply to the synovial membrane is important in the growth of the pannus and can have a damaging effect to cartilage, bone, and joints.^4,7

Cervical pannus can progress in patients with prolonged use of corticosteroids.⁸ Because a pannus can put pressure on any segment of the cervical spine and the cranio-cervical junction leading to cervical instability, patients with this condition may present with a variety of clinical symptoms.⁹ The most frequently reported clinical features include neck pain, easy fatigability, difficulty walking, abnormal gait, increased clumsiness, and numbness and tingling in the arms. Patients also may complain of neck stiffness and decreased neck motion.¹⁰Cervical pannus is most frequently seen in patients with RA. However, patients without a RA diagnosis and incidental atlantoaxial pannus on cervical spine magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) are unlikely to have previously undiagnosed RA.¹¹

Case Presentation

A 70-year-old white woman presented to the neurology clinic at Gretna Medical Center in Virginia in December 2016 with constant headache and imbalance that started in September 2016. She characterized the pain as predominately pressure (6 on a 10-point pain scale) with occasional shooting pains. The pain started at the left occipital lobe and radiated toward the left temporal lobe and left eye. The patient also stated that it was very difficult to lay her head down on a pillow to sleep and that she had to use a recliner in order to sleep over the past 3 months. She reported that the headache felt slightly worse if she had a lot of repetitive head and neck movements during the day. There was no photophobia, phonophobia, nausea, vomiting, facial paresthesias, lacrimation, nasal congestion, confusion, or impaired speech.

The patient’s lack of balance, which resulted in an unsteady gait, had started 1 month before and had increased significantly in the past 2 to 3 weeks. She stated that the unsteady gait was associated with numbness in her right upper and lower extremities, although more intense in the right lower extremity. Aside from the headaches, paresthesia, and unsteady gait, the patient reported no other major symptoms. She did not smoke tobacco or drink alcohol. Her family history revealed that her brothers had heart disease.

The patient’s vital signs at physical examination included heart rate, 83 beats per minute; blood pressure, 159/75 mm hg; temporal temperature, 97.9 °F; and respiratory rate, 20 breaths per minute. The patient’s gait was unsteady, needing stabilization by holding on to her husband’s arm, slightly favoring right lower extremity. Finger-to-nose test, rapid alternating movements, heel-knee-shin testing were all normal. The Romberg sign was positive. The patient could rise on toes and heels with slight balance disturbance. Deep tendon reflexes and reflexes in the upper and lower extremities was symmetric 2+ bilaterally. Musculoskeletal examination revealed strength and tone in all major muscle groups and demonstrated symmetrical movements with no fasciculation noted. A rheumatologic evaluation showed no abnormalities, including inspection of hands, feet, major joints, and other range of motion, besides her neck. The rest of the physical, cognitive, and neurologic examination findings were otherwise unremarkable. A routine rheumatologic laboratory evaluation was negative.

A head computed tomography ordered before coming to the clinic showed normal results. An MRI of the head was obtained to evaluate for ischemic cause or structural abnormality (Figures 1 and 2). Given the patient’s presentation and the pattern seen on the MRI results, it was determined that large pannus posterior to the dens, severely narrowing the spinal canal, was most likely the diagnosis. A second opinion confirmed the diagnosis, and a second MRI revealed stabilization with no signs of enhancement.

The patient was advised to meet with a neurosurgeon to remove the pannus. The patient agreed on occiput to C2 posterior instrument arthrodesis as well as decompression. A plain film radiograph showed C2-occipital repair after surgery (Figure 3). The patient recovered in the neurosurgical intensive care unit, and the rest of the recovery was uncomplicated. She showed some improvement in her headaches and unsteady gait. A postoperative pathologic evaluation of tissue was not available. She was referred to a rheumatologist to rule out an autoimmune disease as the cause for this pannus, but no autoimmune disease was found.

Discussion

Cervical pannus is relatively uncommon in those without RA. However, there are multiple reasons that a patient could develop a cervical pannus. Cervical pannus in RA and cervical pannus without RA may mimic each other clinically, but medical management is distinctly different. Consequently, a rheumatology consult is necessary to ensure that there is no undiagnosed autoimmune disorder. Our patient did not have RA, and a neurosurgery intervention was needed to manage her headaches and unsteady gait. Although we could not isolate a cause of this patient’s cervical pannus development, we believed that nonintervention would adversely affect this patient.

The course of pannus progression can be fatal especially if left untreated.¹² MRI can detect a pannus and may be helpful for planning surgery.¹³ Surgical resection has been the treatment of choice for patients with neurologic symptoms.¹⁴ However, some cases have reported resolution of pannus associated with RA and other forms of chronic atlantoaxial instability only after posterior stabilization.¹⁴In order to manage pannus, cervical spine examination for the diagnosis of cervical involvement is encouraged to prevent morbidity and mortality.¹³ There are new data that demonstrated the potential of using retinoid X receptor agonists, such as bexarotene, as a treatment against the development and progression of pannus.¹⁴

Conclusions

We present a patient with cervical pannus disease without RA whose diagnosis was based on the pathognomonic pattern seen on MRI. She showed a clinically significant recovery with an occiput to C2 posterior instrument arthrodesis as well as decompression. She showed marked improvements in her headaches and unsteady gait. This case report highlights the importance of realizing cervical pannus as a disease found in patients without RA. It serves as an alert to clinicians for timely detection, diagnosis, and initiation of treatment to prevent mortality and long-term neurologic sequelae of cervical pannus.

Although further studies of early diagnosis and treatment for cervical pannus are warranted, we propose that including pannus in a differential diagnosis for patients with no RA could be lifesaving.

Cervical pannus is a disease that could easily develop in an active-duty soldier or veteran. The disease has been associated with trauma and rheumatoid arthritis, or can be idiopathic. For years, cervical pannus has been closely tied to rheumatoid arthritis; however, a study published in 2019 showed that only 28% of patients with cervical pannus had an associated diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis.¹ In the same study, 18% of patients had undergone some type of prior cervical spine surgery as the next most common cause. The condition also can occur years after an injury.

Background

In the US, 42,000 veterans are living with spinal cord disease, and thousands of these veterans have surgery every year.² Service men and women and veterans are at risk for cervical pannus as they age especially if they have a history of rheumatoid arthritis, cervical spine surgery, trauma, and numerous other causes. It is critical for health care providers who treat this population to understand cervical pannus, how to recognize it, and how to identify patients at risk. A cervical pannus can be life threatening if not detected and treated properly.

There is no clear definition for cervical pannus. Some researchers think of it as the chronically inflamed synovial membrane in patients with rheumatoid arthritis (RA); others consider it as a specialized synovial membrane derived from vascular soft tissue structures at or near the bone synovial membrane.³ The pathogenesis for developing a pannus is not well understood, and little is known when a pannus begins or its initial location. A pannus formation can occur in any synovial joint in the body, such as wrists, metacarpophalangeal joint, proximal interphalangeal joint, and cervical joints.

A cervical pannus can cause serious complications. It can lead to a cervical subluxation in up to 4% of patients with RA, or it also can occur spontaneously in some patients without RA especially those with trauma or cancer.⁴

There are 2 suggested mechanisms by which the synovial membrane proliferates. It was originally believed that T cells from the chronic inflamed joint lead to the pannus formation by initiating an autoimmune reaction through the production of different cytokines against arthritogenic agents.^3-5 These cytokines increase inflammation by recruiting neutrophils and activating various kinds of macrophages that might lead to increased osteoclast activity.⁶ Osteoclastic activity can damage bone and allow the synovium to penetrate the bone, forming the pannus.

Another proposed mechanism is that the synovial cells hyperpolarize and hypertrophy automatically without T-cell help by expressing oncogenes and their proteins.³ In either case, angiogenesis follows this proliferation and increases the influx of inflammatory cells into the joints, which can lead to more destruction.⁷ This increase in blood supply to the synovial membrane is important in the growth of the pannus and can have a damaging effect to cartilage, bone, and joints.^4,7

Cervical pannus can progress in patients with prolonged use of corticosteroids.⁸ Because a pannus can put pressure on any segment of the cervical spine and the cranio-cervical junction leading to cervical instability, patients with this condition may present with a variety of clinical symptoms.⁹ The most frequently reported clinical features include neck pain, easy fatigability, difficulty walking, abnormal gait, increased clumsiness, and numbness and tingling in the arms. Patients also may complain of neck stiffness and decreased neck motion.¹⁰Cervical pannus is most frequently seen in patients with RA. However, patients without a RA diagnosis and incidental atlantoaxial pannus on cervical spine magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) are unlikely to have previously undiagnosed RA.¹¹

Case Presentation

A 70-year-old white woman presented to the neurology clinic at Gretna Medical Center in Virginia in December 2016 with constant headache and imbalance that started in September 2016. She characterized the pain as predominately pressure (6 on a 10-point pain scale) with occasional shooting pains. The pain started at the left occipital lobe and radiated toward the left temporal lobe and left eye. The patient also stated that it was very difficult to lay her head down on a pillow to sleep and that she had to use a recliner in order to sleep over the past 3 months. She reported that the headache felt slightly worse if she had a lot of repetitive head and neck movements during the day. There was no photophobia, phonophobia, nausea, vomiting, facial paresthesias, lacrimation, nasal congestion, confusion, or impaired speech.

The patient’s lack of balance, which resulted in an unsteady gait, had started 1 month before and had increased significantly in the past 2 to 3 weeks. She stated that the unsteady gait was associated with numbness in her right upper and lower extremities, although more intense in the right lower extremity. Aside from the headaches, paresthesia, and unsteady gait, the patient reported no other major symptoms. She did not smoke tobacco or drink alcohol. Her family history revealed that her brothers had heart disease.

The patient’s vital signs at physical examination included heart rate, 83 beats per minute; blood pressure, 159/75 mm hg; temporal temperature, 97.9 °F; and respiratory rate, 20 breaths per minute. The patient’s gait was unsteady, needing stabilization by holding on to her husband’s arm, slightly favoring right lower extremity. Finger-to-nose test, rapid alternating movements, heel-knee-shin testing were all normal. The Romberg sign was positive. The patient could rise on toes and heels with slight balance disturbance. Deep tendon reflexes and reflexes in the upper and lower extremities was symmetric 2+ bilaterally. Musculoskeletal examination revealed strength and tone in all major muscle groups and demonstrated symmetrical movements with no fasciculation noted. A rheumatologic evaluation showed no abnormalities, including inspection of hands, feet, major joints, and other range of motion, besides her neck. The rest of the physical, cognitive, and neurologic examination findings were otherwise unremarkable. A routine rheumatologic laboratory evaluation was negative.

A head computed tomography ordered before coming to the clinic showed normal results. An MRI of the head was obtained to evaluate for ischemic cause or structural abnormality (Figures 1 and 2). Given the patient’s presentation and the pattern seen on the MRI results, it was determined that large pannus posterior to the dens, severely narrowing the spinal canal, was most likely the diagnosis. A second opinion confirmed the diagnosis, and a second MRI revealed stabilization with no signs of enhancement.

The patient was advised to meet with a neurosurgeon to remove the pannus. The patient agreed on occiput to C2 posterior instrument arthrodesis as well as decompression. A plain film radiograph showed C2-occipital repair after surgery (Figure 3). The patient recovered in the neurosurgical intensive care unit, and the rest of the recovery was uncomplicated. She showed some improvement in her headaches and unsteady gait. A postoperative pathologic evaluation of tissue was not available. She was referred to a rheumatologist to rule out an autoimmune disease as the cause for this pannus, but no autoimmune disease was found.

Discussion

Cervical pannus is relatively uncommon in those without RA. However, there are multiple reasons that a patient could develop a cervical pannus. Cervical pannus in RA and cervical pannus without RA may mimic each other clinically, but medical management is distinctly different. Consequently, a rheumatology consult is necessary to ensure that there is no undiagnosed autoimmune disorder. Our patient did not have RA, and a neurosurgery intervention was needed to manage her headaches and unsteady gait. Although we could not isolate a cause of this patient’s cervical pannus development, we believed that nonintervention would adversely affect this patient.

The course of pannus progression can be fatal especially if left untreated.¹² MRI can detect a pannus and may be helpful for planning surgery.¹³ Surgical resection has been the treatment of choice for patients with neurologic symptoms.¹⁴ However, some cases have reported resolution of pannus associated with RA and other forms of chronic atlantoaxial instability only after posterior stabilization.¹⁴In order to manage pannus, cervical spine examination for the diagnosis of cervical involvement is encouraged to prevent morbidity and mortality.¹³ There are new data that demonstrated the potential of using retinoid X receptor agonists, such as bexarotene, as a treatment against the development and progression of pannus.¹⁴

Conclusions

We present a patient with cervical pannus disease without RA whose diagnosis was based on the pathognomonic pattern seen on MRI. She showed a clinically significant recovery with an occiput to C2 posterior instrument arthrodesis as well as decompression. She showed marked improvements in her headaches and unsteady gait. This case report highlights the importance of realizing cervical pannus as a disease found in patients without RA. It serves as an alert to clinicians for timely detection, diagnosis, and initiation of treatment to prevent mortality and long-term neurologic sequelae of cervical pannus.

Although further studies of early diagnosis and treatment for cervical pannus are warranted, we propose that including pannus in a differential diagnosis for patients with no RA could be lifesaving.

The pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is confronting the modern world like nothing else before. With over 20 million individuals expected to require hospitalization in the US, this health crisis may become a generation-defining moment for healthcare systems and the field of hospital medicine.¹ The specific challenges facing hospital medicine are comparable to running a sprint and a marathon—at the same time. For the sprint underway, hospitalists must learn to respond to a rapidly changing environment in which critical decisions are made within hours and days. At the same time, hospitalists need to plan for the marathon of increased clinical needs over the coming months, the possibility of burnout, and concerns about staff well-­being. Although runners typically focus on either the sprint or the marathon, healthcare systems and hospital medicine providers will need to simultaneously prepare for both types of races.

Over the past several weeks, hospital medicine leaders have been rapidly responding to an evolving crisis. Leaders and clinicians are quickly learning how to restructure clinical operations, negotiate the short supply of personal protective equipment (PPE), and manage delays in COVID-19 testing. In these areas, our hospitalist group has experienced a steep learning curve. In addition to the strategies outlined in the Table, we will share here our experiences and insights on managing and preparing for the COVID-19 pandemic.

Communication Is Central

During the sprint, focused, regular communication is imperative to ameliorate anxiety and fear. A study of crisis communication after 9/11 found that, for employees, good communication from leadership was one of the most valued factors.² Communications experts also note that, in times of crisis, leaders have a special role in communication, specifically around demystifying the situation, providing hope, and maintaining transparency.³

Mental bandwidth may be limited in a stressful environment, so efforts should be taken to maximize the value of each communication. Information on hospital metrics should be provided regularly, including the number of COVID-19 cases, the status of clinical services and staffing, hospital capacity, and resource availability.⁴ Although the ubiquity and ease of email is convenient, recognize that providers are likely receiving email updates from multiple layers within your healthcare organization. To guard against losing important information, we use the same templated format for daily email updates with changes highlighted, which allows busy clinicians to digest pertinent information easily.⁵ Finally, consider having a single individual be responsible for collating COVID-19–related emails sent to your group. Although clinicians may want to share the most recent studies or their clinical experiences with a group email, instead have them send this information to a single individual who can organize these materials and share them on a regular basis.

To keep two-way communication channels open in a busy, asynchronous environment, consider having a centralized shared document in which providers can give real-time feedback to capture on-the-ground experiences or share questions they would like answered. Within our group, we found that centralizing our conversation in a shared document eliminated redundancy, focused our meetings, and kept everyone up to date. Additionally, regularly scheduled meetings may need to be adapted to a remote format (eg, Zoom, WebEx) as clinicians are asked to work from home when not on clinical service. Finally, recognize that virtual meetings require a different skill set than that required by in-person meetings, including reestablishment of social norms and technology preparation.⁶

Optimize Your Staffing

Hospital volumes could increase to as high as 270% of current hospital bed capacities during this pandemic.¹ This surge is further complicated by the effort involved in caring for these patients, given their increased medical complexity, the use of new protocols, and the extra time needed to update staff and family. As the workload intensifies, staffing models and operations will also need to adapt.

First, optimize your inpatient resources based on the changes your hospital system is making. For instance, as elective surgeries were cancelled, we dissolved our surgical comanagement and consult services to better accommodate our hospitals’ needs. Further, consider using advanced practice providers (eg, physician assistants and nurse practitioners) released from their clinical duties to help with inpatient care in the event of a surge. If your hospital has trainees (eg, residents or fellows), consider reassigning those whose rotations have been postponed to newly created inpatient teams; trainees often have strong institutional knowledge and understanding of hospital protocols and resources.

Second, use hospitalists for their most relevant skills. Hospitalists are pluripotent clinicians who are comfortable with high-­acuity patients and can fit into a myriad of clinical positions. The initial instinct at our institution was to mobilize hospitalists across all areas of increasing needs in the hospital (eg, screening clinics,⁷ advice phone lines for patients, or in the Emergency Department), but we quickly recognized that the hospitalist group is a finite resource. We focused our hospitalists’ clinical work on the expanding inpatient needs and allowed other outpatient or procedure-based specialties that have less inpatient experience to fill the broader institutional gaps.

Finally, consider long-term implications of staffing decisions. Leaders are making challenging coverage decisions that can affect the morale and autonomy of staff. Does backup staffing happen on a volunteer basis? Who fills the need—those with less clinical time or those with fewer personal obligations? When a staffing model is challenged and your group is making such decisions, engaged communication again becomes paramount.

Experts believe that we are only at the beginning of this crisis, one for which we don’t know what the end looks like or when it will come. With this in mind, hospital medicine leadership must plan for the long-term implications of the lengthy race ahead. Recognizing that morale, motivation, and burnout will be issues to deal with on the horizon, a focus on sustainability and wellness will become increasingly important as the marathon continues. To date, we’ve found the following principles to be helpful.

Delegate Responsibilities

Hospitals will not be able to survive COVID-19 through the efforts of single individuals. Instead, consider creating “operational champion” roles for frontline clinicians. These individuals can lead in specific areas (eg, PPE, updates on COVID-19 testing, discharge protocols) and act as conduits for information, updates, and resources for your group. At our institution, such operational meetings and activities take hours out of each day. By creating a breadth of leadership roles, our group has spread the operational workload while still allowing clinicians to care for patients, avoid burnout, and build autonomy and opportunities for both personal and professional growth. While for most institutions, these positions are temporary and not compensated with salary or time, the contribution to the group should be recognized both now and in the future.

Focus on Wellness

Providers are battling a laundry list of both clinical and personal stressors. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has already recognized that stress and mental health are going to be large hurdles for both patients and providers during this crisis.⁸ From the beginning, hospitalist leadership should be attuned to physician wellness and be aware that burnout, mental and physical exhaustion, and the possibility of contracting COVID-19 will be issues in the coming weeks and months. Volunteerism is built into the physician’s work ethic, but we must be mindful about its cost for long-term staffing demands. In addition, scarce medical resources add an additional moral strain for clinicians as they face tough allocation decisions, as we’ve seen with our Italian colleagues.⁹

As regular meetings around COVID-19 have become commonplace, we’ve made sure to set aside defined time for staff to discuss and reflect on their experiences. Doing so has allowed our clinicians to feel heard and to acknowledge the difficulties they are facing in their clinical duties. Leaders should also consider frequent check-ins with individual providers. At our institution, the first positive COVID-19 patient did not radically change any protocol that was in place, but a check-in with the hospitalist on service that day proved helpful for a debrief and processing opportunity. Individual conversations can help those on the front lines feel supported and remind them they are not operating alone in an anonymous vacuum.

Continue by celebrating small victories because this marathon is not going to end with an obvious finish line or a singular moment in which everyone can rejoice. A negative test, a patient with a good outcome, and a donation of PPE are all opportunities to celebrate. It may be what keeps us going when there is no end in sight. We have relied on these celebrations and moments of levity as an integral part of our regular group meetings.

At the end of this pandemic, just as we hope that our social distancing feels like an overreaction, we similarly hope that our sprint to build capacity ends up being unnecessary as well. As we wrote this Perspectives piece, uncertainty about the extent, length, and impact of this pandemic still existed. By the time it is published it may be that the sprint is over, and the marathon is beginning. Or, if our wildest hopes come true, there will be no marathon to run at all.

The pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is confronting the modern world like nothing else before. With over 20 million individuals expected to require hospitalization in the US, this health crisis may become a generation-defining moment for healthcare systems and the field of hospital medicine.¹ The specific challenges facing hospital medicine are comparable to running a sprint and a marathon—at the same time. For the sprint underway, hospitalists must learn to respond to a rapidly changing environment in which critical decisions are made within hours and days. At the same time, hospitalists need to plan for the marathon of increased clinical needs over the coming months, the possibility of burnout, and concerns about staff well-­being. Although runners typically focus on either the sprint or the marathon, healthcare systems and hospital medicine providers will need to simultaneously prepare for both types of races.

Over the past several weeks, hospital medicine leaders have been rapidly responding to an evolving crisis. Leaders and clinicians are quickly learning how to restructure clinical operations, negotiate the short supply of personal protective equipment (PPE), and manage delays in COVID-19 testing. In these areas, our hospitalist group has experienced a steep learning curve. In addition to the strategies outlined in the Table, we will share here our experiences and insights on managing and preparing for the COVID-19 pandemic.

Communication Is Central

During the sprint, focused, regular communication is imperative to ameliorate anxiety and fear. A study of crisis communication after 9/11 found that, for employees, good communication from leadership was one of the most valued factors.² Communications experts also note that, in times of crisis, leaders have a special role in communication, specifically around demystifying the situation, providing hope, and maintaining transparency.³

Mental bandwidth may be limited in a stressful environment, so efforts should be taken to maximize the value of each communication. Information on hospital metrics should be provided regularly, including the number of COVID-19 cases, the status of clinical services and staffing, hospital capacity, and resource availability.⁴ Although the ubiquity and ease of email is convenient, recognize that providers are likely receiving email updates from multiple layers within your healthcare organization. To guard against losing important information, we use the same templated format for daily email updates with changes highlighted, which allows busy clinicians to digest pertinent information easily.⁵ Finally, consider having a single individual be responsible for collating COVID-19–related emails sent to your group. Although clinicians may want to share the most recent studies or their clinical experiences with a group email, instead have them send this information to a single individual who can organize these materials and share them on a regular basis.

To keep two-way communication channels open in a busy, asynchronous environment, consider having a centralized shared document in which providers can give real-time feedback to capture on-the-ground experiences or share questions they would like answered. Within our group, we found that centralizing our conversation in a shared document eliminated redundancy, focused our meetings, and kept everyone up to date. Additionally, regularly scheduled meetings may need to be adapted to a remote format (eg, Zoom, WebEx) as clinicians are asked to work from home when not on clinical service. Finally, recognize that virtual meetings require a different skill set than that required by in-person meetings, including reestablishment of social norms and technology preparation.⁶

Optimize Your Staffing

Hospital volumes could increase to as high as 270% of current hospital bed capacities during this pandemic.¹ This surge is further complicated by the effort involved in caring for these patients, given their increased medical complexity, the use of new protocols, and the extra time needed to update staff and family. As the workload intensifies, staffing models and operations will also need to adapt.

First, optimize your inpatient resources based on the changes your hospital system is making. For instance, as elective surgeries were cancelled, we dissolved our surgical comanagement and consult services to better accommodate our hospitals’ needs. Further, consider using advanced practice providers (eg, physician assistants and nurse practitioners) released from their clinical duties to help with inpatient care in the event of a surge. If your hospital has trainees (eg, residents or fellows), consider reassigning those whose rotations have been postponed to newly created inpatient teams; trainees often have strong institutional knowledge and understanding of hospital protocols and resources.

Second, use hospitalists for their most relevant skills. Hospitalists are pluripotent clinicians who are comfortable with high-­acuity patients and can fit into a myriad of clinical positions. The initial instinct at our institution was to mobilize hospitalists across all areas of increasing needs in the hospital (eg, screening clinics,⁷ advice phone lines for patients, or in the Emergency Department), but we quickly recognized that the hospitalist group is a finite resource. We focused our hospitalists’ clinical work on the expanding inpatient needs and allowed other outpatient or procedure-based specialties that have less inpatient experience to fill the broader institutional gaps.

Finally, consider long-term implications of staffing decisions. Leaders are making challenging coverage decisions that can affect the morale and autonomy of staff. Does backup staffing happen on a volunteer basis? Who fills the need—those with less clinical time or those with fewer personal obligations? When a staffing model is challenged and your group is making such decisions, engaged communication again becomes paramount.

Experts believe that we are only at the beginning of this crisis, one for which we don’t know what the end looks like or when it will come. With this in mind, hospital medicine leadership must plan for the long-term implications of the lengthy race ahead. Recognizing that morale, motivation, and burnout will be issues to deal with on the horizon, a focus on sustainability and wellness will become increasingly important as the marathon continues. To date, we’ve found the following principles to be helpful.

Delegate Responsibilities

Hospitals will not be able to survive COVID-19 through the efforts of single individuals. Instead, consider creating “operational champion” roles for frontline clinicians. These individuals can lead in specific areas (eg, PPE, updates on COVID-19 testing, discharge protocols) and act as conduits for information, updates, and resources for your group. At our institution, such operational meetings and activities take hours out of each day. By creating a breadth of leadership roles, our group has spread the operational workload while still allowing clinicians to care for patients, avoid burnout, and build autonomy and opportunities for both personal and professional growth. While for most institutions, these positions are temporary and not compensated with salary or time, the contribution to the group should be recognized both now and in the future.

Focus on Wellness

Providers are battling a laundry list of both clinical and personal stressors. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has already recognized that stress and mental health are going to be large hurdles for both patients and providers during this crisis.⁸ From the beginning, hospitalist leadership should be attuned to physician wellness and be aware that burnout, mental and physical exhaustion, and the possibility of contracting COVID-19 will be issues in the coming weeks and months. Volunteerism is built into the physician’s work ethic, but we must be mindful about its cost for long-term staffing demands. In addition, scarce medical resources add an additional moral strain for clinicians as they face tough allocation decisions, as we’ve seen with our Italian colleagues.⁹

As regular meetings around COVID-19 have become commonplace, we’ve made sure to set aside defined time for staff to discuss and reflect on their experiences. Doing so has allowed our clinicians to feel heard and to acknowledge the difficulties they are facing in their clinical duties. Leaders should also consider frequent check-ins with individual providers. At our institution, the first positive COVID-19 patient did not radically change any protocol that was in place, but a check-in with the hospitalist on service that day proved helpful for a debrief and processing opportunity. Individual conversations can help those on the front lines feel supported and remind them they are not operating alone in an anonymous vacuum.

Continue by celebrating small victories because this marathon is not going to end with an obvious finish line or a singular moment in which everyone can rejoice. A negative test, a patient with a good outcome, and a donation of PPE are all opportunities to celebrate. It may be what keeps us going when there is no end in sight. We have relied on these celebrations and moments of levity as an integral part of our regular group meetings.

At the end of this pandemic, just as we hope that our social distancing feels like an overreaction, we similarly hope that our sprint to build capacity ends up being unnecessary as well. As we wrote this Perspectives piece, uncertainty about the extent, length, and impact of this pandemic still existed. By the time it is published it may be that the sprint is over, and the marathon is beginning. Or, if our wildest hopes come true, there will be no marathon to run at all.

The pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is confronting the modern world like nothing else before. With over 20 million individuals expected to require hospitalization in the US, this health crisis may become a generation-defining moment for healthcare systems and the field of hospital medicine.¹ The specific challenges facing hospital medicine are comparable to running a sprint and a marathon—at the same time. For the sprint underway, hospitalists must learn to respond to a rapidly changing environment in which critical decisions are made within hours and days. At the same time, hospitalists need to plan for the marathon of increased clinical needs over the coming months, the possibility of burnout, and concerns about staff well-­being. Although runners typically focus on either the sprint or the marathon, healthcare systems and hospital medicine providers will need to simultaneously prepare for both types of races.

Over the past several weeks, hospital medicine leaders have been rapidly responding to an evolving crisis. Leaders and clinicians are quickly learning how to restructure clinical operations, negotiate the short supply of personal protective equipment (PPE), and manage delays in COVID-19 testing. In these areas, our hospitalist group has experienced a steep learning curve. In addition to the strategies outlined in the Table, we will share here our experiences and insights on managing and preparing for the COVID-19 pandemic.

Communication Is Central

During the sprint, focused, regular communication is imperative to ameliorate anxiety and fear. A study of crisis communication after 9/11 found that, for employees, good communication from leadership was one of the most valued factors.² Communications experts also note that, in times of crisis, leaders have a special role in communication, specifically around demystifying the situation, providing hope, and maintaining transparency.³

Mental bandwidth may be limited in a stressful environment, so efforts should be taken to maximize the value of each communication. Information on hospital metrics should be provided regularly, including the number of COVID-19 cases, the status of clinical services and staffing, hospital capacity, and resource availability.⁴ Although the ubiquity and ease of email is convenient, recognize that providers are likely receiving email updates from multiple layers within your healthcare organization. To guard against losing important information, we use the same templated format for daily email updates with changes highlighted, which allows busy clinicians to digest pertinent information easily.⁵ Finally, consider having a single individual be responsible for collating COVID-19–related emails sent to your group. Although clinicians may want to share the most recent studies or their clinical experiences with a group email, instead have them send this information to a single individual who can organize these materials and share them on a regular basis.

To keep two-way communication channels open in a busy, asynchronous environment, consider having a centralized shared document in which providers can give real-time feedback to capture on-the-ground experiences or share questions they would like answered. Within our group, we found that centralizing our conversation in a shared document eliminated redundancy, focused our meetings, and kept everyone up to date. Additionally, regularly scheduled meetings may need to be adapted to a remote format (eg, Zoom, WebEx) as clinicians are asked to work from home when not on clinical service. Finally, recognize that virtual meetings require a different skill set than that required by in-person meetings, including reestablishment of social norms and technology preparation.⁶

Optimize Your Staffing

Hospital volumes could increase to as high as 270% of current hospital bed capacities during this pandemic.¹ This surge is further complicated by the effort involved in caring for these patients, given their increased medical complexity, the use of new protocols, and the extra time needed to update staff and family. As the workload intensifies, staffing models and operations will also need to adapt.

First, optimize your inpatient resources based on the changes your hospital system is making. For instance, as elective surgeries were cancelled, we dissolved our surgical comanagement and consult services to better accommodate our hospitals’ needs. Further, consider using advanced practice providers (eg, physician assistants and nurse practitioners) released from their clinical duties to help with inpatient care in the event of a surge. If your hospital has trainees (eg, residents or fellows), consider reassigning those whose rotations have been postponed to newly created inpatient teams; trainees often have strong institutional knowledge and understanding of hospital protocols and resources.

Second, use hospitalists for their most relevant skills. Hospitalists are pluripotent clinicians who are comfortable with high-­acuity patients and can fit into a myriad of clinical positions. The initial instinct at our institution was to mobilize hospitalists across all areas of increasing needs in the hospital (eg, screening clinics,⁷ advice phone lines for patients, or in the Emergency Department), but we quickly recognized that the hospitalist group is a finite resource. We focused our hospitalists’ clinical work on the expanding inpatient needs and allowed other outpatient or procedure-based specialties that have less inpatient experience to fill the broader institutional gaps.

Finally, consider long-term implications of staffing decisions. Leaders are making challenging coverage decisions that can affect the morale and autonomy of staff. Does backup staffing happen on a volunteer basis? Who fills the need—those with less clinical time or those with fewer personal obligations? When a staffing model is challenged and your group is making such decisions, engaged communication again becomes paramount.

Experts believe that we are only at the beginning of this crisis, one for which we don’t know what the end looks like or when it will come. With this in mind, hospital medicine leadership must plan for the long-term implications of the lengthy race ahead. Recognizing that morale, motivation, and burnout will be issues to deal with on the horizon, a focus on sustainability and wellness will become increasingly important as the marathon continues. To date, we’ve found the following principles to be helpful.

Delegate Responsibilities

Hospitals will not be able to survive COVID-19 through the efforts of single individuals. Instead, consider creating “operational champion” roles for frontline clinicians. These individuals can lead in specific areas (eg, PPE, updates on COVID-19 testing, discharge protocols) and act as conduits for information, updates, and resources for your group. At our institution, such operational meetings and activities take hours out of each day. By creating a breadth of leadership roles, our group has spread the operational workload while still allowing clinicians to care for patients, avoid burnout, and build autonomy and opportunities for both personal and professional growth. While for most institutions, these positions are temporary and not compensated with salary or time, the contribution to the group should be recognized both now and in the future.

Focus on Wellness

Providers are battling a laundry list of both clinical and personal stressors. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has already recognized that stress and mental health are going to be large hurdles for both patients and providers during this crisis.⁸ From the beginning, hospitalist leadership should be attuned to physician wellness and be aware that burnout, mental and physical exhaustion, and the possibility of contracting COVID-19 will be issues in the coming weeks and months. Volunteerism is built into the physician’s work ethic, but we must be mindful about its cost for long-term staffing demands. In addition, scarce medical resources add an additional moral strain for clinicians as they face tough allocation decisions, as we’ve seen with our Italian colleagues.⁹

As regular meetings around COVID-19 have become commonplace, we’ve made sure to set aside defined time for staff to discuss and reflect on their experiences. Doing so has allowed our clinicians to feel heard and to acknowledge the difficulties they are facing in their clinical duties. Leaders should also consider frequent check-ins with individual providers. At our institution, the first positive COVID-19 patient did not radically change any protocol that was in place, but a check-in with the hospitalist on service that day proved helpful for a debrief and processing opportunity. Individual conversations can help those on the front lines feel supported and remind them they are not operating alone in an anonymous vacuum.

Continue by celebrating small victories because this marathon is not going to end with an obvious finish line or a singular moment in which everyone can rejoice. A negative test, a patient with a good outcome, and a donation of PPE are all opportunities to celebrate. It may be what keeps us going when there is no end in sight. We have relied on these celebrations and moments of levity as an integral part of our regular group meetings.

At the end of this pandemic, just as we hope that our social distancing feels like an overreaction, we similarly hope that our sprint to build capacity ends up being unnecessary as well. As we wrote this Perspectives piece, uncertainty about the extent, length, and impact of this pandemic still existed. By the time it is published it may be that the sprint is over, and the marathon is beginning. Or, if our wildest hopes come true, there will be no marathon to run at all.

Chronic pain is a worldwide cause of impairment. According to data from the 2016 National Health Interview Survey, an estimated 50 million American adults suffer from chronic pain, with 19.6 million adults suffering from high-impact chronic pain.¹ This phenomenon is particularly prevalent in the older population. More than 25% of adults aged 65 to 74 years reported that they were often in pain in the past 3 months compared with just 10% of those adults between the ages of 18 and 44 years.²

The economic burdens of chronic pain disorders are well known. In 2010, Gaskin and Richard found that chronic pain has far-reaching consequences for the US economy, ranging from direct health care costs to lost productivity. This study estimated additional health care costs at about $300 billion yearly and lost productivity at $300 billion, bringing total annual costs to about $600 billion. This expense is more than heart disease alone ($309 billion), and cancer and diabetes mellitus ($243 billion and $188 billion respectively) combined.³

Opioid medications are powerful and effective pain-reducing agents that are indicated for short-term acute pain or long-term in the management of chronic, severe cancer-related pain.⁴ Although efficacious, use of these medications carries with it the inherent risks of abuse, misuse, addiction, and overdose.⁵ Since 1999, opioid-related overdose deaths have been on the rise. The CDC estimated that > 15,000 deaths were attributable specifically to prescription opioids in 2015.⁶ The estimates had risen to > 17,000 deaths in 2017, with the number increasing since that time.⁷ Cumulatively, the CDC estimates that > 200,000 deaths in the US between 1999 and 2017 are attributed to prescription opioid overdose, clearly marking this trend as a growing nationwide epidemic.⁸

In 2016, Florence and colleagues estimated costs associated with opioid overdose to be just shy of $80 billion in 2013 dollars.⁹ In October 2017, the US Department of Health and Human Services declared the opioid epidemic a public health emergency and committed $900 million to combating the crisis.¹⁰

An abundance of data exist analyzing outpatient prescribing and its impacts on opioid dependence, particularly postoperatively. A study by Brummett and colleagues indicated that the incidence of new persistent opioid use in patients who underwent surgery was 5.9% to 6.5% and did not differ between major and minor surgical procedures. This study concluded that new opioid use could be considered one of the most common complications after elective surgery.¹¹ Similarly, in 2017 Makary and colleagues found that surgeons tend to overprescribe pain medications after procedures; some prescribing as many as 50 to 60 tablets to control pain after simple procedures.¹² This is in stark contrast to pain guideline recommendations of no more than 10 tablets for most standard operative procedures.¹³

Sun and colleagues conducted a retrospective analysis of health care claims data in more than 18 million opioid-naïve patients who did and did not undergo surgery. Seven of the 11 surgical procedures were associated with an increased risk of chronic opioid use. The highest incidence of chronic opioid use in the first postoperative year was for total hip arthroplasty (1.4%, OR 5.10; 95% CI, 1.29-1.53). The study found that the risk factors most associated with chronic opioid use after surgery were male sex, aged > 50 years, and preoperative history of drug abuse, alcohol abuse, or depression, along with benzodiazepine use or antidepressant use.¹⁴ In a 2018 cohort study that evaluated predictors associated with transitioning to incident chronic opioid therapy, 4 factors were identified. These included opioid duration of action (adjusted odds ratio [AOR], 12.28; 95% CI, 8.1-06-18.72), the parent opioid compound (eg, tramadol vs codeine; AOR, 7.26; 95% CI, 5.20-10.13), the presence of conditions that are very likely to cause chronic pain (AOR, 5.47; 95% CI, 3.89-7.68), and drug use disorders (AOR, 4.02; 95% CI, 2.53-6.40).¹⁵

While there has been research into outpatient risk factors and medical practices that may contribute to chronic opioid use, a relative paucity of data exists on the contribution of hospitalization and inpatient opioid use on patient outcomes. A 2014 Canadian study assessed the impact of opioid use in the intensive care unit (ICU) on opioid use after discharge.¹⁶ This study included more than 2,500 patients who were admitted to a Canadian ICU between 2005 and 2008, and then followed after discharge for 48 months to quantify chronic opioid use. Nonopioid users increased from 87.8% in the early post-ICU period to 95.6% at 48 months after discharge. Preadmission chronic opioid use and prolonged hospital length of stay (LOS) were found to be associated with an increased risk of chronic opioid use after discharge.¹⁶ To date, there are no published studies that analyze the incidence of opioid-naïve veterans who convert to chronic opioid use after receiving opioids during an acute hospitalization.

In this retrospective analysis, we analyze the incidence of chronic opioid use after administration of opioids in the ICU as well as a variety of risk factors that may influence conversion to chronic opioid use.

Methods

This analysis was a single center, retrospective chart review conducted for patients admitted between July 1, 2017 and December 31, 2017 at the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Michael E. DeBakey VA Medical Center (MEDVAMC) in Houston, Texas. MEDVAMC is a 538-bed academic\teaching hospital serving about 130,000 veterans in Southeast Texas. The hospital has 3 ICUs (medical, cardiovascular, and surgical) and 38 total ICU beds. The study was approved by the Baylor College of Medicine Institutional Review Board and MEDVAMC Research and Development Review Board. Informed consent was not required.

Inclusion criteria consisted of patients aged ≥ 18 years admitted to the ICU in the above-specified time frame, who were administered a continuous infusion of an opioid for at least 12 hours. Patients were excluded if they were not opioid naïve prior to admission, defined as receiving > 30 days of opioids in the prior 12 months. Patients who died during hospital admission, never received an opioid despite having an active order, were hospital-to-hospital transfers, or were still admitted at the time of data collection were excluded from the analysis.

All pertinent data were collected using the VA Computerized Patient Record System (CPRS) and the Critical Care Manager (Picis Clinical Solutions) ICU monitoring application. Critical Care Manager was used to track the time frame, duration, and amounts of opioid infusions administered in the ICU. Patient demographic and preadmission data, including date of birth, age, race, history of substance use/alcohol use disorder (defined as a previous diagnosis) and previous opioid prescriptions within the past year were recorded. For the inpatient admission, the ICU LOS, hospital LOS, primary admission diagnosis, type of opioid medication administered, and total duration and dose of opioid administered were collected. After discharge, opioid medication fill data at 3, 6, and 12 months were collected. This information included names of any outpatient opioids filled, dosage unit, quantity, day supply, and number of refills.

The primary outcome for this study was to determine the incidence of chronic opioid use at 3, 6, and 12 months after discharge, defined as the percentage of patients receiving outpatient opioid prescriptions at each time point. Analyses were conducted to observe the effect of age, race, history of substance use or history of alcohol use (International Classification of Diseases documented diagnosis, 9th edition), ICU type (medical, surgical, or cardiovascular), surgical/nonsurgical admission, ICU LOS, hospital LOS, total time, and amount of opioids administered during admission on risk of conversion to chronic opioid use.

Descriptive statistics were calculated to analyze the incidence of chronic opioid use. Univariate logistic regression analysis, including ORs, 95% CIs, and P values, was conducted to determine the effects of the risk factors noted earlier on chronic opioid use at each time point. A multivariate logistic regression model was performed to assess the effect of multiple independent variables on opioid use at 3, 6, and 12 months. Statistical analysis was performed using StataCorp Stata SE.

Results

During the study period, 330 patients were admitted to the ICU. After applying inclusion/exclusion criteria, 118 patients were included in the final analysis. The most frequent reasons for exclusion from the study were patient death (n = 77), a past history of opioid use (n = 56), and not having received an opioid infusion for at least 12 hours (n = 68). The average age of the patients included was 67 years (Table 1). A total of 14% and 9% of patients, respectively, had a diagnosis of alcohol use disorder or substance use disorder recorded in CPRS. After admission, the most common location for these patients was the surgical ICU (65%). All patients were male. The average hospital LOS was 18.6 days , and the ICU LOS was 8.3 days. The average duration of administration for the opioid (fentanyl) infusion was 63 hours, and the average amount of fentanyl administered to each patient was 57.1 mcg/h.

The incidence of opioid-naïve patients receiving opioids after discharge was 76.3% (n = 90) at 3 months, 19.5% (n = 23) at 6 months and 7.6% (n = 9) at 12 months (Figure). The daily morphine milligram equivalent (MME) of patients prescribed opioids at 3, 6, and 12 months was similar (3 months, 22.7; 6 months, 19.7; 12 months, 20.9). In the univariate regression analysis, several variables were found to be associated with converting to chronic opioid use. Prior history of alcohol use disorder (OR, 0.3; 95% CI, 0.10-0.88; P = .03), ICU type (OR, 3.9; 95% CI, 1.73-8.75; P = .001) and ICU LOS (OR, 0.88; 95% CI, 0.81-0.95; P = .01) had a statistically significant association on opioid use at 3 months. (Table 2). No variables evaluated had a statistically significant effect on chronic opioid use at 6 months, and only age (OR 0.93; 95% CI. 0.87-0.99; P = .02) was statistically significant at 12 months. In the multivariate logistic regression analysis, history of alcohol abuse, admission for surgery, and hospital LOS were significant at 3 months (Table 3).

Discussion

In this single-center analysis conducted at a VA academic hospital of opioid-naïve patients who were administered opioids in the ICU, the incidence of patients subsequently receiving outpatient opioid prescriptions at 12 months after discharge was 7.6%. There also was a decrease in the amount of opioids received by patients (daily MME) after discharge at 3, 6, and 12 months. This trend did not demonstrate the propensity for inpatient opioid use to convert opioid-naïve patients to chronic opioid users.

The most common outpatient opioids prescribed were hydrocodone/acetaminophen, morphine, and tramadol. Logistic regression showed few factors that correlated significantly with opioid use in the long-term (12 month) period. This finding is a deviation from the findings of Yaffe and colleagues who found hospital LOS to be one of the only predictors of long-term opioid use in their population (defined as use at 48 months).¹⁶ One important difference between our study and the Yaffe and colleagues study was that they evaluated all patients who were admitted to the ICU, regardless of the exposure to opioids during their inpatient stay. Consequently, this difference may have resulted in the differences in findings.

Strengths and Limitations

Location was a strength of our study, as this analysis was conducted at an integrated health care system that provides comprehensive inpatient and outpatient care. The VA uses a closed electronic health record, which allowed patients to be followed both in the inpatient and outpatient settings to determine which medications were prescribed at each time. In other health care systems this information would have been difficult to follow as patients often fill outpatient prescriptions at community pharmacies not affiliated with the treating hospital. However, any patient not using a VA prescriber for subsequent opioid prescriptions or patients who received opioids through other sources would not have had their continued opioid use captured. These data may be available in the states prescription monitoring program, but it was not available to query for research at this time.

This study also excluded chronic opioid users, which could have been another confounding factor to account for when analyzing the results. However, the primary objective of the study was to determine the impact of opioids prescribed in the ICU on converting previous opioid-naïve patients to chronic users. Finally, a multivariate logistic regression was incorporated to assess for factors that may predispose certain patients to convert to chronic opioid users. This analysis served to extend the applicability of our study by not only analyzing whether receiving opioids in the ICU contributed to chronic opioid use in the long-term, but also which populations may be at greatest risk. This information can be used in the future to target harm-reduction efforts toward high-risk hospitalized patients.

One limitation of this study was that it was conducted as a retrospective, single-center chart review in Houston, Texas. Because this was not a randomized controlled trial, it is difficult to imply any causation between exposure to opioids in the ICU and chronic use. In addition, because this study was conducted at a single site, the results may not be able to be generalized to other populations. VA populations tend to be elderly and predominantly male, as was reflected by the study population. These factors, along with regional variability in patient characteristics, may limit the generalizability of this study to older male patients located in Southeast Texas or other similar populations. Other limitations of this study also included the small sample size, limited period of follow-up obtained, and that other comorbidity information (pain scores during stay, use of nonopioid pain medications, past history of anxiety or depression, or other acute illnesses or surgeries that may have required opioid therapy during admission) was not collected.

This study was only able to review 118 patients for a follow-up duration of 1 year. In the Yaffe and colleagues study, more than 2,500 patients were followed over 4 years, which provided a more long-term overview of the clinical course of these patients and may be another reason for discrepant findings. However, this study did not actually assess the impact on administration of opioids on the development of chronic opioid use.¹⁶ Finally, the biggest limitation to this study may be the potential for confounding discharge prescriptions. After discharge, patients’ prescriptions were evaluated from discharge to 3 months, in between 3 and 6 months, and between 6 and 12 months for the presence of an opioid prescription. Due to this methodology, any opioid prescription a patient was discharged with was counted in the 3-month time point. Since many patients included in the study were admitted to the surgical ICU (65%), it was logical that they were discharged with opioids after their procedure. While including the immediate postdischarge prescription data was useful for evaluating the decrease in opioid use and incidence over time, it did cause the 3-month time point to appear overly inflated, potentially signaling that at 3 months after discharge many of these patients were still requiring opioid use.

The Society of Critical Care Medicine still recommends opioids as first-line therapy for non-neuropathic pain in the ICU setting.¹⁷ Additionally, postoperative pain can be difficult to manage in the surgical population and is often treated with opioids, though treatment with multimodal pain regimens is becoming more common.¹⁸ It is difficult to imagine that a finding that implicates opioid use in the hospital with conversion to chronic opioid use would prompt a cessation in the use of opioid in these settings, especially in the context of analgosedation related to mechanically ventilated patients. However, it would be plausible to use this knowledge to advocate for opioid-sparing therapies and consideration for weaning individuals at high risk for misuse after discharge from opioid-containing sedation or analgesia regimens in a timelier manner.

Though our findings did not show a clinically relevant increase in chronic opioid users, clinicians can still use this information to encourage targeted education and closer monitoring for those patients deemed as high risk at discharge to prevent unnecessary prolonged opioid use. By having more frequent follow-up in pain clinics, switching patients to nonopioid therapies after discharge, and ensuring high-risk patients are discharged with naloxone rescue kits, it would be possible to drastically reduce the number of potential overdoses for patients who previously required opioid therapy in the ICU.

Conclusion

After discharge, 7.6% of previously opioid-naïve patients who were treated with opioids in the ICU were still receiving prescriptions for opioids at 12 months. These findings did not suggest a clinically significant increase in the incidence of chronic opioid use after inpatient administration of opioids. However, these results prompt the need for larger, prospective, multicenter studies to evaluate the effect on hospitalization on converting to chronic opioid use and a deeper evaluation of other potential risk factors that may be present.

Chronic pain is a worldwide cause of impairment. According to data from the 2016 National Health Interview Survey, an estimated 50 million American adults suffer from chronic pain, with 19.6 million adults suffering from high-impact chronic pain.¹ This phenomenon is particularly prevalent in the older population. More than 25% of adults aged 65 to 74 years reported that they were often in pain in the past 3 months compared with just 10% of those adults between the ages of 18 and 44 years.²

The economic burdens of chronic pain disorders are well known. In 2010, Gaskin and Richard found that chronic pain has far-reaching consequences for the US economy, ranging from direct health care costs to lost productivity. This study estimated additional health care costs at about $300 billion yearly and lost productivity at $300 billion, bringing total annual costs to about $600 billion. This expense is more than heart disease alone ($309 billion), and cancer and diabetes mellitus ($243 billion and $188 billion respectively) combined.³

Opioid medications are powerful and effective pain-reducing agents that are indicated for short-term acute pain or long-term in the management of chronic, severe cancer-related pain.⁴ Although efficacious, use of these medications carries with it the inherent risks of abuse, misuse, addiction, and overdose.⁵ Since 1999, opioid-related overdose deaths have been on the rise. The CDC estimated that > 15,000 deaths were attributable specifically to prescription opioids in 2015.⁶ The estimates had risen to > 17,000 deaths in 2017, with the number increasing since that time.⁷ Cumulatively, the CDC estimates that > 200,000 deaths in the US between 1999 and 2017 are attributed to prescription opioid overdose, clearly marking this trend as a growing nationwide epidemic.⁸

In 2016, Florence and colleagues estimated costs associated with opioid overdose to be just shy of $80 billion in 2013 dollars.⁹ In October 2017, the US Department of Health and Human Services declared the opioid epidemic a public health emergency and committed $900 million to combating the crisis.¹⁰

An abundance of data exist analyzing outpatient prescribing and its impacts on opioid dependence, particularly postoperatively. A study by Brummett and colleagues indicated that the incidence of new persistent opioid use in patients who underwent surgery was 5.9% to 6.5% and did not differ between major and minor surgical procedures. This study concluded that new opioid use could be considered one of the most common complications after elective surgery.¹¹ Similarly, in 2017 Makary and colleagues found that surgeons tend to overprescribe pain medications after procedures; some prescribing as many as 50 to 60 tablets to control pain after simple procedures.¹² This is in stark contrast to pain guideline recommendations of no more than 10 tablets for most standard operative procedures.¹³

Sun and colleagues conducted a retrospective analysis of health care claims data in more than 18 million opioid-naïve patients who did and did not undergo surgery. Seven of the 11 surgical procedures were associated with an increased risk of chronic opioid use. The highest incidence of chronic opioid use in the first postoperative year was for total hip arthroplasty (1.4%, OR 5.10; 95% CI, 1.29-1.53). The study found that the risk factors most associated with chronic opioid use after surgery were male sex, aged > 50 years, and preoperative history of drug abuse, alcohol abuse, or depression, along with benzodiazepine use or antidepressant use.¹⁴ In a 2018 cohort study that evaluated predictors associated with transitioning to incident chronic opioid therapy, 4 factors were identified. These included opioid duration of action (adjusted odds ratio [AOR], 12.28; 95% CI, 8.1-06-18.72), the parent opioid compound (eg, tramadol vs codeine; AOR, 7.26; 95% CI, 5.20-10.13), the presence of conditions that are very likely to cause chronic pain (AOR, 5.47; 95% CI, 3.89-7.68), and drug use disorders (AOR, 4.02; 95% CI, 2.53-6.40).¹⁵

While there has been research into outpatient risk factors and medical practices that may contribute to chronic opioid use, a relative paucity of data exists on the contribution of hospitalization and inpatient opioid use on patient outcomes. A 2014 Canadian study assessed the impact of opioid use in the intensive care unit (ICU) on opioid use after discharge.¹⁶ This study included more than 2,500 patients who were admitted to a Canadian ICU between 2005 and 2008, and then followed after discharge for 48 months to quantify chronic opioid use. Nonopioid users increased from 87.8% in the early post-ICU period to 95.6% at 48 months after discharge. Preadmission chronic opioid use and prolonged hospital length of stay (LOS) were found to be associated with an increased risk of chronic opioid use after discharge.¹⁶ To date, there are no published studies that analyze the incidence of opioid-naïve veterans who convert to chronic opioid use after receiving opioids during an acute hospitalization.

In this retrospective analysis, we analyze the incidence of chronic opioid use after administration of opioids in the ICU as well as a variety of risk factors that may influence conversion to chronic opioid use.

Methods

This analysis was a single center, retrospective chart review conducted for patients admitted between July 1, 2017 and December 31, 2017 at the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Michael E. DeBakey VA Medical Center (MEDVAMC) in Houston, Texas. MEDVAMC is a 538-bed academic\teaching hospital serving about 130,000 veterans in Southeast Texas. The hospital has 3 ICUs (medical, cardiovascular, and surgical) and 38 total ICU beds. The study was approved by the Baylor College of Medicine Institutional Review Board and MEDVAMC Research and Development Review Board. Informed consent was not required.

Inclusion criteria consisted of patients aged ≥ 18 years admitted to the ICU in the above-specified time frame, who were administered a continuous infusion of an opioid for at least 12 hours. Patients were excluded if they were not opioid naïve prior to admission, defined as receiving > 30 days of opioids in the prior 12 months. Patients who died during hospital admission, never received an opioid despite having an active order, were hospital-to-hospital transfers, or were still admitted at the time of data collection were excluded from the analysis.

All pertinent data were collected using the VA Computerized Patient Record System (CPRS) and the Critical Care Manager (Picis Clinical Solutions) ICU monitoring application. Critical Care Manager was used to track the time frame, duration, and amounts of opioid infusions administered in the ICU. Patient demographic and preadmission data, including date of birth, age, race, history of substance use/alcohol use disorder (defined as a previous diagnosis) and previous opioid prescriptions within the past year were recorded. For the inpatient admission, the ICU LOS, hospital LOS, primary admission diagnosis, type of opioid medication administered, and total duration and dose of opioid administered were collected. After discharge, opioid medication fill data at 3, 6, and 12 months were collected. This information included names of any outpatient opioids filled, dosage unit, quantity, day supply, and number of refills.

The primary outcome for this study was to determine the incidence of chronic opioid use at 3, 6, and 12 months after discharge, defined as the percentage of patients receiving outpatient opioid prescriptions at each time point. Analyses were conducted to observe the effect of age, race, history of substance use or history of alcohol use (International Classification of Diseases documented diagnosis, 9th edition), ICU type (medical, surgical, or cardiovascular), surgical/nonsurgical admission, ICU LOS, hospital LOS, total time, and amount of opioids administered during admission on risk of conversion to chronic opioid use.

Descriptive statistics were calculated to analyze the incidence of chronic opioid use. Univariate logistic regression analysis, including ORs, 95% CIs, and P values, was conducted to determine the effects of the risk factors noted earlier on chronic opioid use at each time point. A multivariate logistic regression model was performed to assess the effect of multiple independent variables on opioid use at 3, 6, and 12 months. Statistical analysis was performed using StataCorp Stata SE.

Results

During the study period, 330 patients were admitted to the ICU. After applying inclusion/exclusion criteria, 118 patients were included in the final analysis. The most frequent reasons for exclusion from the study were patient death (n = 77), a past history of opioid use (n = 56), and not having received an opioid infusion for at least 12 hours (n = 68). The average age of the patients included was 67 years (Table 1). A total of 14% and 9% of patients, respectively, had a diagnosis of alcohol use disorder or substance use disorder recorded in CPRS. After admission, the most common location for these patients was the surgical ICU (65%). All patients were male. The average hospital LOS was 18.6 days , and the ICU LOS was 8.3 days. The average duration of administration for the opioid (fentanyl) infusion was 63 hours, and the average amount of fentanyl administered to each patient was 57.1 mcg/h.

The incidence of opioid-naïve patients receiving opioids after discharge was 76.3% (n = 90) at 3 months, 19.5% (n = 23) at 6 months and 7.6% (n = 9) at 12 months (Figure). The daily morphine milligram equivalent (MME) of patients prescribed opioids at 3, 6, and 12 months was similar (3 months, 22.7; 6 months, 19.7; 12 months, 20.9). In the univariate regression analysis, several variables were found to be associated with converting to chronic opioid use. Prior history of alcohol use disorder (OR, 0.3; 95% CI, 0.10-0.88; P = .03), ICU type (OR, 3.9; 95% CI, 1.73-8.75; P = .001) and ICU LOS (OR, 0.88; 95% CI, 0.81-0.95; P = .01) had a statistically significant association on opioid use at 3 months. (Table 2). No variables evaluated had a statistically significant effect on chronic opioid use at 6 months, and only age (OR 0.93; 95% CI. 0.87-0.99; P = .02) was statistically significant at 12 months. In the multivariate logistic regression analysis, history of alcohol abuse, admission for surgery, and hospital LOS were significant at 3 months (Table 3).

Discussion

In this single-center analysis conducted at a VA academic hospital of opioid-naïve patients who were administered opioids in the ICU, the incidence of patients subsequently receiving outpatient opioid prescriptions at 12 months after discharge was 7.6%. There also was a decrease in the amount of opioids received by patients (daily MME) after discharge at 3, 6, and 12 months. This trend did not demonstrate the propensity for inpatient opioid use to convert opioid-naïve patients to chronic opioid users.

The most common outpatient opioids prescribed were hydrocodone/acetaminophen, morphine, and tramadol. Logistic regression showed few factors that correlated significantly with opioid use in the long-term (12 month) period. This finding is a deviation from the findings of Yaffe and colleagues who found hospital LOS to be one of the only predictors of long-term opioid use in their population (defined as use at 48 months).¹⁶ One important difference between our study and the Yaffe and colleagues study was that they evaluated all patients who were admitted to the ICU, regardless of the exposure to opioids during their inpatient stay. Consequently, this difference may have resulted in the differences in findings.

Strengths and Limitations

Location was a strength of our study, as this analysis was conducted at an integrated health care system that provides comprehensive inpatient and outpatient care. The VA uses a closed electronic health record, which allowed patients to be followed both in the inpatient and outpatient settings to determine which medications were prescribed at each time. In other health care systems this information would have been difficult to follow as patients often fill outpatient prescriptions at community pharmacies not affiliated with the treating hospital. However, any patient not using a VA prescriber for subsequent opioid prescriptions or patients who received opioids through other sources would not have had their continued opioid use captured. These data may be available in the states prescription monitoring program, but it was not available to query for research at this time.

This study also excluded chronic opioid users, which could have been another confounding factor to account for when analyzing the results. However, the primary objective of the study was to determine the impact of opioids prescribed in the ICU on converting previous opioid-naïve patients to chronic users. Finally, a multivariate logistic regression was incorporated to assess for factors that may predispose certain patients to convert to chronic opioid users. This analysis served to extend the applicability of our study by not only analyzing whether receiving opioids in the ICU contributed to chronic opioid use in the long-term, but also which populations may be at greatest risk. This information can be used in the future to target harm-reduction efforts toward high-risk hospitalized patients.

One limitation of this study was that it was conducted as a retrospective, single-center chart review in Houston, Texas. Because this was not a randomized controlled trial, it is difficult to imply any causation between exposure to opioids in the ICU and chronic use. In addition, because this study was conducted at a single site, the results may not be able to be generalized to other populations. VA populations tend to be elderly and predominantly male, as was reflected by the study population. These factors, along with regional variability in patient characteristics, may limit the generalizability of this study to older male patients located in Southeast Texas or other similar populations. Other limitations of this study also included the small sample size, limited period of follow-up obtained, and that other comorbidity information (pain scores during stay, use of nonopioid pain medications, past history of anxiety or depression, or other acute illnesses or surgeries that may have required opioid therapy during admission) was not collected.

This study was only able to review 118 patients for a follow-up duration of 1 year. In the Yaffe and colleagues study, more than 2,500 patients were followed over 4 years, which provided a more long-term overview of the clinical course of these patients and may be another reason for discrepant findings. However, this study did not actually assess the impact on administration of opioids on the development of chronic opioid use.¹⁶ Finally, the biggest limitation to this study may be the potential for confounding discharge prescriptions. After discharge, patients’ prescriptions were evaluated from discharge to 3 months, in between 3 and 6 months, and between 6 and 12 months for the presence of an opioid prescription. Due to this methodology, any opioid prescription a patient was discharged with was counted in the 3-month time point. Since many patients included in the study were admitted to the surgical ICU (65%), it was logical that they were discharged with opioids after their procedure. While including the immediate postdischarge prescription data was useful for evaluating the decrease in opioid use and incidence over time, it did cause the 3-month time point to appear overly inflated, potentially signaling that at 3 months after discharge many of these patients were still requiring opioid use.

The Society of Critical Care Medicine still recommends opioids as first-line therapy for non-neuropathic pain in the ICU setting.¹⁷ Additionally, postoperative pain can be difficult to manage in the surgical population and is often treated with opioids, though treatment with multimodal pain regimens is becoming more common.¹⁸ It is difficult to imagine that a finding that implicates opioid use in the hospital with conversion to chronic opioid use would prompt a cessation in the use of opioid in these settings, especially in the context of analgosedation related to mechanically ventilated patients. However, it would be plausible to use this knowledge to advocate for opioid-sparing therapies and consideration for weaning individuals at high risk for misuse after discharge from opioid-containing sedation or analgesia regimens in a timelier manner.

Though our findings did not show a clinically relevant increase in chronic opioid users, clinicians can still use this information to encourage targeted education and closer monitoring for those patients deemed as high risk at discharge to prevent unnecessary prolonged opioid use. By having more frequent follow-up in pain clinics, switching patients to nonopioid therapies after discharge, and ensuring high-risk patients are discharged with naloxone rescue kits, it would be possible to drastically reduce the number of potential overdoses for patients who previously required opioid therapy in the ICU.

Conclusion

After discharge, 7.6% of previously opioid-naïve patients who were treated with opioids in the ICU were still receiving prescriptions for opioids at 12 months. These findings did not suggest a clinically significant increase in the incidence of chronic opioid use after inpatient administration of opioids. However, these results prompt the need for larger, prospective, multicenter studies to evaluate the effect on hospitalization on converting to chronic opioid use and a deeper evaluation of other potential risk factors that may be present.

Chronic pain is a worldwide cause of impairment. According to data from the 2016 National Health Interview Survey, an estimated 50 million American adults suffer from chronic pain, with 19.6 million adults suffering from high-impact chronic pain.¹ This phenomenon is particularly prevalent in the older population. More than 25% of adults aged 65 to 74 years reported that they were often in pain in the past 3 months compared with just 10% of those adults between the ages of 18 and 44 years.²

The economic burdens of chronic pain disorders are well known. In 2010, Gaskin and Richard found that chronic pain has far-reaching consequences for the US economy, ranging from direct health care costs to lost productivity. This study estimated additional health care costs at about $300 billion yearly and lost productivity at $300 billion, bringing total annual costs to about $600 billion. This expense is more than heart disease alone ($309 billion), and cancer and diabetes mellitus ($243 billion and $188 billion respectively) combined.³

Opioid medications are powerful and effective pain-reducing agents that are indicated for short-term acute pain or long-term in the management of chronic, severe cancer-related pain.⁴ Although efficacious, use of these medications carries with it the inherent risks of abuse, misuse, addiction, and overdose.⁵ Since 1999, opioid-related overdose deaths have been on the rise. The CDC estimated that > 15,000 deaths were attributable specifically to prescription opioids in 2015.⁶ The estimates had risen to > 17,000 deaths in 2017, with the number increasing since that time.⁷ Cumulatively, the CDC estimates that > 200,000 deaths in the US between 1999 and 2017 are attributed to prescription opioid overdose, clearly marking this trend as a growing nationwide epidemic.⁸

In 2016, Florence and colleagues estimated costs associated with opioid overdose to be just shy of $80 billion in 2013 dollars.⁹ In October 2017, the US Department of Health and Human Services declared the opioid epidemic a public health emergency and committed $900 million to combating the crisis.¹⁰

An abundance of data exist analyzing outpatient prescribing and its impacts on opioid dependence, particularly postoperatively. A study by Brummett and colleagues indicated that the incidence of new persistent opioid use in patients who underwent surgery was 5.9% to 6.5% and did not differ between major and minor surgical procedures. This study concluded that new opioid use could be considered one of the most common complications after elective surgery.¹¹ Similarly, in 2017 Makary and colleagues found that surgeons tend to overprescribe pain medications after procedures; some prescribing as many as 50 to 60 tablets to control pain after simple procedures.¹² This is in stark contrast to pain guideline recommendations of no more than 10 tablets for most standard operative procedures.¹³

Sun and colleagues conducted a retrospective analysis of health care claims data in more than 18 million opioid-naïve patients who did and did not undergo surgery. Seven of the 11 surgical procedures were associated with an increased risk of chronic opioid use. The highest incidence of chronic opioid use in the first postoperative year was for total hip arthroplasty (1.4%, OR 5.10; 95% CI, 1.29-1.53). The study found that the risk factors most associated with chronic opioid use after surgery were male sex, aged > 50 years, and preoperative history of drug abuse, alcohol abuse, or depression, along with benzodiazepine use or antidepressant use.¹⁴ In a 2018 cohort study that evaluated predictors associated with transitioning to incident chronic opioid therapy, 4 factors were identified. These included opioid duration of action (adjusted odds ratio [AOR], 12.28; 95% CI, 8.1-06-18.72), the parent opioid compound (eg, tramadol vs codeine; AOR, 7.26; 95% CI, 5.20-10.13), the presence of conditions that are very likely to cause chronic pain (AOR, 5.47; 95% CI, 3.89-7.68), and drug use disorders (AOR, 4.02; 95% CI, 2.53-6.40).¹⁵

While there has been research into outpatient risk factors and medical practices that may contribute to chronic opioid use, a relative paucity of data exists on the contribution of hospitalization and inpatient opioid use on patient outcomes. A 2014 Canadian study assessed the impact of opioid use in the intensive care unit (ICU) on opioid use after discharge.¹⁶ This study included more than 2,500 patients who were admitted to a Canadian ICU between 2005 and 2008, and then followed after discharge for 48 months to quantify chronic opioid use. Nonopioid users increased from 87.8% in the early post-ICU period to 95.6% at 48 months after discharge. Preadmission chronic opioid use and prolonged hospital length of stay (LOS) were found to be associated with an increased risk of chronic opioid use after discharge.¹⁶ To date, there are no published studies that analyze the incidence of opioid-naïve veterans who convert to chronic opioid use after receiving opioids during an acute hospitalization.

In this retrospective analysis, we analyze the incidence of chronic opioid use after administration of opioids in the ICU as well as a variety of risk factors that may influence conversion to chronic opioid use.

Methods

This analysis was a single center, retrospective chart review conducted for patients admitted between July 1, 2017 and December 31, 2017 at the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Michael E. DeBakey VA Medical Center (MEDVAMC) in Houston, Texas. MEDVAMC is a 538-bed academic\teaching hospital serving about 130,000 veterans in Southeast Texas. The hospital has 3 ICUs (medical, cardiovascular, and surgical) and 38 total ICU beds. The study was approved by the Baylor College of Medicine Institutional Review Board and MEDVAMC Research and Development Review Board. Informed consent was not required.

Inclusion criteria consisted of patients aged ≥ 18 years admitted to the ICU in the above-specified time frame, who were administered a continuous infusion of an opioid for at least 12 hours. Patients were excluded if they were not opioid naïve prior to admission, defined as receiving > 30 days of opioids in the prior 12 months. Patients who died during hospital admission, never received an opioid despite having an active order, were hospital-to-hospital transfers, or were still admitted at the time of data collection were excluded from the analysis.

All pertinent data were collected using the VA Computerized Patient Record System (CPRS) and the Critical Care Manager (Picis Clinical Solutions) ICU monitoring application. Critical Care Manager was used to track the time frame, duration, and amounts of opioid infusions administered in the ICU. Patient demographic and preadmission data, including date of birth, age, race, history of substance use/alcohol use disorder (defined as a previous diagnosis) and previous opioid prescriptions within the past year were recorded. For the inpatient admission, the ICU LOS, hospital LOS, primary admission diagnosis, type of opioid medication administered, and total duration and dose of opioid administered were collected. After discharge, opioid medication fill data at 3, 6, and 12 months were collected. This information included names of any outpatient opioids filled, dosage unit, quantity, day supply, and number of refills.

The primary outcome for this study was to determine the incidence of chronic opioid use at 3, 6, and 12 months after discharge, defined as the percentage of patients receiving outpatient opioid prescriptions at each time point. Analyses were conducted to observe the effect of age, race, history of substance use or history of alcohol use (International Classification of Diseases documented diagnosis, 9th edition), ICU type (medical, surgical, or cardiovascular), surgical/nonsurgical admission, ICU LOS, hospital LOS, total time, and amount of opioids administered during admission on risk of conversion to chronic opioid use.

Descriptive statistics were calculated to analyze the incidence of chronic opioid use. Univariate logistic regression analysis, including ORs, 95% CIs, and P values, was conducted to determine the effects of the risk factors noted earlier on chronic opioid use at each time point. A multivariate logistic regression model was performed to assess the effect of multiple independent variables on opioid use at 3, 6, and 12 months. Statistical analysis was performed using StataCorp Stata SE.

Results

During the study period, 330 patients were admitted to the ICU. After applying inclusion/exclusion criteria, 118 patients were included in the final analysis. The most frequent reasons for exclusion from the study were patient death (n = 77), a past history of opioid use (n = 56), and not having received an opioid infusion for at least 12 hours (n = 68). The average age of the patients included was 67 years (Table 1). A total of 14% and 9% of patients, respectively, had a diagnosis of alcohol use disorder or substance use disorder recorded in CPRS. After admission, the most common location for these patients was the surgical ICU (65%). All patients were male. The average hospital LOS was 18.6 days , and the ICU LOS was 8.3 days. The average duration of administration for the opioid (fentanyl) infusion was 63 hours, and the average amount of fentanyl administered to each patient was 57.1 mcg/h.

The incidence of opioid-naïve patients receiving opioids after discharge was 76.3% (n = 90) at 3 months, 19.5% (n = 23) at 6 months and 7.6% (n = 9) at 12 months (Figure). The daily morphine milligram equivalent (MME) of patients prescribed opioids at 3, 6, and 12 months was similar (3 months, 22.7; 6 months, 19.7; 12 months, 20.9). In the univariate regression analysis, several variables were found to be associated with converting to chronic opioid use. Prior history of alcohol use disorder (OR, 0.3; 95% CI, 0.10-0.88; P = .03), ICU type (OR, 3.9; 95% CI, 1.73-8.75; P = .001) and ICU LOS (OR, 0.88; 95% CI, 0.81-0.95; P = .01) had a statistically significant association on opioid use at 3 months. (Table 2). No variables evaluated had a statistically significant effect on chronic opioid use at 6 months, and only age (OR 0.93; 95% CI. 0.87-0.99; P = .02) was statistically significant at 12 months. In the multivariate logistic regression analysis, history of alcohol abuse, admission for surgery, and hospital LOS were significant at 3 months (Table 3).

Discussion

In this single-center analysis conducted at a VA academic hospital of opioid-naïve patients who were administered opioids in the ICU, the incidence of patients subsequently receiving outpatient opioid prescriptions at 12 months after discharge was 7.6%. There also was a decrease in the amount of opioids received by patients (daily MME) after discharge at 3, 6, and 12 months. This trend did not demonstrate the propensity for inpatient opioid use to convert opioid-naïve patients to chronic opioid users.

The most common outpatient opioids prescribed were hydrocodone/acetaminophen, morphine, and tramadol. Logistic regression showed few factors that correlated significantly with opioid use in the long-term (12 month) period. This finding is a deviation from the findings of Yaffe and colleagues who found hospital LOS to be one of the only predictors of long-term opioid use in their population (defined as use at 48 months).¹⁶ One important difference between our study and the Yaffe and colleagues study was that they evaluated all patients who were admitted to the ICU, regardless of the exposure to opioids during their inpatient stay. Consequently, this difference may have resulted in the differences in findings.

Strengths and Limitations

Location was a strength of our study, as this analysis was conducted at an integrated health care system that provides comprehensive inpatient and outpatient care. The VA uses a closed electronic health record, which allowed patients to be followed both in the inpatient and outpatient settings to determine which medications were prescribed at each time. In other health care systems this information would have been difficult to follow as patients often fill outpatient prescriptions at community pharmacies not affiliated with the treating hospital. However, any patient not using a VA prescriber for subsequent opioid prescriptions or patients who received opioids through other sources would not have had their continued opioid use captured. These data may be available in the states prescription monitoring program, but it was not available to query for research at this time.

This study also excluded chronic opioid users, which could have been another confounding factor to account for when analyzing the results. However, the primary objective of the study was to determine the impact of opioids prescribed in the ICU on converting previous opioid-naïve patients to chronic users. Finally, a multivariate logistic regression was incorporated to assess for factors that may predispose certain patients to convert to chronic opioid users. This analysis served to extend the applicability of our study by not only analyzing whether receiving opioids in the ICU contributed to chronic opioid use in the long-term, but also which populations may be at greatest risk. This information can be used in the future to target harm-reduction efforts toward high-risk hospitalized patients.

One limitation of this study was that it was conducted as a retrospective, single-center chart review in Houston, Texas. Because this was not a randomized controlled trial, it is difficult to imply any causation between exposure to opioids in the ICU and chronic use. In addition, because this study was conducted at a single site, the results may not be able to be generalized to other populations. VA populations tend to be elderly and predominantly male, as was reflected by the study population. These factors, along with regional variability in patient characteristics, may limit the generalizability of this study to older male patients located in Southeast Texas or other similar populations. Other limitations of this study also included the small sample size, limited period of follow-up obtained, and that other comorbidity information (pain scores during stay, use of nonopioid pain medications, past history of anxiety or depression, or other acute illnesses or surgeries that may have required opioid therapy during admission) was not collected.

This study was only able to review 118 patients for a follow-up duration of 1 year. In the Yaffe and colleagues study, more than 2,500 patients were followed over 4 years, which provided a more long-term overview of the clinical course of these patients and may be another reason for discrepant findings. However, this study did not actually assess the impact on administration of opioids on the development of chronic opioid use.¹⁶ Finally, the biggest limitation to this study may be the potential for confounding discharge prescriptions. After discharge, patients’ prescriptions were evaluated from discharge to 3 months, in between 3 and 6 months, and between 6 and 12 months for the presence of an opioid prescription. Due to this methodology, any opioid prescription a patient was discharged with was counted in the 3-month time point. Since many patients included in the study were admitted to the surgical ICU (65%), it was logical that they were discharged with opioids after their procedure. While including the immediate postdischarge prescription data was useful for evaluating the decrease in opioid use and incidence over time, it did cause the 3-month time point to appear overly inflated, potentially signaling that at 3 months after discharge many of these patients were still requiring opioid use.

The Society of Critical Care Medicine still recommends opioids as first-line therapy for non-neuropathic pain in the ICU setting.¹⁷ Additionally, postoperative pain can be difficult to manage in the surgical population and is often treated with opioids, though treatment with multimodal pain regimens is becoming more common.¹⁸ It is difficult to imagine that a finding that implicates opioid use in the hospital with conversion to chronic opioid use would prompt a cessation in the use of opioid in these settings, especially in the context of analgosedation related to mechanically ventilated patients. However, it would be plausible to use this knowledge to advocate for opioid-sparing therapies and consideration for weaning individuals at high risk for misuse after discharge from opioid-containing sedation or analgesia regimens in a timelier manner.

Though our findings did not show a clinically relevant increase in chronic opioid users, clinicians can still use this information to encourage targeted education and closer monitoring for those patients deemed as high risk at discharge to prevent unnecessary prolonged opioid use. By having more frequent follow-up in pain clinics, switching patients to nonopioid therapies after discharge, and ensuring high-risk patients are discharged with naloxone rescue kits, it would be possible to drastically reduce the number of potential overdoses for patients who previously required opioid therapy in the ICU.

Conclusion

After discharge, 7.6% of previously opioid-naïve patients who were treated with opioids in the ICU were still receiving prescriptions for opioids at 12 months. These findings did not suggest a clinically significant increase in the incidence of chronic opioid use after inpatient administration of opioids. However, these results prompt the need for larger, prospective, multicenter studies to evaluate the effect on hospitalization on converting to chronic opioid use and a deeper evaluation of other potential risk factors that may be present.

Specialization, as detailed in Adam Smith’s 1776 landmark treatise, Wealth of Nations,¹ has been an enduring trend in labor and economics for centuries. Mirroring evolution in other sectors of the economy, the healthcare workforce has become ever more specialized.² General practitioners and family doctors have ceded ground to a bevy of specialists and subspecialists ranging from pediatric endocrinologists to otolaryngology-neurotologists. Given the growth in medical knowledge over the past century, this specialization seems both necessary and good. This same specialization that serves us in good times, though, leaves us woefully underprepared for an epidemic that will require large numbers of hospitalists/generalists and intensivists, such as the current coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

A bit on terminology before we proceed. For purposes of this paper we define generalists as physicians trained in Internal Medicine, Family Medicine, Pediatrics, or Med/Peds who provide primary hospital care to adults and children. While some may argue that hospitalists are specialists in inpatient care, we would like to focus on hospitalists as generalists who focus on inpatient care and what we have in common with the broader community of generalists. We include as generalists anyone, irrespective of clinical training, who chooses broad primary patient responsibility over the narrower consultative role. There is always a specialist in our midst who knows more about a particular disease or condition; as generalists, most of us appreciate and welcome that expertise.

Sometimes it takes a pandemic like COVID-19 to highlight a tremendous blind spot in our healthcare system that, in retrospect, seems hard to have missed. What do we do when we need more generalists and have only a surplus of specialists, many of whom were involuntarily “furloughed” by canceled elective procedures and postponed clinics? How do we “un-specialize” our specialist workforce?

We will discuss some of the most pressing problems facing hospitals working to ensure adequate staffing for general inpatient units caused by the simultaneous reductions in physician availability (because of illness and/or quarantine) and markedly increased admissions of undifferentiated COVID-19–related illnesses. We will assume that hospitals have already activated all providers practicing in areas most similar to hospital medicine, including generalists who have mixed inpatient/outpatient practices, subspecialists with significant inpatient clinical roles, fellows, and advanced practice providers (APPs) with inpatient experience. The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education released guidance around the roles of physician trainees during the pandemic.³ Despite these measures, though, further workforce augmentation will be vital. To that end, several challenges to clinical staffing are enumerated below, accompanied by strategies to address them.

1. Clinicians eager to help, but out of practice in the inpatient setting: As hospitals across the country work to develop physician staffing contingency plans for scenarios in which general inpatient volumes increase by 50%-300% while 33%-50% of hospitalists either become infected or require quarantine, many hospitals are looking to bolster their physician depth. We have been extremely gratified by the tremendous response from the broader physician communities in which we work. We have encountered retired physicians who have volunteered to come back to work despite being at higher risk of severe COVID-19 complications and physician-­scientists offering to step back into clinical roles. We have found outstanding subspecialists asking to work under the tutelage of experienced hospitalists; these specialists recognize how, despite years of clinical experience, they would need significant supervision to function in the inpatient setting. The humility and self-awareness of these volunteers has been phenomenal.

Retraining researchers, subspecialists, and retirees as hospitalists requires purposeful onboarding to target key educational goals. This onboarding should stress COVID-19–specific medical management, training in infection prevention and control, and hospital-specific workflow processes (eg, shift length, sign-over). Onboarding must also include access and orientation to electronic health records, training around inpatient documentation requirements, and billing practices. Non–COVID-19 healthcare will continue; hospitals and clinical leaders will need to determine whether certain specialists should focus on COVID-19 care alone and leave others to continue with speciality practice still needed. Ready access to hospital medicine and medical subspecialty consultation will be pivotal in supervising providers asked to step into hospitalist roles.

The onboarding process we describe might best be viewed through the lens of focused professional practice evaluation (FPPE). Required by the Joint Commission, FPPE is a process for the medical staff of a facility to evaluate privilege-specific competence by clinicians and is used for any new clinical privileges and when there may be question as to a current practitioner’s capabilities. The usual FPPE process includes reassessment of provider practice, typically at 3 to 6 months. Doing so may be challenging given overall workforce stress and the timing of clinical demand—eg, time for medical record review will be limited. Consideration of a “preceptorship” with an experienced hospitalist providing verbal oversight for providers with emergency privileges may be very appropriate. Indeed the Joint Commission recently published guidance around FPPE during the COVID-19 epidemic with the suggestion that mentorship and direct observation are reasonable ways to ensure quality.⁴

Concerns around scope of practice and medicolegal liability must be rapidly addressed by professional practice organizations, state medical boards, and medical malpractice insurers to protect frontline providers, nurses, and pharmacists. In particular, Joint Commission FPPE process requirements may need to be relaxed to respond to a surge in clinical demand. Contingency and crisis standards of care permit doing so. We welcome the introduction of processes to expedite provider licensure in many hard-hit states.

2. Clinicians who should not help because of medical comorbidities or age: Individuals with certain significant comorbidities (eg, inflammatory conditions treated with immunosuppressants, pulmonary disease, cancer with active treatment) or meeting certain age criteria should be discouraged from clinical work because the dangers of illness for them and of transmission of illness are high. Judgment and a version of mutual informed consent will be needed to address fewer clear scenarios, such as whether a 35-year-old physician who requires a steroid inhaler for asthma or a 64-year-old physician who is otherwise healthy have higher risk. It is our opinion that all physicians should contribute to the care of patients with documented or suspected COVID-19 unless they meet institutionally defined exclusion criteria. We should recognize that physicians who are unable to provide direct care to patients with COVID-19 infection may have significant remorse and feelings that they are letting down their colleagues and the oath they have taken. As the COVID -19 pandemic continues, we are quickly learning that physicians who have contraindications to providing care to patients with active COVID-19 infection can still contribute in numerous mission-critical ways. This may include virtual (telehealth) visits, preceptorship via telehealth of providers completing FPPE in hospital medicine practice, postdischarge follow-up of patients who are no longer infectious, and other care-­coordination activities, such as triaging direct admission calls.

3. Clinicians who should be able to help but are fearful: All efforts must be undertaken to protect healthcare workers from acquiring COVID-19. Nevertheless, there are models predicting that ultimately the vast majority of the world’s population will be exposed, including healthcare workers.^5,6 In our personal experience as hospitalists and leaders, the vast majority (95%-plus) of our hospitalists have not only continued to do their job but taken on additional responsibilities and clinical work despite the risk. We are hesitant to co-opt words like courage and bravery that we typically would reserve for people in far more hazardous lines of work than physicians, but in the current setting perhaps courage is the correct term. In quiet conversation, many are vaguely unnerved and some significantly so, but they set their angst aside and get to work. The same can be said for the numerous subspecialists, surgeons, nurses, and others who have volunteered to help.

Alternatively, as leaders, we must manage an extremely small minority of faculty who request to not care for patients with COVID-19 despite no clear contraindication. These situations are nuanced and fraught with difficulty for leaders. As physicians we have moral and ethical obligations to society.⁷ We also have contractual obligations to our employers. Finally, we have a professional duty to our colleagues. When such cases arise, as leaders we should try to understand the perspective of the physician making the request. It is also important to remember that as leaders we are obliged to be fair and equitable to all faculty; granting exceptions to some who ask to avoid COVID-19-related work, but not to others, is difficult to justify. Moreover, granting exceptions can undermine faith in leadership and inevitably sow discord. We suggest setting clear mutual expectations of engagement and not granting unwarranted exceptions.

In this time of a global pandemic, we face a looming shortage of hospital generalists, which calls for immediate and purposeful workforce expansion facilitated by learning to “un-specialize” certain providers. We propose utilizing the framework of FPPE to educate and support those joining hospital medicine teams. Hospitalists are innovators and health systems science leaders. Let’s draw on that strength now to rise to the challenge of COVID-19.

Specialization, as detailed in Adam Smith’s 1776 landmark treatise, Wealth of Nations,¹ has been an enduring trend in labor and economics for centuries. Mirroring evolution in other sectors of the economy, the healthcare workforce has become ever more specialized.² General practitioners and family doctors have ceded ground to a bevy of specialists and subspecialists ranging from pediatric endocrinologists to otolaryngology-neurotologists. Given the growth in medical knowledge over the past century, this specialization seems both necessary and good. This same specialization that serves us in good times, though, leaves us woefully underprepared for an epidemic that will require large numbers of hospitalists/generalists and intensivists, such as the current coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

A bit on terminology before we proceed. For purposes of this paper we define generalists as physicians trained in Internal Medicine, Family Medicine, Pediatrics, or Med/Peds who provide primary hospital care to adults and children. While some may argue that hospitalists are specialists in inpatient care, we would like to focus on hospitalists as generalists who focus on inpatient care and what we have in common with the broader community of generalists. We include as generalists anyone, irrespective of clinical training, who chooses broad primary patient responsibility over the narrower consultative role. There is always a specialist in our midst who knows more about a particular disease or condition; as generalists, most of us appreciate and welcome that expertise.

Sometimes it takes a pandemic like COVID-19 to highlight a tremendous blind spot in our healthcare system that, in retrospect, seems hard to have missed. What do we do when we need more generalists and have only a surplus of specialists, many of whom were involuntarily “furloughed” by canceled elective procedures and postponed clinics? How do we “un-specialize” our specialist workforce?

We will discuss some of the most pressing problems facing hospitals working to ensure adequate staffing for general inpatient units caused by the simultaneous reductions in physician availability (because of illness and/or quarantine) and markedly increased admissions of undifferentiated COVID-19–related illnesses. We will assume that hospitals have already activated all providers practicing in areas most similar to hospital medicine, including generalists who have mixed inpatient/outpatient practices, subspecialists with significant inpatient clinical roles, fellows, and advanced practice providers (APPs) with inpatient experience. The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education released guidance around the roles of physician trainees during the pandemic.³ Despite these measures, though, further workforce augmentation will be vital. To that end, several challenges to clinical staffing are enumerated below, accompanied by strategies to address them.

1. Clinicians eager to help, but out of practice in the inpatient setting: As hospitals across the country work to develop physician staffing contingency plans for scenarios in which general inpatient volumes increase by 50%-300% while 33%-50% of hospitalists either become infected or require quarantine, many hospitals are looking to bolster their physician depth. We have been extremely gratified by the tremendous response from the broader physician communities in which we work. We have encountered retired physicians who have volunteered to come back to work despite being at higher risk of severe COVID-19 complications and physician-­scientists offering to step back into clinical roles. We have found outstanding subspecialists asking to work under the tutelage of experienced hospitalists; these specialists recognize how, despite years of clinical experience, they would need significant supervision to function in the inpatient setting. The humility and self-awareness of these volunteers has been phenomenal.

Retraining researchers, subspecialists, and retirees as hospitalists requires purposeful onboarding to target key educational goals. This onboarding should stress COVID-19–specific medical management, training in infection prevention and control, and hospital-specific workflow processes (eg, shift length, sign-over). Onboarding must also include access and orientation to electronic health records, training around inpatient documentation requirements, and billing practices. Non–COVID-19 healthcare will continue; hospitals and clinical leaders will need to determine whether certain specialists should focus on COVID-19 care alone and leave others to continue with speciality practice still needed. Ready access to hospital medicine and medical subspecialty consultation will be pivotal in supervising providers asked to step into hospitalist roles.

The onboarding process we describe might best be viewed through the lens of focused professional practice evaluation (FPPE). Required by the Joint Commission, FPPE is a process for the medical staff of a facility to evaluate privilege-specific competence by clinicians and is used for any new clinical privileges and when there may be question as to a current practitioner’s capabilities. The usual FPPE process includes reassessment of provider practice, typically at 3 to 6 months. Doing so may be challenging given overall workforce stress and the timing of clinical demand—eg, time for medical record review will be limited. Consideration of a “preceptorship” with an experienced hospitalist providing verbal oversight for providers with emergency privileges may be very appropriate. Indeed the Joint Commission recently published guidance around FPPE during the COVID-19 epidemic with the suggestion that mentorship and direct observation are reasonable ways to ensure quality.⁴

Concerns around scope of practice and medicolegal liability must be rapidly addressed by professional practice organizations, state medical boards, and medical malpractice insurers to protect frontline providers, nurses, and pharmacists. In particular, Joint Commission FPPE process requirements may need to be relaxed to respond to a surge in clinical demand. Contingency and crisis standards of care permit doing so. We welcome the introduction of processes to expedite provider licensure in many hard-hit states.

2. Clinicians who should not help because of medical comorbidities or age: Individuals with certain significant comorbidities (eg, inflammatory conditions treated with immunosuppressants, pulmonary disease, cancer with active treatment) or meeting certain age criteria should be discouraged from clinical work because the dangers of illness for them and of transmission of illness are high. Judgment and a version of mutual informed consent will be needed to address fewer clear scenarios, such as whether a 35-year-old physician who requires a steroid inhaler for asthma or a 64-year-old physician who is otherwise healthy have higher risk. It is our opinion that all physicians should contribute to the care of patients with documented or suspected COVID-19 unless they meet institutionally defined exclusion criteria. We should recognize that physicians who are unable to provide direct care to patients with COVID-19 infection may have significant remorse and feelings that they are letting down their colleagues and the oath they have taken. As the COVID -19 pandemic continues, we are quickly learning that physicians who have contraindications to providing care to patients with active COVID-19 infection can still contribute in numerous mission-critical ways. This may include virtual (telehealth) visits, preceptorship via telehealth of providers completing FPPE in hospital medicine practice, postdischarge follow-up of patients who are no longer infectious, and other care-­coordination activities, such as triaging direct admission calls.

3. Clinicians who should be able to help but are fearful: All efforts must be undertaken to protect healthcare workers from acquiring COVID-19. Nevertheless, there are models predicting that ultimately the vast majority of the world’s population will be exposed, including healthcare workers.^5,6 In our personal experience as hospitalists and leaders, the vast majority (95%-plus) of our hospitalists have not only continued to do their job but taken on additional responsibilities and clinical work despite the risk. We are hesitant to co-opt words like courage and bravery that we typically would reserve for people in far more hazardous lines of work than physicians, but in the current setting perhaps courage is the correct term. In quiet conversation, many are vaguely unnerved and some significantly so, but they set their angst aside and get to work. The same can be said for the numerous subspecialists, surgeons, nurses, and others who have volunteered to help.

Alternatively, as leaders, we must manage an extremely small minority of faculty who request to not care for patients with COVID-19 despite no clear contraindication. These situations are nuanced and fraught with difficulty for leaders. As physicians we have moral and ethical obligations to society.⁷ We also have contractual obligations to our employers. Finally, we have a professional duty to our colleagues. When such cases arise, as leaders we should try to understand the perspective of the physician making the request. It is also important to remember that as leaders we are obliged to be fair and equitable to all faculty; granting exceptions to some who ask to avoid COVID-19-related work, but not to others, is difficult to justify. Moreover, granting exceptions can undermine faith in leadership and inevitably sow discord. We suggest setting clear mutual expectations of engagement and not granting unwarranted exceptions.

In this time of a global pandemic, we face a looming shortage of hospital generalists, which calls for immediate and purposeful workforce expansion facilitated by learning to “un-specialize” certain providers. We propose utilizing the framework of FPPE to educate and support those joining hospital medicine teams. Hospitalists are innovators and health systems science leaders. Let’s draw on that strength now to rise to the challenge of COVID-19.

Specialization, as detailed in Adam Smith’s 1776 landmark treatise, Wealth of Nations,¹ has been an enduring trend in labor and economics for centuries. Mirroring evolution in other sectors of the economy, the healthcare workforce has become ever more specialized.² General practitioners and family doctors have ceded ground to a bevy of specialists and subspecialists ranging from pediatric endocrinologists to otolaryngology-neurotologists. Given the growth in medical knowledge over the past century, this specialization seems both necessary and good. This same specialization that serves us in good times, though, leaves us woefully underprepared for an epidemic that will require large numbers of hospitalists/generalists and intensivists, such as the current coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

A bit on terminology before we proceed. For purposes of this paper we define generalists as physicians trained in Internal Medicine, Family Medicine, Pediatrics, or Med/Peds who provide primary hospital care to adults and children. While some may argue that hospitalists are specialists in inpatient care, we would like to focus on hospitalists as generalists who focus on inpatient care and what we have in common with the broader community of generalists. We include as generalists anyone, irrespective of clinical training, who chooses broad primary patient responsibility over the narrower consultative role. There is always a specialist in our midst who knows more about a particular disease or condition; as generalists, most of us appreciate and welcome that expertise.

Sometimes it takes a pandemic like COVID-19 to highlight a tremendous blind spot in our healthcare system that, in retrospect, seems hard to have missed. What do we do when we need more generalists and have only a surplus of specialists, many of whom were involuntarily “furloughed” by canceled elective procedures and postponed clinics? How do we “un-specialize” our specialist workforce?

We will discuss some of the most pressing problems facing hospitals working to ensure adequate staffing for general inpatient units caused by the simultaneous reductions in physician availability (because of illness and/or quarantine) and markedly increased admissions of undifferentiated COVID-19–related illnesses. We will assume that hospitals have already activated all providers practicing in areas most similar to hospital medicine, including generalists who have mixed inpatient/outpatient practices, subspecialists with significant inpatient clinical roles, fellows, and advanced practice providers (APPs) with inpatient experience. The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education released guidance around the roles of physician trainees during the pandemic.³ Despite these measures, though, further workforce augmentation will be vital. To that end, several challenges to clinical staffing are enumerated below, accompanied by strategies to address them.

1. Clinicians eager to help, but out of practice in the inpatient setting: As hospitals across the country work to develop physician staffing contingency plans for scenarios in which general inpatient volumes increase by 50%-300% while 33%-50% of hospitalists either become infected or require quarantine, many hospitals are looking to bolster their physician depth. We have been extremely gratified by the tremendous response from the broader physician communities in which we work. We have encountered retired physicians who have volunteered to come back to work despite being at higher risk of severe COVID-19 complications and physician-­scientists offering to step back into clinical roles. We have found outstanding subspecialists asking to work under the tutelage of experienced hospitalists; these specialists recognize how, despite years of clinical experience, they would need significant supervision to function in the inpatient setting. The humility and self-awareness of these volunteers has been phenomenal.

Retraining researchers, subspecialists, and retirees as hospitalists requires purposeful onboarding to target key educational goals. This onboarding should stress COVID-19–specific medical management, training in infection prevention and control, and hospital-specific workflow processes (eg, shift length, sign-over). Onboarding must also include access and orientation to electronic health records, training around inpatient documentation requirements, and billing practices. Non–COVID-19 healthcare will continue; hospitals and clinical leaders will need to determine whether certain specialists should focus on COVID-19 care alone and leave others to continue with speciality practice still needed. Ready access to hospital medicine and medical subspecialty consultation will be pivotal in supervising providers asked to step into hospitalist roles.

The onboarding process we describe might best be viewed through the lens of focused professional practice evaluation (FPPE). Required by the Joint Commission, FPPE is a process for the medical staff of a facility to evaluate privilege-specific competence by clinicians and is used for any new clinical privileges and when there may be question as to a current practitioner’s capabilities. The usual FPPE process includes reassessment of provider practice, typically at 3 to 6 months. Doing so may be challenging given overall workforce stress and the timing of clinical demand—eg, time for medical record review will be limited. Consideration of a “preceptorship” with an experienced hospitalist providing verbal oversight for providers with emergency privileges may be very appropriate. Indeed the Joint Commission recently published guidance around FPPE during the COVID-19 epidemic with the suggestion that mentorship and direct observation are reasonable ways to ensure quality.⁴

Concerns around scope of practice and medicolegal liability must be rapidly addressed by professional practice organizations, state medical boards, and medical malpractice insurers to protect frontline providers, nurses, and pharmacists. In particular, Joint Commission FPPE process requirements may need to be relaxed to respond to a surge in clinical demand. Contingency and crisis standards of care permit doing so. We welcome the introduction of processes to expedite provider licensure in many hard-hit states.

2. Clinicians who should not help because of medical comorbidities or age: Individuals with certain significant comorbidities (eg, inflammatory conditions treated with immunosuppressants, pulmonary disease, cancer with active treatment) or meeting certain age criteria should be discouraged from clinical work because the dangers of illness for them and of transmission of illness are high. Judgment and a version of mutual informed consent will be needed to address fewer clear scenarios, such as whether a 35-year-old physician who requires a steroid inhaler for asthma or a 64-year-old physician who is otherwise healthy have higher risk. It is our opinion that all physicians should contribute to the care of patients with documented or suspected COVID-19 unless they meet institutionally defined exclusion criteria. We should recognize that physicians who are unable to provide direct care to patients with COVID-19 infection may have significant remorse and feelings that they are letting down their colleagues and the oath they have taken. As the COVID -19 pandemic continues, we are quickly learning that physicians who have contraindications to providing care to patients with active COVID-19 infection can still contribute in numerous mission-critical ways. This may include virtual (telehealth) visits, preceptorship via telehealth of providers completing FPPE in hospital medicine practice, postdischarge follow-up of patients who are no longer infectious, and other care-­coordination activities, such as triaging direct admission calls.

3. Clinicians who should be able to help but are fearful: All efforts must be undertaken to protect healthcare workers from acquiring COVID-19. Nevertheless, there are models predicting that ultimately the vast majority of the world’s population will be exposed, including healthcare workers.^5,6 In our personal experience as hospitalists and leaders, the vast majority (95%-plus) of our hospitalists have not only continued to do their job but taken on additional responsibilities and clinical work despite the risk. We are hesitant to co-opt words like courage and bravery that we typically would reserve for people in far more hazardous lines of work than physicians, but in the current setting perhaps courage is the correct term. In quiet conversation, many are vaguely unnerved and some significantly so, but they set their angst aside and get to work. The same can be said for the numerous subspecialists, surgeons, nurses, and others who have volunteered to help.

Alternatively, as leaders, we must manage an extremely small minority of faculty who request to not care for patients with COVID-19 despite no clear contraindication. These situations are nuanced and fraught with difficulty for leaders. As physicians we have moral and ethical obligations to society.⁷ We also have contractual obligations to our employers. Finally, we have a professional duty to our colleagues. When such cases arise, as leaders we should try to understand the perspective of the physician making the request. It is also important to remember that as leaders we are obliged to be fair and equitable to all faculty; granting exceptions to some who ask to avoid COVID-19-related work, but not to others, is difficult to justify. Moreover, granting exceptions can undermine faith in leadership and inevitably sow discord. We suggest setting clear mutual expectations of engagement and not granting unwarranted exceptions.

In this time of a global pandemic, we face a looming shortage of hospital generalists, which calls for immediate and purposeful workforce expansion facilitated by learning to “un-specialize” certain providers. We propose utilizing the framework of FPPE to educate and support those joining hospital medicine teams. Hospitalists are innovators and health systems science leaders. Let’s draw on that strength now to rise to the challenge of COVID-19.

Beyond asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), inhalation therapy is a mainstay in the management of bronchiectasis, cystic fibrosis, and pulmonary artery hypertension. Several US Food and Drug Administration off-label indications for inhalational medications include hypoxia secondary to acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) and intraoperative and postoperative pulmonary hypertension during and following cardiac surgery, respectively.^1-11 Therapeutic delivery of aerosols to the lung may be provided via nebulization, pressurized metered-dose inhalers (pMDI), and other devices (eg, dry powder inhalers, soft-mist inhalers, and smart inhalers).¹² The most common aerosolized medications given in the clinical setting are bronchodilators.¹²

Product selection is often guided by practice guidelines (Table 1), consideration of the formulation’s advantages and disadvantages (Table 2), and/or formulary considerations. For example, current guidelines for COPD state that there is no evidence for superiority of nebulized bronchodilator therapy over handheld devices in patients who can use them properly.² Due to equivalence, nebulized formulations are commonly used in hospitals, emergency departments (EDs) and ambulatory clinics based on the drug’s unit cost. In contrast, a pMDI is often more cost-effective for use in ambulatory patients who are administering multiple doses from the same canister.

The World Health Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommend droplet and contact precautions for all patients suspected or diagnosed with novel coronavirus-19 (COVID-19).^13,14 Airborne precautions must be applied when performing aerosol-generating medical procedures (AGMPs), including but not limited to, open suctioning of the respiratory tract, intubation, bronchoscopy, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Data from the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS-CoV) epidemic suggest that nebulization of medication is also an AGMP.^15-17

Institutions must ensure that their health care workers (HCWs) are wearing appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) including gloves, long-sleeved gowns, eye protection, and fit-tested particulate respirators (N95 mask) for airborne procedures and are carefully discarding PPE after use.^13,14 Due to severe shortages in available respirators in the US supply chain, the CDC has temporarily modified WHO recommendations. Face masks are now an acceptable alternative to protect HCWs from splashes and sprays from procedures not likely to generate aerosols and for cleaning of rooms, although there is no evidence to support this decision.

Internationally, HCWs are falling ill with COVID-19. Data from Italy and Spain show that about 9% to 13% of these countries’ cases are HCWs.^18,19 Within the US, the Ohio health department reports approximately 16% of cases are HCWs.²⁰ It is possible that 20% of frontline HCWs will become infected.²¹ Evolving laboratory research shows that COVID-19 remains viable in aerosols for up to 3 hours postaerosolization, thus making aerosol transmission plausible.²² Nebulizers convert liquids into aerosols and during dispersal may potentially cause secondary inhalation of fugitive emissions.²³ Since interim CDC infection control guidance is to allow only essential personnel to enter the room of patients with COVID-19, many facilities will rely on their frontline nursing staff to clean and disinfect high-touch surfaces following routine care activities.²⁴

Achieving adequate fomite disinfection following viral aerosolization may pose a significant problem for any patient receiving scheduled doses of nebulized medications. Additionally, for personnel who clean rooms following intermittent drug nebulization while wearing PPE that includes a face mask, protection from aerosolized virus may be inadequate. Subsequently, fugitive emissions from nebulized medications may potentially contribute to both nosocomial COVID-19 transmission and viral infections in the medical staff until proven otherwise by studies conducted outside of the laboratory. Prevention of infection in the medical staff is imperative since federal health care systems cannot sustain a significant loss of its workforce.

Recommendations

We recommend that health care systems stop business as usual and adopt public health recommendations issued by Canadian and Hong Kong health care authorities for the management of suspected or confirmed COVID-19 disease.^25-28 We have further clarified and expanded on these interventions. During viral pandemics, prescribers and health care systems should:

1. Deprescribe nebulized therapies on medical wards and intensive care units as an infection control measure. Also avoid use in any outpatient health care setting (eg, community-based clinics, EDs, triage).
2. Avoid initiation of nebulized unproven therapies (eg, n-acetylcysteine, hypertonic saline).¹
3. Use alternative bronchodilator formulations as appropriate (eg, oral β-2 agonist, recognizing its slower onset) before prescribing nebulized agents to patients who are uncooperative or unable to follow directions needed to use a pMDI with a spacer or have experienced a prior poor response to a pMDI with spacer (eg, OptiChamber Diamond, Philips).^25,27
4.  Limit nebulized drug utilization (eg, bronchodilators, epoprostenol) to patients who are on mechanical ventilation and will receive nebulized therapies via a closed system or to patients housed in negative pressure hospital rooms.²² Use a viral filter (eg, Salter Labs system) to decrease the spread of infection for those receiving epoprostenol via face mask.²⁵
5. Adjust procurement practices (eg, pharmacy, logistics) to address the transition from nebulized drugs to alternatives.
6. Add a safety net to the drug-ordering process by restricting new orders for nebulized therapies to the prior authorization process.²⁷ Apply the exclusion criterion of suspected or definite COVID-19.
7. Add a safety net to environmental service practices. Nursing staff should track patients who received ≥ 1 nebulizations via open (before diagnosis) or closed systems so that staff wear suitable PPE to include a N-95 mask while cleaning the room.

Conclusions

To implement the aggressive infection control guidance promulgated here, we recommend collaboration with infection control, pharmacy service (eg, prior authorization team, clinical pharmacy team, and procurement team), respiratory therapy, pulmonary and other critical care physicians, EDs, CPR committee, and other stakeholders. When making significant transitions in clinical care during a viral pandemic, guidelines must be timely, use imperative wording, and consist of easily identifiable education and/or instructions for the affected frontline staff in order to change attitudes.²⁹ Additionally, when transitioning from nebulized bronchodilators to pMDI, educational in-services should be provided to frontline staff to avoid misconceptions regarding pMDI treatment efficacy and patients’ ability to use their pMDI with spacer.³⁰

Acknowledgments

This material is the result of work supported with resources and the use of facilities at the VA Tennessee Valley Healthcare System in Nashville.

Beyond asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), inhalation therapy is a mainstay in the management of bronchiectasis, cystic fibrosis, and pulmonary artery hypertension. Several US Food and Drug Administration off-label indications for inhalational medications include hypoxia secondary to acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) and intraoperative and postoperative pulmonary hypertension during and following cardiac surgery, respectively.^1-11 Therapeutic delivery of aerosols to the lung may be provided via nebulization, pressurized metered-dose inhalers (pMDI), and other devices (eg, dry powder inhalers, soft-mist inhalers, and smart inhalers).¹² The most common aerosolized medications given in the clinical setting are bronchodilators.¹²

Product selection is often guided by practice guidelines (Table 1), consideration of the formulation’s advantages and disadvantages (Table 2), and/or formulary considerations. For example, current guidelines for COPD state that there is no evidence for superiority of nebulized bronchodilator therapy over handheld devices in patients who can use them properly.² Due to equivalence, nebulized formulations are commonly used in hospitals, emergency departments (EDs) and ambulatory clinics based on the drug’s unit cost. In contrast, a pMDI is often more cost-effective for use in ambulatory patients who are administering multiple doses from the same canister.

The World Health Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommend droplet and contact precautions for all patients suspected or diagnosed with novel coronavirus-19 (COVID-19).^13,14 Airborne precautions must be applied when performing aerosol-generating medical procedures (AGMPs), including but not limited to, open suctioning of the respiratory tract, intubation, bronchoscopy, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Data from the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS-CoV) epidemic suggest that nebulization of medication is also an AGMP.^15-17

Institutions must ensure that their health care workers (HCWs) are wearing appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) including gloves, long-sleeved gowns, eye protection, and fit-tested particulate respirators (N95 mask) for airborne procedures and are carefully discarding PPE after use.^13,14 Due to severe shortages in available respirators in the US supply chain, the CDC has temporarily modified WHO recommendations. Face masks are now an acceptable alternative to protect HCWs from splashes and sprays from procedures not likely to generate aerosols and for cleaning of rooms, although there is no evidence to support this decision.

Internationally, HCWs are falling ill with COVID-19. Data from Italy and Spain show that about 9% to 13% of these countries’ cases are HCWs.^18,19 Within the US, the Ohio health department reports approximately 16% of cases are HCWs.²⁰ It is possible that 20% of frontline HCWs will become infected.²¹ Evolving laboratory research shows that COVID-19 remains viable in aerosols for up to 3 hours postaerosolization, thus making aerosol transmission plausible.²² Nebulizers convert liquids into aerosols and during dispersal may potentially cause secondary inhalation of fugitive emissions.²³ Since interim CDC infection control guidance is to allow only essential personnel to enter the room of patients with COVID-19, many facilities will rely on their frontline nursing staff to clean and disinfect high-touch surfaces following routine care activities.²⁴

Achieving adequate fomite disinfection following viral aerosolization may pose a significant problem for any patient receiving scheduled doses of nebulized medications. Additionally, for personnel who clean rooms following intermittent drug nebulization while wearing PPE that includes a face mask, protection from aerosolized virus may be inadequate. Subsequently, fugitive emissions from nebulized medications may potentially contribute to both nosocomial COVID-19 transmission and viral infections in the medical staff until proven otherwise by studies conducted outside of the laboratory. Prevention of infection in the medical staff is imperative since federal health care systems cannot sustain a significant loss of its workforce.

Recommendations

We recommend that health care systems stop business as usual and adopt public health recommendations issued by Canadian and Hong Kong health care authorities for the management of suspected or confirmed COVID-19 disease.^25-28 We have further clarified and expanded on these interventions. During viral pandemics, prescribers and health care systems should:

1. Deprescribe nebulized therapies on medical wards and intensive care units as an infection control measure. Also avoid use in any outpatient health care setting (eg, community-based clinics, EDs, triage).
2. Avoid initiation of nebulized unproven therapies (eg, n-acetylcysteine, hypertonic saline).¹
3. Use alternative bronchodilator formulations as appropriate (eg, oral β-2 agonist, recognizing its slower onset) before prescribing nebulized agents to patients who are uncooperative or unable to follow directions needed to use a pMDI with a spacer or have experienced a prior poor response to a pMDI with spacer (eg, OptiChamber Diamond, Philips).^25,27
4.  Limit nebulized drug utilization (eg, bronchodilators, epoprostenol) to patients who are on mechanical ventilation and will receive nebulized therapies via a closed system or to patients housed in negative pressure hospital rooms.²² Use a viral filter (eg, Salter Labs system) to decrease the spread of infection for those receiving epoprostenol via face mask.²⁵
5. Adjust procurement practices (eg, pharmacy, logistics) to address the transition from nebulized drugs to alternatives.
6. Add a safety net to the drug-ordering process by restricting new orders for nebulized therapies to the prior authorization process.²⁷ Apply the exclusion criterion of suspected or definite COVID-19.
7. Add a safety net to environmental service practices. Nursing staff should track patients who received ≥ 1 nebulizations via open (before diagnosis) or closed systems so that staff wear suitable PPE to include a N-95 mask while cleaning the room.

Conclusions

To implement the aggressive infection control guidance promulgated here, we recommend collaboration with infection control, pharmacy service (eg, prior authorization team, clinical pharmacy team, and procurement team), respiratory therapy, pulmonary and other critical care physicians, EDs, CPR committee, and other stakeholders. When making significant transitions in clinical care during a viral pandemic, guidelines must be timely, use imperative wording, and consist of easily identifiable education and/or instructions for the affected frontline staff in order to change attitudes.²⁹ Additionally, when transitioning from nebulized bronchodilators to pMDI, educational in-services should be provided to frontline staff to avoid misconceptions regarding pMDI treatment efficacy and patients’ ability to use their pMDI with spacer.³⁰

Acknowledgments

This material is the result of work supported with resources and the use of facilities at the VA Tennessee Valley Healthcare System in Nashville.

Beyond asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), inhalation therapy is a mainstay in the management of bronchiectasis, cystic fibrosis, and pulmonary artery hypertension. Several US Food and Drug Administration off-label indications for inhalational medications include hypoxia secondary to acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) and intraoperative and postoperative pulmonary hypertension during and following cardiac surgery, respectively.^1-11 Therapeutic delivery of aerosols to the lung may be provided via nebulization, pressurized metered-dose inhalers (pMDI), and other devices (eg, dry powder inhalers, soft-mist inhalers, and smart inhalers).¹² The most common aerosolized medications given in the clinical setting are bronchodilators.¹²

Product selection is often guided by practice guidelines (Table 1), consideration of the formulation’s advantages and disadvantages (Table 2), and/or formulary considerations. For example, current guidelines for COPD state that there is no evidence for superiority of nebulized bronchodilator therapy over handheld devices in patients who can use them properly.² Due to equivalence, nebulized formulations are commonly used in hospitals, emergency departments (EDs) and ambulatory clinics based on the drug’s unit cost. In contrast, a pMDI is often more cost-effective for use in ambulatory patients who are administering multiple doses from the same canister.

The World Health Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommend droplet and contact precautions for all patients suspected or diagnosed with novel coronavirus-19 (COVID-19).^13,14 Airborne precautions must be applied when performing aerosol-generating medical procedures (AGMPs), including but not limited to, open suctioning of the respiratory tract, intubation, bronchoscopy, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Data from the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS-CoV) epidemic suggest that nebulization of medication is also an AGMP.^15-17

Institutions must ensure that their health care workers (HCWs) are wearing appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) including gloves, long-sleeved gowns, eye protection, and fit-tested particulate respirators (N95 mask) for airborne procedures and are carefully discarding PPE after use.^13,14 Due to severe shortages in available respirators in the US supply chain, the CDC has temporarily modified WHO recommendations. Face masks are now an acceptable alternative to protect HCWs from splashes and sprays from procedures not likely to generate aerosols and for cleaning of rooms, although there is no evidence to support this decision.

Internationally, HCWs are falling ill with COVID-19. Data from Italy and Spain show that about 9% to 13% of these countries’ cases are HCWs.^18,19 Within the US, the Ohio health department reports approximately 16% of cases are HCWs.²⁰ It is possible that 20% of frontline HCWs will become infected.²¹ Evolving laboratory research shows that COVID-19 remains viable in aerosols for up to 3 hours postaerosolization, thus making aerosol transmission plausible.²² Nebulizers convert liquids into aerosols and during dispersal may potentially cause secondary inhalation of fugitive emissions.²³ Since interim CDC infection control guidance is to allow only essential personnel to enter the room of patients with COVID-19, many facilities will rely on their frontline nursing staff to clean and disinfect high-touch surfaces following routine care activities.²⁴

Achieving adequate fomite disinfection following viral aerosolization may pose a significant problem for any patient receiving scheduled doses of nebulized medications. Additionally, for personnel who clean rooms following intermittent drug nebulization while wearing PPE that includes a face mask, protection from aerosolized virus may be inadequate. Subsequently, fugitive emissions from nebulized medications may potentially contribute to both nosocomial COVID-19 transmission and viral infections in the medical staff until proven otherwise by studies conducted outside of the laboratory. Prevention of infection in the medical staff is imperative since federal health care systems cannot sustain a significant loss of its workforce.

Recommendations

We recommend that health care systems stop business as usual and adopt public health recommendations issued by Canadian and Hong Kong health care authorities for the management of suspected or confirmed COVID-19 disease.^25-28 We have further clarified and expanded on these interventions. During viral pandemics, prescribers and health care systems should:

1. Deprescribe nebulized therapies on medical wards and intensive care units as an infection control measure. Also avoid use in any outpatient health care setting (eg, community-based clinics, EDs, triage).
2. Avoid initiation of nebulized unproven therapies (eg, n-acetylcysteine, hypertonic saline).¹
3. Use alternative bronchodilator formulations as appropriate (eg, oral β-2 agonist, recognizing its slower onset) before prescribing nebulized agents to patients who are uncooperative or unable to follow directions needed to use a pMDI with a spacer or have experienced a prior poor response to a pMDI with spacer (eg, OptiChamber Diamond, Philips).^25,27
4.  Limit nebulized drug utilization (eg, bronchodilators, epoprostenol) to patients who are on mechanical ventilation and will receive nebulized therapies via a closed system or to patients housed in negative pressure hospital rooms.²² Use a viral filter (eg, Salter Labs system) to decrease the spread of infection for those receiving epoprostenol via face mask.²⁵
5. Adjust procurement practices (eg, pharmacy, logistics) to address the transition from nebulized drugs to alternatives.
6. Add a safety net to the drug-ordering process by restricting new orders for nebulized therapies to the prior authorization process.²⁷ Apply the exclusion criterion of suspected or definite COVID-19.
7. Add a safety net to environmental service practices. Nursing staff should track patients who received ≥ 1 nebulizations via open (before diagnosis) or closed systems so that staff wear suitable PPE to include a N-95 mask while cleaning the room.

Conclusions

To implement the aggressive infection control guidance promulgated here, we recommend collaboration with infection control, pharmacy service (eg, prior authorization team, clinical pharmacy team, and procurement team), respiratory therapy, pulmonary and other critical care physicians, EDs, CPR committee, and other stakeholders. When making significant transitions in clinical care during a viral pandemic, guidelines must be timely, use imperative wording, and consist of easily identifiable education and/or instructions for the affected frontline staff in order to change attitudes.²⁹ Additionally, when transitioning from nebulized bronchodilators to pMDI, educational in-services should be provided to frontline staff to avoid misconceptions regarding pMDI treatment efficacy and patients’ ability to use their pMDI with spacer.³⁰

Acknowledgments

This material is the result of work supported with resources and the use of facilities at the VA Tennessee Valley Healthcare System in Nashville.

The current COVID-19 pandemic has raised substantial anxieties and fears for healthcare workers, many of which they have not previously encountered. Important ethical issues have arisen involving the tension between their duties to their patients and their duties to themselves and to their loved ones. While these fears and duties are not unique to physicians or to members of one specialty, this article will focus on hospitalists. In general, hospitalists have an obligation to care for patients even if this puts them at risk, but duties to patients may at times be constrained by duties to others. At the same time, hospitals have correlative obligations to protect their employees and mitigate risk. Balancing these duties requires weighing benefits and risks, often in the context of considerable uncertainty. At this current time, it is conceivable that the risks may become so great that caring for patients is no longer obligatory but becomes heroic.

Conflicting duties arise in a variety of ways. Hospitalists are at increased risk of contracting the virus, given workplace exposures. The risk of complications is even higher for those who are older or have chronic medical conditions. Further, the shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE) adds to the overall risk. Hospitalists may also have concerns about transmitting the virus to family members or friends, especially to those who are elderly or have comorbidities. Hospitalists may also become physically and emotionally exhausted as work and home demands increase. Concerns for the care of dependents adds to the stress as daycares and schools close and older relatives are isolated in their homes. Hospitalists who are single parents and those whose partners are also healthcare workers are especially affected. The duty to care, encumbered by the cumulative stressors, creates an environment ripe for conflict.

Hospitalists have a duty to expose themselves to some, albeit not unlimited, risks. There are different ways of characterizing this obligation.¹ Some base it in the knowledge and power differential between physicians and patients, a differential increased by patients’ illnesses. Others frame it as a social contract: physicians receive certain benefits and privileges and, in accepting them, incur certain duties. Physicians practicing in the 1980s may recall a similar discussion about treating patients with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), while those who practiced in other countries in the early 2000s faced a similar conflict during the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, caused by another coronavirus.² The expectation of accepting risk may have been weakened in the last several decades, however, by the relative lack of risk in treating hospitalized patients in the United States.

Hospitalists’ duties to themselves and to their families are both intrinsically and instrumentally important. Being a hospitalist is not every hospitalist’s sole or predominant identity. They may also be adult children, spouses, and/or parents, or school board members or leaders in religious communities. Each of these roles entails its own duties and fulfilling them is also important. Effectuating them may, however, be more difficult because of the pandemic. Adult children may feel obligated to shop for their parents and parents of young children may have more childcare obligations. If no one else can fulfill these duties, they might take precedence over professional duties.

By fulfilling their duties to themselves and others, hospitalists may also be enabled to serve their patients. Unlike some discrete events, such as mass shootings or tornados, for which contingency and crisis standards of care may last for hours or days, we may be working under altered standards of care for weeks or months. (A contingency standard of care involves doing things differently in order to produce comparable clinical outcomes. A crisis standard of care is reached when it’s no longer possible to produce comparable clinical outcomes and the focus shifts from individual patient’s best interests or preferences to trying to save the most lives.³) It, therefore, is important we maintain our health and well-being by getting adequate sleep, eating well, and exercising.⁴ Arranging alternative child- and eldercare may reduce distractions at work and decrease the chance of needing to leave work unexpectedly.

In addressing these ethical issues, one of the key considerations is reducing the risks. We can reduce some risks ourselves while maintaining comparable outcomes to our conventional practices. I hope that it would go without saying, for example, that we should not work when we are sick. It is also important that we engage in adequate physical distancing whenever possible. It is important that physical distancing measures be applied equitably to all employees and that the actions hospitalists take to reduce their exposure do not disproportionately burden trainees or other types of providers. Consider, for example, having residents or nurse practitioners examine patients instead of the attending physician. This places subordinates at greater risk. Attending physicians, however, may have the best examination skills and their feedback is integral to trainees’ learning. Modeling a commitment to the duty to care and equitably accepting risk is exceptionally important as team members and leaders.

We can check in with one another and support each other emotionally. If some colleagues have substantially higher risks of complications, they may be assigned alternative duties with lower exposure risks. As a relatively young specialty, this may be more feasible for hospitalists than other specialties with a greater number of older practitioners. Care, however, should be taken to respect individuals’ privacy and confidentiality.

Minimizing risk is also a responsibility of hospitals and the local, state, and federal government. They have crucial roles in, for example, establishing adequate infection control policies and securing sufficient PPE. Many institutions have already moved to contingency standards of care to conserve PPE.⁵ These efforts not only support the duty of reciprocity⁶ but also help maintain an adequate workforce by reducing sick leave. The government’s apparent failure to fulfill its obligation to stockpile and distribute adequate equipment is currently being acutely felt.⁷

There are other potential actions that facilities can take, such as providing scrubs, child- and eldercare, housing, or life insurance. Individuals may be concerned about infecting family members. There is unfortunately limited data about spread on objects or asymptomatic spread, but these are reasonable possibilities. Facilities can provide scrubs to employees who do not normally wear them to provide a further barrier between the facility and the employees’ homes. They can provide child and elder care. It has been wonderful to see local community organizations and groups of medical students provide childcare for healthcare workers and other essential employees.⁸ Healthcare facilities could also consider providing temporary housing to staff with family members at high risk of complications. During the Ebola outbreak, some facilities provided supplemental disability and life insurance to staff who volunteered to put themselves at risk to help assure that their families would be provided for if the staff member unfortunately contracted the virus and became disabled or died.

Reciprocal duties to healthcare workers in a crisis standard of care are unresolved. Establishing ethically and clinically sound ventilator triage criteria is complex.^9,10 Some argue that healthcare providers should have some degree of priority. One argument is that if they recover, they can return to work and save more lives. (Having individuals who have recovered and are theoretically immune treat patients without PPE is one proposed conservation strategy.) It is, however, unclear whether individuals are likely to recover in enough time to return to work while we are still in a crisis standard of care. A different argument is that healthcare workers should be given priority because they accepted risk. This assumes they were infected at work and not in the community. While this argument has merit, it could be influenced by or perceived to be influenced by self-interest. Prioritizing healthcare workers for scarce resources requires substantial community support.¹¹

While providers have a duty to accept some risks, this duty is not unlimited. The mitigation strategies may be unsuccessful, and the risks substantial. One can think of analogies in other fields. Firefighters, for example, expose themselves to risk to save lives and to protect property. They are trained to take calculated risks, considering the likelihood and type of benefit and the degree of risk, but not to be reckless. They will take greater risk to save a life than property, and less risk if the victim is unlikely to survive. Their obligation to accept risk is not unlimited. They may justifiably choose not to enter a building, which is at significant, imminent risk of collapse, to protect property. The same is true for physicians. They are obligated to expose themselves to some risk, but not at a high likelihood of serious injury or death. At some point the duty to care for patients becomes supererogatory; fulfilling the duty is no longer required but becomes optional and doing so is heroic.¹² Some facilities, for example, will not perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation under a crisis standard of care due to the high risk of exposure and the low likelihood of success.¹³

Weighing potential benefits and risk is difficult. This difficulty is exacerbated by uncertainty. Some decisions would be easier, for example, if there was better evidence regarding asymptomatic spread. Finally, the subjectivity of some of these decisions raises concerns about unconscious bias or self-interest. It is therefore valuable to make some decisions collectively rather than individually. In particular, it is important to include those with adequate situation awareness. Conversely, once decisions are made, it is valuable to communicate both the decision and its rationale, and to be open to revising them based on feedback.

Given the fear and uncertainty generated by the pandemic, some individuals may be tempted to act unethically. Individuals have, unfortunately, taken hospital supplies, such as masks and hand sanitizer, for household use, and healthcare providers have hoarded medications, such as hydroxychloroquine.¹⁴ Individuals may also be tempted to use PPE for encounters when it is not indicated. We should address these fears and anxieties in other ways, such as discussing them with colleagues, chaplains, social workers, or employee assistance programs. If you observe coworkers acting in a manner that appears to be unethical, it is important to address their behavior while still giving them the benefit of the doubt. If you do not receive a satisfactory response, you should utilize the appropriate chain of command.

Most hospitalists are encountering situations that they have not previously experienced in their careers. These situations generate significant fear and anxiety. Many of these situations involve tensions between our duties to our patients and our duties to ourselves and to our families and friends. This tension is heightened for individuals who are older or have chronic health conditions or have family members who are. While healthcare providers have an obligation to accept some risks, this duty is not unlimited. Hospitals, healthcare systems, and governments have reciprocal obligations to keep providers safe. It is important to think creatively about ways to minimize risk. Due to uncertainty and self-interest, it may be better to make decisions collectively and transparently.

The current COVID-19 pandemic has raised substantial anxieties and fears for healthcare workers, many of which they have not previously encountered. Important ethical issues have arisen involving the tension between their duties to their patients and their duties to themselves and to their loved ones. While these fears and duties are not unique to physicians or to members of one specialty, this article will focus on hospitalists. In general, hospitalists have an obligation to care for patients even if this puts them at risk, but duties to patients may at times be constrained by duties to others. At the same time, hospitals have correlative obligations to protect their employees and mitigate risk. Balancing these duties requires weighing benefits and risks, often in the context of considerable uncertainty. At this current time, it is conceivable that the risks may become so great that caring for patients is no longer obligatory but becomes heroic.

Conflicting duties arise in a variety of ways. Hospitalists are at increased risk of contracting the virus, given workplace exposures. The risk of complications is even higher for those who are older or have chronic medical conditions. Further, the shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE) adds to the overall risk. Hospitalists may also have concerns about transmitting the virus to family members or friends, especially to those who are elderly or have comorbidities. Hospitalists may also become physically and emotionally exhausted as work and home demands increase. Concerns for the care of dependents adds to the stress as daycares and schools close and older relatives are isolated in their homes. Hospitalists who are single parents and those whose partners are also healthcare workers are especially affected. The duty to care, encumbered by the cumulative stressors, creates an environment ripe for conflict.

Hospitalists have a duty to expose themselves to some, albeit not unlimited, risks. There are different ways of characterizing this obligation.¹ Some base it in the knowledge and power differential between physicians and patients, a differential increased by patients’ illnesses. Others frame it as a social contract: physicians receive certain benefits and privileges and, in accepting them, incur certain duties. Physicians practicing in the 1980s may recall a similar discussion about treating patients with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), while those who practiced in other countries in the early 2000s faced a similar conflict during the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, caused by another coronavirus.² The expectation of accepting risk may have been weakened in the last several decades, however, by the relative lack of risk in treating hospitalized patients in the United States.

Hospitalists’ duties to themselves and to their families are both intrinsically and instrumentally important. Being a hospitalist is not every hospitalist’s sole or predominant identity. They may also be adult children, spouses, and/or parents, or school board members or leaders in religious communities. Each of these roles entails its own duties and fulfilling them is also important. Effectuating them may, however, be more difficult because of the pandemic. Adult children may feel obligated to shop for their parents and parents of young children may have more childcare obligations. If no one else can fulfill these duties, they might take precedence over professional duties.

By fulfilling their duties to themselves and others, hospitalists may also be enabled to serve their patients. Unlike some discrete events, such as mass shootings or tornados, for which contingency and crisis standards of care may last for hours or days, we may be working under altered standards of care for weeks or months. (A contingency standard of care involves doing things differently in order to produce comparable clinical outcomes. A crisis standard of care is reached when it’s no longer possible to produce comparable clinical outcomes and the focus shifts from individual patient’s best interests or preferences to trying to save the most lives.³) It, therefore, is important we maintain our health and well-being by getting adequate sleep, eating well, and exercising.⁴ Arranging alternative child- and eldercare may reduce distractions at work and decrease the chance of needing to leave work unexpectedly.

In addressing these ethical issues, one of the key considerations is reducing the risks. We can reduce some risks ourselves while maintaining comparable outcomes to our conventional practices. I hope that it would go without saying, for example, that we should not work when we are sick. It is also important that we engage in adequate physical distancing whenever possible. It is important that physical distancing measures be applied equitably to all employees and that the actions hospitalists take to reduce their exposure do not disproportionately burden trainees or other types of providers. Consider, for example, having residents or nurse practitioners examine patients instead of the attending physician. This places subordinates at greater risk. Attending physicians, however, may have the best examination skills and their feedback is integral to trainees’ learning. Modeling a commitment to the duty to care and equitably accepting risk is exceptionally important as team members and leaders.

We can check in with one another and support each other emotionally. If some colleagues have substantially higher risks of complications, they may be assigned alternative duties with lower exposure risks. As a relatively young specialty, this may be more feasible for hospitalists than other specialties with a greater number of older practitioners. Care, however, should be taken to respect individuals’ privacy and confidentiality.

Minimizing risk is also a responsibility of hospitals and the local, state, and federal government. They have crucial roles in, for example, establishing adequate infection control policies and securing sufficient PPE. Many institutions have already moved to contingency standards of care to conserve PPE.⁵ These efforts not only support the duty of reciprocity⁶ but also help maintain an adequate workforce by reducing sick leave. The government’s apparent failure to fulfill its obligation to stockpile and distribute adequate equipment is currently being acutely felt.⁷

There are other potential actions that facilities can take, such as providing scrubs, child- and eldercare, housing, or life insurance. Individuals may be concerned about infecting family members. There is unfortunately limited data about spread on objects or asymptomatic spread, but these are reasonable possibilities. Facilities can provide scrubs to employees who do not normally wear them to provide a further barrier between the facility and the employees’ homes. They can provide child and elder care. It has been wonderful to see local community organizations and groups of medical students provide childcare for healthcare workers and other essential employees.⁸ Healthcare facilities could also consider providing temporary housing to staff with family members at high risk of complications. During the Ebola outbreak, some facilities provided supplemental disability and life insurance to staff who volunteered to put themselves at risk to help assure that their families would be provided for if the staff member unfortunately contracted the virus and became disabled or died.

Reciprocal duties to healthcare workers in a crisis standard of care are unresolved. Establishing ethically and clinically sound ventilator triage criteria is complex.^9,10 Some argue that healthcare providers should have some degree of priority. One argument is that if they recover, they can return to work and save more lives. (Having individuals who have recovered and are theoretically immune treat patients without PPE is one proposed conservation strategy.) It is, however, unclear whether individuals are likely to recover in enough time to return to work while we are still in a crisis standard of care. A different argument is that healthcare workers should be given priority because they accepted risk. This assumes they were infected at work and not in the community. While this argument has merit, it could be influenced by or perceived to be influenced by self-interest. Prioritizing healthcare workers for scarce resources requires substantial community support.¹¹

While providers have a duty to accept some risks, this duty is not unlimited. The mitigation strategies may be unsuccessful, and the risks substantial. One can think of analogies in other fields. Firefighters, for example, expose themselves to risk to save lives and to protect property. They are trained to take calculated risks, considering the likelihood and type of benefit and the degree of risk, but not to be reckless. They will take greater risk to save a life than property, and less risk if the victim is unlikely to survive. Their obligation to accept risk is not unlimited. They may justifiably choose not to enter a building, which is at significant, imminent risk of collapse, to protect property. The same is true for physicians. They are obligated to expose themselves to some risk, but not at a high likelihood of serious injury or death. At some point the duty to care for patients becomes supererogatory; fulfilling the duty is no longer required but becomes optional and doing so is heroic.¹² Some facilities, for example, will not perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation under a crisis standard of care due to the high risk of exposure and the low likelihood of success.¹³

Weighing potential benefits and risk is difficult. This difficulty is exacerbated by uncertainty. Some decisions would be easier, for example, if there was better evidence regarding asymptomatic spread. Finally, the subjectivity of some of these decisions raises concerns about unconscious bias or self-interest. It is therefore valuable to make some decisions collectively rather than individually. In particular, it is important to include those with adequate situation awareness. Conversely, once decisions are made, it is valuable to communicate both the decision and its rationale, and to be open to revising them based on feedback.

Given the fear and uncertainty generated by the pandemic, some individuals may be tempted to act unethically. Individuals have, unfortunately, taken hospital supplies, such as masks and hand sanitizer, for household use, and healthcare providers have hoarded medications, such as hydroxychloroquine.¹⁴ Individuals may also be tempted to use PPE for encounters when it is not indicated. We should address these fears and anxieties in other ways, such as discussing them with colleagues, chaplains, social workers, or employee assistance programs. If you observe coworkers acting in a manner that appears to be unethical, it is important to address their behavior while still giving them the benefit of the doubt. If you do not receive a satisfactory response, you should utilize the appropriate chain of command.

Most hospitalists are encountering situations that they have not previously experienced in their careers. These situations generate significant fear and anxiety. Many of these situations involve tensions between our duties to our patients and our duties to ourselves and to our families and friends. This tension is heightened for individuals who are older or have chronic health conditions or have family members who are. While healthcare providers have an obligation to accept some risks, this duty is not unlimited. Hospitals, healthcare systems, and governments have reciprocal obligations to keep providers safe. It is important to think creatively about ways to minimize risk. Due to uncertainty and self-interest, it may be better to make decisions collectively and transparently.

The current COVID-19 pandemic has raised substantial anxieties and fears for healthcare workers, many of which they have not previously encountered. Important ethical issues have arisen involving the tension between their duties to their patients and their duties to themselves and to their loved ones. While these fears and duties are not unique to physicians or to members of one specialty, this article will focus on hospitalists. In general, hospitalists have an obligation to care for patients even if this puts them at risk, but duties to patients may at times be constrained by duties to others. At the same time, hospitals have correlative obligations to protect their employees and mitigate risk. Balancing these duties requires weighing benefits and risks, often in the context of considerable uncertainty. At this current time, it is conceivable that the risks may become so great that caring for patients is no longer obligatory but becomes heroic.

Conflicting duties arise in a variety of ways. Hospitalists are at increased risk of contracting the virus, given workplace exposures. The risk of complications is even higher for those who are older or have chronic medical conditions. Further, the shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE) adds to the overall risk. Hospitalists may also have concerns about transmitting the virus to family members or friends, especially to those who are elderly or have comorbidities. Hospitalists may also become physically and emotionally exhausted as work and home demands increase. Concerns for the care of dependents adds to the stress as daycares and schools close and older relatives are isolated in their homes. Hospitalists who are single parents and those whose partners are also healthcare workers are especially affected. The duty to care, encumbered by the cumulative stressors, creates an environment ripe for conflict.

Hospitalists have a duty to expose themselves to some, albeit not unlimited, risks. There are different ways of characterizing this obligation.¹ Some base it in the knowledge and power differential between physicians and patients, a differential increased by patients’ illnesses. Others frame it as a social contract: physicians receive certain benefits and privileges and, in accepting them, incur certain duties. Physicians practicing in the 1980s may recall a similar discussion about treating patients with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), while those who practiced in other countries in the early 2000s faced a similar conflict during the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, caused by another coronavirus.² The expectation of accepting risk may have been weakened in the last several decades, however, by the relative lack of risk in treating hospitalized patients in the United States.

Hospitalists’ duties to themselves and to their families are both intrinsically and instrumentally important. Being a hospitalist is not every hospitalist’s sole or predominant identity. They may also be adult children, spouses, and/or parents, or school board members or leaders in religious communities. Each of these roles entails its own duties and fulfilling them is also important. Effectuating them may, however, be more difficult because of the pandemic. Adult children may feel obligated to shop for their parents and parents of young children may have more childcare obligations. If no one else can fulfill these duties, they might take precedence over professional duties.

By fulfilling their duties to themselves and others, hospitalists may also be enabled to serve their patients. Unlike some discrete events, such as mass shootings or tornados, for which contingency and crisis standards of care may last for hours or days, we may be working under altered standards of care for weeks or months. (A contingency standard of care involves doing things differently in order to produce comparable clinical outcomes. A crisis standard of care is reached when it’s no longer possible to produce comparable clinical outcomes and the focus shifts from individual patient’s best interests or preferences to trying to save the most lives.³) It, therefore, is important we maintain our health and well-being by getting adequate sleep, eating well, and exercising.⁴ Arranging alternative child- and eldercare may reduce distractions at work and decrease the chance of needing to leave work unexpectedly.

In addressing these ethical issues, one of the key considerations is reducing the risks. We can reduce some risks ourselves while maintaining comparable outcomes to our conventional practices. I hope that it would go without saying, for example, that we should not work when we are sick. It is also important that we engage in adequate physical distancing whenever possible. It is important that physical distancing measures be applied equitably to all employees and that the actions hospitalists take to reduce their exposure do not disproportionately burden trainees or other types of providers. Consider, for example, having residents or nurse practitioners examine patients instead of the attending physician. This places subordinates at greater risk. Attending physicians, however, may have the best examination skills and their feedback is integral to trainees’ learning. Modeling a commitment to the duty to care and equitably accepting risk is exceptionally important as team members and leaders.

We can check in with one another and support each other emotionally. If some colleagues have substantially higher risks of complications, they may be assigned alternative duties with lower exposure risks. As a relatively young specialty, this may be more feasible for hospitalists than other specialties with a greater number of older practitioners. Care, however, should be taken to respect individuals’ privacy and confidentiality.

Minimizing risk is also a responsibility of hospitals and the local, state, and federal government. They have crucial roles in, for example, establishing adequate infection control policies and securing sufficient PPE. Many institutions have already moved to contingency standards of care to conserve PPE.⁵ These efforts not only support the duty of reciprocity⁶ but also help maintain an adequate workforce by reducing sick leave. The government’s apparent failure to fulfill its obligation to stockpile and distribute adequate equipment is currently being acutely felt.⁷

There are other potential actions that facilities can take, such as providing scrubs, child- and eldercare, housing, or life insurance. Individuals may be concerned about infecting family members. There is unfortunately limited data about spread on objects or asymptomatic spread, but these are reasonable possibilities. Facilities can provide scrubs to employees who do not normally wear them to provide a further barrier between the facility and the employees’ homes. They can provide child and elder care. It has been wonderful to see local community organizations and groups of medical students provide childcare for healthcare workers and other essential employees.⁸ Healthcare facilities could also consider providing temporary housing to staff with family members at high risk of complications. During the Ebola outbreak, some facilities provided supplemental disability and life insurance to staff who volunteered to put themselves at risk to help assure that their families would be provided for if the staff member unfortunately contracted the virus and became disabled or died.

Reciprocal duties to healthcare workers in a crisis standard of care are unresolved. Establishing ethically and clinically sound ventilator triage criteria is complex.^9,10 Some argue that healthcare providers should have some degree of priority. One argument is that if they recover, they can return to work and save more lives. (Having individuals who have recovered and are theoretically immune treat patients without PPE is one proposed conservation strategy.) It is, however, unclear whether individuals are likely to recover in enough time to return to work while we are still in a crisis standard of care. A different argument is that healthcare workers should be given priority because they accepted risk. This assumes they were infected at work and not in the community. While this argument has merit, it could be influenced by or perceived to be influenced by self-interest. Prioritizing healthcare workers for scarce resources requires substantial community support.¹¹

While providers have a duty to accept some risks, this duty is not unlimited. The mitigation strategies may be unsuccessful, and the risks substantial. One can think of analogies in other fields. Firefighters, for example, expose themselves to risk to save lives and to protect property. They are trained to take calculated risks, considering the likelihood and type of benefit and the degree of risk, but not to be reckless. They will take greater risk to save a life than property, and less risk if the victim is unlikely to survive. Their obligation to accept risk is not unlimited. They may justifiably choose not to enter a building, which is at significant, imminent risk of collapse, to protect property. The same is true for physicians. They are obligated to expose themselves to some risk, but not at a high likelihood of serious injury or death. At some point the duty to care for patients becomes supererogatory; fulfilling the duty is no longer required but becomes optional and doing so is heroic.¹² Some facilities, for example, will not perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation under a crisis standard of care due to the high risk of exposure and the low likelihood of success.¹³

Weighing potential benefits and risk is difficult. This difficulty is exacerbated by uncertainty. Some decisions would be easier, for example, if there was better evidence regarding asymptomatic spread. Finally, the subjectivity of some of these decisions raises concerns about unconscious bias or self-interest. It is therefore valuable to make some decisions collectively rather than individually. In particular, it is important to include those with adequate situation awareness. Conversely, once decisions are made, it is valuable to communicate both the decision and its rationale, and to be open to revising them based on feedback.

Given the fear and uncertainty generated by the pandemic, some individuals may be tempted to act unethically. Individuals have, unfortunately, taken hospital supplies, such as masks and hand sanitizer, for household use, and healthcare providers have hoarded medications, such as hydroxychloroquine.¹⁴ Individuals may also be tempted to use PPE for encounters when it is not indicated. We should address these fears and anxieties in other ways, such as discussing them with colleagues, chaplains, social workers, or employee assistance programs. If you observe coworkers acting in a manner that appears to be unethical, it is important to address their behavior while still giving them the benefit of the doubt. If you do not receive a satisfactory response, you should utilize the appropriate chain of command.

Most hospitalists are encountering situations that they have not previously experienced in their careers. These situations generate significant fear and anxiety. Many of these situations involve tensions between our duties to our patients and our duties to ourselves and to our families and friends. This tension is heightened for individuals who are older or have chronic health conditions or have family members who are. While healthcare providers have an obligation to accept some risks, this duty is not unlimited. Hospitals, healthcare systems, and governments have reciprocal obligations to keep providers safe. It is important to think creatively about ways to minimize risk. Due to uncertainty and self-interest, it may be better to make decisions collectively and transparently.

A few days ago, I had a heartfelt conversation with my good friend Dr Omayra Mansfield. Dr Mansfield has been an Emergency Department Physician for more than 12 years. She is also the wife of another physician and the mother of two young children, the recently appointed Chief Medical Officer at a hospital at AdventHealth, and one of the first graduates of the Physician Leader Development Course I teach.

“During the leadership course, you always provided examples of how physicians are like soldiers,” she began. She reminded me of my words describing how both doctors and soldiers are part of a professional body, how both have a cherished ethos and a set of directing values to guide both their path and their actions as a very special part of our society, and how of all the professions in our society, the military and medicine are the only two that deal in life and death, albeit in very different ways.

She had certainly paid attention in our seminars. Now, as she and her team faced the COVID-19 pandemic, she realized their daily challenges are expanding and they are now going to war. The leadership discussions that had sparked so much debate in our colloquia had now become real.

Dr Mansfield explained that beyond caring for patients, one of her key concerns was the physical and emotional well-­being of the clinical staff at her hospital: the physicians, nurses, technicians, and clinicians under her care. Getting to her point, she asked if I might have any suggestions based on my time and experiences in combat that might be helpful to her as she “cared for her troops” as they faced the battle ahead.

Her request was a good one. Lessons from my military past immediately rushed to my mind. I started scribbling and came up with a Top Ten list of recommendations for anyone going into a tough fight. Here’s what I sent to her:

1. Find a battle-buddy. On the first day of Army basic training, drill sergeants pair new recruits with one another. That’s primarily for accountability purposes throughout the weeks of training—to ensure soldiers hold each other responsible for getting to the right place, at the right time, in the right uniform—but it’s also part of a larger psychological dynamic related to building teams and mutual support within organizations. Your battle-buddy is charged with keeping you out of trouble, having your back, and being there when you need it most. In combat, battle-buddies do all those things and then some; they protect you from harm in so many other ways. Healthcare providers during this crisis will sometimes feel all alone, and they need to rely on someone else to help them when times get really tough. Having a battle-buddy—for those at the healthcare team level, of course, but also among those at the level of clinical director, hospital administrator, CMO, or even CEO—will help get you through the tough times and provide sanity when you need it the most. So my first piece of advice: Find a battle-buddy.
2. Plan and prepare for things you don’t expect will happen. During a preparatory training exercise for our unit’s deployment to Iraq during the surge, when we thought the exercise was about to end, the trainers surprised us with a final crisis we had to solve. According to the scenario, Al Qaida had blown up a major bridge in our area, causing dire logistical problems for the security forces and challenges to the population as they brought their goods to market. I remember my initial reaction: “They don’t have the strength to do that. This’ll never happen,” I said to the Chief of Staff under my breath, as we started developing the required drill to counter the action and please the trainers. I quickly forgot about that lesson, until after we deployed. Two weeks into our 15-month tour in Iraq, the enemy blew the exact bridge that was part of the scenario, causing the exact problems that were predicted. Because we had prepared for the unexpected, we were able to quickly repair the bridge, reestablish the logistics flow, and satisfy the worried population. The lesson: Teams can hope for the best, but it’s always important to prepare for the worst—a lack of equipment, a key member of the team not being available to contribute, an overwhelming surge of patients—and then develop a plan to mitigate it. Take time to reflect, and ask yourself, What is the worst that can happen, what can the “enemy” do to disrupt our lives, and how do we prepare to counter it?
3. Get everyone into the fight. In every organizations, it’s often true that some people take on too much and try and do it all themselves, others do only what they’re told to do, there’s the unique few who want to contribute but don’t know how they can to help, and then there’s some who even attempt to avoid contributing at all. It’s important for leaders to know who on their team fits each of these categories. It’s even more critical for leaders to be able to find ways to relieve the overworked, assign tasks to those who might not know their role, bring those who want to contribute into the fold, and cross-train teams to help relieve those who are exhausted. Leaders must look across their “battlespace” and ensure everyone is contributing. Leaders assign everyone tasks and do their best to level—and lighten—the load of the overworked.
4. “Fatigue makes cowards of us all.” During any type of crisis, the body and mind will rapidly break down from lack of sleep, emotional strain, or overwhelming stress. While a 12-hour shift in a hospital is exceedingly tough even during normal operations, the COVID-19 crisis will demand dramatically more of all the members of any healthcare team. For that reason, leaders must incorporate rest cycles, team rotations, and half-days away from the hospitals even when all hands are on deck, as well as consider reducing shift times, if possible. Many who have experienced the disease in hot spots say this is really tough, but not attempting to plan for this will cause eventual breakdown and dysfunction. Take a break, do all you can to maintain a modicum of balance, and get away for a while.
5. Take time to huddle. Communication and information are always key, but especially critical during any crisis. One technique that has proven valuable, beyond meetings and shift changes, is a preshift and postshift huddle. Different from the formal passing of critical information, the huddle is a brief opportunity for teams to pass informal information, look each other in the eye, and perhaps even pray together. As a two-star general, I did that every morning in combat with my small team of sergeants, captains, and privates before we left the headquarters to visit units, and it gave us all the power of knowing we had shared information, and we had a common operating picture. It gave us strength. During a crisis, all kinds of communication, formal and informal, are key.
6. This ain’t peacetime. In a crisis, the enemy gets a vote. If leaders don’t find ways to counter the enemy’s action (and fast!), they’ll be behind the curve! It’s important to find the techniques and procedures that are bureaucratic (or even dumb) and overturn or eliminate them quickly. Decisions must be made with alacrity and with an understood flow, and people must be assigned responsibilities and held accountable to make things happen. In a crisis, speed in action will almost always trump perfection in understanding. Stay calm but ensure that those who might not understand this come around to the dynamics associated with the threat. A crisis isn’t the time for business as usual.
7. Force adaptation—don’t wait ’til things are over to adjust. In a crisis, faults and disconnects in techniques and procedures often bubble to the surface and cause consternation. Don’t wait for a break in the action to adjust and find new ways to do things because a break in the action will usually never happen. The military has an expression: “Those who adapt the fastest on the battlefield win.” Find ways to look for and then publicize your methods of adaptation to the team, pin the rose on someone to ensure the changes are made, and then have someone make a historical record so other teams might also learn from your scar tissue. Lessons from the fight must be incorporated by the organization, or they’re not “lessons learned.”
8. Talkin’ ain’t fightin’. During a crisis, it’s important to establish techniques of verbal shorthand between the members of a team, and everyone must know their responsibilities and required actions. In the military, this is called a battle drill; in medicine, you know it as a code. In these situations, leaders must find ways to pass information quickly, and the reaction should be immediate response. In a crisis, normal process must take on the dynamics of a “code.” All members of the team must understand that there are just times when things can’t be explained, but it’s also important that leaders know when to use this abbreviated format. Explain when you can, but act when you must.
9. Cherish your teams. Every single team will experience things that human beings aren’t designed or meant to handle—even those in the medical profession, who likely thought they had seen it all. There will be repeated and overwhelming trauma, with the expected emotional reactions. The approach during these situations requires empathy, humility, emotional understanding, and validation. Praise your team at every opportunity, find ways to turn mistakes into learning opportunities, but most importantly be human and find ways to provide memories that your team can cherish and look back upon. Give them memories.
10. Leaders don’t have the right to have a bad day. In 2004, after a 12-month deployment in Iraq, our unit was on our way home. We had been a long time away from our families, and we had experienced some tough fighting. A third of our unit had already returned to their families in Germany when we were told we would be extended because of a changing situation on the ground. A wave of frustration went through our 18,000 soldiers. Our commander then pulled us together, communicated our new mission, and told us he was also disappointed, but it was time we had to show our grit by getting those soldiers who had already returned to Europe back, unpack our equipment, and return to the fight. Then he said something I will always remember: “It’s tough, but understand your soldiers are looking at you to lead in this crisis … and leaders don’t have the right to have a bad day.” He didn’t mean we couldn’t be frustrated, or disappointed, or emotional, or even pissed off. He meant we just couldn’t show it when others were around. That’s one of the toughest things about leading during a crisis: The unimaginable is expected of leaders. And leaders have to be ready to lead.

All this advice may seem like philosophical musings rather than pragmatic thoughts for a crisis, but hopefully this advice will make a difference as healthcare providers tackle the issues ahead. Stay healthy, mitigate risks, but know that the calm provided by leaders will make a difference.

A few days ago, I had a heartfelt conversation with my good friend Dr Omayra Mansfield. Dr Mansfield has been an Emergency Department Physician for more than 12 years. She is also the wife of another physician and the mother of two young children, the recently appointed Chief Medical Officer at a hospital at AdventHealth, and one of the first graduates of the Physician Leader Development Course I teach.

“During the leadership course, you always provided examples of how physicians are like soldiers,” she began. She reminded me of my words describing how both doctors and soldiers are part of a professional body, how both have a cherished ethos and a set of directing values to guide both their path and their actions as a very special part of our society, and how of all the professions in our society, the military and medicine are the only two that deal in life and death, albeit in very different ways.

She had certainly paid attention in our seminars. Now, as she and her team faced the COVID-19 pandemic, she realized their daily challenges are expanding and they are now going to war. The leadership discussions that had sparked so much debate in our colloquia had now become real.

Dr Mansfield explained that beyond caring for patients, one of her key concerns was the physical and emotional well-­being of the clinical staff at her hospital: the physicians, nurses, technicians, and clinicians under her care. Getting to her point, she asked if I might have any suggestions based on my time and experiences in combat that might be helpful to her as she “cared for her troops” as they faced the battle ahead.

Her request was a good one. Lessons from my military past immediately rushed to my mind. I started scribbling and came up with a Top Ten list of recommendations for anyone going into a tough fight. Here’s what I sent to her:

1. Find a battle-buddy. On the first day of Army basic training, drill sergeants pair new recruits with one another. That’s primarily for accountability purposes throughout the weeks of training—to ensure soldiers hold each other responsible for getting to the right place, at the right time, in the right uniform—but it’s also part of a larger psychological dynamic related to building teams and mutual support within organizations. Your battle-buddy is charged with keeping you out of trouble, having your back, and being there when you need it most. In combat, battle-buddies do all those things and then some; they protect you from harm in so many other ways. Healthcare providers during this crisis will sometimes feel all alone, and they need to rely on someone else to help them when times get really tough. Having a battle-buddy—for those at the healthcare team level, of course, but also among those at the level of clinical director, hospital administrator, CMO, or even CEO—will help get you through the tough times and provide sanity when you need it the most. So my first piece of advice: Find a battle-buddy.
2. Plan and prepare for things you don’t expect will happen. During a preparatory training exercise for our unit’s deployment to Iraq during the surge, when we thought the exercise was about to end, the trainers surprised us with a final crisis we had to solve. According to the scenario, Al Qaida had blown up a major bridge in our area, causing dire logistical problems for the security forces and challenges to the population as they brought their goods to market. I remember my initial reaction: “They don’t have the strength to do that. This’ll never happen,” I said to the Chief of Staff under my breath, as we started developing the required drill to counter the action and please the trainers. I quickly forgot about that lesson, until after we deployed. Two weeks into our 15-month tour in Iraq, the enemy blew the exact bridge that was part of the scenario, causing the exact problems that were predicted. Because we had prepared for the unexpected, we were able to quickly repair the bridge, reestablish the logistics flow, and satisfy the worried population. The lesson: Teams can hope for the best, but it’s always important to prepare for the worst—a lack of equipment, a key member of the team not being available to contribute, an overwhelming surge of patients—and then develop a plan to mitigate it. Take time to reflect, and ask yourself, What is the worst that can happen, what can the “enemy” do to disrupt our lives, and how do we prepare to counter it?
3. Get everyone into the fight. In every organizations, it’s often true that some people take on too much and try and do it all themselves, others do only what they’re told to do, there’s the unique few who want to contribute but don’t know how they can to help, and then there’s some who even attempt to avoid contributing at all. It’s important for leaders to know who on their team fits each of these categories. It’s even more critical for leaders to be able to find ways to relieve the overworked, assign tasks to those who might not know their role, bring those who want to contribute into the fold, and cross-train teams to help relieve those who are exhausted. Leaders must look across their “battlespace” and ensure everyone is contributing. Leaders assign everyone tasks and do their best to level—and lighten—the load of the overworked.
4. “Fatigue makes cowards of us all.” During any type of crisis, the body and mind will rapidly break down from lack of sleep, emotional strain, or overwhelming stress. While a 12-hour shift in a hospital is exceedingly tough even during normal operations, the COVID-19 crisis will demand dramatically more of all the members of any healthcare team. For that reason, leaders must incorporate rest cycles, team rotations, and half-days away from the hospitals even when all hands are on deck, as well as consider reducing shift times, if possible. Many who have experienced the disease in hot spots say this is really tough, but not attempting to plan for this will cause eventual breakdown and dysfunction. Take a break, do all you can to maintain a modicum of balance, and get away for a while.
5. Take time to huddle. Communication and information are always key, but especially critical during any crisis. One technique that has proven valuable, beyond meetings and shift changes, is a preshift and postshift huddle. Different from the formal passing of critical information, the huddle is a brief opportunity for teams to pass informal information, look each other in the eye, and perhaps even pray together. As a two-star general, I did that every morning in combat with my small team of sergeants, captains, and privates before we left the headquarters to visit units, and it gave us all the power of knowing we had shared information, and we had a common operating picture. It gave us strength. During a crisis, all kinds of communication, formal and informal, are key.
6. This ain’t peacetime. In a crisis, the enemy gets a vote. If leaders don’t find ways to counter the enemy’s action (and fast!), they’ll be behind the curve! It’s important to find the techniques and procedures that are bureaucratic (or even dumb) and overturn or eliminate them quickly. Decisions must be made with alacrity and with an understood flow, and people must be assigned responsibilities and held accountable to make things happen. In a crisis, speed in action will almost always trump perfection in understanding. Stay calm but ensure that those who might not understand this come around to the dynamics associated with the threat. A crisis isn’t the time for business as usual.
7. Force adaptation—don’t wait ’til things are over to adjust. In a crisis, faults and disconnects in techniques and procedures often bubble to the surface and cause consternation. Don’t wait for a break in the action to adjust and find new ways to do things because a break in the action will usually never happen. The military has an expression: “Those who adapt the fastest on the battlefield win.” Find ways to look for and then publicize your methods of adaptation to the team, pin the rose on someone to ensure the changes are made, and then have someone make a historical record so other teams might also learn from your scar tissue. Lessons from the fight must be incorporated by the organization, or they’re not “lessons learned.”
8. Talkin’ ain’t fightin’. During a crisis, it’s important to establish techniques of verbal shorthand between the members of a team, and everyone must know their responsibilities and required actions. In the military, this is called a battle drill; in medicine, you know it as a code. In these situations, leaders must find ways to pass information quickly, and the reaction should be immediate response. In a crisis, normal process must take on the dynamics of a “code.” All members of the team must understand that there are just times when things can’t be explained, but it’s also important that leaders know when to use this abbreviated format. Explain when you can, but act when you must.
9. Cherish your teams. Every single team will experience things that human beings aren’t designed or meant to handle—even those in the medical profession, who likely thought they had seen it all. There will be repeated and overwhelming trauma, with the expected emotional reactions. The approach during these situations requires empathy, humility, emotional understanding, and validation. Praise your team at every opportunity, find ways to turn mistakes into learning opportunities, but most importantly be human and find ways to provide memories that your team can cherish and look back upon. Give them memories.
10. Leaders don’t have the right to have a bad day. In 2004, after a 12-month deployment in Iraq, our unit was on our way home. We had been a long time away from our families, and we had experienced some tough fighting. A third of our unit had already returned to their families in Germany when we were told we would be extended because of a changing situation on the ground. A wave of frustration went through our 18,000 soldiers. Our commander then pulled us together, communicated our new mission, and told us he was also disappointed, but it was time we had to show our grit by getting those soldiers who had already returned to Europe back, unpack our equipment, and return to the fight. Then he said something I will always remember: “It’s tough, but understand your soldiers are looking at you to lead in this crisis … and leaders don’t have the right to have a bad day.” He didn’t mean we couldn’t be frustrated, or disappointed, or emotional, or even pissed off. He meant we just couldn’t show it when others were around. That’s one of the toughest things about leading during a crisis: The unimaginable is expected of leaders. And leaders have to be ready to lead.

All this advice may seem like philosophical musings rather than pragmatic thoughts for a crisis, but hopefully this advice will make a difference as healthcare providers tackle the issues ahead. Stay healthy, mitigate risks, but know that the calm provided by leaders will make a difference.

A few days ago, I had a heartfelt conversation with my good friend Dr Omayra Mansfield. Dr Mansfield has been an Emergency Department Physician for more than 12 years. She is also the wife of another physician and the mother of two young children, the recently appointed Chief Medical Officer at a hospital at AdventHealth, and one of the first graduates of the Physician Leader Development Course I teach.

“During the leadership course, you always provided examples of how physicians are like soldiers,” she began. She reminded me of my words describing how both doctors and soldiers are part of a professional body, how both have a cherished ethos and a set of directing values to guide both their path and their actions as a very special part of our society, and how of all the professions in our society, the military and medicine are the only two that deal in life and death, albeit in very different ways.

She had certainly paid attention in our seminars. Now, as she and her team faced the COVID-19 pandemic, she realized their daily challenges are expanding and they are now going to war. The leadership discussions that had sparked so much debate in our colloquia had now become real.

Dr Mansfield explained that beyond caring for patients, one of her key concerns was the physical and emotional well-­being of the clinical staff at her hospital: the physicians, nurses, technicians, and clinicians under her care. Getting to her point, she asked if I might have any suggestions based on my time and experiences in combat that might be helpful to her as she “cared for her troops” as they faced the battle ahead.

Her request was a good one. Lessons from my military past immediately rushed to my mind. I started scribbling and came up with a Top Ten list of recommendations for anyone going into a tough fight. Here’s what I sent to her:

1. Find a battle-buddy. On the first day of Army basic training, drill sergeants pair new recruits with one another. That’s primarily for accountability purposes throughout the weeks of training—to ensure soldiers hold each other responsible for getting to the right place, at the right time, in the right uniform—but it’s also part of a larger psychological dynamic related to building teams and mutual support within organizations. Your battle-buddy is charged with keeping you out of trouble, having your back, and being there when you need it most. In combat, battle-buddies do all those things and then some; they protect you from harm in so many other ways. Healthcare providers during this crisis will sometimes feel all alone, and they need to rely on someone else to help them when times get really tough. Having a battle-buddy—for those at the healthcare team level, of course, but also among those at the level of clinical director, hospital administrator, CMO, or even CEO—will help get you through the tough times and provide sanity when you need it the most. So my first piece of advice: Find a battle-buddy.
2. Plan and prepare for things you don’t expect will happen. During a preparatory training exercise for our unit’s deployment to Iraq during the surge, when we thought the exercise was about to end, the trainers surprised us with a final crisis we had to solve. According to the scenario, Al Qaida had blown up a major bridge in our area, causing dire logistical problems for the security forces and challenges to the population as they brought their goods to market. I remember my initial reaction: “They don’t have the strength to do that. This’ll never happen,” I said to the Chief of Staff under my breath, as we started developing the required drill to counter the action and please the trainers. I quickly forgot about that lesson, until after we deployed. Two weeks into our 15-month tour in Iraq, the enemy blew the exact bridge that was part of the scenario, causing the exact problems that were predicted. Because we had prepared for the unexpected, we were able to quickly repair the bridge, reestablish the logistics flow, and satisfy the worried population. The lesson: Teams can hope for the best, but it’s always important to prepare for the worst—a lack of equipment, a key member of the team not being available to contribute, an overwhelming surge of patients—and then develop a plan to mitigate it. Take time to reflect, and ask yourself, What is the worst that can happen, what can the “enemy” do to disrupt our lives, and how do we prepare to counter it?
3. Get everyone into the fight. In every organizations, it’s often true that some people take on too much and try and do it all themselves, others do only what they’re told to do, there’s the unique few who want to contribute but don’t know how they can to help, and then there’s some who even attempt to avoid contributing at all. It’s important for leaders to know who on their team fits each of these categories. It’s even more critical for leaders to be able to find ways to relieve the overworked, assign tasks to those who might not know their role, bring those who want to contribute into the fold, and cross-train teams to help relieve those who are exhausted. Leaders must look across their “battlespace” and ensure everyone is contributing. Leaders assign everyone tasks and do their best to level—and lighten—the load of the overworked.
4. “Fatigue makes cowards of us all.” During any type of crisis, the body and mind will rapidly break down from lack of sleep, emotional strain, or overwhelming stress. While a 12-hour shift in a hospital is exceedingly tough even during normal operations, the COVID-19 crisis will demand dramatically more of all the members of any healthcare team. For that reason, leaders must incorporate rest cycles, team rotations, and half-days away from the hospitals even when all hands are on deck, as well as consider reducing shift times, if possible. Many who have experienced the disease in hot spots say this is really tough, but not attempting to plan for this will cause eventual breakdown and dysfunction. Take a break, do all you can to maintain a modicum of balance, and get away for a while.
5. Take time to huddle. Communication and information are always key, but especially critical during any crisis. One technique that has proven valuable, beyond meetings and shift changes, is a preshift and postshift huddle. Different from the formal passing of critical information, the huddle is a brief opportunity for teams to pass informal information, look each other in the eye, and perhaps even pray together. As a two-star general, I did that every morning in combat with my small team of sergeants, captains, and privates before we left the headquarters to visit units, and it gave us all the power of knowing we had shared information, and we had a common operating picture. It gave us strength. During a crisis, all kinds of communication, formal and informal, are key.
6. This ain’t peacetime. In a crisis, the enemy gets a vote. If leaders don’t find ways to counter the enemy’s action (and fast!), they’ll be behind the curve! It’s important to find the techniques and procedures that are bureaucratic (or even dumb) and overturn or eliminate them quickly. Decisions must be made with alacrity and with an understood flow, and people must be assigned responsibilities and held accountable to make things happen. In a crisis, speed in action will almost always trump perfection in understanding. Stay calm but ensure that those who might not understand this come around to the dynamics associated with the threat. A crisis isn’t the time for business as usual.
7. Force adaptation—don’t wait ’til things are over to adjust. In a crisis, faults and disconnects in techniques and procedures often bubble to the surface and cause consternation. Don’t wait for a break in the action to adjust and find new ways to do things because a break in the action will usually never happen. The military has an expression: “Those who adapt the fastest on the battlefield win.” Find ways to look for and then publicize your methods of adaptation to the team, pin the rose on someone to ensure the changes are made, and then have someone make a historical record so other teams might also learn from your scar tissue. Lessons from the fight must be incorporated by the organization, or they’re not “lessons learned.”
8. Talkin’ ain’t fightin’. During a crisis, it’s important to establish techniques of verbal shorthand between the members of a team, and everyone must know their responsibilities and required actions. In the military, this is called a battle drill; in medicine, you know it as a code. In these situations, leaders must find ways to pass information quickly, and the reaction should be immediate response. In a crisis, normal process must take on the dynamics of a “code.” All members of the team must understand that there are just times when things can’t be explained, but it’s also important that leaders know when to use this abbreviated format. Explain when you can, but act when you must.
9. Cherish your teams. Every single team will experience things that human beings aren’t designed or meant to handle—even those in the medical profession, who likely thought they had seen it all. There will be repeated and overwhelming trauma, with the expected emotional reactions. The approach during these situations requires empathy, humility, emotional understanding, and validation. Praise your team at every opportunity, find ways to turn mistakes into learning opportunities, but most importantly be human and find ways to provide memories that your team can cherish and look back upon. Give them memories.
10. Leaders don’t have the right to have a bad day. In 2004, after a 12-month deployment in Iraq, our unit was on our way home. We had been a long time away from our families, and we had experienced some tough fighting. A third of our unit had already returned to their families in Germany when we were told we would be extended because of a changing situation on the ground. A wave of frustration went through our 18,000 soldiers. Our commander then pulled us together, communicated our new mission, and told us he was also disappointed, but it was time we had to show our grit by getting those soldiers who had already returned to Europe back, unpack our equipment, and return to the fight. Then he said something I will always remember: “It’s tough, but understand your soldiers are looking at you to lead in this crisis … and leaders don’t have the right to have a bad day.” He didn’t mean we couldn’t be frustrated, or disappointed, or emotional, or even pissed off. He meant we just couldn’t show it when others were around. That’s one of the toughest things about leading during a crisis: The unimaginable is expected of leaders. And leaders have to be ready to lead.

All this advice may seem like philosophical musings rather than pragmatic thoughts for a crisis, but hopefully this advice will make a difference as healthcare providers tackle the issues ahead. Stay healthy, mitigate risks, but know that the calm provided by leaders will make a difference.

The field of telemedicine, in which clinicians use remote evaluation and monitoring to diagnose and treat patients, has grown substantially over the past decade. Its roles in acute care medicine settings are diverse, including virtual intensive care unit (ICU) care, after-­hours medical admissions, cross coverage, and, most aptly, disaster management.¹

At HealthPartners, a large integrated healthcare delivery and financing system based in the Twin Cities region of Minnesota, we have used provider-initiated telemedicine in hospital medicine for more than 2 years, providing evening and nighttime hospitalist coverage to our rural hospitals. We additionally provide a 24/7 nurse practitioner-staffed virtual clinic called Virtuwell.² Because we are now immersed in a global pandemic, we have taken steps to bolster our telemedicine infrastructure to meet increasing needs.

SARS-CoV-2, the causative agent of COVID-19, is a novel coronavirus with the capability to cause severe illness in roughly 14% of those infected.³ According to some estimates, the virus may infect up to 60% of the US population in the next year.⁴ As the pandemic looms over the country and the healthcare community, telemedicine can offer tools to help respond to this crisis. Healthcare systems leveraging telemedicine for patient care will gain several advantages, including workforce sustainability, reduction of provider burnout, limitation of provider exposure, and reduction of personal protective equipment (PPE) waste (Table). Telemedicine can also facilitate staffing of both large and small facilities that find themselves overwhelmed with pandemic-related patient overload (PRPO). Although telemedicine holds promise for pandemic response, this technology has limitations. It requires robust IT infrastructure, training of both nurses and physicians, and modifications to integrate within hospital workflows. In this article, we summarize key clinical needs that telemedicine can meet, implementation challenges, and important business considerations.

Our organization currently uses telemedicine to provide after-­hours hospital medicine coverage from 6 pm to 8 am at five rural and critical-access hospitals. We utilize commercial telemedicine carts on-site at hospitals and company-provided laptops at home. Our video visits are completed using enterprise video software and commercial digital stethoscopes. In the past month, we have increased our capacity, including at two large tertiary-care hospitals, by adding web cameras to existing mobile workstations and purchasing additional laptops for new telemedicine providers. Major barriers we encountered included cost, credentialing providers across multiple sites, and equipment testing. However, with close coordination with executive leadership, use of disaster credentialing, and robust IT support, we have been able to move past these obstacles in expanding our telemedicine infrastructure for support during this crucial time.

Patient Triage

Limiting exposure in the community and in the acute care setting is key to “flattening the curve” in pandemics.⁵ Triaging patients by telephone and online surveys is an important method to prevent high-risk patients from exposing others to infection. For example, since March 9, 2020, over 20,000 patients have called in weekly for COVID-19 screening. Although our organization introduced drive-up testing to reduce exposure, patients are still presenting to our clinics and emergency rooms in need of screening and testing. In several of our clinics, patients have been roomed alone to facilitate screening in the room by use of Google Duo, a free video chat product. Rooms with telemedicine capabilities allow patients with potentially communicable infections to be evaluated and observed while avoiding the risk of viral transmission. Additional considerations could include self-administered nasal swabs; although this has comparable efficacy to staff-administered swabs,⁶ it has not yet been implemented in our clinics.

Direct Care

Virtual care, specifically synchronous video and audio provider-­initiated services, is a well-established modality to provide direct care to patients in acute care and ambulatory settings.⁷ Telemedicine can be deployed to care for hospitalized patients in most locations as long as they meet the operational requirements described below. With a bedside nurse or other facilitator, patients can be interviewed and examined using a high definition camera and digital peripherals, including stethoscopes, otoscopes, ophthalmoscopes, and dermatoscopes. COVID-19 patients or patients under investigation may be seen in this manner. In-person visits should remain part of patients’ care as an important part of the provider-patient relationship⁸; however, telemedicine could still be deployed to provide direct care and monitoring to these patients while minimizing exposure to healthcare personnel. Additionally, telemedicine can be used for specialist consultations that are likely in high demand with COVID-19, including infectious disease, cardiology, and pulmonology.

Exposure Reduction and Resource Allocation

Currently in the United States there are concerns for shortages of PPE including surgical masks and N95 respirators. Telemedicine can reduce provider exposure, increase provider efficiency, and curtail PPE utilization by minimizing the number and frequency of in-room visits while still allowing virtual visits for direct patient care. For instance, our nursing staff is currently using telemedicine to conduct hourly rounding and limit unnecessary in-room visits.

We recommend keeping telemedicine equipment within individual isolation rooms intended for COVID-19 patients in order to eliminate the need for repeated cleaning. For other patients, a mobile cart could be used. Most commercial video software can autoanswer calls to allow for staff-free history taking. For a thorough physical exam, a bedside facilitator is need for use of digital stethoscopes and similar peripherals.

Provider Shortages and Reducing Burnout

Because SARS-CoV-2 is a highly contagious pathogen that can spread prior to symptom presentation, current CDC guidelines recommend self-monitoring at home for health care workers who have a healthcare-related exposure to a COVID-19 patient.⁹ This can leave significant gaps in coverage for healthcare systems. For example, in Vacaville, California, one positive case resulted in over 200 health care workers unable to work on site.¹⁰

Large volumes of acutely ill patients, coupled with the risk of ill or quarantined providers, means provider shortages due to PRPO are likely to occur and threaten hospitals’ ability to care for patients with or without COVID-19. Furthermore, given increased patient loads, frontline staff are at exceptionally high risk of burnout in pandemic situations. Hospital medicine teams will need contingency plans to meet the needs. Using telemedicine to protect the workforce and maintain staffing levels will reduce that risk.

Telehospitalists can see and examine patients, write orders, and maintain patient service lines much like in-person providers. Recently, we have used it when providers are ill or self-monitoring. In multisite systems, telehospitalists who are privileged in multiple hospitals can be efficiently deployed to meet patient care needs and relieve overburdened providers across hundreds of miles or more.

Enabling patient rooms for telemedicine allows telehospitalists and other providers to see hospitalized patients. Furthermore, quarantined hospitalists can continue to work and support in-person clinical services during PRPO. Providers in high-risk groups (eg, older, immunosuppressed, pregnant) can also continue caring for patients with telemedicine while maintaining safety. As schools close, telemedicine can help providers navigate the challenge between patient care and childcare responsibilities.

The basic element of telemedicine involves a computer or monitor with an internet-connected camera and a HIPAA-compliant video application, but implementation can vary.

Recent changes have allowed the use of popular video chat software such as FaceTime, Skype, or Google Duo for patient interactions; with a tablet attached to a stand, organizations can easily create a mobile telemedicine workstation. Larger monitors or mounted screens can be used in patient areas where portability is not required. A strong network infrastructure and robust IT support are also necessary; as of 2016, 24 million Americans did not have broadband access, and even areas that do can struggle with wireless connectivity in hospitals with thick concrete walls and lack of wi-fi extenders.¹¹

With the addition of a digital stethoscope, hospitalists can perform a thorough history and physical with the aid of bedside staff. This requires dedicated training for all members of the care team in order to optimize the virtual hospitalist’s “telepresence” and create a seamless patient experience. Provider education is imperative: Creating a virtual telepresence is essential in building a strong provider-patient relationship. We have used simulation training to prepare new telehospitalists.

An overlooked, but important, operational requirement is patient education and awareness. In the absence of introduction and onboarding, telemedicine can be viewed by patients as impersonal; however, with proper implementation, high patient satisfaction has been demonstrated in other virtual care experiences.¹²

Though several health systems offer “tele-ICU” services, the number of hospital medicine programs is more limited. The cost of building a program can be significant, with outlays for equipment, IT support, provider salaries, and training. While all 50 states and the District of Columbia cover some form of fee-for-service live video with Medicaid, only 40, along with DC, have parity laws with commercial payors. Medicare has historically had more restrictions, limiting covered services to specific types of originating sites in certain geographic areas. Furthermore, growth of telehospitalist programs has been hampered by the lack of reimbursement for “primary care services.”¹³

With passage of the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2020, geographic and site restrictions have been waived for Medicare reimbursement.¹⁴ Providers must still demonstrate a prior relationship with patients, which requires at least one encounter with the patient in the past 3 years by the same provider or one with a similar tax identification number (TIN). All hospitalists within our group are identified with a common TIN, which helps to meet this requirement for patient with recent admissions. However, clear guidance on reimbursement for primary care services by acute care providers is still lacking. As the utility of telemedicine is demonstrated in the hospital setting, we hope further changes may be enacted.

Organizations must properly credential and privilege telehospitalists. Telemedicine services may fall under either core or “delegated” privileges depending on the individual hospital. Additionally, while malpractice insurance does typically cover telemedicine services, each organization should verify this with their particular carrier.

The COVID-19 pandemic has created a systemic challenge for healthcare systems across the nation. As hospitalists continue to be on the front lines, organizations can leverage telemedicine to support their patients, protect their clinicians, and conserve scarce resources. Building out a virtual care program is intricate and requires significant operational support. Laying the groundwork now can prepare institutions to provide necessary care for patients, not just in the current pandemic, but in numerous emergency health care situations in the future.

The field of telemedicine, in which clinicians use remote evaluation and monitoring to diagnose and treat patients, has grown substantially over the past decade. Its roles in acute care medicine settings are diverse, including virtual intensive care unit (ICU) care, after-­hours medical admissions, cross coverage, and, most aptly, disaster management.¹

At HealthPartners, a large integrated healthcare delivery and financing system based in the Twin Cities region of Minnesota, we have used provider-initiated telemedicine in hospital medicine for more than 2 years, providing evening and nighttime hospitalist coverage to our rural hospitals. We additionally provide a 24/7 nurse practitioner-staffed virtual clinic called Virtuwell.² Because we are now immersed in a global pandemic, we have taken steps to bolster our telemedicine infrastructure to meet increasing needs.

SARS-CoV-2, the causative agent of COVID-19, is a novel coronavirus with the capability to cause severe illness in roughly 14% of those infected.³ According to some estimates, the virus may infect up to 60% of the US population in the next year.⁴ As the pandemic looms over the country and the healthcare community, telemedicine can offer tools to help respond to this crisis. Healthcare systems leveraging telemedicine for patient care will gain several advantages, including workforce sustainability, reduction of provider burnout, limitation of provider exposure, and reduction of personal protective equipment (PPE) waste (Table). Telemedicine can also facilitate staffing of both large and small facilities that find themselves overwhelmed with pandemic-related patient overload (PRPO). Although telemedicine holds promise for pandemic response, this technology has limitations. It requires robust IT infrastructure, training of both nurses and physicians, and modifications to integrate within hospital workflows. In this article, we summarize key clinical needs that telemedicine can meet, implementation challenges, and important business considerations.

Our organization currently uses telemedicine to provide after-­hours hospital medicine coverage from 6 pm to 8 am at five rural and critical-access hospitals. We utilize commercial telemedicine carts on-site at hospitals and company-provided laptops at home. Our video visits are completed using enterprise video software and commercial digital stethoscopes. In the past month, we have increased our capacity, including at two large tertiary-care hospitals, by adding web cameras to existing mobile workstations and purchasing additional laptops for new telemedicine providers. Major barriers we encountered included cost, credentialing providers across multiple sites, and equipment testing. However, with close coordination with executive leadership, use of disaster credentialing, and robust IT support, we have been able to move past these obstacles in expanding our telemedicine infrastructure for support during this crucial time.

Patient Triage

Limiting exposure in the community and in the acute care setting is key to “flattening the curve” in pandemics.⁵ Triaging patients by telephone and online surveys is an important method to prevent high-risk patients from exposing others to infection. For example, since March 9, 2020, over 20,000 patients have called in weekly for COVID-19 screening. Although our organization introduced drive-up testing to reduce exposure, patients are still presenting to our clinics and emergency rooms in need of screening and testing. In several of our clinics, patients have been roomed alone to facilitate screening in the room by use of Google Duo, a free video chat product. Rooms with telemedicine capabilities allow patients with potentially communicable infections to be evaluated and observed while avoiding the risk of viral transmission. Additional considerations could include self-administered nasal swabs; although this has comparable efficacy to staff-administered swabs,⁶ it has not yet been implemented in our clinics.

Direct Care

Virtual care, specifically synchronous video and audio provider-­initiated services, is a well-established modality to provide direct care to patients in acute care and ambulatory settings.⁷ Telemedicine can be deployed to care for hospitalized patients in most locations as long as they meet the operational requirements described below. With a bedside nurse or other facilitator, patients can be interviewed and examined using a high definition camera and digital peripherals, including stethoscopes, otoscopes, ophthalmoscopes, and dermatoscopes. COVID-19 patients or patients under investigation may be seen in this manner. In-person visits should remain part of patients’ care as an important part of the provider-patient relationship⁸; however, telemedicine could still be deployed to provide direct care and monitoring to these patients while minimizing exposure to healthcare personnel. Additionally, telemedicine can be used for specialist consultations that are likely in high demand with COVID-19, including infectious disease, cardiology, and pulmonology.

Exposure Reduction and Resource Allocation

Currently in the United States there are concerns for shortages of PPE including surgical masks and N95 respirators. Telemedicine can reduce provider exposure, increase provider efficiency, and curtail PPE utilization by minimizing the number and frequency of in-room visits while still allowing virtual visits for direct patient care. For instance, our nursing staff is currently using telemedicine to conduct hourly rounding and limit unnecessary in-room visits.

We recommend keeping telemedicine equipment within individual isolation rooms intended for COVID-19 patients in order to eliminate the need for repeated cleaning. For other patients, a mobile cart could be used. Most commercial video software can autoanswer calls to allow for staff-free history taking. For a thorough physical exam, a bedside facilitator is need for use of digital stethoscopes and similar peripherals.

Provider Shortages and Reducing Burnout

Because SARS-CoV-2 is a highly contagious pathogen that can spread prior to symptom presentation, current CDC guidelines recommend self-monitoring at home for health care workers who have a healthcare-related exposure to a COVID-19 patient.⁹ This can leave significant gaps in coverage for healthcare systems. For example, in Vacaville, California, one positive case resulted in over 200 health care workers unable to work on site.¹⁰

Large volumes of acutely ill patients, coupled with the risk of ill or quarantined providers, means provider shortages due to PRPO are likely to occur and threaten hospitals’ ability to care for patients with or without COVID-19. Furthermore, given increased patient loads, frontline staff are at exceptionally high risk of burnout in pandemic situations. Hospital medicine teams will need contingency plans to meet the needs. Using telemedicine to protect the workforce and maintain staffing levels will reduce that risk.

Telehospitalists can see and examine patients, write orders, and maintain patient service lines much like in-person providers. Recently, we have used it when providers are ill or self-monitoring. In multisite systems, telehospitalists who are privileged in multiple hospitals can be efficiently deployed to meet patient care needs and relieve overburdened providers across hundreds of miles or more.

Enabling patient rooms for telemedicine allows telehospitalists and other providers to see hospitalized patients. Furthermore, quarantined hospitalists can continue to work and support in-person clinical services during PRPO. Providers in high-risk groups (eg, older, immunosuppressed, pregnant) can also continue caring for patients with telemedicine while maintaining safety. As schools close, telemedicine can help providers navigate the challenge between patient care and childcare responsibilities.

The basic element of telemedicine involves a computer or monitor with an internet-connected camera and a HIPAA-compliant video application, but implementation can vary.

Recent changes have allowed the use of popular video chat software such as FaceTime, Skype, or Google Duo for patient interactions; with a tablet attached to a stand, organizations can easily create a mobile telemedicine workstation. Larger monitors or mounted screens can be used in patient areas where portability is not required. A strong network infrastructure and robust IT support are also necessary; as of 2016, 24 million Americans did not have broadband access, and even areas that do can struggle with wireless connectivity in hospitals with thick concrete walls and lack of wi-fi extenders.¹¹

With the addition of a digital stethoscope, hospitalists can perform a thorough history and physical with the aid of bedside staff. This requires dedicated training for all members of the care team in order to optimize the virtual hospitalist’s “telepresence” and create a seamless patient experience. Provider education is imperative: Creating a virtual telepresence is essential in building a strong provider-patient relationship. We have used simulation training to prepare new telehospitalists.

An overlooked, but important, operational requirement is patient education and awareness. In the absence of introduction and onboarding, telemedicine can be viewed by patients as impersonal; however, with proper implementation, high patient satisfaction has been demonstrated in other virtual care experiences.¹²

Though several health systems offer “tele-ICU” services, the number of hospital medicine programs is more limited. The cost of building a program can be significant, with outlays for equipment, IT support, provider salaries, and training. While all 50 states and the District of Columbia cover some form of fee-for-service live video with Medicaid, only 40, along with DC, have parity laws with commercial payors. Medicare has historically had more restrictions, limiting covered services to specific types of originating sites in certain geographic areas. Furthermore, growth of telehospitalist programs has been hampered by the lack of reimbursement for “primary care services.”¹³

With passage of the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2020, geographic and site restrictions have been waived for Medicare reimbursement.¹⁴ Providers must still demonstrate a prior relationship with patients, which requires at least one encounter with the patient in the past 3 years by the same provider or one with a similar tax identification number (TIN). All hospitalists within our group are identified with a common TIN, which helps to meet this requirement for patient with recent admissions. However, clear guidance on reimbursement for primary care services by acute care providers is still lacking. As the utility of telemedicine is demonstrated in the hospital setting, we hope further changes may be enacted.

Organizations must properly credential and privilege telehospitalists. Telemedicine services may fall under either core or “delegated” privileges depending on the individual hospital. Additionally, while malpractice insurance does typically cover telemedicine services, each organization should verify this with their particular carrier.

The COVID-19 pandemic has created a systemic challenge for healthcare systems across the nation. As hospitalists continue to be on the front lines, organizations can leverage telemedicine to support their patients, protect their clinicians, and conserve scarce resources. Building out a virtual care program is intricate and requires significant operational support. Laying the groundwork now can prepare institutions to provide necessary care for patients, not just in the current pandemic, but in numerous emergency health care situations in the future.

The field of telemedicine, in which clinicians use remote evaluation and monitoring to diagnose and treat patients, has grown substantially over the past decade. Its roles in acute care medicine settings are diverse, including virtual intensive care unit (ICU) care, after-­hours medical admissions, cross coverage, and, most aptly, disaster management.¹

At HealthPartners, a large integrated healthcare delivery and financing system based in the Twin Cities region of Minnesota, we have used provider-initiated telemedicine in hospital medicine for more than 2 years, providing evening and nighttime hospitalist coverage to our rural hospitals. We additionally provide a 24/7 nurse practitioner-staffed virtual clinic called Virtuwell.² Because we are now immersed in a global pandemic, we have taken steps to bolster our telemedicine infrastructure to meet increasing needs.

SARS-CoV-2, the causative agent of COVID-19, is a novel coronavirus with the capability to cause severe illness in roughly 14% of those infected.³ According to some estimates, the virus may infect up to 60% of the US population in the next year.⁴ As the pandemic looms over the country and the healthcare community, telemedicine can offer tools to help respond to this crisis. Healthcare systems leveraging telemedicine for patient care will gain several advantages, including workforce sustainability, reduction of provider burnout, limitation of provider exposure, and reduction of personal protective equipment (PPE) waste (Table). Telemedicine can also facilitate staffing of both large and small facilities that find themselves overwhelmed with pandemic-related patient overload (PRPO). Although telemedicine holds promise for pandemic response, this technology has limitations. It requires robust IT infrastructure, training of both nurses and physicians, and modifications to integrate within hospital workflows. In this article, we summarize key clinical needs that telemedicine can meet, implementation challenges, and important business considerations.

Our organization currently uses telemedicine to provide after-­hours hospital medicine coverage from 6 pm to 8 am at five rural and critical-access hospitals. We utilize commercial telemedicine carts on-site at hospitals and company-provided laptops at home. Our video visits are completed using enterprise video software and commercial digital stethoscopes. In the past month, we have increased our capacity, including at two large tertiary-care hospitals, by adding web cameras to existing mobile workstations and purchasing additional laptops for new telemedicine providers. Major barriers we encountered included cost, credentialing providers across multiple sites, and equipment testing. However, with close coordination with executive leadership, use of disaster credentialing, and robust IT support, we have been able to move past these obstacles in expanding our telemedicine infrastructure for support during this crucial time.

Patient Triage

Limiting exposure in the community and in the acute care setting is key to “flattening the curve” in pandemics.⁵ Triaging patients by telephone and online surveys is an important method to prevent high-risk patients from exposing others to infection. For example, since March 9, 2020, over 20,000 patients have called in weekly for COVID-19 screening. Although our organization introduced drive-up testing to reduce exposure, patients are still presenting to our clinics and emergency rooms in need of screening and testing. In several of our clinics, patients have been roomed alone to facilitate screening in the room by use of Google Duo, a free video chat product. Rooms with telemedicine capabilities allow patients with potentially communicable infections to be evaluated and observed while avoiding the risk of viral transmission. Additional considerations could include self-administered nasal swabs; although this has comparable efficacy to staff-administered swabs,⁶ it has not yet been implemented in our clinics.

Direct Care

Virtual care, specifically synchronous video and audio provider-­initiated services, is a well-established modality to provide direct care to patients in acute care and ambulatory settings.⁷ Telemedicine can be deployed to care for hospitalized patients in most locations as long as they meet the operational requirements described below. With a bedside nurse or other facilitator, patients can be interviewed and examined using a high definition camera and digital peripherals, including stethoscopes, otoscopes, ophthalmoscopes, and dermatoscopes. COVID-19 patients or patients under investigation may be seen in this manner. In-person visits should remain part of patients’ care as an important part of the provider-patient relationship⁸; however, telemedicine could still be deployed to provide direct care and monitoring to these patients while minimizing exposure to healthcare personnel. Additionally, telemedicine can be used for specialist consultations that are likely in high demand with COVID-19, including infectious disease, cardiology, and pulmonology.

Exposure Reduction and Resource Allocation

Currently in the United States there are concerns for shortages of PPE including surgical masks and N95 respirators. Telemedicine can reduce provider exposure, increase provider efficiency, and curtail PPE utilization by minimizing the number and frequency of in-room visits while still allowing virtual visits for direct patient care. For instance, our nursing staff is currently using telemedicine to conduct hourly rounding and limit unnecessary in-room visits.

We recommend keeping telemedicine equipment within individual isolation rooms intended for COVID-19 patients in order to eliminate the need for repeated cleaning. For other patients, a mobile cart could be used. Most commercial video software can autoanswer calls to allow for staff-free history taking. For a thorough physical exam, a bedside facilitator is need for use of digital stethoscopes and similar peripherals.

Provider Shortages and Reducing Burnout

Because SARS-CoV-2 is a highly contagious pathogen that can spread prior to symptom presentation, current CDC guidelines recommend self-monitoring at home for health care workers who have a healthcare-related exposure to a COVID-19 patient.⁹ This can leave significant gaps in coverage for healthcare systems. For example, in Vacaville, California, one positive case resulted in over 200 health care workers unable to work on site.¹⁰

Large volumes of acutely ill patients, coupled with the risk of ill or quarantined providers, means provider shortages due to PRPO are likely to occur and threaten hospitals’ ability to care for patients with or without COVID-19. Furthermore, given increased patient loads, frontline staff are at exceptionally high risk of burnout in pandemic situations. Hospital medicine teams will need contingency plans to meet the needs. Using telemedicine to protect the workforce and maintain staffing levels will reduce that risk.

Telehospitalists can see and examine patients, write orders, and maintain patient service lines much like in-person providers. Recently, we have used it when providers are ill or self-monitoring. In multisite systems, telehospitalists who are privileged in multiple hospitals can be efficiently deployed to meet patient care needs and relieve overburdened providers across hundreds of miles or more.

Enabling patient rooms for telemedicine allows telehospitalists and other providers to see hospitalized patients. Furthermore, quarantined hospitalists can continue to work and support in-person clinical services during PRPO. Providers in high-risk groups (eg, older, immunosuppressed, pregnant) can also continue caring for patients with telemedicine while maintaining safety. As schools close, telemedicine can help providers navigate the challenge between patient care and childcare responsibilities.

The basic element of telemedicine involves a computer or monitor with an internet-connected camera and a HIPAA-compliant video application, but implementation can vary.

Recent changes have allowed the use of popular video chat software such as FaceTime, Skype, or Google Duo for patient interactions; with a tablet attached to a stand, organizations can easily create a mobile telemedicine workstation. Larger monitors or mounted screens can be used in patient areas where portability is not required. A strong network infrastructure and robust IT support are also necessary; as of 2016, 24 million Americans did not have broadband access, and even areas that do can struggle with wireless connectivity in hospitals with thick concrete walls and lack of wi-fi extenders.¹¹

With the addition of a digital stethoscope, hospitalists can perform a thorough history and physical with the aid of bedside staff. This requires dedicated training for all members of the care team in order to optimize the virtual hospitalist’s “telepresence” and create a seamless patient experience. Provider education is imperative: Creating a virtual telepresence is essential in building a strong provider-patient relationship. We have used simulation training to prepare new telehospitalists.

An overlooked, but important, operational requirement is patient education and awareness. In the absence of introduction and onboarding, telemedicine can be viewed by patients as impersonal; however, with proper implementation, high patient satisfaction has been demonstrated in other virtual care experiences.¹²

Though several health systems offer “tele-ICU” services, the number of hospital medicine programs is more limited. The cost of building a program can be significant, with outlays for equipment, IT support, provider salaries, and training. While all 50 states and the District of Columbia cover some form of fee-for-service live video with Medicaid, only 40, along with DC, have parity laws with commercial payors. Medicare has historically had more restrictions, limiting covered services to specific types of originating sites in certain geographic areas. Furthermore, growth of telehospitalist programs has been hampered by the lack of reimbursement for “primary care services.”¹³

With passage of the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2020, geographic and site restrictions have been waived for Medicare reimbursement.¹⁴ Providers must still demonstrate a prior relationship with patients, which requires at least one encounter with the patient in the past 3 years by the same provider or one with a similar tax identification number (TIN). All hospitalists within our group are identified with a common TIN, which helps to meet this requirement for patient with recent admissions. However, clear guidance on reimbursement for primary care services by acute care providers is still lacking. As the utility of telemedicine is demonstrated in the hospital setting, we hope further changes may be enacted.

Organizations must properly credential and privilege telehospitalists. Telemedicine services may fall under either core or “delegated” privileges depending on the individual hospital. Additionally, while malpractice insurance does typically cover telemedicine services, each organization should verify this with their particular carrier.

The COVID-19 pandemic has created a systemic challenge for healthcare systems across the nation. As hospitalists continue to be on the front lines, organizations can leverage telemedicine to support their patients, protect their clinicians, and conserve scarce resources. Building out a virtual care program is intricate and requires significant operational support. Laying the groundwork now can prepare institutions to provide necessary care for patients, not just in the current pandemic, but in numerous emergency health care situations in the future.

From the University of North Carolina at Wilmington School of Nursing (Dr. Smith and Dr. Turrise), the New Hanover Regional Medical Center Heart Center (Mr. Jordan), the Coastal Carolinas Health Alliance and Coastal Connect Health Information Exchange (Ms. Robertson), and Coastal Thoracic Surgical Associates (Dr. Kane), Wilmington, NC.

Abstract

Objective: Cardiothoracic (CT) surgeons at our medical center were not receiving timely notification when their coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery patients were admitted to the medical center or to other hospitals. The CT surgical team worked with a health alliance in southeastern North Carolina to implement health information exchange (HIE) real-time electronic notifications for their CABG patients who presented to the hospital’s emergency department (ED) or any ED affiliated with the medical center. The alert tool notifies team members about patient encounters, driving timely clinical engagement.

Methods: The CT team provided the HIE team with the names of CABG surgery patients, which were loaded into the alert tool. When a patient on the list presented to the hospital ED or its affiliates, the alert tool sent a real-time electronic notification to the Cardiac Surgical Services nurse coordinator. This intervention prompted the assessment and disposition of CABG patients, while in the ED, by the CT surgical team.

Results: Over a 16-month period (September 2017-December 2018), the names of 614 post-CABG patients were input into the HIE for tracking. Of these patients, 47 were treated and discharged from the ED; 31 were admitted for observation; 44 were readmitted for inpatient care; and 492 did not have a qualifying event requiring a notification alert. Following implementation of this practice change, the 30-day readmission rate for patients who underwent CABG at our institution decreased from 10% to 7.2%.

Conclusion: Utilizing a real-time alert tool resulted in immediate notification of the CT team when 1 of their patients presented to the ED. This afforded the CT surgical team an opportunity to intervene in the care of their patients, which in turn led to improved quality of care, physician communication and collaboration, and patient outcomes, such as preventable 30-day readmissions.

Keywords: electronic health record; real-time electronic notification; CABG; process improvement.

Unplanned 30-day hospital readmissions of patients who have undergone coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery contribute to higher overall health care costs. CABG is 1 of the conditions/procedures that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) monitors for excess readmissions.¹ Readmission rates for CABG-related conditions at 30 days post-surgery are reported to be between 16% and 20% for US hospitals.² Readmissions are not only financially costly, but also have been associated with worse patient outcomes and decreased patient satisfaction.³ Common diagnoses for post-CABG admission include atrial fibrillation, pleural effusion, and wound infection.

The facility where this project was implemented had a 10% post-CABG admission rate for patients across all payers. While this rate is below the national average of 13.2%, the cardiothoracic (CT) surgical team was not being notified in a timely manner when their post-CABG patients were readmitted. The Lean team used the A3 problem-solving process to develop strategies that would reduce these readmissions and improve the care of their patients.

We explored the use of electronic alerts in managing post-CABG patients by conducting a literature search using the terms electronic alerts in patient care, patient engagement in the emergency department, electronic alerts in CABG, real-time notifications to prevent readmission, and CABG readmission. Databases searched were PubMed, Google Scholar, Cumulative Index of Nursing and Allied Health Literature, ProQuest, and ScienceDirect. This search resulted in studies focused on the use of electronic health record (EHR) alerts as a clinical decision-support tool; for example, patient demographic and assessment data are entered into the EHR, and the clinician is prompted with “performance” recommendations (eg, consider electrocardiogram and aspirin).⁴ In a paper by Engelman and Benjamin,⁵ the authors discuss the importance of the engaged physician and note that, in their emergency department (ED), an electronic notification is sent when a postoperative patient presents; however, the notification goes to the inpatient service for timely review and disposition. There was no literature that discussed the use of an electronic alert tool as a real-time patient engagement strategy that resulted in a practice change specific to the CT surgical team.

Our process improvement project focused on alerting the CT surgical team when a post-CABG patient presented to the ED, allowing them to evaluate the patient in real time and determine whether the chief complaint was related to the CABG and whether further evaluation by the CT surgeon was required. Specifically, we wanted to determine whether a real-time electronic alert that notified the CT surgical team about post-op CABG patients presenting to the ED would result in timely patient engagement, avoidance of readmissions, and an enhanced patient experience. During this project, alerts were sent to the CT surgical team notifying them of a post-CABG patient presenting to the ED or being directly admitted from home on physician orders, a provider’s office, or inpatient rehabilitation; however, the focus of this article is specifically on the notification regarding post-CABG patients presenting to the ED.

Prior to implementing the electronic notification project, the team developed and implemented several internal and external readmission reduction and prevention strategies for CABG patients. An in-house strategy involved a process whereby patients would receive their discharge medications prior to being discharged from the hospital post-CABG, thereby avoiding potential delays in the patient obtaining medications. When examining post-CABG patient readmissions, the primary conditions that led to readmission were fluid overload, pleural effusion, and atrial fibrillation. As such, a second in-house strategy was developed for post-CABG patients presenting to the ED with atrial fibrillation. The newly established protocol allowed patients to be monitored and treated in the cardiac observation unit. In addition, external strategies, including an outpatient furosemide protocol for home health nurses and an outpatient thoracentesis program and order set, were established (eg, for patients with congestive heart failure, shortness of breath).

Methods

Setting

The regional medical center where this project was implemented is the ninth largest hospital in North Carolina and the largest county-owned public hospital in the state. It is a tertiary care center and teaching hospital with 3 hospital campuses and 855 licensed beds. The medical center was included in the 100 Safecare Hospitals list by the Safecare Group; received a grade “A” Hospital Safety Score from the Leapfrog Group; and is 1 of America’s Top 100 Hospitals for Patient Experience.

Real-Time Notification Project

A regional hospital alliance in southeastern North Carolina established a health information exchange (HIE) with its member hospitals and office-based physicians to enable electronic exchange of patient information to improve quality, safety, and efficiency in health care delivery. Our medical center is part of this alliance. The HIE is a digital platform that facilitates the sharing of information between disparate connected EHR systems, and offers a portal for practices and hospitals to access patient information across North Carolina, South Carolina (via SC HIE), and nationwide (select dialysis centers). More specifically, approved providers and team members are able to access, in real time, patient-care encounter documents from other care settings (eg, acute, post-acute, ambulatory) via the HIE. Additionally, approved care entities can query-retrieve web portal information to support patient outcome improvement strategies. A partnership discussion highlighted the opportunity to utilize the HIE’s capabilities, such as real-time notification, to facilitate workflow (eg, when a patient presents to the ED, the HIE can provide access to health information at the point of care). In this capacity, the alert tool notifies care team members about patient encounters to drive timely clinical engagement for care transitions.

In January 2017, we began discussions on using the HIE to facilitate real-time electronic tracking in the Cardiac Surgical Services department at our medical center. Persons involved in these discussions included the cardiovascular (CV) team (comprised of case managers, department managers and coordinators, program coordinators, administrators, and support services [eg, pre-admission testing and home health staff]) and CT surgeons. At that time, CABG readmissions were manually tracked, and the real-time notification tool was being used in other departments (eg, in case management for tracking readmissions). The entire team was part of the initial decision meeting to pursue this possibility. The CV team reached consensus in June 2017 and proposed extending the use of the alert tool to the post-CABG population presenting to the ED (or any ED affiliated with the medical center) or admitted directly to the medical center.

The HIE staff met with the Cardiac Surgical Services team to tailor and develop the logistics of the project, such as who would be notified and how. The goals of the project were to support appropriate care intervention, reduce preventable hospital readmissions, and improve quality of care through enhanced provider communication and engagement. To achieve these goals, on the day of discharge the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator provided the HIE team with the names of patients who had undergone CABG surgery. This patient list was loaded into the alert tool and continually updated. At 31 days, patient names were removed from the list. When a patient on the list presented to the hospital ED, the alert tool sent 2 real-time electronic notifications, an email and a text message, to the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator, noting that a patient event occurred. Personal information was not included in the alert in order to protect patient information and comply with Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act regulations.

The alert prompted the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator to securely access patient information to identify and, if necessary, visit the patient. Then, based on the information gathered by the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator, a Situation-Background-Assessment-Recommendation report was relayed to the CT surgeon, who then determined whether intervention by the CT surgical team was warranted. This process, on average, took approximately 30 minutes to complete. This was a key change in processes, one that allowed post-CABG patients to be seen by the CT surgical team while in the ED. If the issue was related to the CABG surgery, the CT surgeons could then determine an appropriate course of action, including admission or implementation of another protocol, such as the home furosemide protocol. For patients directly admitted, the surgeon contacted the admitting provider to discuss the level of care required (ie, observation or inpatient admission and treatment).

Biweekly CV team meetings were conducted during the implementation of the real-time notification alert tool. At each meeting, updates were provided on notifications received, patients who were missed by the notification process, and how well the real-time alerts were working to enhance care and appropriate disposition.

Measurements

Clinical performance data included total notifications, total number of ED visits, ED disposition (inpatient admission, observation, discharge), total number of direct admissions, direct admissions to observation, direct inpatient admissions, and patients missed by the notification process (eg, due to data entry errors, omissions of information [suffix of junior or senior], as well as programming bugs). Finally, the number of observation admissions converted to inpatient admissions was collected and further analyzed to inform needed process changes.

The Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator collected, entered, and maintained data using Excel. Data were obtained from the EHR, recorded in Excel, and analyzed using basic descriptive statistics in an ongoing fashion. Particular attention was focused on problems with the notification process (eg, patients being missed due to errors in data entry) and summarizing information to keep the Cardiac Surgical Services team updated on the progress of the process improvement. This project did not require staff protections or considerations, and because this was not a research study Institutional Review Board approval was not required.

Results

This practice change was implemented in September 2017 and led to improvements in care quality, as evidenced by improved physician communication and collaboration. In the 16-month period from implementation through December 2018, the names of 614 post-CABG patients were input into the HIE for tracking. Of these patients, 47 were treated and discharged from the ED; 31 were admitted for observation; and 44 were readmitted for inpatient care. The remaining 492 patients did not have a qualifying event requiring a notification alert. Clinical performance data from this period included 70 ED visits, 21 direct admissions, 19 direct admissions to observation, 5 patients missed by the notification process, and 4 observation admissions converted to inpatient admissions. A reduction in the CABG readmission rate from 10% in September 2017 to 7.2% in December 2018 was also noted.

Discussion

The aim of this process improvement project was to determine whether a real-time electronic alert that notified the CT surgical team about post-op CABG patients presenting to the ED would result in timely patient engagement, avoidance of readmissions, and an enhanced patient experience. This practice change has been successful, following 16 months of implementation and process refinement. Integrating a real-time electronic alert with a supporting action plan and care protocols resulted in timely patient engagement and avoidance of readmission of post-CABG patients.

Early notification of possible post-CABG readmissions became a standard-of-care process within the Cardiac Surgical Services department, with expansion to all CT post-op patients. Leveraging HIE technology to support quality improvement processes was also viewed by other departments as relevant and beneficial. For example, the hospital stroke and orthopedic-spine teams established their own processes for receiving real-time alerts.

There were several lessons learned during this project. First, gaining 100% physician buy-in to collaborative communication proved to be critical to the project’s success. The CV team was surprised by the length of time (approximately 8-10 months) it took for the practice change to be adopted by the physicians. In part, some of this delay in adoption resulted from medical staff turnover, primarily in the medical resident training rotations. Collaborative communication was key. The CT surgeons spoke with ED leadership and hospitalist services to explain the readmission reduction project and the use of an electronic alert tool. The CT surgeons also communicated to the ED physicians, hospitalists, and cardiologists that the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator would be involved in the process and discussions regarding patientss care. Additionally, the CT surgeons authored the furosemide protocol and then committed to its use in the home health setting, further highlighting the role of collaborative communication in avoiding readmissions.

Another key step in this quality improvement project was determining who should receive the alert notifications. At the onset of the project, all notifications were sent to 1 person, the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator. While this seemed logical in the initial stage of the project, it was unsustainable, as the receipt of the alert and the subsequent notification of the CT surgeon depended on 1 person and their availability. Approximately 10 months into the project, the notification process was further refined, with the cardiovascular intensive care unit charge nurse becoming the point of contact for the alerts. The Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator, in collaboration with nursing leaders and CT surgeons, completed a Lean Standard Work template outlining the major steps and the associated responsibilities (for the cardiovascular intensive care unit charge nurse, CT surgeon and on-call surgeon, Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator) in the process of receiving notifications, collecting patient assessment data, and reporting notifications to the CT surgeons.

Establishing adequate support mechanisms during a practice change is also important. For instance, we had to dedicate personnel time for data collection and analysis and involve additional nursing or other qualified personnel in the new process to avoid depending on a single person for the project’s success. Additional considerations were establishing criteria for surgeon notification and defining an appropriate time frame for notification (eg, urgent versus next-day notifications). We accomplished these activities approximately 10 months into the project, after it became apparent at CV team meeting discussions that further clarification of criteria and timelines was needed.

Some aspects of the project unfolded as planned, while others presented opportunities for improvement. For example, the alert notification process worked as envisioned; however, as previously mentioned, the process needed to be more inclusive to ensure there is always a charge nurse on duty to receive the alert notification, rather than just the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator, who may not always be at the hospital. The outpatient thoracentesis program was well planned and effectively implemented. This program provided an avenue for patients who had symptoms of pleural effusion to be treated in an outpatient setting, rather than requiring an inpatient stay. Opportunities for improvement included addressing the inconsistent use of the home health furosemide protocol (developed in 2016), and the need for continued interprofessional and interdepartmental communication and coordination. For example, we had to inform the ED physicians and staff who rotate or are new to the ED about established processes and protocols in place for managing post-CABG patients who present to the ED.

The primary limitation of this project was the inability to measure the enhanced patient experience, which was 1 of the stated project goals. This goal became secondary because of more pressing issues, specifically, interorganizational collaboration (eg, hospital EHR, HIE, and CT surgical team) and tailoring the functionality of the electronic alert tool to the project. Developing and implementing measures of enhanced patient experience were not feasible during this implementation. Additionally, because this was not a research study, it was not possible to determine cause and effect or to control for confounders, such as a sicker, older cohort with more comorbid conditions, during the comparison period. Finally, although this process improvement project was conducted at a regional medical center that is the only facility performing CABG within the region, patients may have presented to another facility for an event that led to a readmission. Because readmissions to other facilities could not be captured, it is possible that the actual readmission rate was higher than the rate reported here.

Conclusions and Implications

Utilizing a real-time alert from the HIE to the CT surgical team resulted in CT surgeons being immediately made aware when their patients presented to the ED, allowing the CT surgical team the opportunity to intervene, as appropriate, in the care of their patients. Furthermore, this real-time notification and intervention resulted in timely patient engagement and, in some cases, avoidance of readmissions. Currently, patients are monitored for readmission within 30 days of discharge. In the future, the time will expand to 91 days, in preparation for participation in the CMS bundle payment program for CABG surgery.

This practice change can be used in organizations that do not have or participate in a HIE. In fact, these real-time alert applications may be available through an EHR already in use within the organization. The use of the alert requires collaborative communication and having supporting protocols in place to guide decision-making and care of post-CABG patients presenting to the ED.

There appears to be a gap in the literature discussing the use of an electronic alert tool as a real-time patient engagement strategy for post-CABG patients presenting to the ED. As such, this project contributes important results and lessons learned for other hospital service lines/departments that might consider implementing a similar process. Next steps include designing and conducting methodologically rigorous research studies based on this process improvement project to examine mortality rates as an outcome, and designing a more specific measure of patient experience, as the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey only provides hospital-level data.

Corresponding author: Stephanie D. Smith, PhD, RN, UNCW School of Nursing, 601 South College Road, Wilmington, NC 28403; [email protected].

Funding disclosures: None.

From the University of North Carolina at Wilmington School of Nursing (Dr. Smith and Dr. Turrise), the New Hanover Regional Medical Center Heart Center (Mr. Jordan), the Coastal Carolinas Health Alliance and Coastal Connect Health Information Exchange (Ms. Robertson), and Coastal Thoracic Surgical Associates (Dr. Kane), Wilmington, NC.

Abstract

Objective: Cardiothoracic (CT) surgeons at our medical center were not receiving timely notification when their coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery patients were admitted to the medical center or to other hospitals. The CT surgical team worked with a health alliance in southeastern North Carolina to implement health information exchange (HIE) real-time electronic notifications for their CABG patients who presented to the hospital’s emergency department (ED) or any ED affiliated with the medical center. The alert tool notifies team members about patient encounters, driving timely clinical engagement.

Methods: The CT team provided the HIE team with the names of CABG surgery patients, which were loaded into the alert tool. When a patient on the list presented to the hospital ED or its affiliates, the alert tool sent a real-time electronic notification to the Cardiac Surgical Services nurse coordinator. This intervention prompted the assessment and disposition of CABG patients, while in the ED, by the CT surgical team.

Results: Over a 16-month period (September 2017-December 2018), the names of 614 post-CABG patients were input into the HIE for tracking. Of these patients, 47 were treated and discharged from the ED; 31 were admitted for observation; 44 were readmitted for inpatient care; and 492 did not have a qualifying event requiring a notification alert. Following implementation of this practice change, the 30-day readmission rate for patients who underwent CABG at our institution decreased from 10% to 7.2%.

Conclusion: Utilizing a real-time alert tool resulted in immediate notification of the CT team when 1 of their patients presented to the ED. This afforded the CT surgical team an opportunity to intervene in the care of their patients, which in turn led to improved quality of care, physician communication and collaboration, and patient outcomes, such as preventable 30-day readmissions.

Keywords: electronic health record; real-time electronic notification; CABG; process improvement.

Unplanned 30-day hospital readmissions of patients who have undergone coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery contribute to higher overall health care costs. CABG is 1 of the conditions/procedures that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) monitors for excess readmissions.¹ Readmission rates for CABG-related conditions at 30 days post-surgery are reported to be between 16% and 20% for US hospitals.² Readmissions are not only financially costly, but also have been associated with worse patient outcomes and decreased patient satisfaction.³ Common diagnoses for post-CABG admission include atrial fibrillation, pleural effusion, and wound infection.

The facility where this project was implemented had a 10% post-CABG admission rate for patients across all payers. While this rate is below the national average of 13.2%, the cardiothoracic (CT) surgical team was not being notified in a timely manner when their post-CABG patients were readmitted. The Lean team used the A3 problem-solving process to develop strategies that would reduce these readmissions and improve the care of their patients.

We explored the use of electronic alerts in managing post-CABG patients by conducting a literature search using the terms electronic alerts in patient care, patient engagement in the emergency department, electronic alerts in CABG, real-time notifications to prevent readmission, and CABG readmission. Databases searched were PubMed, Google Scholar, Cumulative Index of Nursing and Allied Health Literature, ProQuest, and ScienceDirect. This search resulted in studies focused on the use of electronic health record (EHR) alerts as a clinical decision-support tool; for example, patient demographic and assessment data are entered into the EHR, and the clinician is prompted with “performance” recommendations (eg, consider electrocardiogram and aspirin).⁴ In a paper by Engelman and Benjamin,⁵ the authors discuss the importance of the engaged physician and note that, in their emergency department (ED), an electronic notification is sent when a postoperative patient presents; however, the notification goes to the inpatient service for timely review and disposition. There was no literature that discussed the use of an electronic alert tool as a real-time patient engagement strategy that resulted in a practice change specific to the CT surgical team.

Our process improvement project focused on alerting the CT surgical team when a post-CABG patient presented to the ED, allowing them to evaluate the patient in real time and determine whether the chief complaint was related to the CABG and whether further evaluation by the CT surgeon was required. Specifically, we wanted to determine whether a real-time electronic alert that notified the CT surgical team about post-op CABG patients presenting to the ED would result in timely patient engagement, avoidance of readmissions, and an enhanced patient experience. During this project, alerts were sent to the CT surgical team notifying them of a post-CABG patient presenting to the ED or being directly admitted from home on physician orders, a provider’s office, or inpatient rehabilitation; however, the focus of this article is specifically on the notification regarding post-CABG patients presenting to the ED.

Prior to implementing the electronic notification project, the team developed and implemented several internal and external readmission reduction and prevention strategies for CABG patients. An in-house strategy involved a process whereby patients would receive their discharge medications prior to being discharged from the hospital post-CABG, thereby avoiding potential delays in the patient obtaining medications. When examining post-CABG patient readmissions, the primary conditions that led to readmission were fluid overload, pleural effusion, and atrial fibrillation. As such, a second in-house strategy was developed for post-CABG patients presenting to the ED with atrial fibrillation. The newly established protocol allowed patients to be monitored and treated in the cardiac observation unit. In addition, external strategies, including an outpatient furosemide protocol for home health nurses and an outpatient thoracentesis program and order set, were established (eg, for patients with congestive heart failure, shortness of breath).

Methods

Setting

The regional medical center where this project was implemented is the ninth largest hospital in North Carolina and the largest county-owned public hospital in the state. It is a tertiary care center and teaching hospital with 3 hospital campuses and 855 licensed beds. The medical center was included in the 100 Safecare Hospitals list by the Safecare Group; received a grade “A” Hospital Safety Score from the Leapfrog Group; and is 1 of America’s Top 100 Hospitals for Patient Experience.

Real-Time Notification Project

A regional hospital alliance in southeastern North Carolina established a health information exchange (HIE) with its member hospitals and office-based physicians to enable electronic exchange of patient information to improve quality, safety, and efficiency in health care delivery. Our medical center is part of this alliance. The HIE is a digital platform that facilitates the sharing of information between disparate connected EHR systems, and offers a portal for practices and hospitals to access patient information across North Carolina, South Carolina (via SC HIE), and nationwide (select dialysis centers). More specifically, approved providers and team members are able to access, in real time, patient-care encounter documents from other care settings (eg, acute, post-acute, ambulatory) via the HIE. Additionally, approved care entities can query-retrieve web portal information to support patient outcome improvement strategies. A partnership discussion highlighted the opportunity to utilize the HIE’s capabilities, such as real-time notification, to facilitate workflow (eg, when a patient presents to the ED, the HIE can provide access to health information at the point of care). In this capacity, the alert tool notifies care team members about patient encounters to drive timely clinical engagement for care transitions.

In January 2017, we began discussions on using the HIE to facilitate real-time electronic tracking in the Cardiac Surgical Services department at our medical center. Persons involved in these discussions included the cardiovascular (CV) team (comprised of case managers, department managers and coordinators, program coordinators, administrators, and support services [eg, pre-admission testing and home health staff]) and CT surgeons. At that time, CABG readmissions were manually tracked, and the real-time notification tool was being used in other departments (eg, in case management for tracking readmissions). The entire team was part of the initial decision meeting to pursue this possibility. The CV team reached consensus in June 2017 and proposed extending the use of the alert tool to the post-CABG population presenting to the ED (or any ED affiliated with the medical center) or admitted directly to the medical center.

The HIE staff met with the Cardiac Surgical Services team to tailor and develop the logistics of the project, such as who would be notified and how. The goals of the project were to support appropriate care intervention, reduce preventable hospital readmissions, and improve quality of care through enhanced provider communication and engagement. To achieve these goals, on the day of discharge the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator provided the HIE team with the names of patients who had undergone CABG surgery. This patient list was loaded into the alert tool and continually updated. At 31 days, patient names were removed from the list. When a patient on the list presented to the hospital ED, the alert tool sent 2 real-time electronic notifications, an email and a text message, to the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator, noting that a patient event occurred. Personal information was not included in the alert in order to protect patient information and comply with Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act regulations.

The alert prompted the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator to securely access patient information to identify and, if necessary, visit the patient. Then, based on the information gathered by the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator, a Situation-Background-Assessment-Recommendation report was relayed to the CT surgeon, who then determined whether intervention by the CT surgical team was warranted. This process, on average, took approximately 30 minutes to complete. This was a key change in processes, one that allowed post-CABG patients to be seen by the CT surgical team while in the ED. If the issue was related to the CABG surgery, the CT surgeons could then determine an appropriate course of action, including admission or implementation of another protocol, such as the home furosemide protocol. For patients directly admitted, the surgeon contacted the admitting provider to discuss the level of care required (ie, observation or inpatient admission and treatment).

Biweekly CV team meetings were conducted during the implementation of the real-time notification alert tool. At each meeting, updates were provided on notifications received, patients who were missed by the notification process, and how well the real-time alerts were working to enhance care and appropriate disposition.

Measurements

Clinical performance data included total notifications, total number of ED visits, ED disposition (inpatient admission, observation, discharge), total number of direct admissions, direct admissions to observation, direct inpatient admissions, and patients missed by the notification process (eg, due to data entry errors, omissions of information [suffix of junior or senior], as well as programming bugs). Finally, the number of observation admissions converted to inpatient admissions was collected and further analyzed to inform needed process changes.

The Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator collected, entered, and maintained data using Excel. Data were obtained from the EHR, recorded in Excel, and analyzed using basic descriptive statistics in an ongoing fashion. Particular attention was focused on problems with the notification process (eg, patients being missed due to errors in data entry) and summarizing information to keep the Cardiac Surgical Services team updated on the progress of the process improvement. This project did not require staff protections or considerations, and because this was not a research study Institutional Review Board approval was not required.

Results

This practice change was implemented in September 2017 and led to improvements in care quality, as evidenced by improved physician communication and collaboration. In the 16-month period from implementation through December 2018, the names of 614 post-CABG patients were input into the HIE for tracking. Of these patients, 47 were treated and discharged from the ED; 31 were admitted for observation; and 44 were readmitted for inpatient care. The remaining 492 patients did not have a qualifying event requiring a notification alert. Clinical performance data from this period included 70 ED visits, 21 direct admissions, 19 direct admissions to observation, 5 patients missed by the notification process, and 4 observation admissions converted to inpatient admissions. A reduction in the CABG readmission rate from 10% in September 2017 to 7.2% in December 2018 was also noted.

Discussion

The aim of this process improvement project was to determine whether a real-time electronic alert that notified the CT surgical team about post-op CABG patients presenting to the ED would result in timely patient engagement, avoidance of readmissions, and an enhanced patient experience. This practice change has been successful, following 16 months of implementation and process refinement. Integrating a real-time electronic alert with a supporting action plan and care protocols resulted in timely patient engagement and avoidance of readmission of post-CABG patients.

Early notification of possible post-CABG readmissions became a standard-of-care process within the Cardiac Surgical Services department, with expansion to all CT post-op patients. Leveraging HIE technology to support quality improvement processes was also viewed by other departments as relevant and beneficial. For example, the hospital stroke and orthopedic-spine teams established their own processes for receiving real-time alerts.

There were several lessons learned during this project. First, gaining 100% physician buy-in to collaborative communication proved to be critical to the project’s success. The CV team was surprised by the length of time (approximately 8-10 months) it took for the practice change to be adopted by the physicians. In part, some of this delay in adoption resulted from medical staff turnover, primarily in the medical resident training rotations. Collaborative communication was key. The CT surgeons spoke with ED leadership and hospitalist services to explain the readmission reduction project and the use of an electronic alert tool. The CT surgeons also communicated to the ED physicians, hospitalists, and cardiologists that the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator would be involved in the process and discussions regarding patientss care. Additionally, the CT surgeons authored the furosemide protocol and then committed to its use in the home health setting, further highlighting the role of collaborative communication in avoiding readmissions.

Another key step in this quality improvement project was determining who should receive the alert notifications. At the onset of the project, all notifications were sent to 1 person, the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator. While this seemed logical in the initial stage of the project, it was unsustainable, as the receipt of the alert and the subsequent notification of the CT surgeon depended on 1 person and their availability. Approximately 10 months into the project, the notification process was further refined, with the cardiovascular intensive care unit charge nurse becoming the point of contact for the alerts. The Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator, in collaboration with nursing leaders and CT surgeons, completed a Lean Standard Work template outlining the major steps and the associated responsibilities (for the cardiovascular intensive care unit charge nurse, CT surgeon and on-call surgeon, Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator) in the process of receiving notifications, collecting patient assessment data, and reporting notifications to the CT surgeons.

Establishing adequate support mechanisms during a practice change is also important. For instance, we had to dedicate personnel time for data collection and analysis and involve additional nursing or other qualified personnel in the new process to avoid depending on a single person for the project’s success. Additional considerations were establishing criteria for surgeon notification and defining an appropriate time frame for notification (eg, urgent versus next-day notifications). We accomplished these activities approximately 10 months into the project, after it became apparent at CV team meeting discussions that further clarification of criteria and timelines was needed.

Some aspects of the project unfolded as planned, while others presented opportunities for improvement. For example, the alert notification process worked as envisioned; however, as previously mentioned, the process needed to be more inclusive to ensure there is always a charge nurse on duty to receive the alert notification, rather than just the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator, who may not always be at the hospital. The outpatient thoracentesis program was well planned and effectively implemented. This program provided an avenue for patients who had symptoms of pleural effusion to be treated in an outpatient setting, rather than requiring an inpatient stay. Opportunities for improvement included addressing the inconsistent use of the home health furosemide protocol (developed in 2016), and the need for continued interprofessional and interdepartmental communication and coordination. For example, we had to inform the ED physicians and staff who rotate or are new to the ED about established processes and protocols in place for managing post-CABG patients who present to the ED.

The primary limitation of this project was the inability to measure the enhanced patient experience, which was 1 of the stated project goals. This goal became secondary because of more pressing issues, specifically, interorganizational collaboration (eg, hospital EHR, HIE, and CT surgical team) and tailoring the functionality of the electronic alert tool to the project. Developing and implementing measures of enhanced patient experience were not feasible during this implementation. Additionally, because this was not a research study, it was not possible to determine cause and effect or to control for confounders, such as a sicker, older cohort with more comorbid conditions, during the comparison period. Finally, although this process improvement project was conducted at a regional medical center that is the only facility performing CABG within the region, patients may have presented to another facility for an event that led to a readmission. Because readmissions to other facilities could not be captured, it is possible that the actual readmission rate was higher than the rate reported here.

Conclusions and Implications

Utilizing a real-time alert from the HIE to the CT surgical team resulted in CT surgeons being immediately made aware when their patients presented to the ED, allowing the CT surgical team the opportunity to intervene, as appropriate, in the care of their patients. Furthermore, this real-time notification and intervention resulted in timely patient engagement and, in some cases, avoidance of readmissions. Currently, patients are monitored for readmission within 30 days of discharge. In the future, the time will expand to 91 days, in preparation for participation in the CMS bundle payment program for CABG surgery.

This practice change can be used in organizations that do not have or participate in a HIE. In fact, these real-time alert applications may be available through an EHR already in use within the organization. The use of the alert requires collaborative communication and having supporting protocols in place to guide decision-making and care of post-CABG patients presenting to the ED.

There appears to be a gap in the literature discussing the use of an electronic alert tool as a real-time patient engagement strategy for post-CABG patients presenting to the ED. As such, this project contributes important results and lessons learned for other hospital service lines/departments that might consider implementing a similar process. Next steps include designing and conducting methodologically rigorous research studies based on this process improvement project to examine mortality rates as an outcome, and designing a more specific measure of patient experience, as the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey only provides hospital-level data.

Corresponding author: Stephanie D. Smith, PhD, RN, UNCW School of Nursing, 601 South College Road, Wilmington, NC 28403; [email protected].

Funding disclosures: None.

From the University of North Carolina at Wilmington School of Nursing (Dr. Smith and Dr. Turrise), the New Hanover Regional Medical Center Heart Center (Mr. Jordan), the Coastal Carolinas Health Alliance and Coastal Connect Health Information Exchange (Ms. Robertson), and Coastal Thoracic Surgical Associates (Dr. Kane), Wilmington, NC.

Abstract

Objective: Cardiothoracic (CT) surgeons at our medical center were not receiving timely notification when their coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery patients were admitted to the medical center or to other hospitals. The CT surgical team worked with a health alliance in southeastern North Carolina to implement health information exchange (HIE) real-time electronic notifications for their CABG patients who presented to the hospital’s emergency department (ED) or any ED affiliated with the medical center. The alert tool notifies team members about patient encounters, driving timely clinical engagement.

Methods: The CT team provided the HIE team with the names of CABG surgery patients, which were loaded into the alert tool. When a patient on the list presented to the hospital ED or its affiliates, the alert tool sent a real-time electronic notification to the Cardiac Surgical Services nurse coordinator. This intervention prompted the assessment and disposition of CABG patients, while in the ED, by the CT surgical team.

Results: Over a 16-month period (September 2017-December 2018), the names of 614 post-CABG patients were input into the HIE for tracking. Of these patients, 47 were treated and discharged from the ED; 31 were admitted for observation; 44 were readmitted for inpatient care; and 492 did not have a qualifying event requiring a notification alert. Following implementation of this practice change, the 30-day readmission rate for patients who underwent CABG at our institution decreased from 10% to 7.2%.

Conclusion: Utilizing a real-time alert tool resulted in immediate notification of the CT team when 1 of their patients presented to the ED. This afforded the CT surgical team an opportunity to intervene in the care of their patients, which in turn led to improved quality of care, physician communication and collaboration, and patient outcomes, such as preventable 30-day readmissions.

Keywords: electronic health record; real-time electronic notification; CABG; process improvement.

Unplanned 30-day hospital readmissions of patients who have undergone coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery contribute to higher overall health care costs. CABG is 1 of the conditions/procedures that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) monitors for excess readmissions.¹ Readmission rates for CABG-related conditions at 30 days post-surgery are reported to be between 16% and 20% for US hospitals.² Readmissions are not only financially costly, but also have been associated with worse patient outcomes and decreased patient satisfaction.³ Common diagnoses for post-CABG admission include atrial fibrillation, pleural effusion, and wound infection.

The facility where this project was implemented had a 10% post-CABG admission rate for patients across all payers. While this rate is below the national average of 13.2%, the cardiothoracic (CT) surgical team was not being notified in a timely manner when their post-CABG patients were readmitted. The Lean team used the A3 problem-solving process to develop strategies that would reduce these readmissions and improve the care of their patients.

We explored the use of electronic alerts in managing post-CABG patients by conducting a literature search using the terms electronic alerts in patient care, patient engagement in the emergency department, electronic alerts in CABG, real-time notifications to prevent readmission, and CABG readmission. Databases searched were PubMed, Google Scholar, Cumulative Index of Nursing and Allied Health Literature, ProQuest, and ScienceDirect. This search resulted in studies focused on the use of electronic health record (EHR) alerts as a clinical decision-support tool; for example, patient demographic and assessment data are entered into the EHR, and the clinician is prompted with “performance” recommendations (eg, consider electrocardiogram and aspirin).⁴ In a paper by Engelman and Benjamin,⁵ the authors discuss the importance of the engaged physician and note that, in their emergency department (ED), an electronic notification is sent when a postoperative patient presents; however, the notification goes to the inpatient service for timely review and disposition. There was no literature that discussed the use of an electronic alert tool as a real-time patient engagement strategy that resulted in a practice change specific to the CT surgical team.

Our process improvement project focused on alerting the CT surgical team when a post-CABG patient presented to the ED, allowing them to evaluate the patient in real time and determine whether the chief complaint was related to the CABG and whether further evaluation by the CT surgeon was required. Specifically, we wanted to determine whether a real-time electronic alert that notified the CT surgical team about post-op CABG patients presenting to the ED would result in timely patient engagement, avoidance of readmissions, and an enhanced patient experience. During this project, alerts were sent to the CT surgical team notifying them of a post-CABG patient presenting to the ED or being directly admitted from home on physician orders, a provider’s office, or inpatient rehabilitation; however, the focus of this article is specifically on the notification regarding post-CABG patients presenting to the ED.

Prior to implementing the electronic notification project, the team developed and implemented several internal and external readmission reduction and prevention strategies for CABG patients. An in-house strategy involved a process whereby patients would receive their discharge medications prior to being discharged from the hospital post-CABG, thereby avoiding potential delays in the patient obtaining medications. When examining post-CABG patient readmissions, the primary conditions that led to readmission were fluid overload, pleural effusion, and atrial fibrillation. As such, a second in-house strategy was developed for post-CABG patients presenting to the ED with atrial fibrillation. The newly established protocol allowed patients to be monitored and treated in the cardiac observation unit. In addition, external strategies, including an outpatient furosemide protocol for home health nurses and an outpatient thoracentesis program and order set, were established (eg, for patients with congestive heart failure, shortness of breath).

Methods

Setting

The regional medical center where this project was implemented is the ninth largest hospital in North Carolina and the largest county-owned public hospital in the state. It is a tertiary care center and teaching hospital with 3 hospital campuses and 855 licensed beds. The medical center was included in the 100 Safecare Hospitals list by the Safecare Group; received a grade “A” Hospital Safety Score from the Leapfrog Group; and is 1 of America’s Top 100 Hospitals for Patient Experience.

Real-Time Notification Project

A regional hospital alliance in southeastern North Carolina established a health information exchange (HIE) with its member hospitals and office-based physicians to enable electronic exchange of patient information to improve quality, safety, and efficiency in health care delivery. Our medical center is part of this alliance. The HIE is a digital platform that facilitates the sharing of information between disparate connected EHR systems, and offers a portal for practices and hospitals to access patient information across North Carolina, South Carolina (via SC HIE), and nationwide (select dialysis centers). More specifically, approved providers and team members are able to access, in real time, patient-care encounter documents from other care settings (eg, acute, post-acute, ambulatory) via the HIE. Additionally, approved care entities can query-retrieve web portal information to support patient outcome improvement strategies. A partnership discussion highlighted the opportunity to utilize the HIE’s capabilities, such as real-time notification, to facilitate workflow (eg, when a patient presents to the ED, the HIE can provide access to health information at the point of care). In this capacity, the alert tool notifies care team members about patient encounters to drive timely clinical engagement for care transitions.

In January 2017, we began discussions on using the HIE to facilitate real-time electronic tracking in the Cardiac Surgical Services department at our medical center. Persons involved in these discussions included the cardiovascular (CV) team (comprised of case managers, department managers and coordinators, program coordinators, administrators, and support services [eg, pre-admission testing and home health staff]) and CT surgeons. At that time, CABG readmissions were manually tracked, and the real-time notification tool was being used in other departments (eg, in case management for tracking readmissions). The entire team was part of the initial decision meeting to pursue this possibility. The CV team reached consensus in June 2017 and proposed extending the use of the alert tool to the post-CABG population presenting to the ED (or any ED affiliated with the medical center) or admitted directly to the medical center.

The HIE staff met with the Cardiac Surgical Services team to tailor and develop the logistics of the project, such as who would be notified and how. The goals of the project were to support appropriate care intervention, reduce preventable hospital readmissions, and improve quality of care through enhanced provider communication and engagement. To achieve these goals, on the day of discharge the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator provided the HIE team with the names of patients who had undergone CABG surgery. This patient list was loaded into the alert tool and continually updated. At 31 days, patient names were removed from the list. When a patient on the list presented to the hospital ED, the alert tool sent 2 real-time electronic notifications, an email and a text message, to the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator, noting that a patient event occurred. Personal information was not included in the alert in order to protect patient information and comply with Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act regulations.

The alert prompted the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator to securely access patient information to identify and, if necessary, visit the patient. Then, based on the information gathered by the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator, a Situation-Background-Assessment-Recommendation report was relayed to the CT surgeon, who then determined whether intervention by the CT surgical team was warranted. This process, on average, took approximately 30 minutes to complete. This was a key change in processes, one that allowed post-CABG patients to be seen by the CT surgical team while in the ED. If the issue was related to the CABG surgery, the CT surgeons could then determine an appropriate course of action, including admission or implementation of another protocol, such as the home furosemide protocol. For patients directly admitted, the surgeon contacted the admitting provider to discuss the level of care required (ie, observation or inpatient admission and treatment).

Biweekly CV team meetings were conducted during the implementation of the real-time notification alert tool. At each meeting, updates were provided on notifications received, patients who were missed by the notification process, and how well the real-time alerts were working to enhance care and appropriate disposition.

Measurements

Clinical performance data included total notifications, total number of ED visits, ED disposition (inpatient admission, observation, discharge), total number of direct admissions, direct admissions to observation, direct inpatient admissions, and patients missed by the notification process (eg, due to data entry errors, omissions of information [suffix of junior or senior], as well as programming bugs). Finally, the number of observation admissions converted to inpatient admissions was collected and further analyzed to inform needed process changes.

The Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator collected, entered, and maintained data using Excel. Data were obtained from the EHR, recorded in Excel, and analyzed using basic descriptive statistics in an ongoing fashion. Particular attention was focused on problems with the notification process (eg, patients being missed due to errors in data entry) and summarizing information to keep the Cardiac Surgical Services team updated on the progress of the process improvement. This project did not require staff protections or considerations, and because this was not a research study Institutional Review Board approval was not required.

Results

This practice change was implemented in September 2017 and led to improvements in care quality, as evidenced by improved physician communication and collaboration. In the 16-month period from implementation through December 2018, the names of 614 post-CABG patients were input into the HIE for tracking. Of these patients, 47 were treated and discharged from the ED; 31 were admitted for observation; and 44 were readmitted for inpatient care. The remaining 492 patients did not have a qualifying event requiring a notification alert. Clinical performance data from this period included 70 ED visits, 21 direct admissions, 19 direct admissions to observation, 5 patients missed by the notification process, and 4 observation admissions converted to inpatient admissions. A reduction in the CABG readmission rate from 10% in September 2017 to 7.2% in December 2018 was also noted.

Discussion

The aim of this process improvement project was to determine whether a real-time electronic alert that notified the CT surgical team about post-op CABG patients presenting to the ED would result in timely patient engagement, avoidance of readmissions, and an enhanced patient experience. This practice change has been successful, following 16 months of implementation and process refinement. Integrating a real-time electronic alert with a supporting action plan and care protocols resulted in timely patient engagement and avoidance of readmission of post-CABG patients.

Early notification of possible post-CABG readmissions became a standard-of-care process within the Cardiac Surgical Services department, with expansion to all CT post-op patients. Leveraging HIE technology to support quality improvement processes was also viewed by other departments as relevant and beneficial. For example, the hospital stroke and orthopedic-spine teams established their own processes for receiving real-time alerts.

There were several lessons learned during this project. First, gaining 100% physician buy-in to collaborative communication proved to be critical to the project’s success. The CV team was surprised by the length of time (approximately 8-10 months) it took for the practice change to be adopted by the physicians. In part, some of this delay in adoption resulted from medical staff turnover, primarily in the medical resident training rotations. Collaborative communication was key. The CT surgeons spoke with ED leadership and hospitalist services to explain the readmission reduction project and the use of an electronic alert tool. The CT surgeons also communicated to the ED physicians, hospitalists, and cardiologists that the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator would be involved in the process and discussions regarding patientss care. Additionally, the CT surgeons authored the furosemide protocol and then committed to its use in the home health setting, further highlighting the role of collaborative communication in avoiding readmissions.

Another key step in this quality improvement project was determining who should receive the alert notifications. At the onset of the project, all notifications were sent to 1 person, the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator. While this seemed logical in the initial stage of the project, it was unsustainable, as the receipt of the alert and the subsequent notification of the CT surgeon depended on 1 person and their availability. Approximately 10 months into the project, the notification process was further refined, with the cardiovascular intensive care unit charge nurse becoming the point of contact for the alerts. The Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator, in collaboration with nursing leaders and CT surgeons, completed a Lean Standard Work template outlining the major steps and the associated responsibilities (for the cardiovascular intensive care unit charge nurse, CT surgeon and on-call surgeon, Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator) in the process of receiving notifications, collecting patient assessment data, and reporting notifications to the CT surgeons.

Establishing adequate support mechanisms during a practice change is also important. For instance, we had to dedicate personnel time for data collection and analysis and involve additional nursing or other qualified personnel in the new process to avoid depending on a single person for the project’s success. Additional considerations were establishing criteria for surgeon notification and defining an appropriate time frame for notification (eg, urgent versus next-day notifications). We accomplished these activities approximately 10 months into the project, after it became apparent at CV team meeting discussions that further clarification of criteria and timelines was needed.

Some aspects of the project unfolded as planned, while others presented opportunities for improvement. For example, the alert notification process worked as envisioned; however, as previously mentioned, the process needed to be more inclusive to ensure there is always a charge nurse on duty to receive the alert notification, rather than just the Cardiac Surgical Services coordinator, who may not always be at the hospital. The outpatient thoracentesis program was well planned and effectively implemented. This program provided an avenue for patients who had symptoms of pleural effusion to be treated in an outpatient setting, rather than requiring an inpatient stay. Opportunities for improvement included addressing the inconsistent use of the home health furosemide protocol (developed in 2016), and the need for continued interprofessional and interdepartmental communication and coordination. For example, we had to inform the ED physicians and staff who rotate or are new to the ED about established processes and protocols in place for managing post-CABG patients who present to the ED.

The primary limitation of this project was the inability to measure the enhanced patient experience, which was 1 of the stated project goals. This goal became secondary because of more pressing issues, specifically, interorganizational collaboration (eg, hospital EHR, HIE, and CT surgical team) and tailoring the functionality of the electronic alert tool to the project. Developing and implementing measures of enhanced patient experience were not feasible during this implementation. Additionally, because this was not a research study, it was not possible to determine cause and effect or to control for confounders, such as a sicker, older cohort with more comorbid conditions, during the comparison period. Finally, although this process improvement project was conducted at a regional medical center that is the only facility performing CABG within the region, patients may have presented to another facility for an event that led to a readmission. Because readmissions to other facilities could not be captured, it is possible that the actual readmission rate was higher than the rate reported here.

Conclusions and Implications

Utilizing a real-time alert from the HIE to the CT surgical team resulted in CT surgeons being immediately made aware when their patients presented to the ED, allowing the CT surgical team the opportunity to intervene, as appropriate, in the care of their patients. Furthermore, this real-time notification and intervention resulted in timely patient engagement and, in some cases, avoidance of readmissions. Currently, patients are monitored for readmission within 30 days of discharge. In the future, the time will expand to 91 days, in preparation for participation in the CMS bundle payment program for CABG surgery.

This practice change can be used in organizations that do not have or participate in a HIE. In fact, these real-time alert applications may be available through an EHR already in use within the organization. The use of the alert requires collaborative communication and having supporting protocols in place to guide decision-making and care of post-CABG patients presenting to the ED.

There appears to be a gap in the literature discussing the use of an electronic alert tool as a real-time patient engagement strategy for post-CABG patients presenting to the ED. As such, this project contributes important results and lessons learned for other hospital service lines/departments that might consider implementing a similar process. Next steps include designing and conducting methodologically rigorous research studies based on this process improvement project to examine mortality rates as an outcome, and designing a more specific measure of patient experience, as the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey only provides hospital-level data.

Corresponding author: Stephanie D. Smith, PhD, RN, UNCW School of Nursing, 601 South College Road, Wilmington, NC 28403; [email protected].

Funding disclosures: None.